

**Ethnicized citizenship as illegitimate citizenship.
The Case of Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India**

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Abstract

This thesis tackles the commonly overlooked issue of ethnic groups that have suffered a delegitimization of their citizenship. They are not considered as the ideal citizens of a nation-state because they do not conform ethnically to the definition of the nation.

Citizenship emerges with the formation of the nation-state in a modern world system characterized by a still operating coloniality. The legitimacy of this global colonial idea of nation-state was based on the cultural concept of a nation; an illusion of a homogenous shared past, customs and language where differences were suppressed. This is the common pattern of nation-state formation and the rise of the idea of a legitimate citizen.

Illegitimate citizenship is another way of naming a colonial citizenship inserted in a Eurocentric patriarchal/white and Christian-centered world-system. Citizenship is a concept referring to individuals, however, and when it is racialized or ethnicized, the individuality of the person is taken away. The racialized citizen, the illegitimate citizen is always described as part of a group; the "immigrants", the "Muslims", the "indigenous", the "northeastern Indians". They are never described as an autonomous individual subject. This individuality is reserved for white European or European-descendant people and has been coined as "white privilege".

This research describes how illegitimate citizenship empirically operates in a very similar way in two ethnic groups within two different countries that have in common a colonial subordinated position in the world system. Therefore, Mapuches in Chile and Northeastern Indians suffer a double colonization in two different scales; one regarding the position of Chile and India in the world-system and one regarding their own position within the nation-state.

Keywords: ethnic groups, citizenship, coloniality, nation-state

Zusammenfassung

Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit dem oft vernachlässigten Problem ethnischer Gruppen, die eine Delegitimierung ihrer Staatsbürgerschaft erfahren haben. Sie gelten nicht als „richtige“ Staatsbürger eines Nationalstaates, da sie nicht der ethnischen Definition der Nation entsprechen.

Staatsbürgerschaft entsteht im Zuge der Bildung von Nationalstaaten in einem modernen Weltsystem, das nach wie vor kolonial geprägt ist. Die Legitimität dieser globalen kolonialen Idee des Nationalstaates basierte auf dem kulturellen Konzept einer Nation; der Illusion einer homogenen gemeinsamen Vergangenheit, gemeinsamer Gebräuche und einer gemeinsamen Sprache, in der Unterschiede unterdrückt werden. Auf diesem Modell basiert die Idee eines legitimen Bürgers.

Illegitime Staatsbürgerschaft ist eine andere Art und Weise, eine koloniale Staatsbürgerschaft zu benennen, die in ein eurozentrisches, patriarchalisch/weiß und christlich zentriertes Weltsystem eingebettet ist. Staatsbürgerschaft ist ein Konzept, das sich auf Individuen bezieht. Durch Rassialisierung und Ethnisierung wird dem Mensch seine Individualität genommen. Der rassifizierte - illegitime Bürger wird stets als Teil einer Gruppe beschrieben; die "Einwanderer", die "Muslime", die "Indigenen", die "Inder des Nordostens". Sie werden nie als autonomes individuelles Subjekt beschrieben. Diese Individualität ist den weißen europäischen oder europäischen Nachkommen vorbehalten und wird als "weißes Privileg" bezeichnet.

Diese Dissertation beschreibt, wie ähnlich die illegitime Staatsbürgerschaft in zwei unterschiedlichen Ländern empirisch operiert, die beide eine koloniale, untergeordnete Position im Weltsystem einnehmen. Die untersuchten Gruppen – die Mapuche in Chile und die Menschen im Nordosten

Indiens – leiden unter einer doppelten Kolonialisierung. Zum einen aufgrund der Position von Chile und Indien im Weltsystem, zum anderen bezüglich der geringen Wertschätzung innerhalb des Nationalstaates.

Schlagwörter: ethnische Gruppen, Staatsbürgerschaft, Kolonialität, Nationalstaat

Acknowledgments

“-Blumenfeld: Don’t you have any love for your own people? (...)”

-Arendt: Ohh Kurt! You know me, I have never loved any people, so why should I love a folk in particular?

I love my friends... this is the only love I am able to feel...” (Excerpt from the movie Hannah Arendt)

This dissertation is dedicated to all the people who suffer injustice because of their belonging to a particular nation or ethnic group; those who suffer discriminations and even sometimes atrocities for belonging to the “wrong” nation, ethnicity, culture or citizenship. At the time of concluding my dissertation, the number of refugees arriving to Europe has increased enormously and many nationalist reactions have arisen. As a critical person and researcher who stands against nationalist and racist manifestations, I would especially like to dedicate this thesis to the refugees suffering discrimination and racism, in addition to the pain they carry within them.

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Introduction

Citizenship as a concept is ambiguous and the debate on its meaning is rather broad. While for some the term refers to a purely legal status given by nationality or country of belonging, for others it connotes a form of identity.

In social sciences citizenship has been conceived either as legal, political and social entitlements that citizens bear (Marshall, 1992 [1950]); as a set of institutionally embedded practices (Somers, 1993; Turner, 1993) or as a form of identity (Isin and Wood 1999; Oommen, 1997). However, merging all various definitions, citizenship can be described as “*a modern form of membership in a political and geographical space*” (Marshall, 1992 (1950); Sommers, 2006; Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2008). Therefore, the concept of citizenship expresses legal and symbolic belonging to a nation-state. This seems a simple definition but it becomes more complex if we consider the historical context in which the concept of citizenship emerges.

Citizenship in its modern form developed hand in hand with the genesis of the nation-state. This can be traced back to the late eighteenth century idea of a nation-state; looking to the examples of the French and the US revolutions. A modern nation-state was defined as an independent state, with a written constitution and ruled in the name of *a nation of equal citizens* (Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010). The principles of legitimacy, thus, changed from the king (or any representative of God) to the representation of *a nation of equal citizens* (Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010).

However, these concepts of citizenship and nation-state are Eurocentric and based in a singular way of building a nation-state. Coloniality is still a constitutive part of the modern world system and it is not only a legal-administrative structure from the past (Adlbi Sibai, 2016; Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel, 2007; Dussel, 2000; Mignolo, 2007).

In this colonial conception of nation-state, the idea of *nation* is the essence on which modern states are built and the base of their legitimacy. The relationship between *nation* and modern states seems evident and is usually not questioned in our daily lives. We often use the terms nation, state and country interchangeably. And sometimes we even consider citizenship as a synonym for all of them.

If we want to understand the concept of citizenship and its relationship with legitimacy, it is necessary to understand the process of nation-state-building. Within this process, all modern nations-states had to produce imaginations of unity and define or redefine borders and nations legitimated in supposedly old traditions and cultural homogeneities (Bourdieu, 1998; Nassehi, 2010). During the nation- state building process, citizenship was used as a political instrument to provide the imagination of organized inclusion of people into society (Nassehi, 2010). Therefore, citizenship operated as a mechanism that produces an imagination of unity and homogeneity within a nation-state. Nevertheless, only some collectivities were made visible, reducing others to secondary ones or rendering their history as invisible (Bourdieu, 1998) as in the case of some ethnic groups or minorities.

Most analyses on citizenship ignore the historical formation of concepts. A concept is a sign and, like every sign, is formed by a signified attached to a signifier. Laclau (2000) argues that this process of creation of signs is historically determined. A signified is arbitrarily inscribed in a certain signifier; however, it is historically influenced. Therefore, the study of every concept should involve an analysis of the historical conditions of its formation. Considering the historical formation of concepts – as a genealogy- elucidates that the construction of *peoplehood* such as *nations* within the nation-state is an arbitrary process influenced by historical conditions (Wallerstein, 1991).

Even the most quoted concept of citizenship proposed by T.H Marshall (1992 (1950)) does not discuss the historical formation of the nation and its implications for the nation-state. Furthermore, only few citizenship studies analyze the issue from a comparative and non-Eurocentric perspective (see Isin, 2012; Isin and Turner, 2008; Benhabib, 2001; 2002, Yuval-Davis 1997). This limited historical and comparative reflection leads to a blind spot: they do not clearly reveal the political imposition that entails the construction of a nation within the nation-state.

A nation is supposed to have a common past, shared customs and language and therefore, a nation can make claims in the present, justified in the past. In many cases, the state preceded the formation of the nation and not the other way around as nationalistic discourses assume (Wallerstein, 1991). Within a geographical space a state was formed and afterwards a *nation* was established as a cultural group with common identity. In many cases, the state performed a process of *nation* building homogenizing language and customs, especially through the educational system (Bourdieu, 1998).

People integrating the nation as a homogenous cultural group are considered *legitimate citizens*. Legitimacy is not the same as legality, even though they are related. Legitimacy embodies the social acceptance of something or someone, as Max Weber (2002 (1992) posits. In this case, legitimacy expresses the acceptance that the representatives of a nation of *equal citizens* execute power, and not a monarch. However, these *equal citizens* are not everyone inside the nation-state but the ones considered legitimately belonging to the cultural nation. Thus, a distinction between two kinds of citizens emerged: the legitimate and the illegitimate ones. This distinction underwent a long process of homogenization, where a hegemonic culture emerged. During this process, other cultural groups with different customs and languages were degraded as secondary and constituted as minorities or ethnic groups. They were considered to be citizens of the country but not the legitimate or the “real” ones.

This problematic dimension of citizenship is not always taken into consideration in studies on citizenship or in social sciences in general. Ethnic groups are analyzed in their specific problems: land conflicts, their recognition as a different group and the lack of opportunities or violence against them. However, their cultural illegitimation is hardly studied as an inherent part of the nation-state building process or as a problematic within citizenship.

Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke and Tambini (2002) argue that the Nation-State is an institution that succeeds in giving shared collective identity to particularistic identities of traditional communities. They define 3 types of codes for boundary construction: primordial, traditional and universalist. Boundary definition according to primordial codes means that people are classified according to ascriptive characteristics as gender, generation, kinship, etc. Another type of delimiting boundaries follows traditional codes; they are mostly based on a historical and cultural shared experience. A third type of defining boundaries is based on universalist codes. This mode of constructing collective identity

operates by relating the collectivity to a sacred creation, which in the case of citizenship can be the idea of the Republic and the Nation-State. Through a political-constitutional way, people participate in collective will formation, and this political constitutional way can also be treated as sacred.

Therefore, in this research I tackle this commonly overlooked issue of ethnic groups that have suffered a delegitimization of their citizenship. They are not considered the “true” citizens of a nation-state because they do not conform ethnically to the definition of *the nation*, to the boundary construction of this collectivity called Nation-State. In order to describe this devalued citizenship, I first developed the concept of “*illegitimate citizenship*” and afterwards I observed how this concept empirically operates in two different ethnic groups: Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India.

Illegitimate citizenship is another way of naming a colonial citizenship inserted in a capitalist/patriarchal/white Eurocentric and Christian centered world-system. Citizenship is a concept referring to individuals but when it is racialized or ethnicized, the individuality of the subjects is taken away. The racialized citizen, the illegitimate citizen is always described as a part of a group; the “immigrants”, the “arabs”, the “muslims”, the “indigenous”, the “northeastern Indians” but they are never described as an autonomous individual subject. This individuality is reserved for the white European or European descendant people. The failures of a white person are attributed to an individual error; they hold the privilege of being individuals; the “white privilege” (Roediger, 2010). On the other hand, the colonial subjects’ failures, the illegitimate citizens’ errors are attributed to the culture, the nation, the race, the ethnicity, but never to the individual as an autonomous person. Illegitimate citizens are always prisoners of their ethnicity and race in a way that people who enjoys the white privilege are not. The white privilege operates as an invisible dispositive; the ethnicity and race of the privileged ones is never mentioned or acknowledged. Thus, operates as not existing and this fact brings the freedom of individuality. The achievements and failures of privileged ones are seen as individual accomplishments, while only the achievements of racialized or ethnicized citizens are seen as individual merit, even as an exceptional individual merit. Their failures are attributed to their group belonging.

Mapuches in Chile and Northeastern Indians are interesting examples of illegitimate citizenship. The two groups are legally part of the nation-state but face strong tensions with the respective national legitimate and hegemonic culture. In addition, they have fewer opportunities than the rest of the citizens. In Northeast India and in the Araucanía region of Chile (where Mapuche live), there are fewer opportunities than in other parts of the country, given that both are less developed regions.

“Northeastern” Indians is the name given to the population that live in the Northeast part of India. This region is constituted by eight states and has around 39 million inhabitants in a country of 1,210 million people (Ministry of Home Affairs, Census 2011). Many Northeasterners face racist devaluations as their features denote Tai, Tibeto-Burman, and Mon- Khmer lineages that are better known as “mongoloid features”. From the year 2000 onwards migration from this region to the so called “mainland” or “mainstream” part of India quickly increased, especially to big cities like Delhi. The empirical part of this dissertation was conducted with Northeasterners that settled in Delhi.

On the other hand, Mapuches are the biggest indigenous group in Chile, they count around 1,5 million people in a country of 16 million (National Statistics Institute, Census 2012). Being Mapuche in Chile is a problematic identity as they are an indigenous group that has been facing devaluations since colonial times and many have rejected their own identity. Historically, Mapuche have concentrated in three

southern regions of Chile (Región de la Araucanía, Región de los Lagos y Región de los Ríos). From 1950 onwards many migrated to big cities and today one third lives in the metropolitan region around Santiago de Chile, the capital of the country. The data collection for this study was conducted in Santiago de Chile with Mapuche people that either migrate or were born there.

I chose to do a comparative study with the strong conviction that comparing in an international perspective allows for a better understanding of the specificities and generalities of particular phenomenon. As Piketty (2015) argues, history is always country specific but in order to notice these specificities, we need a general analysis of the commonalities. In the same line of thought, Isin and Turner (2008) argue that investigating citizenship inevitably involves the comparative study of different states.

In order to make a comparison, similarities and differences are relevant. This research focuses on similarities in the configuration of citizenship within two different nation-states and it considers differences as important specificities that allow a better framing of citizenship in a particular context.

The criteria for choosing these two countries as case studies were based both on similarities and differences. In terms of similarities, Chile and India are both peripheral and colonial countries; they belong to the so-called Global South. In both countries, there are ethnic groups that have been constituted as illegitimate citizens since the formation of the respective nation states. Moreover, we can find many inequalities in both countries: Chile is a very unequal country with a Gini coefficient of 0.52 (World Bank, 2015), while India has extreme social exclusions, being the caste system only one of them (Heller, 2009).

Despite the fact that the dynamic of nation-state formation is very similar in most countries, Chile and India are very different. Their history, geographical location and culture (religion, customs, and values) are dissimilar. Chile is a small Latin-American country with approximately 16 million inhabitants, sharing common traits with the rest of Latin-America but also with its own particularities. India is one of the biggest and most diverse countries in the world, with 1.2 billion inhabitants, and very different culture and traditions.

This dissertation aims to show how ethnitized minorities are constituted as legal but *illegitimate citizens*, whose belonging to the nation-State is regularly questioned. In order to do that two empirical cases will be analyzed and compared: Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India.

This research observes how illegitimate citizenship operates in the case of Mapuches in Chile and Northeastern Indians. By doing so, I will show that the mechanisms that produce and reproduce the illegitimacy of the citizenship of both ethnic groups are mostly the same – even though context is very different. In both countries these mechanisms can, for the most part, be distinguished as three. The first mechanism is the belief in a homogenous culture within the nation-state, which constitutes an Indian and a Chilean legitimate identity. The second is the racist classificatory devaluations of ethnic groups. The third mechanism is the invisibilization of the history of both ethnic groups, resulting in a general lack of knowledge about Mapuches in Chile and Northeastern Indians.

Consequently, I argue that illegitimate citizenship is specifically an ethnicized citizenship that affects ethnic groups as indigenous or tribal people, and probably also ethnicized migrants. Their ethnic habitus is less valued and they have had historically less access to capital and resources, which affects the opportunities they have as a group to participate in different spheres of society (job market,

education, health, politics, etc). illegitimate citizenship is an inequality that operates in tandem with other inequalities such as gender, social class, caste, and religion.

Conversely, this delegitimation of citizenship is a specific kind of inequality that questions the belonging to the nation state, affecting the recognition of people and devaluating their dignity as citizens in a specific form.

The concept of illegitimate citizenship is different than the concept of “second class citizenship” (Sassen, 2005). Second class citizenship aims to highlight that not all citizens have equal opportunities, while the concept of illegitimate citizenship wants to stress that ethnicized people suffer discrimination based on their different culture, which is different to the legitimate culture or identity of a specific Nation-State.

The illegitimacy of citizenship I am proposing in this dissertation is based on a historical-cultural dimension of boundary construction that constituted the modern nation-states. This analysis of citizenship seeks to explain how historical experiences have shaped ideas of a culturally “legitimate” membership in a nation-state. These historical experiences took place during the construction of nation-states within a colonial world-system.

Structure of the dissertation

In order to explore the relationship of citizenship and inequalities and to show how ethnic groups have been constructed as illegitimate citizens within a nation state, this dissertation is divided in two parts. The first part constitutes the theoretical framework and the second part an empirical analysis.

The first part is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 describes the constitution of People in a still colonial world-system. The chapter starts by defining the concept of world-system, coloniality and the decolonial turn in social sciences. The decolonial turn denounce how colonial structures and technologies of power are still present in knowledge in the world-system. Coloniality is a constitutive part of the modern world system and not just a secondary problem (Adlbi Sibai, 2016; Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel, 2007; Dussel, 2000; Mignolo, 2007). Therefore, illegitimate citizenship is another way of naming a colonial citizenship.

In order to develop more the idea of citizenship inserted in a still colonial world-system, in the second section of chapter 1 the concept of racism is deeply analyzed. It presents the perspective of Balibar (1991) on racism beyond race and of Anja Weiss (2010) on racism as symbolic capital. In section 3 of chapter 1, the idea from Wallerstein (1991) on the construction of people in the world-system is analyzed in order to relate it with illegitimate citizenship as an ethnicized citizenship. He relates the operation of the world-economy with the constitution of people such as races, nations and ethnic groups. For Wallerstein (1991), the construction of peoplehood resolves one of the most basic contradictions of historical capitalism; its simultaneous aim for theoretical equality and practical inequality. Wallertsein (1991) argue that there is no substantial difference whether we define pastness in terms of genetically continuous groups (races), historical socio-political groups (nations) or cultural groups (ethnic groups). They are all peoplehood constructs, all inventions of past, and therefore, all contemporary political phenomena. To this constellation of three different peoplehood constructs, I added a fourth one; the concept of citizenship, a construction of people that encloses race, nation and ethnicity within a nation-state under the promise of equality.

Section 4 of chapter 1 explains the drawing of boundaries in the formation of ethnicity, nation, state and citizenship. Here the concepts of ethnicity, ethnicization and ethnification are defined as well as the concept of nation-state, nation and state. Ethnification is a marginalization of certain collectivities through the process of cultural homogenization (Oommen, 1997), while ethnicization is a special case of *identification* (Eder et al, 2002). The particularity of ethnicization consists in its reference to a past which is seen as the source of a good social order in the present, therefore ethnicity is the force of the past existing currently in social life. Nation refers to a cultural group with common identity and language that lives in a determined territory, while the state is a legal institution that provides protection to its citizens, also in a determined territory (Oommen 1997). Territory is common to the nation and to the state, however, the former is an identity entity while the latter is a legal one. If the state and the nation coincide, there is a nation-state. Most of the states today are multicultural, poly-ethnic, or a combination of both, even though they all operate as a nation-state based in enacting one of the national or ethnic particularities as the main one.

Chapter 1 finally describes the relationship between illegitimate citizenship and boundary definition. The boundary construction in relation to **primordial** codes constitutes a hierarchy of subjects according to their racial and ethnic features. This primary hierarchy is reinforced by a **traditional** one (traditional codes) and the idea that some cultures are more adequate than others and fit better to the concept of **nation** a specific State requires. The third boundary based on universalism, operates by relating the collectivity to a sacred creation, which can be the Nation-State with a constitutional-political expression. This third collective boundary is affected by the primordial and traditional boundary construction. Thus, the sacred secular nation-states or republics and its constitutional enlightened universal laws, are based in racist and cultural supremacist foundations, which are still present in the current world-system. Consequently, illegitimate citizenship is not an exception but a constitutive part of the formation of modern nation-states. Illegitimate citizens are needed in order to create a nation-state and maintain the world-system order.

Chapter 2 explores the complex relationship between citizenship and inequality in order to define and explain the concept of illegitimate citizenship as a specific form of inequality within citizenship. This chapter offers an overview of the different concepts of citizenship such as the one proposed by T. H Marshall (1992 [1950]), Nassehi, 2010; Bloemraad et al, 2008; Sommers, 2008; Bauboeck, 1994; 2001; 2005; 2008; 2014 und 2015; Soysal, 1996). Marshall argues that the concept of citizenship brings a minimum of equality in the form of basic rights. However, he recognizes that afterwards any inequality becomes legitimate. Therefore, this chapter explains why this dissertation rejects conceptualizing citizenship as a principle of equality. Conceiving citizenship as a principle of equality helps justifying inequalities by hiding their real causes. In section 3 inequality is conceived beyond class system. There exist different kinds of inequalities and not only the social-class-based inequality as intersectionality stated (Crenshaw, 1991; Phoenix, 2006). There are inequalities based on gender, age, religion, nationality, region and caste, among many others. Afterwards, this chapter discusses the Bourdieuan perspective of Rehbein and Souza (2014 a) on inequality as a dignity problem. Inequality is understood by these authors as the unequal valuation attributed to activities and habitus traits of groups and individuals. Chapter 2 concludes by defining illegitimate citizenship as a specific inequality which is constructed during the formation of nation-states through a process of ethnification that devaluates certain groups. Consequently, illegitimate citizenship is specifically an ethnicized citizenship that affects ethnic groups as indigenous people but also ethnicized migrants. Their ethnic habitus is less

valued, they had historically less access to capital and resources and that also affects the opportunities they have to participate in society.

Chapter 3 starts by analyzing the formation of the nation-state from the perspective of Pierre Bourdieu (1998). It describes the state as the institution that bears the monopoly of symbolic violence and explains how the state historically concentrated symbolic capital and still bases its legitimacy on it until today. The chapter also draws attention on the homogenization attained during the formation of Nation-State. Chapter 3 ends with an analysis of legitimacy and group formation through symbolic power.

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 can be read as independent chapters, as both contain their own introduction and conclusion and analyze different cases. However, they can also be read as a comparison since their structures and titles are almost identical. Both chapters start with a contextualization and definition of the respective ethnic group. Afterwards an historical perspective is offered, in order to historically situate the case of analysis. These first two steps allow a better understanding of the mechanism that produce and reproduce the illegitimacy of citizenship of Northeasterners in India and Mapuches in Chile. In the following, both chapters describe the ways of resistance and end with a brief conclusion.

Chapter 4 provides an empirical analysis of the illegitimate citizenship of Northeast Indians. It illustrates the few development opportunities that the region offers in comparison with other parts of India, together with the multiple conflicts and tensions that it faces. The main conflict is the tension with the army due to the famous Armed Forces Special Power Acts (AFSPA), which grants the military special powers to act against insurgency in some states in the region. Northeast India is a very diverse area. Its eight states comprise different ethnic groups with different religions, some of them incorporating the caste system (some Hindu and Muslims) and others not. Tribal populations have been categorized by the state since the times of British colonization, and since independence they have been called *Scheduled Tribes*. The chapter presents a historical perspective in order to understand the political and social – and not only geographical – peripherality of Northeast India. Knowing the history of these states and their inclusion in the State of India is fundamental in order to comprehend the particularity of this region and the main differences among the states. This chapter provides an analysis of the mechanisms that produce and reproduce the illegitimacy of citizenship in the case of Northeasterners. In India there is a belief in a homogenous Hindu culture, which is enacted as the legitimate Indian identity. Northeasterners face tensions with this homogenous hegemonic identity and this provokes racist classificatory devaluations against them. Northeasterners experience everyday devaluations in public places. Almost all the interviewees declare having faced many small episodes of overt devaluations such as comments on the street or bad words and other manifestations of rejection in public places. All these devaluations are potentiated by the lack of knowledge about Northeast India. This lack of knowledge is enforced by the invisibilization of its history in the education system. The teaching of an “official” history that either ignores or treats Northeasterners as figures of the past without agency, is a powerful use of knowledge that invisibilizes them. Chapter 4 finally describes the ways Northeasterners find for resistance and ends with a brief conclusion.

Chapter 5 presents an empirical analysis of the illegitimate citizenship of Mapuches in Chile. Mapuches are the indigenous group most affected by poverty and low educational attainments in Chile. However, it is the indigenous group who has experienced the strongest new appreciation of its culture in the last 15 years. This chapter describes the progressive dispossession of land, power and dignity that the

Mapuche people have suffered in Chile from the colonization until today. Knowing about the historical dispossession is crucial to understand the current situation of Mapuches and their ethnification process. Then, Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the mechanisms that produce and reproduce the illegitimacy of citizenship for the Mapuches, using the same dimensions of analysis as in Chapter 4 for the case of Northeasterners in India. In Chile, there is also a belief in a homogenous Chilean legitimate culture that imitates European culture. Mapuche culture faces tensions with this hegemonic homogenous identity, which provokes racist classificatory devaluations against them, as in the case of Northeasterners in India. Mapuches suffer racist devaluations because of their skin color or surnames, though not as violently and overtly as in the case of Northeastern Indians. In the case of Mapuches, episodes of overt devaluations, such as comments on the street and other manifestations of rejection in public places, remain an exception. The racist classificatory devaluations against Mapuches are boosted by a lack of knowledge, which is perpetuated through the invisibilization of their own Mapuche history in the education system and the criminalization of their struggles by mass media. As in the case of India, in Chile the teaching of an “official” history is a powerful tool of invisibilization or criminalization of Mapuches. The hegemonic history either ignores the Mapuche perspective or treats them like figures of the past without agency, or as terrorists. Chapter 5 finally recounts the ways in which Mapuches resist this devaluation and ends with a brief conclusion.

The dissertation ends with final conclusions presenting the main results of the study. As the two empirical chapters constitute units in themselves, the conclusion compares the main findings of the two case studies.

Methodology

This dissertation follows a sociological perspective. The main methodological approach has been the *configurational* analysis, which means that empirical data has been studied as a configuration, where every new insight and concept alters the whole picture. This perspective proposes that social configurations or relations should be studied in a precise place and time, because complete theoretical explanations of the phenomena are impossible. Every attempt to know social reality gives a point of view – even contradictory sometimes – that will help to understand the phenomenon (Rehbein, 2007 and 2015; Nederveen Pieterse, 2001). For that reason, the construction of the object of study - and not only the field work - needs to be done empirically in order to situate it in its own social configuration.

For this research two field visits were conducted in both Chile and India. During the first visit to the field, the object of study (citizenship) was contextually defined. During the second field visit, more detailed data regarding the relationship between citizenship and inequality in the two ethnic groups chosen was collected. The main forms of data collection were interviews, focus groups and the review of historical material. A more exhaustive description on the methodology can be found in the methodological appendix. The appendix presents the justification for the use of comparisons and for the election of the countries studied, together with a detailed description of the first and second field visits and the description of the technique of analysis.

First Fieldwork

During the first fieldwork in Chile in 2010, I conducted a total of 17 interviews, with scholars studying citizenship, members of the government from a department related with the promotion of democratic

participation (DOS Division de Organizaciones Sociales, *Social organizations department*), social activists and NGO members. I included interviews with social activists; members of NGOs and members of the government following a recommendation from experts, who argue in those years, that one of the main concerns about citizenship in Chile has been the lack of civil participation in democracy¹.

During the first fieldwork in India in 2011, I conducted a total of 9 interviews with scholars. In the case of India, activists were not directly concerned with the definition of citizenship I wanted to address with the questionnaire. When talking about citizenship, the focus lied in the social justice dimension of citizenship and less in the question of participation as it was the case in Chile. Therefore, social activists and members from NGOs were not interviewed during this first fieldwork in India. This initial difference in the definition of citizenship in Chile and India was one of the first findings that led to a change in the focus of the research.

After the initial set of field visits, I realized that citizenship was related to different concepts in the different countries and determined by the particular history of the nation-state building. The historical events that every country faces determine a certain type of democracy and a different way of conceiving citizenship (Taylor, 2007). Therefore, it became evident that the abstract concept I had operationalized for citizenship was not enough to explain the way citizenship operates in every country configuration. This fact changed the focus of the research from citizenship to the problematic of nation-state building and the formation of ethnic groups on it. The creation of nation-states is not something “natural” or necessary. The way in which these nation-states were formed has consequences on social processes and institutions in the country, especially regarding citizenship. The nationalist and homogenizing discourses in every country not only define who is and who is not a citizen, but also who is and who is not a *legitimate citizen*.

The process of defining who is a citizen and who is a *legitimate* (“true”) citizen is still mixed with the idea of nation, and nation is a foundational concept of nation-state. However, there is a conflation between both concepts. This conflation between nation and state potentiates the monolithic image of a country as a homogenous nation-state. Differences have always existed but have been suppressed by this homogenizing discourse (Wagner, 2008; Rehbein, 2007; Eder et al, 2002)

Therefore, after the initial field visits I decided to focus my research on the legitimacy of citizenship that emerges during the nation-state formation, where many groups were left behind and ethnicized. Consequently, I decided to center the empirical study on one ethnic group in each country, whose citizenship is questioned as illegitimate. Both the Mapuches in Chile and Northeast Indians are interesting examples of illegitimate citizenship, as both are legally part of the nation state but face strong tensions with the national hegemonic culture.

Second Fieldwork

During the second fieldwork in Chile I conducted 7 interviews and 1 focus group with Mapuche people that live mostly in Santiago de Chile. The migration experience of the interviewees (or from their parents) is an important factor that I considered when selecting them in order to compare their

¹ After the important student movement in Chile in 2011, the perspectives on civil participation in democracy have changed. Before that movement, researchers were mostly worried about the lack of engagement of civil population in democracy.

experiences with the case of Northeastern Indians, who migrated from the Northeast to Delhi. The idea was to introduce the variable of migration to the “center” in the country.

37% of the people who declare themselves Mapuches in Chile live in Santiago. These people are mostly the offspring of Mapuches who migrated during the 1950s to Santiago in quest of better opportunities. Some of my interviewees were born in Santiago but others migrate from the Araucania region with their parents when they were children or later to pursue higher education. It is no longer possible to classify Mapuches as either urban or rural. Many people study or work in urban areas but they are still connected to their rural communities. This is a new phenomenon that has been described in recent studies about Mapuches in Chile (Bengoa, 2002; Bengoa and Caniguan, 2011; Alvarez and Imilán, 2008).

All Mapuches I interviewed belong to the socioeconomic group that can be labeled as **lower middle class** and have a good educational level.² Accordingly, my interviewees are a relatively privileged group inside the Mapuche population, as they are very well educated and **lower middle class**. Mapuches in Chile present a worse socioeconomic index than the rest of the population in terms of poverty, extreme poverty, housing and education (National Statistics Institute, 2005).

I interviewed Mapuches from relatively good economic and educational backgrounds for two main reasons. First, because the new appreciation of Mapuche culture has been especially strong between young educated Mapuches, who also get more politically involved and want to engage in the recognition of Mapuches as a valid but different actor. This recognition of the Mapuche culture includes also the validation of their worldview or spirituality, as spirituality for them is not separated from other ideas about the world. Second, to be able to compare them with the Northeasterners that migrate to Delhi, who are mainly educated and with a good economic situation. This decision was taken during the research, because the focus is to observe the tension between these ethnic group and the nation-state. In both countries the hegemony of the nation-state is strongly practised and observed in the capital cities: Santiago de Chile and Delhi.

More detailed information about the definition of income groups in Chile and India and the classification of my interviewees are described in the Methodological Appendix of this dissertation.

During the second fieldwork in India I conducted 11 interviews and 1 focus group with people coming from the Northeast of India that live in Delhi and 1 Interview with a Northeastern Indian that is doing a PhD in Germany. All my interviewees and Focus group participants live in Delhi and migrated either to study or work and only 2 of them grew up in Delhi. Consequently, most of them have migration experience. Migration from Northeast is different than the usual patterns of migration in India of rural poor to urban centers. Compared to the migrants from other parts of India, the migrants from North East that migrate to big cities have better economic and educational situation (Remesh, 2012, Appendix Tables 3 & 4; 6). Accordingly, all my Northeastern Indians interviewees have good economic and educational backgrounds. They belong to the three groups with better incomes in India, which are only 20% of the Indian population.

In India the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) conducts income surveys and created the database Market Information Survey of Households (MISH) that classify the income groups

² For more details, see the methodological appendix.

of people in 5: Deprived, Aspirers, Seekers, Strivers and Globals (McKinsey Global Institute, 2007)³. The three upper groups are Globals, Strivers and Seekers. Even though my interviewees belong to three higher income groups, they do not belong to the elite nor are millionaires and they should be better classified as upper middle class. In the upper group of Globals - that constitutes 0,3% of the Indian population- there is a strong difference inside the group between the income of people like my interviewees and Indian millionaires and billionaires⁴.

This dissertation was designed to include a third case of study: the case of people with Turkish migration background in Germany. The purpose was to have a case of migrants whose citizenship was delegitimized and also to study this phenomenon in a “Northern” country. However, the specificities and differences that the case of migration has regarding the native ethnic groups are so large that the comparison would need another analysis and study on its own. Even though the case of people with Turkish migration background in Germany was not analyzed in this dissertation, it was considered as the third case of empirical study for a long time during this research. This fact influenced the analysis and has the advantage that the conceptual framework and analysis can be used to certain extent to analyze the case of ethnicized migrants. Parallel to the other two cases of study, interviews with people with migration background in Germany were conducted and the analysis of these interviews also contributed to the development of the concept of illegitimate citizenship. Furthermore, citizenship in contemporary world cannot be understood without referring to migration; migration challenges citizenship and obliges to redefine the boundaries of the concept. Therefore, for the definition of illegitimate citizenship, migration was theoretically and empirically considered, even though the analysis of people with Turkish migration background in Germany could not be completed nor included in this work.

³ This was the most complete and clear data that could be found available online regarding Indian income groups. Is not the newest data and therefore it is a limitation for the research, even though the estimations for 2015 built by Mckinsey (2007) coincide with estimations done in 2012 with survey data from 2009/2010 by Meyer and Birdsall (2012).

⁴ In many data income, wealth or inheritance is not included. A brief discussion on this topic is in the methodological appendix

Part I: Theoretical Framework

Chapter 1: The Constitution of People in a still colonial world-system: the formation of illegitimate citizenship

Section 1: Situating the concepts in a still colonial World-System

Illegitimate citizenship is a citizenship inserted in a capitalist/patriarchal/white/military Eurocentric and christiancentric world-system. In order to understand how the illegitimacy of citizenship is related to the colonial power in the world system, it is necessary to describe the political, theoretical and methodological decolonial framework. This theoretical framework is based in what has been called **the decolonial turn** (Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel, 2007). This decolonial turn posits that we haven't overcome colonialism yet, even when colonial administration has ended and Nation-States have been formed in the "former colonies" too. This approach is based on the assumption that hierarchies formed during centuries of European colonial expansion have not significantly changed with the end of colonialism and the formation of the nation-states. The international division of labour between center and periphery as well as the ethnic-racial hierarchy (white/dark) between the world populations still remains. It has been just a transition from a modern colonialism to a global one. Therefore, the power relations have changed more in appearance than in structure. The relations of domination center-periphery continue in a world scale. The new institutions of global capital, as the FMI and World Bank as well as military organizations as OTAN, still establish a hierarchy where certain regions of the world are maintained in a subordinated relation. The end of the Cold War finished with the modern colonialism and marked the beginning of the process of global colonialism (Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel, 2007). This approach goes beyond the concept of "capitalist world-system" coined by Wallerstein (1991) and refers to the current world-system as "European/euroamerican capitalist/modern patriarchal/ colonial world-system" (Grosfoguel, 2005). This concept refers to the international global, intrinsically colonial, imperialist, patriarchal and racist system that institutionalized the systemic extraction and transference of material, epistemic, spiritual and human resources from two third parts of the world to a minoritarian privileged third part of humanity (Esteva and Prakash, 1997). This minoritarian third part of humanity benefits from this scheme of extraction and transference.

This system is related to semantic spheres, to a net of significants, to images and discourses that generate this system itself, legitimate it and bring sense to it. At the same time these discourses are product of the system and are generated and legitimated by it. This discourses started from the unquestionable superiority of everything considered "Western" and work through binary and antithetic concepts as identity/alterity, normality/anormality, development/underdevelopment, western/others. These concepts are at the base of a series of hierarchies: being them global, linguistic, cultural, ethno-racial, economic, epistemic, sexual and human. These concepts are interconnected with each other and articulated around the global capitalist market economy, the concept of race and the gender-sex system (Adlbi Sibai, 2016)

These binary discourses create instruments to observe reality that become a way of reality construction and control. These discourses delimitate the field of possibilities of plural and heterogeneous enunciation. Therefore, this is a power technology that controls subjectivities and intersubjectivities very effectively in a global level. This dispositive justifies itself as being "rational",

this way violence against the colonized subjects is justified in truth and power. They are considered to be less-humans. This power technology is extremely powerful as it invisibilizes the racist character of these justifications as well as the interests of the colonial elites who sustain them (Adlbi Sibai, 2016)

1) The concept of power in the decolonial turn

Adlbi Sibai and other latinamerican decolonial thinkers use a concept of power called heterarchy (Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel, 2007). This concept is the opposite to the concept of hierarchy and posits the existence of different chains of power that operates in different levels of generality. This concept was coined by the greek sociologist Kyriakos Kontopoulos (2006), who argues that the theories of Foucault, Bourdieu and Touraine are heterarchic.

Coloniality, from this point of view, consists in multiple and diverse power apparatuses that work in different levels and are interconnected between them. This means there is no *a priori* superstructures that determine infrastructures or the other way around. There exist relations of mutual determination that vary in relation to each socio-political or concrete historical context.

This approach overcomes Marxist and structuralist theories, which hinder the conception of the subject and its possibility of agency. Therefore, it highlights a type of marginal spaces not determined by different structures of power and makes clear the existence of macrocolonialities that imbricate with microcolonialities. Macrocolonialities are colonialities or power structures in a macropolitical level. For example, in a global systemic level they are constituted by the international relations regime, while in a mesopolitical level, they are expressed at a State level. Microcolonialities, on the other hand, are the construction of subjectivities. Therefore, decoloniality operates simultaneously in different levels. It is not possible to conceive a revolution in a macro level if the subjects have microcolonial dispositives that configured different aspects of their lives; as their language, way of living, desiring, identifying and observing reality (Adlbi Sibai, 2016). Thus, coloniality is not considered as a consequence of the system but as intrinsic to it (Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel, 2007).

Hence, coloniality is a power apparatus, which describes how global hierarchies in labour market, epistemology, linguistic, ethnicity/race, sexuality and culture are interwoven and articulated around the global capitalist market (Quijano, 2007)

Walter Mignolo (2007) distinguishes coloniality in three interrelated forms: coloniality of power, coloniality of being and coloniality of knowledge. Coloniality of power refers to the interrelation between modern forms of exploitation and domination. Coloniality of knowledge is related to the role of epistemology and knowledge production in the reproduction of colonial regimes of thought or as “Epistemological-existencial jail” as Adlbi Sibai (2016) named it. Coloniality of being refers to the colonization experienced by the individuals and its impact in language. Therefore, coloniality is present in all the spheres of our life, from macropolitical to everyday practices (Adlbi Sibai, 2016).

2) Decolonization: A point of inflection and not only a legal-political Independence

Coloniality is different than colonialism because it transcends history. Colonialism is a political, economic and administrative relation where the sovereignty of one people resides in another people or nation; fact that constitutes a specific nation in an empire. Coloniality is the power apparatus

generated in the colonial period, which shapes the manner in which work, knowledge, authority and intersubjective relations are articulated with each other through the world capitalist market and the race and sex-gender system (Maldonado, 2007; Lugones, 2008; Adlbi Sibai, 2016).

Therefore, decolonization does not simply lie in a legal-political independence of a State from a colonial empire. Decolonization encompasses a wide range of power relations that intersect global knowledge, political economy, political-military state relations, spirituality, gender relations and sexuality. To conceive coloniality as a constitutive fact of the modern world system constitutes a point of inflection in a theoretical, political, methodological and epistemological level (Adlbi Sibai, 2016). So far coloniality has been the hidden face of modernity, even though it is constitutive of modernity.

Dussel (2000) describes modernity in a different way. He considers that the lineal understanding of modernity is Eurocentric. This perspective shows modernity as starting in Grece and Rome and ending in the XVIII century with the European modernity. For Dussel, this vision of modernity is false and he called it "the myth of modernity". He posits that the first modernity was the discovery of America in 1492. Without this colonization, this other second and Eurocentric modernity would not have been possible. The modernity of the enlightenment positioned Europe at the center of the world. But this position would not have been possible without the invasion and genocide of indigenous in America and the better technological and scientific developments of the Arab world and other cultures, like the Chinese for example⁵.

Dussel (2000) identifies the romantic Germans from the end of the XVIII century as the creators of the *Myth of Modernity*, whose main exponent was Hegel, when he described the space and time of this modernity, followed later by Habermas (2007). From this historical perspective, the main events are the Reform, the Enlightenment and the French revolution. They are considered key moments of construction of modern subjectivity, reason and humanism. This narrative follows a delimited space and time sequency; Italy during the XV Century; Germany during the XVI-XVIII century; France during the XVIII century and England during the XIX century. Dussel (2000) conceptualizes this approach to modernity as Eurocentric, provincial and regional. Modernity here is described as an intraeuropean phenomenon. This narrative invisibilizes the colonial processes and the contribution of other civilizations to the construction of western civilization. Against the Myth of Modernity, Dussel (2000) proposes a second definition of modernity intimately connected to the decisively fundamental positioning of Europe at the center of world history. The main point that Dussel wants to highlight is that the narrative of the enlightenment Modernity, this second modernity, was only possible when positioning Europe at the center of the world. Positioning that started in 1492 with the invasion of the American continent.

Consequently, the coloniality of knowledge has been based during the last 500 years on technologies of power that translate the local concrete western epistemology and cosmovision to a universal, abstract, neutral and objective position. This perspective of history hides the position of enunciation, relegating all the others epistemologies as partial, concrete, particular and unable to reach universality. Meanwhile the *western man* places its knowledge as the only one able to achieve a universal consciousness. The western men situate itself in a *point zero*. This strategy is crucial to western global designs (Dussel, 2000). When the place of enunciation is hidden, it is possible to expand

⁵ For more see Dussel, 2005; Rehbein, 2007; Hobson 2013; Abu-Lughod, 1989.

western colonial domination and constitute a hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge, thus, forming superior and inferior people within a world system.

Mignolo (2007) distinguishes a difference in the techniques used in the colonization of the East, widely described by Edward Said (2008), and in the techniques used in the case of Latin-America. He affirms that while in the East they used the technique of exotization or “extreme othering”, Latin-America was integrated as a part of the western world, denying this way its cultural and civilizational specificity. However, this thesis has been questioned by some authors. Hernández Castillo (2008) affirms that indigenous population was integrated in different ways in the project of modernity during the building of Latin-American Nation States. Most of the mechanisms to integrate indigenous population were either integrationist or assimilationist, constituting them either way as subaltern. Adlbi Sibai (2016) considers that there was a type of “orientalism” or exotization and extreme differentiation with the indigenous people. Those were precisely the techniques used to build the national identities of modern societies, which were trying to constitute themselves in clear opposition to the “barbarians” outside of Europe.

Conceiving coloniality as a constitutive part of the modern world system and not as the hidden face of modernity anymore constitutes a point of inflection in a theoretical, political, methodological and epistemological level (Adlbi Sibai, 2016). This point of inflection is at the base of this dissertation and constitutes the framework where the concept of illegitimate citizenship is understood.

3) The formation of colonial subjects: ethnicized citizenship as illegitimate citizenship

Illegitimate citizenship is another way of naming a colonial citizenship or a citizenship inserted in this capitalist/patriarchal/white/military Eurocentric and Christian centered world-system. Citizenship is a concept referring to individuals but when it is racialized or ethnicized, the individuality of the subjects is taken away. The racialized citizen, the illegitimate citizen is always described as a part of a group; the “immigrants”, the “Arabs”, the “Muslims”, the “indigenous”, the “northeastern Indians” and never described as an autonomous individual subject. This individuality is reserved for the white people. The failures of a white European or European descendant person are attributed to an individual error; they possess the privilege of being individual citizens. This has been conceptualized as the “white privilege” (Roediger, 2010). On the other hand, the colonial subjects’ failures, the illegitimate citizens’ errors are attributed to the culture, the nation, the race, the ethnicity, but never to the individual as an autonomous citizen. Illegitimate citizens are always prisoners of their ethnicity and race in a way that people who enjoys the white privilege are not. The white privilege operates as an invisible dispositive; the ethnicity and race of the privileged ones is never mentioned or acknowledged. Thus, operates as not existing and this fact brings the freedom of individuality. The achievements and failures of privileged ones are seen as individual accomplishments.

However, it is important to mention that white privilege does not always works the same way. This privilege has to be first situated in the world hierarchy. It is important to situate these “white privileged individuals” in order to analyze them correctly and identify other oppressions or privileges they might experience. To which nation-state do they belong to? Are they upper class? Are we talking about women? At this point it is also important to understand some country and cultural specificities; for example, the existence of a cultural-country specific privilege. In some countries, belonging to some

specific region, religious or ethnic group bring some privileges but they are context specific and has to be included in the analysis to fully understand the social classifications.

In order to better understand the concept of illegitimate citizenship as an ethnitized or racialized citizenship, first, it is necessary to examine the concept of racism (2). To afterwards connect it with Wallenstein's concept on the construction of people in the world-system: race, nation and ethnicity (3). To finally end analyzing the complex process of drawing boundaries in the formation of ethnicity, nation, state and citizenship (4).

Section 2: Racism

1) Balibar: Racism goes beyond race

For Balibar (1991) the concept of racism has changed. It continues being a concept of denial of rights and devaluation; however, the justifications today are not only biological but cultural and historical as well.

Balibar (1991) coined the concept "neo-racism"

*"The new racism is a racism of the era of "decolonization", of the reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises and the division of humanity within a single political space "racism without races" which is already developed in other countries particularly in Anglo Saxons ones. It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but "only" the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions; in short, it is what P.A Taguieff⁶ has rightly called a **differentialist racism**"⁷ (Balibar, 1991: 21)*

Balibar posits that general displacement of the problem has been taking place

"We now move from the theory of races or the struggle between the races in human history, whether based on biological or psychological principles to a theory of 'race relations' within society, which naturalizes not racial belonging but racist conduct" (Balibar, 1991: 22).

Balibar (1991) argues that differentialist racism⁸ is a meta-racism or a "second-position" racism, which presents itself as having learnt the lessons from the past conflicts between racism and anti-racism. For Balibar (1991), differentialist racism tries to avoid only that "abstract" and more explicit form of racism. However, differentialist racism posits that the "tolerance thresholds" must be respected; that it is necessary to maintain "cultural distances" or, in other words, segregate collectivities through the frontiers of the national state. These abstract theories of racism argue that the behavior of individuals

⁶ See Taguieff, 2001.

⁷The highlighted words belong to the original text

⁸ See Taguieff, 2001.

cannot be explained in terms of blood or even genes, but that they are the result of their belonging to historical “cultures”.

Therefore, biological or genetic naturalism is not the only way of naturalizing human and social behavior. Culture can also function like a nature, bonding individuals and groups a priori into a lineage. On the other hand, it is not difficult to see that, in neo-racist doctrines, the suppression of the hierarchy is more apparent than real. Indeed, the hierarchy is reconstructed in the application of the doctrine and in the criteria applied in thinking the difference between cultures (Balibar, 1991).

Balibar (1991) argues that the idea of “racism without race” is not as revolutionary as one might imagine. A racism that does not have the pseudo-biological concept of race as its main driving force has always existed, and it has existed at exactly this level of secondary theoretical elaborations. Its prototype is for example anti-Semitism, even though there were some offenses related to supposedly body features (Balibar, 1991). The same dynamic of racism without race is reproduced today with the emergence of an “Arabophobia” or more precisely “Islamophobia”, especially in Europe and the US. This Arabophobia carries with it an image of Islam as a “conception of the world” which is incompatible with Europeaness and an enterprise of universal ideological domination.

Balibar (1991) poses very clearly that there is a specifically French version of the doctrines of racist and cultural supremacy. He is describing the French case, but this idea could be also applied to other European countries.

Balibar argues that the “French ideology”:

“Lies rather in the idea that the culture of the “land of the Rights of Man” has been entrusted with a universal mission to educate the human race. There corresponds to this mission (to educate human race) a practice of assimilating dominated populations and a consequent need to differentiate and rank individuals or groups in terms of their greater or lesser aptitude for - or resistance to assimilation. It was this simultaneously subtle and crushing form of exclusion/inclusion which was deployed in the process of colonization and the strictly French (or “democratic”) variant of the “White man's burden”” (Balibar, 1991; 24)

This idea is present in the whole European world or what has been called the West or the North-Atlantic countries. These countries feel they have the mission to educate and “save” the rest of the human race, because these “others” are not able to do it by themselves. This idea is clearly shared by all the decolonial authors mentioned at the beginning of the chapter.

2) Weiss: Racism as symbolic capital

Anja Weiss (2010) develops a model of racist classifications, which is embedded in the multidimensional theory of social inequality proposed by Pierre Bourdieu. She argues that research on social inequality tends to focus on class and class has mostly been understood in terms of economic positions; whereas theories of race have focused on studying race as an ideology and/or as a cultural matter. She argues that there is no separation between structural and ideological racism as it has been described. Racist contents are culturally produced but they only gain societal relevance through their embedding into social and structural relations of inequality (Weiss, 2010).

Many Marxist perspectives are unidimensional. Class takes precedence, therefore ethnic and racial conflicts are frequently seen only as consequence of class conflict. However, from these unidimensional perspectives it is not possible to analyze accurately certain phenomenon as the white working class racism, for example. As Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992; 92) posit it *"It is increasingly seen as inadequate to understand other social divisions, like sex or race, as epiphenomena of class"* They are independent phenomena, though they are intimately related. Consequently, Weiss (2010) considers racism as a dimension of social inequality in its own right and not as a subordinated category of class struggles *"Race constitutes at the same time a symbolic ascription and an objective social reality"* (Weiss, 2010: 38).

Anja Weiss (2010; 2001) argues that in order to overcome the divide between structural and ideological racism, Pierre Bourdieu's theory provides a good theoretical framework. In his theory of symbolic power (1989) he develops a model on how dichotomous classifications can become structurally relevant. Weiss (2010) uses this model to analyze racism even though Bourdieu does not concentrate on this topic and considers the concept of ethnic groups as a euphemism⁹.

For Weiss (2001; 2010) racism is not about identity but about a structural type of domination based on *symbolic classifications, diverging practices and institutional orders*, which attribute unequal and lesser rights to a constructed group based in one specific characteristic that makes its otherness visible. This specific characteristic can refer to a biological one or other kind of stable differences as language, religion or culture, as the concept of neo-racism proposed by Balibar (1991). For Weiss (2010) and other scholars studying racism (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Hund, 2010; Balibar, 1991) racism can be racially constructed or not; it can be based in biological arguments or in skin color as it can also be based in other social markers as religion, culture or language. Therefore, there is racism (racially constructed or not) when a group is created as a less valuable other, based in one specific characteristic. As Anja Weiss defined it:

"We should talk of racism when a long-term and stable marker pretends to make alleged otherness visible and is impacting on social classifications, practice and institutions in a manner that attributes lesser rights to collectives of that category, irrespective of whether this marker refers to biological or other kinds of stable differences" (Weiss, 2010: 50)

The hypothesis from Anja Weiss (2010) is that some actors are marked through arbitrary criteria as people of lesser rights. Consequently, their right to participate in many markets, systems or arenas is contested. The fact that racism entails lesser rights relate it immediately with the concept of citizenship, especially if it questions the symbolical belonging of certain groups to the nation-state based either in biological, linguistic, religious or cultural differences.

Actors marked as others are frequently asked to prove why they should be accepted as equals. This experience of being frequently compelled to prove why they should be accepted has been conceptualized as everyday racism by Philomena Essed (1991). It consists in everyday small but

⁹ As a left weberian, he interprets racism in the frame of group's formation processes and he uses it to explain the construct of "intelligence", especially regarding school performance but does not study the phenomenon of racism in itself (Bourdieu, 1993; Weiss, 2010).

repetitive experiences that persons who suffer discrimination live. Its recurrence configured them as a structural experience and cannot be atomized in small and anecdotic experiences¹⁰.

This experience of everyday subtle but powerful discrimination is very similar to the one described for the masculine domination (Bourdieu, 2001). The individuals threatened by exclusion find that they need to act strategically in order to be accepted as equals, and they will subtly adapt their practices to their challenged position. Members of the privileged groups, on the other hand, act normally as entitled to an interaction of equals, because their position is not at stake. In order for classifications to affect practices, doubt about the right to be included as equals is sufficient to influence a practice. For example, an employer will feel some skepticism towards applicants who might have visa problems. A landlord may anticipate problems with “normal” tenants if she lets an apartment to “foreigners”, etc. (Weiss, 2010). Of course all these practices are also influenced by social class, gender, ethnic group and the country the person in question comes from. Therefore, in analyzing racism other categories have to be taken in to consideration as well. Once the threat of exclusion or delegitimation is generalized, it translates into divergent action strategies and finally into symbolic power. Symbolic power is the power of constructing the world, establishing certain classifications and organizing the perception of the world (Bourdieu, 1989). Consequently, delegitimation becomes independent from individual situations and racist classifications develop into an objective structuring of society in the same way Bourdieu described it for masculine domination (Weiss, 2010).

For Weiss (2010) using Bourdieu’s theoretical framework to grasp racism, has several advantages. First, it shows why racism consists of prejudice (“classifications” in Bourdieu’s words), group formation processes (“practices”) and of discourse and institutions (which are formed by symbolic power). Secondly, it allows understanding the stability of racism as a form of symbolic domination. Therefore, it can be integrated into an analysis of social structure. Thirdly, the concept of symbolic power shows that racism is more stable when it is not challenged. In societies where racism is racially constructed, symbolic struggles appear when race relations are either challenged or enforced, but they do not tackle the hidden assumptions underlying racial inequality. Focusing only on more open and evident expressions of racism as Nazism or Apartheid, leaves structural racism aside. Thus, criticizing people as racist is also misleading because as a structural process we have all internalized this discriminatory and hierarchical way of thinking. It has become a hegemonic and legitimate way of thinking, as it happens with patriarchal and colonial thinking.

Anti-racism will fail if it remains on the level of discourse and excludes criticism of institutional discrimination. An antiracist strategy only at a discursive level can restrict the expression of a social problem but does not bring a solution to both the institutional and the discursive level. The privileged group of people might claim to be open-minded and friendly when they in fact profit from institutional closure but they do not realize it. As in the example that Bourdieu presents on a factory owner interacting with his secretary; his friendliness has to be interpreted in a context of a clearly unequal power relation. Weiss (2001, 2010), shows how highly educated and privileged people are not less racist than the less educated and lower classes if we observe racism in an institutional way and not

¹⁰ It is very frequent when asking people about their racist discriminatory experiences they answer that it is a general feeling of being challenged and compelled to prove why they are worthy. However, when hearing or reading the experiences of discriminations they seem very small or without importance for the ones who have not experienced themselves, especially when narrated separately. They make sense all together as a structural experience of everyday life. See Essed (1991).

only in its more overt forms. The institutional implications are so big that even people engaged in anti-racism reproduce racist structures without noticing it. In its purest form symbolic power remains unchallenged and self-evident and it becomes noticeable only in case of symbolic struggles. Therefore, analyzing struggles or other societies and cultures help observing hidden structures; for that comparison between countries is a great tool.

Following and extending Bourdieu's lead, Anja Weiss proposes that the stable "symbolic power" present in racism be treated as a specific type of symbolic capital.

*"Racist symbolic capital is an asymmetrically distributed resource with considerable influence on the life chances of its owners. Physical features such as light skin and an "angelic face" have turned into **symbolic goods** signifying equal standing. Institutions such as passports, border controls, labour market restrictions, educational certificates, or the laws regulating professions serve to distinguish between equals and others. Note that **racist symbolic capital translates into economic and cultural capital**, but it is not identical to it. Educated blacks may earn a middle class income, wear a doctor's outfit and insignia, but still be addressed as cleaning women as a result of their visible features"* (Weiss, 2010:47)

In racialized societies, individuals cannot escape the racial status attributed to them. However, there exist other social markers that are not as visible as physical features. This is the case for religion, language, ethnicity or nationality, which start operating only in the moment they become visible. For instance, religion becomes visible only with the use of symbols or clothes such as veils or turbans. Therefore, it is wide-spread for people to strategically hide their racial status (based in some social religious, ethnic, national or language marker), as it was the case for some Jewish people in Europe, some Polish migrants¹¹ in Germany, or some mixed indigenous people in Chile. Some mixed indigenous people in Chile, who cannot be recognized by its features as indigenous, tried to hide their surnames. However, when the social markers are an important part of their identity, people do not hide them. In this case, they rather stand the consequences and might even create strategies of resistance. This case will be analyzed in chapter 4 on illegitimate citizenship in Chile.

Racist symbolic capital is a collective resource as well as social capital and as such can be utilized by individuals as representatives of a group. Racist symbolic capital also shares characteristics with cultural capital as it is also acquired through prolonged processes of socialization and the collective effort of numerous generations. However, in contrast to cultural capital, the emphasis in the reproduction of racist symbolic capital is on the classificatory efforts of the dominant class and not so much on the acceptance of a dominant culture by the dominated group. Racist domination leave to the dominated group little space for transformative action because they can adapt or rebel, but either way they will suit racial stereotyping (Weiss, 2010).

Bourdieu's concept of class is specific as he considers class as an objective position in social space even if people do not see themselves as a class for itself. The same way, Anja Weiss (2010) conceptualizes racist symbolic capital as one among several axes structuring social space and contributing to class formation even when members of society do not see themselves as stratified along racist lines. In

¹¹ Interviews made for another project (Rehbein et al, 2015) evidenced that polish migrants after the second world war tried to hide their polish identity in order to avoid being discriminated, as their features are very similar to Germans they could hide it, especially by learning good German without foreign accent.

Germany for example, racist discriminations are hardly directed against racially constructed others but it is subtler and culturally connoted. In this case, discrimination is racist but not racial. Antisemitism for example has been detached from the term race and attempted to be legitimized in a culturalistic and nationalistic manner. Descendants of Turkish migrants are racist discriminated but not racialized. Many cases of anti-Islamic violence overlap racialized and cultural-religious causes.

Weiss (2010) posits that by analyzing the historic continuity and contingency of racial classifications it is possible to show that things could have turned out differently. This also happens when analyzing the genealogy of every phenomenon as Foucault (1972) postulates. However, the important fact to know is under which conditions some classifications succeeded and others no. Knowing how people is and has been constructed in the world-system is very important in order to understand world classifications.

Section 3: The construction of people in the world-system: race, nation and ethnicity

Wallerstein (1991) argues that the construction of peoplehood is a very complicated and even bizarre phenomenon *“one (phenomenon) whose central features is the reality of inconstancy and the denial of this reality”* (Wallerstein, 1991: 77). Therefore, he proposes that the answer *“to such a curious social process”* is in the analysis of the historical system (Wallerstein, 1991: 77). All the discussions and inaccuracies regarding the construction of people or peoplehood are mainly due to the fact that this construction has changing boundaries, but no one is supposed or allowed to point out this inconstancy.

Wallerstein (1991) proposes to distinguish three main historical modes of construction of the “people”: **race, nation and ethnicity**. They are related to different structures of the world-economy, stressing the historical break between the bourgeois state and earlier forms of the state. Race was historically a genetic category, which had a visible physical form - even though today it can also be based in culture as Balibar and others authors argue (Balibar, 1991; Weiss, 2001 and 2010; Hund, 2010; Essed, 1991). Nation is a sociopolitical category linked to the actual or potential boundaries of a state. On the other hand, ethnic group is a cultural category, of which there are supposed to be certain continuing behaviors that are passed on from one generation to the other. Moreover, ethnic groups are not necessarily linked to state boundaries.

Wallerstein (1991) argues that the terms race, nation and ethnicity are used to indicate a persistent phenomenon that offers a basis for making present day political claims. A “people” is said to be or to act as it does because of its genetic characteristics (race), its sociopolitical history (nation), or its “traditional” norms and values (ethnic group). These constructions of people enable to make claims based upon the past against the manipulable and rational present. Therefore, these categories are used to explain why things are the way they are and should not or cannot be changed. As an alternative, these constructions of people may also be used to explain why present structures should indeed be outdated in the name of new social realities. For this reason, history and the way it is narrated is fundamental either for the legitimation of present structures that come from the past or for opening up in the present possibilities of changing certain structures and hierarchies.

Therefore, the temporal dimension of past and history are central and inherent in the concept of peoplehood. Wallerstein (1991) argues that past is a mode by which persons are persuaded to act in the present in ways they might not otherwise act. Past is tradition and is a central element in the socialization of individuals, in the maintenance of group solidarity and in the establishment or challenge to social legitimation. Pastness in the form of history or tradition is embedded in the habitus of individual through socialization by family and school.

“Pastness therefore is preeminently a moral phenomenon, therefore a political phenomenon, always a contemporary phenomenon. That is why it is so inconstant. Since the real world is constantly changing, what is relevant to contemporary politics is necessarily constantly changing. Ergo, the content of pastness constantly changes. Since, however, pastness is by definition an assertion of the constant past, no one can ever admit that any particular past has ever changed or could possibly change. The past is normally considered to be inscribed in stone and irreversible. The real past, to be sure, is indeed inscribed in stone. The social past, how we understand this real past, on the other hand, is inscribed at best in soft clay” (Wallerstein, 1991: 78)

Therefore, the way we interpret tradition and history changes constantly. However, assuming this would challenge the legitimacy of current structures based in the authority of history and tradition. Wallerstein (1991) affirms that it makes little difference whether we define pastness in terms of genetically continuous groups (races), historical socio-political groups (nations) or cultural groups (ethnic groups). They are all peoplehood constructs, all inventions of pastness, and all contemporary political phenomena. However, I add to this constellation of three different peoplehood constructs a fourth one; the concept of citizenship, a construction of people that encloses race, nation and ethnicity within a nation-state under the promise of equality.

Wallerstein (1991) argues that there is a reason for the separation of one logical category - people construction- into three (four) social categories. Each of the three terms is related to one of the basic structural features of the capitalist world-economy.

1) The Construction of Race

The concept of race is related to the axial division of labor in the world-economy that has generated a spatial division of labor. Core and periphery are relational concepts that have to do with differential cost structures of production. Secondly, the concept of nation is related to the political superstructure of this historical system, that is, to the sovereign states that form and derive from the interstate system. The third concept of ethnic group is related to the creation of household structures that allow the preservation of low-waged labor in the accumulation of capital. Citizenship as the fourth peoplehood construction, ensures that people belong (culturally and legal) to a nation state and with this mechanism their movements around the world-system are controlled.

Wallerstein argues (1991) that the division of labor within the world economy has created a spatial division of labor and the formation of a core-periphery antinomy, related with different cost structures of production. Consequently, there are political elements maintaining a set of core-periphery relationships. The products obtained from primary production cross political frontiers. This control of frontier transit is one of the greatest real powers the state actually exercises. On the other hand, the concentration of core processes in some places tends to create differing internal political structures in

each, a difference that sustain this unequal interstate system that maintains the world division of labor. All these processes occurred during the expansion of Europe and the racial division of people mainly between white and non-white, which is related with the position that countries occupied in this world hierarchy.

As a result, race and racism are the consequence of the geographical concentrations associated with the world division of labor. This point has been also analyzed by decolonial thinkers, who established a fluent dialogue and intellectual exchange with Wallerstein. They describe and analyze this process of world division of labor, formation of core-periphery and constitution of colonial subject based on racist hierarchies (Dussel, 2000; Grosfoguel, 2005; Quijano, 2007; Mignolo, 2007)¹².

2) The Construction of Nation

On the other hand, the constitution of nation derives from the political structuring of the world-system. The current states are all creations of the modern world-system. Most of them did not even exist more than a century or two ago.

“A systematic look at the history of the modern world will show, I believe, that in almost every case, statehood preceded nationhood, and not the other way around, despite a widespread myth to the contrary” (Wallerstein, 1990;81)

Once recognized as sovereign, the states frequently found themselves threatened by both internal disintegration and external aggression. Therefore, “national” sentiments were developed in order to have lesser threats. The government in power was interested in promoting this nationalist sentiment. Any group, using the state’s legal power to advance its interest against groups outside the state or in any sub region of the state, was interested in promoting nationalist sentiments as a legitimization of its claims. States wanted administrative uniformity in order to increase the efficacy of their policies *“Nationalism is the expression, the promoter and the consequence of such state-level uniformities”* (Wallerstein, 1991; 82).

Furthermore, Wallerstein (1991) argues that there is another even more important reason for the rise of nationalism. The interstate system is not a mere grouping of sovereign states. It is a hierarchical system with an order that is stable but changeable. Slow shifts in rank order are historically normal the same way that inequalities are significant but not immutable. Therefore, following this historical process, ideologies are able to justify high rank but also to challenge low rank. Such ideologies are nationalisms. If a state is not constituted as a nation, it would be outside the game of either resisting or promoting the alteration of its rank; therefore, that state would not be part of the interstate system. Some political entities existed before the development of the interstate system as the political superstructure of a capitalist world-economy. However, these political entities did not need to be “nations” at that time and they were constructed as nations-states only later (Wallerstein, 1991; 82). Wallerstein (1991) considers misleading that we use the word “state” and “nation” as exchangeable terms to describe both: these other political entities that existed before the historical period of a capitalist world-economy and the states created within the interstate system. As a result, the

¹² Decolonial thinking was described at the beginning of this chapter.

inevitable relationship between the statehood of these latter “states” and their nationhood is most of the time ignored or confused as the same.

For Wallerstein, racial categorization emerges as a mode of expressing and sustaining the core-periphery antinomy, while national categorization arose originally as a mode of expressing the competition between states in the global hierarchical world – system. In an over simplified formula Wallerstein argues that *“both categories (nation and race) are claims to the right to possess advantages in the capitalist world-economy”* (Wallerstein 1991; 82). This relation between racially less valued people (fact that coincides with former colonies) and economic disadvantages of these parts of the world has also been conceptualized as current colonialism. From the decolonial approach, the international division of labour between center and periphery as well as this ethnic-racial hierarchy in the world population, formed during the European colonial expansion haven’t significantly changed with the end of colonialism and the formation of the nation-states. These decolonial authors (Dussel, 2000; Grosfoguel, 2004 and 2005; Quijano, 2007; Mignolo, 2007) argue it is more a transition from a modern colonialism to a global colonialism. However, power relations and structures still operate as Foucaultian dispositives in economy, politics and subjectivity.

3) The Construction of Ethnic groups

Wallerstein (1991) also describes the category ethnic groups as the third type of construction of peoplehood. He argues that ethnic group is the new name given to minorities. He posits that in the case of ethnicity, the location of this social power is inside the different states and not the world-system as a whole. The concept “ethnic group” is as related to state boundaries, as is the concept nation and citizenship, although this fact is never included in the definition. Most of the times a state tends to have one main nation and many ethnic groups. This aspect has been deeply developed by the Marxist concept of internal colonialism. From a Marxist perspective domination becomes imperialism when it operates interstate; class domination when it is one class oppressing other one and internal colonialism when one ethnic or cultural group oppresses others. Hind (1984) describes how the concept of internal colonialism was not as popular as imperialism and class struggle. The nation is related to a majority, not numerically but regarding to power, while ethnic groups have been constituted as minorities within the nation-state. That is also what happens nowadays with the phenomenon of migration where certain groups of migrants, especially the ones coming from peripheral countries, are ethnicized (Grosfoguel, 2004)

Wallerstein argues that there has been an ethnicization of occupational categories. Along with an occupational hierarchy comes the “ethnicization” of the work force within a given state’s boundaries.

“Even without a comprehensive legal framework to enforce this, as in South Africa (...) or the United States yesterday, there has been a very high correlation everywhere between ethnicity and occupation” (Wallerstein, 1991; 83).

The ethnicization of occupational categories brings various advantages to the capitalist economy. Different kinds of relations of production require different kinds of normal behavior by the work force and this behavior must be taught. Workforces need to be socialized into specific sets of attitudes

“The “culture” of an ethnic group is precisely the set of rules into which parents belonging to that ethnic group are pressured to socialize their children” (Wallerstein, 1991; 83)

This “culture” of ethnic groups as structures of behavior and thoughts corresponds with the habitus defined by Bourdieu. Habitus is an embodied socialization and it is simultaneously both a system of schemes of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices (Bourdieu, 1989).

Different ethnic groups have a different habitus and reproduce it. The State or the school system can reproduce this particular ethnic culture used for the benefit of the economy. However, Wallerstein (1991) argues that the State avoid doing this too overtly, as it violates the concept of national equality promised under the name of citizenship. Therefore, family is more efficient in doing this reproduction of social inequalities

Furthermore, Wallerstein (1991) posits that ethnic groups not only socialize their respective members differently from others, but also it is the very definition of ethnic groups that they socialize in a particular manner. Consequently, what is illegitimate for the state to do is done “voluntary” by the group’s behavior defending a social “identity”. This provides a legitimation to the hierarchical reality of capitalism that does not offend the formal equality before the law. This way the identity and habitus of ethnic groups is reproduced and confirm objective structures.

Therefore, following Wallerstein (1991), peoplehood resolves one of the most basic contradictions of historical capitalism; its simultaneous aim for theoretical equality and practical inequality. Capitalism as a historical system requires constant inequality but also a constant restructuring of economic processes. For this reason, what guarantees a particular set of hierarchical relations today may not work in the future. The behavior of the work force changes without undermining the legitimacy of the system. The recurrent emergence, restructuring and disappearance of ethnic groups are thereby an invaluable instrument of flexibility in the economy.

“Peoplehood is a major institutional construct of historical capitalism. It is an essential pillar, and as such has grown more and more important as the system has developed greater density. In this sense it is like sovereign statehood, which is also an essential pillar, and has also grown more and more important” (Wallerstein, 1991; 84)

To this argument I add that citizenship is also an essential pillar of the world-system and it encompasses all the forms of peoplehood (race, nation and ethnic groups). This construction of peoplehood (race, nation, ethnic groups and citizenship) need to be understood with reference to the current global colonialism and its labor market, epistemic, linguistic, ethno-racial, sexual and cultural hierarchies. Moreover, it is important to explain the boundaries in the formation of race-ethnicity, nation and citizenship in order to have more clarity about these concepts.

Section 4: The drawing of boundaries in the formation of ethnicity, nation, state and citizenship

1) Ethnicity, ethnicization and ethnification

Ethnicity is a contested concept. It is the key concept invoked in legitimization of claims to national self-determination. The title of “ethnic” is claimed for hugely diverse forms of collectivity; indigenous

groups in Canada and India; the Kurds in different countries, the Basques in Spain and Mapuches in Chile. These claims to ethnicity are often attempts to legitimize and institutionalize a given collectivity, and under-mine another, invoking the institutional structure of national self-determination.

Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke and Tambini (2002) argue that the problem with using the concept of ethnicity is thus not merely that it is contested and therefore unstable one. It is that the concept itself, and the reality it signifies, is reflexively constituted in relation to the problem of self-determination, recognition and resource distribution.

“In the ongoing symbolic struggle over the definition of ethnicity, attempts are made to define it according to various attributes, such as race, language, history, and mythology. None of these can be seen as the defining feature of ethnicity, because academic discourse on ethnicity is not external to the debates about legitimation, but at the very centre of them” (Eder et al., 2002:19).

Eder et al. (2002) propose to understand the process of ethnicization as a special case of the process of *identification*. They define identification as the chain of events through which objective conditions of economic or political injustice become the basis of political claims justified by reference to a collective identity. Identification is a process that the authors regard as general, since individual actors attempt to solve problems of action, whereas ethnicization is a particular version of this. Ethnicization, then, is a special case of identification. The particularity of ethnicization consists in its reference to a past which is seen as the source of a good social order in the present. Ethnicity is the force of the past which makes it a universal phenomenon of social life.

On the other hand, T.K Oommen (1997) considers that ethnification is a cultural homogenization performed by one group which marginalizes other collectivities. This process occurred during the nation-state building where a particular culture and/or language was enacted as the universal inside the nation-state, while the others were considered particular and relegated to have less power and legitimacy. During the nation-state building, together with the capital accumulation performed by the state, a cultural and linguistic homogenization took place.

For T.K Oommen (1997) ethnic groups are cultural collectivities that share an identity and language but without a specific territory. They are different from the concept of nation, because from Oommen's (1997) perspective, a nation is also a cultural group with common identity and language but with a determined territory and power. There are several types of ethnification processes but they all have in common to have suffered the process of discrimination and domination by a hegemonic group, which is supposed to be the legitimate national group of the state. Thus, ethnification derives in a symbolic and material deprivation of cultural collectivities and has impact in their respective habitus and capitals. All these processes occurred during the formation of nation-states.

One case of ethnification is when a nation remains in its homeland but is transformed into a minority or a marginalized collectivity by the colonizing (the case of the indigenous people in North and South America) or by a native dominant collectivity (one native group marginalized others). Another case is when collectivities remain divided after the creation of state territories (Kurds, Basques, Nagas¹³). A

¹³The **Nagas are a transnational indigenous people** inhabiting parts of north-east India (in the federal states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Manipur) and north-west Burma (parts of Kachin state and Sagaing division). They are approximately 4 million in population

different type of ethnification is the denial of fully fledged membership to an immigrant collectivity which had adopted a new land as its homeland, as it was for many years the case of guest workers in Europe from Tunisia or Turkey¹⁴ (Oommen, 1997; Grosfoguel, 2004).

2) Nation-state is not the same as nation and state

The concept of nation-state is confusing, because nation and state are different concepts. Nation refers to a cultural group with common identity and language that lives in a determined territory, while *“The state is a legally constituted institution, which provides its residents with protection from internal insecurity and external aggression”* (Oommen 1997; 19). The state *“is an entity endowed with political sovereignty over a clearly defined territorial area; that has the monopoly on the use of legitimate force; and that consists of citizens whose terminal loyalty is to the state”* (Oommen 1997; 23). Territory is common to the nation and to the state, but there is a crucial difference between national territory and state territory; the former has to do with identity and the latter is a legal entity. If the state and the nation coincide, there is a nation-state. Most of the states today are multicultural, poly-ethnic, or a combination of both, even though they all operate as a nation-state based in enacting one of the national or ethnic particularities as the main one.

Therefore, it is very important to separate the concept of nation from the state and from ethnicity. Nation in its original classical Latin meaning refers to a group of people born in the same place and territory; the political dimension was not a necessary element. The emergence of the nation as a community of citizens and a homogenous political entity follows the maxim *“one nation, one state”* propagated during the French revolution, *“a nation becomes at once a cultural entity as well as a political entity in Europe”* (Oommen, 1997; 28). Therefore, since then in Europe and in the world, the concept of nation has been conceptualized as a community that would normally tend to build a state on its own. There exists the assumption that for a nation is natural and even necessary to have a state, especially in order to maintain and protect its culture¹⁵.

T. K Oommen (1997) argues that nations in Europe are mainly cultural entities that seek the establishment and maintenance of their states. Therefore, the idea of homogeneity in the formation of nation-states is present as Nassehi (2010) also argues. However, Oommen posits that in the colonized countries the concept of nation was related to nationalist movements that wanted the independence from colonial power to create a republic of their own. However, in both Europe and colonized countries the concept of nation is related with a process of homogenization, conceived as necessary in order to build a nation-state. During this process of nation-state building or independence all the other cultural expressions were subdued as less relevant; thus, they were ethnicized.

The hegemonic and legitimate idea of national identity was spread by the group who led the process of Nation-state formation or independence and fixed to it a unique identity. This leading group left in a second category the identity of other cultural, ethnic or racial groups. These other groups relegated

and comprise more than 45 different tribes. The Nagas were divided between the two countries with the colonial transfer of power from Great Britain to India in 1947. In <http://www.iwgia.org/regions/asia/nagalim>

¹⁴T.K Oommen mentioned five kinds of ethnification processes but here I just concentrate in the ones that are more related with the concept of Illegitimate citizenship. For more information, see (Oommen, 1997; 13-19)

¹⁵ Nowadays, it is not always proposed that every nation should have a state but at least some autonomy in the decision making.

to the illegitimacy, have been recognized in the political constitution in the case of India or in international conventions in the case of Chile (Convention 169, ILO). Nevertheless, they are still not considered socially and symbolically legitimate because they do not adapt or assimilate with the legitimate idea of national identity. Consequently, their difference is not recognized as a part of the nation-state.

Furthermore, as Wallerstein (1991) also points out, these “ethnic groups” once constituted as people, reproduce and socialize their habitus, reproducing their minority condition. Therefore, the identity dimension of citizenship has been historically operating as a mechanism that reproduces the legitimate culture of the nation-state. This legitimate culture is a homogenous one and represents the social group with more resources and power in society, which is the one that guided the process of nation-state building. This group has more access to resources and, thus, the power to reproduce the hegemonic identity. In the case of India, this hegemonic social group is expressed in upper class and upper caste Hindus and in Chile in the white European descendant landlords.

3) Illegitimate citizenship and Boundary definition

This legitimacy based in a national homogeneous and unique identity that left outside other potential national identities it is based on a racist thinking¹⁶. The outsiders can be natives, migrants or ethnic groups that were relegated as “*others*” in the nation-state and are not considered part of the legitimate culture. The fact that these groups are not considered part of the legitimate culture, make them have less access to resources (economic, social and cultural) than groups that are considered legitimately belonging to the nation-state. Therefore, the illegitimacy of citizenship reproduces inequalities in other spheres of social life. This happens to a certain extent in every nation-state, even though they are very different and their processes of nation-state building were also historically particular.

The nation-State is an institution that succeeds in adding a shared collective identity above the particularistic identities of traditional communities and by doing so defines a new boundary transcending the boundaries of traditional communities (Eder et al. 2002). There exist different codes for defining boundaries. Eder et al. (2002) define three that are analytically very helpful; primordial, traditional and universalist.

Eder et al. (2002) posit that there exist codes for defining boundaries. They distinguish three types of codes: primordial, traditional and universalist. Boundary definition according to **primordial codes** means that people are classified according to ascriptive characteristics as gender, generation, kinship, etc. **Primordial types of collective identity** appear to be objective and unquestionable; the boundaries cannot be moved, and crossing the boundaries seems to be extremely difficult. Another type of delimiting boundaries follows **traditional codes**; they are mostly based on a historical and cultural shared experience. This **traditional type**, is constructed on the basis of familiarity with implicit rules of conduct, traditions and social routines. It represents the constitutive difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ related to the difference between the routine and the extra-ordinary. A third type of defining boundaries is based on **universalist codes**. This form of code links the constitutive boundary between

¹⁶ I consider racism and racist thinking as a more encompassing concept than ethnic group, nation and citizenship. I agree with Wallerstein that it is a construction of peoplehood, but I don’t separate it completely from ethnicity or nation, that is why it is not defined here separately.

'us' and 'them' not to nature or continuity, but to a particular relationship between the collective subject and the sacred. This mode of constructing collective identity has been called **universalist** by Eder et al. (2002) and operates by relating the collectivity to a sacred concept, which can be defined as God, Reason, the Republic, Progress or Rationality. This kind of boundary construction in the case of citizenship can be achieved through the political-constitutional way; people participate in collective will formation in order to belong to this group, and this political constitutional is treated as sacred.

The illegitimacy of citizenship I am proposing in this dissertation is based on the historical-cultural dimension of boundary construction that constituted the modern nation-states (traditional type mixed with universalist). This analysis of citizenship seeks to explain how historical experiences have shaped ideas of a culturally "legitimate" membership in a nation-state. These historical experiences are based on the construction of nation-states within a colonial world-system. Therefore, the illegitimacy I am analyzing is directly related to the cultural dimension of citizenship; the dimension expressed when discussing the concept of nation.

The boundary construction according to primordial codes constitutes a hierarchy of subjects according to their racial and ethnic features. This primary hierarchy is reinforced by a **traditional** one (traditional codes) and the idea that some cultures are more adequate than others and fit better to the concept of **nation** a specific State requires. The third boundary based on universalism, which can have a constitutional-political expression, is affected by this other two collective identities. Thus, the sacralized concepts of nation-state and the secular republics with their constitutional enlightened secular and universal laws are based in racist and cultural supremacist foundations, which are still very present in the current world-system. Consequently, illegitimate citizenship is not an exception but a constitutive part of the formation of modern nation-states. Illegitimate citizens are needed in order to create a nation-state and maintain the world-system order. They are the legal citizens of different countries who find more barriers to genuinely exercise their rights, due to historical economic and cultural devaluations.

Bauboeck (2015) posits that if the concept of citizenship is detached from the cultural-historical idea of nationality or national identity, a much more flexible concept of citizenship could be created. That means that citizenship would be defined as an agreement not based only in collectives identities but in a legal procedure that enables people to fully exercise their rights within a country. Collective forms of identities; being them primordial, historical-cultural (traditional) or attached to a sacred concept (universalist) are important for people (Honneth, 2002; Eder et al. 2002; Larraín, 2000). Thus, instead of disappearing they could be relegated as one of the multiple identities possible within a plural State. The concept of nation in a global world do not need to be attached to citizenship anymore, instead it can be relegated as possibility for cultural identification. Consequently, citizenship could entail multiple identities and cultures or nations and not be fixed to a hegemonic one. Hegemonic identities, especially the ones chosen to represent a country follow colonialist patterns and lead to excluding nationalism.

To ground the concept of citizenship in an abstract political constitutional way, will not change by itself the colonial functioning of the world-system. However, it will indicate that adscriptive or cultural origins are not determinants factors for having rights or even to attain citizenship. Especially in a global world, where people mobility and ethnic and national conflicts continue being an issue.

If nationality is detached from citizenship, obtaining multiple citizenships would be possible. Thus, if citizenship is not attached to nationality, it would not matter if a particular person belongs to a particular cultural group (ethnic group) in the same country or in another country (migrant). That individual would have the same legal rights and will be considered as legitimately belonging to the state as this person participates in the different spheres of societies (education, work spaces, public spaces, and markets). Consequently, detaching nationality from citizenship could enact more plural and diverse countries, demolishing the old fashioned union between the nation and the state.

It is interesting to observe the negative reaction of the hegemonic groups and the hegemonic dominated groups (the ones that accept the legitimate culture) when attempts to detach nationality from citizenship are expressed. This can be observed when the possibility of double or multiple citizenships is proposed. One example of it is the discussion that has been taking place in Germany, regarding obtaining double citizenship, which has still not developed into a law. Another case of negative reaction to detach nationality from citizenship can be noticed when proposing to bring the status of nation to an ethnic group. This recognition means to invest of the same value both the ethnic group and the national culture. For the hegemonic group, this process means a devaluation of their privileged culture that has been universalized as the culture of the whole country. This happens in Chile regarding the denying of recognition of indigenous groups as a different people and nation within the Chilean Constitution “the sovereignty lies essentially in the nation” (Chilean Constitution, 1st chapter, art. 3; 6). In the case of India, the concept of nation refers to the whole country as a unity and not to the different cultural groups, even though India is defined as a union of states and a multicultural country. India resolved to secure to all its citizens “the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation” (Indian Constitution, forty-second amend. Act 1976, preamble; 1). Therefore, the different cultural groups in India are not considered different collective identities but citizens with different religions, races and places of birth that have to adapt to a hegemonic Hindu culture.

Chapter 2: Citizenship and its relation with inequalities

To define citizenship is a complex task. The debate on the meaning of citizenship is indeed very broad. Citizenship can be conceived as legal, political and social entitlements that citizens bear (Marshall, 1992 [1950]), but it can also be defined as a set of institutionally embedded practices (Somers, 1993; Turner, 1993) or as a form of identity (Isin and Wood 1999; Oommen, 1997).

Reviewing most of the relevant literature on citizenship, it can be found that even if there are many definitions of citizenship with different emphasis and characteristics, there is a common definition that describes it as *“a modern form of membership in a political and geographical space”* (Marshall, 1992 (1950); Sommers, 2006; Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008). Thus, citizenship is linked simultaneously to the idea of modernity, the formation of nation-states and the idea of belonging.

Section 1: Citizenship and class inequality: A first approach

Citizenship is a concept supposed to ensure equality for all citizens, but on the contrary it reproduces the existent inequalities in society. T.H Marshall in his famous lecture *“Citizenship and Social Class”* (Marshall, 1992 (1950)), argues specifically about the coexistence of citizenship and class inequality. His concept of citizenship is one of the most well-known; every book written on citizenship mentions him as a starting point of the argument, either to agree, disagree or complement it.

Marshall demonstrates that citizenship is a principle of equality that has been growing together with capitalism, which is a principle of inequality. This contradiction in the two principles makes him focus on the analysis of social class and points out that social inequality is a key concept to really understand citizenship.

He claims that citizenship is composed by three different kinds of rights: civil rights, political rights and social rights. These rights were achieved in different centuries¹⁷; the civil ones during the eighteenth century, the political ones during the nineteenth century and the social ones during the twentieth century (Marshall, 1992 (1950)).

He proposes that citizenship is not a mechanism that confronts capitalism or social inequality, but it brings a change in the status of every human being from total inequality to basic equality expressed in some rights; first civil rights in front of the law; then political rights, including the right to vote and finally social rights, which allow achieving some economical minimum. Social rights are defined as *“a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society”* (Marshall, 1992 (1950); 8). Thus, he argues that citizenship becomes the guarantor of a minimum of equality but it does not end with social class inequality.

The concept of Marshall has been mainly criticized because of his Eurocentric perspective, something very common during his historical time. The author describes the reality of England in the early fifties

¹⁷ This division is of course flexible, and it is expressed by the author in the book.

(1950) and generalizes it as universal, without considering other contexts such as non-European societies, a gender perspective or the phenomenon of migration.

Critiques argue that Marshall's definition of citizenship is derived from middle-class, English male and white cultural values that do not take individual subjectivities and cultural differences into account, particularly those of women, children, and racialized minorities (*Benhabib 2002, Yuval-Davis 1997*)” (Bloemraad et al, 2008; 157). Marshall's analysis also does not consider the phenomena of migration as he focuses on the native-born working class, which does not allow him to see cultural rights as a distinct prerequisite to full societal participation (Bauboeck 2001). *“These critiques highlight sources of inequality beyond class position and suggest that other inequalities might require differential group rights”* as Bloemraad et al. (2008; 157) argue.

Therefore, this perspective cannot explain the phenomena globally nor accurately analyze citizenship in particular historical contexts. For example, the extension of civil, political, and social rights did not uniformly happen according to Marshall's historical progression. In Britain and in many other countries, women received social rights even before political rights (Lister and Skocpol 1992). In a similar way, immigrants without the legal status of “citizen”, can benefit from social rights (Bauboeck, 2005; Soysal 1994), or participate in political decision making (Bloemraad et al, 2008). Besides, there were other realities – mostly non-European – which did not have a welfare state - or it was very weak- by the time Marshall did the analysis.

Despite all critiques, the most important contribution of Marshall is the clear analysis of the tension between inequalities and citizenship, which he sees as the expression of a tension between the inequality principle of capitalism and the equality principle of democracy. He argues that this tension is solved through a historical evolution of citizenship rights¹⁸ that help to guarantee a minimum status to live as a civilized person according to the society in which the person lives. It does not guarantee equality but ensures a minimum.

In order to understand the concept of citizenship and its relationship with inequalities today, it is necessary to go beyond concepts and ideas conceived more than fifty years ago in only one particular context (England). Therefore, it becomes necessary to observe empirically how citizenship and inequalities operate in other particular contexts. For instance, doing research on the concept of citizenship and inequalities in other non-Europeans (or Western) societies as in Latin-America and Asia, without a Eurocentric point of view. The present dissertation also contributes to describe how citizenship and inequalities operate in two non-European contexts.

1) Citizenship: From a symbolic inclusion to a legal mechanism

Armin Nassehi in his text “Citizenship and modernity” (2010) argues that *“citizenship is one of the means modern society uses to provide the imagination of organized inclusion of persons into society”* (Nassehi, 2010; 204). Consequently, all nation building processes were political processes, which produced imaginations of unity, of a common world and of reasonable claims for solidarity concerning the redistribution of resources and the compensation for precarious life-situations of underprivileged groups. For most of the countries, this effort of constructing social unity formed one of the most

¹⁸ He states that citizenship has been evolving assuring every time more rights to the citizens.

important policies. This process of nation-state building is also true for the case of Chile and India and their respective process of independence.

Thus, citizenship was a mechanism used by nation-states to symbolize and to enforce inclusion, but even more exclusion of others outside a particular nation-state. This definition refers to the inclusion of individuals into a functional system. Nassehi following Luhmann (2002) for this definition, posits that all individuals are included in functional systems, even if the form of inclusion is different or unequal. The promise of free access to different functional systems only means that everyone participates in one way or another in the economy, legal affairs, politics, education or medical treatment. Everyone participates in the system but the access is not an organized or coordinated one. Not everyone has the same access to the different systems (there are some people that are even excluded) and this will depend on other factors as the position they have in the social space. Therefore, for Nassehi, citizenship is a mechanism that provides the imagination that the inclusion in social system will be organized and coordinated by the state.

Hence, the author argues that the concept of citizenship as symbolizing and enforcing organized inclusion, can operate as long as the legitimation of membership is based on national, ethnic or cultural characteristics of the members. However, this homogeneity has been disputed recently with the raising of pluralism, multiculturalism and diversity claims around the world and to certain extent with the challenge to the role of the nation-state in a world-society.

All nation-state building processes, including the post-colonial and the post-communist ones, produced imaginations of unity and had to define or redefine borders and nations legitimated in “old” traditions and ethnic or cultural homogeneities. During these processes of nation-state building, citizenship was used as a political instrument to provide the imagination of organized inclusion of persons into society (Nassehi, 2010). Therefore, citizenship was used as a mechanism that produces and reproduces an imagination and ideology of unity and homogeneity within a nation-state. Nevertheless, only some collectivities were made visible relegating others as secondary ones or simply denying them as the case of some ethnic groups or minorities.

Nassehi (2010) criticizes the illusion of citizenship as a mechanism that provides social integration. He posits that one of the starting points of this integration idea can be traced to Hegel’s political philosophy from which sociology has adapted its own reflections for a long time.

He argues:

“For Hegel the state is a power, which is able to overcome the disintegration and the individualization of the bourgeois society. From this point of view, the state was not only a universal generator of membership, but also the incarnation of an objective spirit, raising the individual to the general freedom of the state” (Nassehi, 2010; 188)

The sociological notion of ‘society’ has been bound to the concept of nation-states as a politically delimited order, which appears to provide social integration and the coordination of differentiated fields of society (Nassehi, 2010; 188). Furthermore, the concept of state has been attached to the concept of nation, presupposing that there is only one homogenous nation.

Therefore, sociological reflection on citizenship does not discuss the existence of societal communities but assumes them. Marshall also presupposes that citizenship as an integration mechanism can only work within a common and loyally shared culture. For Marshall, citizenship requires a specific form of

attachment, an authentic sense of being a member of a community but he does not discuss how these sentiments occur (Nassehi, 2010).

Consequently, all these statements are based on the classical sociology of modernity, which begins with a methodological nationalism (Smith 1979), bounding the notion of society to the idea of self-sufficiency of social units. Sociology adopted the political experience of closure of national economies, education, labor markets, national traditions and culture. Ulrich Beck called this way of looking at social phenomena the “container model of society” (Beck 1997). The container model perceives society as a closed entity with a clear stratified social structure—in which every individual has *one* fixed social position—and an inherent law of development (or evolution or modernization) (Rehbein, 2007). However, Beck argued that this model should be replaced with regard to globalization.

The experience of such container-ideas, of national closure and societal self-sufficiency is not a quasi-natural attribute of societal modernity but the result of self-adapting to modernization processes. Citizenship, as an instrument that symbolizes membership to certain societies, is completely linked to the container-experience of nineteenth-century modernity in Europe (Nassehi, 2010; also see Rehbein, 2007; 15-17) and therefore to the homogenous concept of nation. Hence, the colonial definition of citizenship must be defied.

This concept of citizenship based in the nation-state as a container model of society is not suitable anymore in a world with transnational and immigration realities and with a growing interconnectedness. Consequently, Nassehi argues that the function of citizenship changed in contemporary societies. It switched from a political symbolization of membership within a nation-state to a legal and visualization mechanism in the current world-society. Nassehi recognizes citizenship is not only a legal instrument to organize access to the benefits and achievements of the state one belongs to. It is also a mechanism that provides visibility, symbolizing solidarity between strangers and making collectivities visible.

He observes, following Soysal’s research, a decoupling of legal and political inclusion (Soysal, 1996). Immigrants with a legal residency status do not differ decisively in the rights they have from people with the citizenship status. In most of the countries the only difference is that they do not have the right to politically vote¹⁹. However, the inclusion of persons, or their membership, is not only dependent on political or legal forms of citizenship but also on the inclusion in other spheres of the social space, as labor markets, economy, educational systems, etc. Therefore, Nassehi (2010) argues that modern societies cannot reject legal inclusion, participation in labor markets and education towards long-term immigrants without violating their own laws.

For Nassehi, to achieve equality under the contemporary functioning of citizenship, a new form of supervising multi-inclusion in a highly mobile society has to be created. For him the main question is how citizenship can be a mechanism that helps to achieve more equality in a functionally differentiated society. Nassehi thinks that the current problem of citizenship is that inclusion in a more complex social world happens at different levels and in different respects. The main problem of the era of pre and postcolonial nation building was to provide a special form of nationality, or a political national status. However, the present problem is about establishing forms and claims for participation

¹⁹ In some countries like Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden permanent residents are allowed to vote in local elections. Only in Uruguay and New Zealand permanent residents are allowed to vote in national elections.

in labor markets, in governmental insurance systems, in education and other functional systems beyond the question of nationality and beyond the idea of homogenous “cultures” (Nassehi, 2010).

However, despite questioning the role of the nation-state, Nassehi considers that citizenship is still a mechanism that provides visibility to collectivities and as a political instrument continues establishing nation-states based societies within one world-society. He also argues that citizenship includes persons legally into one nation-state. Nevertheless, he does not emphasize the active role of contemporary nation-states, which are the ones that finally guarantee rights and the rights to have rights (Somers, 2008). Thus, he does not clearly explain what the new role of the nation-state in this one world-society is.

Nassehi shares the systemic idea that the state does not coordinate all spheres of life as there is no center of society anymore. He proposes that new forms of supervising multi-inclusion in society have to be created, but he does not explain how they are supposed to operate.

On the other hand, he does not analyze the consequences of citizenship as mechanism of visibility in society. This is a relevant aspect if we consider the *invisibilization* that affects certain groups in society even though they possess legal recognition, as is the case of ethnic or minority groups. They are legally citizens but they lack the visibility (as recognition and belonging) that citizenship is supposed to bring.

Hence, he reduces citizenship as a legal phenomenon, because even if he recognizes visibility as a dimension of citizenship, he considers it as a secondary and separated symbolical dimension. Thus, visibility as the symbolical part is seen only as a reflection of the legal one. However following Max Weber, Bourdieu, Rehbein and Weiss, I consider that reality is at the same time symbolical and concrete, there are no dichotomist dimensions where one part is subdued to the other one. Symbolic reality is not an epiphenomenon of a “concrete” and “objective” reality (Weber, 2002 (1922); Bourdieu, 1989; Rehbein, 2014a; Weiss, 2010). Citizenship is legal but at the same time expresses belonging as it will be defined in the following part.

Section 2: Citizenship as belonging and not as equality

Conceptualizing citizenship as a principle of equality is the main mistake that most theorists of citizenship have done, transforming citizenship into an ideal concept; analyzing how it should be instead of analyzing how citizenship really operates in contemporary societies. Citizenship is far from being an equality concept, and even Marshall recognized this, arguing that citizenship provides the foundation of equality on which the structure of inequality could be built (Marshall, 1992 (1950)). This entails that citizenship is the minimum equality for everyone and after that every inequality is legitimate and a product of natural differences, or differences in achievement or capacities²⁰.

“Is it still true that basic equality, when enriched in substance and embodied in the formal right of citizenship, is consistent with the inequalities of social class? I shall suggest that our society today assumes that the two are still compatible, so much so that citizenship has itself become, in certain respects, the architect of legitimate social inequality” (Marshall, 1992 (1950); 7).

²⁰ This argument is very similar to the concept of equal opportunities from John Rawls (2005(1971)) “A theory of Justice”.

Citizenship is then a principle that legitimizes social inequalities and in this sense is not an equality principle; its purpose is not to make citizens equal. Citizenship is a concept that expresses belonging to a certain Nation-state, that legally gives equal access to rights and duties but only as a base on which the structure of inequality could be built. Therefore, people that did not manage to have a better socioeconomic position are devalued as less intelligent or less hardworking, attributing to them their own failure, ignoring all the social conditions that caused it. In the case of countries with a strong Welfare state such as Germany, this argument could be even stronger as people are supposedly given more opportunities to improve. This does not mean that the same argument is not used in countries with a minimum of Welfare state, as the case of Chile and India, where people supposedly also have the same opportunities and their failure is also their own fault.

In the case of migration, the exclusionary faculty of citizenship is more explicitly revealed, especially when there are struggles and limitations for the obtainment of citizenship.

For Nassehi (2010) citizenship is a legal mechanism that also brings visibility to collectivities. However, as it was discussed above he subdues visibility as a symbolic and secondary dimension. Citizenship is at the same time a legal and symbolic reality as every other phenomenon (Weber, 2002 (1922), Bourdieu, 1989; Rehbein; 2014a, Weiss, 2010) and it expresses belonging (legal and symbolical belonging) to a certain nation-state.

This fact becomes very clear if we compare the status of citizenship with the one of permanent residence permit. As mentioned before, both statuses entail certain rights and duties and they become every time more similar. In some countries legal residents have even the right to vote in political elections²¹. If citizenship were only a legal reality, it would not be necessary to distinguish between permanent residents and citizens in the cases where the rights and duties are the same. They either would all become citizens or the concept of citizen would disappear. However, there is still a distinction between being a citizen and having the permanent residence; both represent a different status. In some countries these different statuses continue being attached to different political rights. However, the difference between citizens and residents is primarily and clearly a symbolic and status difference. The fact that residents are not allowed to vote operates as a reminder that they do not completely belong to the nation-state. In the cases where residents are allowed to vote and have the same rights as citizens, the differential status of citizenship is only symbolical and not attached to any differences in rights. It is only a mark that indicates they do not completely belong to a certain nation-state.

As Weber stated in "Economy and Society" (2002 (1922)), status is the symbolic position of a person in society. It is related with the material conditions but it goes beyond that, reminding us of the symbolic aspects of every social reality. Therefore, status is not only a consequence of material conditions but a different phenomenon by its own, though both are closely interrelated.

"Money and an entrepreneurial position are not in themselves status qualifications, although they may lead to them; and the lack of property is not in itself a status disqualification, although this may be a reason for it. Conversely, status may influence, if not completely determine, a class position without being identical with it" (Weber, 2002; 306)

²¹ As mentioned before, in some countries like Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden permanent residents are allowed to vote in local elections. Only in Uruguay and New Zealand permanent residents are allowed to vote in national elections.

Generally, residents are allowed to attain citizenship status after fulfilling some requirements but sometimes they don't want to, either because of conflicts with belonging feelings or because obtaining the new citizenship requires giving up the current one.

Bauboeck (2005) argues that there exists the assumption that individuals cannot be loyal to several states. This is mainly based in traditional republican or ethno nationalist views on citizenship but also in some liberal perspectives of territorial inclusion²². Migrants certainly often have relevant stakes in more than one polity. This problem could be solved allowing either multiple citizenship or a combination of expatriate voting rights with acquirement of all the rights in the country of settlement (with or without the citizenship status).

However, the difference in status and not only the differences in rights bring diverse opportunities to individuals. Some opportunities are formally and legally the same, such as the right to work or to vote in local elections, but socially, one status is more valued than the other. Consequently, one status (citizenship) would bring more opportunities than the other (permanent resident).

When a person obtains the citizenship status, the meaning attached to it is that this person belongs to the nation-state and this legal status is the base on which inequality can be built. Therefore, this equally belonging to the nation-state is only in an abstract form because it does not mean that this person will be equally included in other spheres of life such as labor markets, economy, education systems, etc. It is just a formal inclusion, it gives equal rights and duties to people but it does not ensure that they will count with the necessary resources to exercise their rights. Therefore, we cannot expect citizenship to include or integrate people in different social spheres and activities, as we can also not expect it to bring equality.

Bloemraad et al. (2008), argue that citizenship has been studied as a complex concept composed by four dimensions that are interrelated and influence each other. The four dimensions are legal status, rights, participation (political and other forms of participation in society) and a sense of belonging.

Even though these four dimensions of citizenship (legal status, rights, participation (political and other forms of participation in society) and a sense of belonging) are very convincing, in this research, some changes to the definition from Bloemraad et al. (2008) have been introduced. Legal status and rights are considered one dimension, while Bloemraad et al. (2008) conceived both of them separately. Furthermore, this research does not consider participation as part of citizenship. They are intimately related but constitute different variables. The dimension of participation has been challenged with the phenomenon of migration. Non-citizens can participate in society and even vote (political participation), thus participation is not an exclusive dimension of citizenship. In addition, participation has been further expanded to social and economic inclusion by many authors, which posits citizenship as a guarantor of equality. The main mistake that most theorists of citizenship have done.

Regarding the 4th dimension of citizenship; sense of belonging, in this research it is considered an important dimension that accompanies the legal - formal dimension (status and rights). Therefore, in

²² A traditional republican position emphasizes territorial boundaries as well as membership. Only citizens who are present in the polity can govern themselves by participating in making its laws. A republican polity can be open to newcomers but it can freely determine through its own laws whom to admit. Ethnic nationalism considers that the nation's membership is given by ethnicity and not necessarily by the territorial residency on a state where this nation is dominant. It conceives the nation as a community of culture, imagined descent, and destiny that has a right to self-determination. That supports the inclusion of expatriates but rejects political rights for non-citizen residents. On the other hand, the liberal perspective of territorial inclusion proposes that the ones who live in a territory have to govern it and make their own laws (For more on this discussion see Bauboeck, 2005)

this dissertation, citizenship is considered to be composed of only two dimensions: the legal-formal one and the belonging dimension.

TABLE 1: LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE CITIZENS

	Legitimate citizen	Illegitimate citizen
Legal- formal	+	+
Belonging	+	-

Source: Own elaboration

The legal-formal aspect of citizenship and the belonging dimension operate independently but are equally relevant for citizenship and cannot be completely separated. Nevertheless, the legal aspect has attained more importance while the belonging dimension is only seen as a consequence of the legal one without importance by itself²³. Therefore, in this research I want to stress that the belonging dimension of citizenship is also crucial. The belonging dimension of citizenship, and not only the legal one, opens possibilities for participation in different spheres of society (labor markets, economy, educational systems, etc.). As a result, both dimensions operate as a resource that people can either possess or not.

However, citizenship is not the only resource that would facilitate or obstruct participation of people in society. There are many other characteristic as social class, gender and the position in the hierarchy on the world-system that people can use as resources. This point makes clearer that participation is a separate variable from citizenship; participation depends on many factors and not only on citizenship.

1) Citizenship within and beyond the nation-state

Lately the relationship between citizenship and nation-state has been put at stake. Nowadays, discussions on citizenship are focused on the question of transnational, global and multicultural realities of world- society. Accordingly, the concept of national citizenship has been re-elaborated and discussed through the concepts of trans-national citizenship (Bauboeck, 1994); postnational citizenship (Soysal 1996); multi-cultural citizenship (Kymlicka 1995); global citizenship (Hoeffe, 2007) and cosmopolitan citizenship (Habermas, 1991). Nonetheless, all these concepts analyze citizenship in relationship with other concepts; trans-nationalism, multi-culturalism, postnationalism, globalization or cosmopolitanism in order to propose a normative way of having a more plural citizenship in society. This is a great exercise and sometimes useful for citizenship policies in topics of migration and indigenous people²⁴. However, they don't describe how citizenship empirically operates but propose how it should be.

²³The belonging dimension of citizenship has acquired importance by itself only in some cultural or identity studies related to citizenship.

²⁴Bauboeck (2008) argues that the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was made shortly after the publication of Kymlicka's book on multiculturalism – even if in “a watered-down version”. This shows the influence of normative theory in public policies.

Although all these processes of interconnectedness and exchange between countries are taking place, there are two aspects that have not changed regarding the nation-state. First, the state still has the power and institutional apparatus to guarantee the right to have rights (Sommers, 2006). International institutions can make claims and put some pressure on particular issues but the decision making and the process finally still concern the national state. In these decisions and its political processes, the particular history or the narration of every national history plays an important role. On the other hand, nation-states in general continue privileging one culture as the legitimate one, relegating the others either as inexistent or secondary, despite many multicultural and pluralist efforts.

Nevertheless, this accent put on analyzing citizenship within the nation-state does not mean national closure and societal self-sufficiency. It does not indicate that citizenship is based in the nation-state as a “container model of society” (Beck 1997) where every country is a closed society with totally independent and closed economies, education, labor markets, national traditions and culture. To conceive society as a closed container is not suitable anymore in a world with transnational and migration realities and with a growing interconnectedness. Even when the focus is based in national realities as the cases analyzed in this dissertation.

Bauboeck (2014 and 2015) also criticizes the fact that citizenship has mostly been attached to nationality and/or territoriality. This concept of citizenship entails the pre-political idea that the folk existed before democracy; the people is defined through language, history, ancestry, and a common territory. He called it the nation-culture concept of the nation-state and argues that for a liberal and flexible citizenship to exist, citizenship needs to be detached from nation. Citizenship can exist without the concept of nation as a homogeneous entity. If this is the case, other forms of belonging can be found, opening possibilities for newcomers. They could belong to a new country even if they did not share the same history. Bauboeck (2014) suggests that in order to have a more flexible concept of citizenship, it should be based on some kind of tie between the individual and the country. This attachment does not necessarily have to be connected to a specific culture or nationality but rather be based on some biographic relationship to the country. Bauboeck called this proposal of citizenship “stakeholder citizenship”. This notion of citizenship goes beyond attaining it either by the *jus solis* principle (by birth in the country) or the *jus sanguinis* (by ancestry), and also beyond the assumption that people cannot be attached to more than one country. Bauboeck (2015) argues that if people have lived in a certain country for certain time or if they have ancestors from this country, both are enough reasons to attain citizenship. Besides, this suggestion would be possible to put in practice as the information regarding the biography from people can be proved. Nowadays, people are eligible to obtain citizenship because of years of residence or because of ancestors, but there are different rules in different countries. In some countries many barriers exist for one or another cause for obtaining citizenship and double citizenship is still seen by many countries as highly suspicious.

These limits to citizenship and voting rights have been imposed by three different perspectives that share the assumption that individuals cannot be loyal to several states (Bauboeck, 2005). The first one is the **traditional republican position**, which emphasizes territorial boundaries as well as membership. Only citizens who are present in the polity can govern themselves by participating in making its laws. A republican polity can be open to newcomers, but it can also be very exclusive in determining whom to admit. The second perspective is based on **ethnic nationalism**, which supposes that a certain ethnicity is entitled to the nation's membership and not necessarily residents of a certain territory. It conceives the nation as a community of culture, imagined descent, and destiny that has a right to self-

determination. Moreover, from this perspective the inclusion of expatriates is supported, while political rights for non-citizen residents are rejected. From this perspective, it is crucial to include citizens that live abroad in national self-government and legitimate to exclude non-citizens who have not assimilated into the national community. The third perspective is the **liberal perspective** of territorial inclusion, which proposes that the ones who live in a territory have to govern it and make their own laws (leaving outside expatriates). Thus, this perspective also ignores the external attachments of citizenship and the fact that expatriates can also be interested in what happen in its former land of residence.

The definition of **stakeholder citizenship** from Bauboeck overcomes the tight relation of citizenship with nation. As mentioned before, detaching citizenship from nation open up more criteria for claiming citizenship, for example through biographical ties (ancestors, be born in the country, have lived in the country, have offspring in the country, have worked or studied in the country, etc). Therefore, different ethnic groups from the country, migrants, and also expatriates could be included as citizens. Furthermore, having double or triple citizenship could be possible from this perspective. Certainly, in order to do that many changes have to be done as it means a paradigm change: Citizenship without nation.

Section 3: Citizenship and inequality

For Marshall (1992 (1950)), social inequality was just based on social class. He only recognizes two different kinds of inequalities in two different societies: caste system societies and social class system societies. In the former, hierarchy is based on a division of distinct hereditary human species, where the whole structure has the quality of a plan and natural order. On the other hand, social class system is for him not a natural order or an institution on its own right but a product of the interplay of a variety of factors related to the institutions of property and education and the structure of national economy (Marshall, 1992 (1950)).

“Modern contract is the agreement between men who are free and equal in status, though not necessarily in power. Status was not eliminated from the social system. Differential status, associated with class, function and family, was replaced by the single uniform status of citizenship, which provided the foundation of equality on which the structure of inequality could be built” (Marshall, 1992; 21)

Therefore, Marshall (1992 (1950)) argues that in the class system in capitalist societies, there is no overall pattern of inequality in which an appropriate value is attached a priori to each social level, as it was in caste system. However, following Rehbein and Souza (2014a; 2014b, 2015) we can see that in capitalist class system there is a value attached a priori to each social strata and it is a moral one. For Rehbein and Souza (2015) pre-capitalist structures are reproduced and merely transformed; they just become invisible under capitalist surface. Consequently, they argue that inequality is a more fundamental structure than capitalism and feudalism. Marshall (1992 (1950)) shares the modern belief that there is a basic equality expressed in citizenship, but at the same time he recognizes the unequal distribution of power that is expressed in inequalities. This is very similar to the equal opportunities approach from John Rawls (1971), where the initial equality principle ensures that any difference and inequality that comes afterwards is legitimate. However, as Rehbein and Souza

(2014a) argue this fact just reproduces inequalities. The reproduction of inequalities remains even though the form of organizing society changes from a caste to a class system.

Citizenship and democracy are supposed to ensure a minimum of equality and give the freedom to perform the activity one prefers regarding the own skills. However, the scientific foundation of capitalist societies, which Rehbein and Souza (2015) refer to as symbolic liberalism, makes the persistence of classes and its relation to certain activities invisible.

“The scientific foundation of capitalist societies makes the persistence of classes invisible that are reproduced on the basis of a hierarchy of values, which itself decides about success in competition. In other words, in spite of the formal equality of all individuals, they are symbolically distributed into unequal classes even before any competition has started” (Rehbein and Souza, 2015; 22)

In a democratic society, each and every individual is supposed to be able to determine his or her own fate and to choose between socially available options. That a large percentage of the members of any democratic society are not in a position to choose the best possible option is, according to symbolic liberalism, due to individual failure. The failed individual deserves less respect by him- or herself and by others and loses a substantial amount of dignity. This also involves a process of humiliation that Rehbein and Souza (2015) called *symbolic racism*. In order for *symbolic racism* and humiliation of entire classes of people to work, it has to appear as legitimate. Here it is important to mention that this concept of *symbolic racism* that Rehbein and Souza utilize is not the same I used for the definition of racism on this dissertation.

The legitimization of the whole order is sustained by the symbolic liberalism and by the modern status of citizenship (Rehbein and Souza, 2015). Therefore, citizenship justifies a new inequality system when it is conceived as an equality principle. Citizenship expresses belonging to a nation-state (legal and symbolic) but it is not an equality principle, even when it can be used as a resource to obtain certain benefits.

In this research following Rehbein and Souza (2014 a), inequality is not understood as economic stratification or division of labor, but as the unequal valuation attributed to activities and habitus traits including the evaluation and devaluation of groups and individuals. Different habitus entail different chances to carry out activities. The most valued habitus also grants chances of performing the most valued activities in society. Therefore, the access to each social activity is more or less restricted in society regarding to the habitus a person has. Habitus is an embodied socialization and as such depends on the family and its class, thus it is a mechanism of social reproduction²⁵. Besides, in order to carry out an activity, a person requires specific resources, for example an academic title, certain physical abilities or money (Fröhlich and Rehbein, 2009). Pierre Bourdieu (1989) has analyzed the resources that give access to socially valued activities in the framework of a division of “capital”. The social division of capital, for Bourdieu, is itself a society’s social structure. Bourdieu distinguishes between economic capital (money), cultural capital (knowledge and possession of culturally relevant objects, symbols and practices), social capital (socially relevant relations and networks) and symbolic capital (symbolically codified superiority) (Fröhlich and Rehbein, 2009; 134-140). Therefore, people with less resources or capital have fewer chances to carry out valued activities in society and this also implies that they have fewer possibilities to fully exercise their rights as citizens.

²⁵ Joseph Jurt (2010) argues that habitus is a bit more flexible and can also be influenced by other socialization factors and not only by the family. However, still the possibility of social mobility that it allows is limited.

The only ones who can fully exercise their rights are the most privileged groups in every society. All the others will face at least one category that leads to discrimination in at least one sphere of their lives. As for women, even upper-class ones will be oppressed because of their gender condition, thus, even though they are privileged in other dimensions, the discrimination because of gender limits their chances to exercise all their rights. In India for instance, the small privileged group that can fully exercise their rights are the Hindu upper-caste and upper-class men and in Chile the white European descendant male landlords or entrepreneurs. They do not face devaluations and have possibilities to accumulate more resources in order to perform the most valued activities in society.

1) Inequality beyond class system

For years, inequality was only analyzed through the perspective of social class and sometimes even the problematic of social class has been reduced only to a problem of distribution of income, especially in some economicist approaches. Nevertheless, there exist different kinds of inequalities and not only the social-class-based inequality. There are inequalities based on gender, age, religion, nationality, region and caste, among many others. The intersectionality approach was introduced by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989 (see also Crenshaw, 1991) and since then has been used to describe how all these categories of inequality interact and influence each other simultaneously. These different categories affect the opportunities people have to carry out some activities that are valued in society.

Intersectionality explains an intersection of multiple forms of discrimination. It is a richer and more complex perspective than the attempts to reduce people to one category at time. In particular, it indicates that knowledge production must treat social positions as relational, showing the need for multiple epistemologies. Thus, intersectionality is useful as it aims to bring to light the multiple positioning that constitute everyday life and the power relations that are central to it (Phoenix, 2006). This concept has been mainly used in feminist work and it was developed to analyze how women are simultaneously positioned as such and at the same time as black, working-class, lesbian and/ or colonial subjects (Brah and Phoenix, 2004).

Some critiques and improvements to this approach were put forward by Nira Yuval-Davis (2006), especially when she argues that this intersection of categories is also historically determined and the importance or “weight” of some of them might vary in different contexts.

The social position or classification of a person in society depends on his/her habitus and the amount of capitals it has. As already mentioned, habitus and capital are differentiated and segmented by social class, thus, through them social class is reproduced. However, other categories as gender, age, race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, region and caste also influence and shape habitus and the amount of resources people can have (economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital). At the same time, the access to these resources and the social positioning of each person bring differentiated opportunities to exercise the rights that citizenship brings.

From this perspective it is difficult to rank the different kinds of oppressions, especially because they are historically based and depend on the context. The different categories of classification are interrelated and not easily separable. The mix of them shapes the experiences of people. Nonetheless, between these categories social class plays a fundamental role.

The concept of social class entails not only the economic capital but also the cultural, social and symbolical one. If the categories of classification already mentioned are not related to social class in

the analysis of inequalities, their explicative role is misleading. All these categories (with social class at the center) shape and are shaped by habitus. These categories also determine the activities people can perform and influences the valuation and evaluation that society makes of them as more or less valuable. These categories are positioned in interaction with the other capitals and habitus the person has. Depending on that interaction, they would become a resource or barrier to be valued in society. To be an upper-middle-class woman in Germany is very different than being a lower-class migrant man. The experiences, kind and amount of devaluations are different. Social class inequalities are central; however, it is not easy to determine a clear hierarchy of discriminations that states which disadvantages are worse than others. Is gender discrimination worse than racial or ethnic ones? It is a challenging question.

On the other hand, we are used to hear that the economic and bodily goods related disadvantages are the worst ones, but generally we forget that they are intrinsically related with other factors that are as important and complementary as economic inequality. This emphasis on only one aspect of reality emerges from the separation between body and mind that has a long philosophical tradition in Western traditions since Plato and Saint Augustine. Old western philosophical traditions and many Oriental and indigenous worldviews emphasize the absence of dichotomies or dualities (Cavallé, 2008). This means that there is no separation in the ultimate reality, everything is connected at the end and is part of the same. Every duality is part of a unity that we live as separate, mainly because our rational thought and language work that way (Rehbein and Souza, 2014a). The contemporary rational thinking, which has been extended to science and to almost all spheres of life, is based in Descartes rational method. Descartes changed the hierarchy from emphasis on virtue, ideas and contemplation to the focus on reason as a rational process and logical method (Rehbein and Souza, 2014a). Following Rehbein and Souza (2014a), I argue that this dichotomy has to be overcome in order to stop interpreting reality as composed of opposite dichotomist categories; they exist, as they are present in our categories of thoughts and language. However, both are part of a unity that can be only understood as a meaningful practice. Only by understanding this fact, it is possible to stop giving emphasis to one aspect of reality, considering the other as opposed and/or secondary.

“We reject the distinctions between being and consciousness, mind and body, economy and ideology and functional system and life-world. Instead we interpret society entirely as meaningful practice.” (Rehbein and Souza, 2014a; 17)

2) Citizenship and equality as dignity

As stated before, the most important contribution of Marshall is to clearly argue that citizenship and its historical evolution²⁶ help to guarantee a minimum status to live as a civilized person, according to the society the person is in. However, it does not guarantee equality. This concept is very similar to the development approach proposed by Amartya Sen (2000), where development is related to the freedom to live the kind of life that we have reason to value (Sen, 2000).

The value of activities and what a “civilized” person means, is in different societies a particular definition that leaves some people out. In capitalist societies, there is a line that divides people with dignity and people below that line (Rehbein and Souza, 2014a)²⁷. Nevertheless, dignity is not only

²⁶ He argues that citizenship has been evolving assuring every time more rights to the citizens.

²⁷ For this topic, also see Souza, 2011.

related to “*a modicum of economic welfare and security*” as Marshall argued, but to the value that society gives to different social groups (Rehbein and Souza, 2014b).

As it was mentioned before, this value that society gives to different social groups is for Rehbein and Souza (2014a) the base of inequalities, because it is not only the cause of inequalities in the capitalist system but it was also the main cause of inequalities in former systems such as feudalism or caste systems. This evaluation of the different social groups and the inequalities resulting from it are a more persistent structure than the way social structure is organized either in feudalism, capitalism or some other forms of organization. The difference is that in capitalism this value is not justified anymore by religion and every status position is not related to a certain activity anymore (commerce, farming, ruling, etc.) but it is based in the success people have in the capitalist system. That means in their “merit” to achieve better social and economic positions. Now that everyone is formally equal and has more or less the same opportunities and that there is Welfare (even if it is minimal), the responsibility of achievement is on every individual. This discourse and justification of the capitalist system is what Rehbein and Souza (2014a) called symbolic liberalism, where citizenship (a supposedly equality mechanism) helps to justify inequalities.

“The foundation of inequality is not capital but its evaluation. More generally, it is the unequal value that is attributed symbolically to activities and habitus traits including the evaluation and devaluation of groups and individuals. The unequal value is contained in the use of symbols, which means in any action.” (Rehbein and Souza, 2014a; 23)

Therefore, inequality is also related to the dignity of a person and the recognized value this person has in society.

3) Welfare State, dignity and citizenship

There are two main confusions of concepts regarding citizenship and its relationship with inequality that have been used or misused since Marshall. The first one is the assumption that a minimum of economic welfare is the same as dignity. The second one is the attachment of the concept of citizenship to welfare state and equality.

Many authors mix the access to a minimum of economic and social welfare with the status of being a “civilized human being”. However, they are not automatically the same. To be a civilized person is related with being a person with a minimum of dignity. A dividing line must be drawn between dignity and indignity. This dividing line is based on a moral hierarchy that separates the worthy from the unworthy ones (Rehbein and Souza, 2015).

Marshall and most of the poverty and inequalities approaches have taken for granted that a minimum of economic welfare, health and education automatically gives dignity to people. When Marshall refers to citizenship as an equality principle, he is linking it to the development of a welfare state, which is an achievement of democracies in taming capitalism. Supposedly, all the welfare support from the state would improve the dignity conditions of people as they also would advance in their freedom to live the kind of life that they have reason to value. It would improve their capabilities, using the terms of Amartya Sen (2000); even if the welfare state is rather small as in the case of India or Chile.

There is no doubt that state welfare helps to improve the material conditions of people but it does not change the value society attributes to them. People are not immediately considered worthy when they access this minimum of economic welfare. It improves their material conditions and allows them to have enough to live, but their status, dignity and equality conditions in society remain untouched. This appears clearly when we make a comparison between countries. In Germany, there is a strong Welfare State, with a good unemployment and pension system and with good public education, at least in comparison to other countries with weaker welfare states. However, the status of the person, in the sense of the way this person is valued in society, does not improve just because they have access to this economic and social security. Sometimes, even their dignity is put at stake when they have to ask for long term welfare help, and the ones who use it frequently are seen as lazy and undeserving. Hence, in some cases to use these benefits is even seen as a case of falling below the dignity line²⁸. Therefore, to consider that a poverty line is the same as a dignity line is a big mistake that the inequalities approach has been doing.

“The existence of a “line of dignity” in all capitalist societies shows that there is a moral hierarchy, which is legitimized in the same way in all capitalist societies. The meritocratic myth is the core of symbolic domination in capitalist societies and it articulates its inherent symbolic inequality in its devaluation and humiliation of the socially worthless and excluded” (Rehbein and Souza, 2015; 30)

Thus, the measure of dignity is not determined by a minimum of economic and social security but by the value that people have in society regarding this moral hierarchy that divides the worthy and the unworthy.

As a result, inequality continues to be reproduced, since the minimum of dignity required to be considered a worthy human being is not obtained through these minimal economic benefits. In spite of having economic benefits, people continue having disadvantages in other aspects of their lives. Nevertheless, this failure in becoming a worthy human being is attributed to them. It is considered their fault to be unworthy and therefore, it is considered fair that they are under this line of dignity, because “they deserve it”.

Welfare support definitely helps people and improves their material conditions but it does not bring them automatically dignity and it does not end inequalities. Even in countries with a stronger welfare state such as Germany or the Netherlands, the system does not put an end to inequalities in society; it improves the lives of people who have access to it but does not change the social structure.

Marshall mixes economic capital with other capitals like cultural, social and symbolic capital, as if they were automatically exchangeable. These capitals can be transformed one into another but the exchange is not automatic (Fröhlich and Rehbein, 2009; Bourdieu, 1986). Consequently, Marshall and most of the theories on inequality forget the social meaning of practices and consider the economic capital as a direct medium to obtain a minimum of dignity. There is no doubt that it helps and that both terms (economic capital and dignity) are related, but focusing on material reality or goods without paying attention to the valuation of practices and positions, shows the valuation as a mere consequence of the material reality. This belief just reproduces inequalities and as Rehbein and Souza (2014c) and Weiss (2010) argue, it renders invisible the mechanism that reproduces inequality.

²⁸ In the case of Germany, especially when the welfare benefit asked is Hartz IV.

Even though Marshall also confuses economic security with dignity, he noticed that status and the social value of a person are important for the definition of citizenship and for the achievement of equality. He even recognizes that this valuation of people or “being civilized” can vary in different societies. Rehbein and Souza (2014a) also state that this hierarchy of dignity is present in every society, even when the content can vary. In richer or poorer countries, in countries with a strong or weak welfare state, the mechanism of reproduction of inequality is more or less the same and it is based on this moral hierarchy of dignity.

The second assumption, besides the assumption that a minimum of economic welfare is the same as dignity, is that citizenship is attached to welfare state and equality. This is not an empirical reality since the concept of citizenship existed even before the welfare state and exists in different countries with different degrees of state protection. This also makes empirically clear that citizenship is not necessarily an equality principle; it is a legal status that gives access to certain rights and duties and grants belonging. This becomes clearer when analyzing migration. Even in a globalized world, when we consider migrants, refugees or simply international exchange, citizenship operates as a legal and belonging inclusion or exclusion term, which determines who has certain rights in a certain country (or region as in the case of the European Union), who hasn’t, and under which conditions.

Citizenship is a legal and social (belonging) category. Citizenship itself expresses that certain people equally belong to a certain nation-state and because of that, this nation-state offers them protection; but not equality. Consequently, the focus that theories on poverty and inequalities have put on the role of welfare state in taming capitalism and softening inequalities is also misleading. Welfare state only brings social protection but not equality.

Section 4: The illegitimate citizens and the process of ethnification

As mentioned before, to be a citizen or not of a certain nation-state, entails different resources and involves a different valorization of people. Therefore, citizenship works as a symbolic capital that gives more or less value to the person depending on the citizenship or citizenships a person bears and how it is valued in different countries. Symbolic capital is a special kind of capital as it accompanies the economic, cultural and social one; it is the one that makes the other kinds of capitals recognizable. Valuation, status, prominence and even recognition are symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1998), but they only become symbolic capital when they are perceived and recognized as such (Fröhlich and Rehbein, 2009; 138). Every capital type needs recognition and a symbolic dimension to have a value. Hence, citizenship as status, recognition and valuation of belonging to the nation-state, operates as a symbolic capital.

Due to eurocentrism and colonialism, North Atlantic countries are more valued than the ones from the Global South. Therefore, citizenship from North Atlantic countries has higher symbolic value than citizenship from Southern countries in an international context. A German or US passport has more value than an Indian or Chilean one, because some positive characteristics are attributed to the former while less valuable ones are attributed to the latter. Grosfoguel (2004) argues that there is a hierarchy of power between countries and regions in the world, which is based on the history of colonization, being it territorial, political or just economical colonization. This hierarchy is expressed in symbolic capital; bringing to individual more or less value.

However, we know that citizenship is not the only category that determines the position that people have in society and the different opportunities they have access to, but it also plays a role becoming an opportunity or a barrier. This position is determined by habitus, the amount of valuable capitals a person has (economic, cultural, social and symbolic) and also by other relevant categories depending on the historical context such as ethnicity, race, gender and religion²⁹ as proposed by intersectionality theory (Crenshaw, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 2006).

Citizenship is a category that distinguishes citizens from migrants, refugees, and aliens. Nevertheless, due to the intersectionality of categories of social classification, not all migrants are in a worse position than the citizens of a country because it also depends on their capitals, habitus and other categories as gender, age, religion, region, race and ethnicity.

Between all these categories, there are two that are intimately related to belonging and therefore to citizenship; the ascriptive or voluntary membership to racial/ethnic groups and the migration status. There are certain citizens whose citizenship is devalued and delegitimized; they are legal citizens but in the social life their legitimate belonging to the nation-state is put at stake. This has consequences for the opportunities these people have to carry out the activities that are valued in society. This happens to ethnic groups within a nation-state as Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India but also to some ethnicized migrants as Turkish in Germany and the Netherlands or Algerians in France, between others (Grosfoguel, 2004). Consequently, some migrants suffer the same process of ethnification that native population suffered during colonization or formation of nation-states.

Consequently, illegitimate citizenship is specifically an ethnicized citizenship that affects ethnic groups as indigenous people but also ethnicized migrants. This is a citizenship problem as their legitimate belonging to the nation-state is put at stake but it is also simultaneously an inequality problem. Their ethnic habitus is less valued and as a consequence they had historically less access to capital and resources and that also affects the opportunities they have now to participate in different spheres of society (job market, education, health, politics, etc).

This does not mean that other groups of people do not suffer inequalities; they do. As mentioned before, the aim of this study is not to rank the different kind of oppressions, building a hierarchy to determine which groups suffer more discrimination or experience more inequalities. The focus is to analyze a specific kind of inequality regarding citizenship and its dimension of belonging that affects specifically some ethnic groups and ethnicized migrants.

Different mechanisms are used to devalue the citizenship of ethnic groups and ethnicized migrants, from racist discrimination to invisibilization of their history and a constant reminder that they are outsiders. Hence, race, ethnicity and different cultural practices (habitus) are the main point of devaluation and are at the same time related with other categories of inequalities such as social class, gender, and caste and religion in the case of India. All these other categories intersect and influence this devaluation of citizenship and are at the same time influenced by this devaluation. Ethnicity, race and migration status are intrinsically related to the belonging dimension of citizenship (in some countries religion as well), while other categories of inequalities such as gender, class and caste are not, even though they are all interrelated and influence each other.

²⁹ In some contexts, religion is relevant for the social position, while in others not.

For example, a person from a very low socioeconomic position could suffer discriminations and humiliations but her belonging to the nation-state will not necessarily be put at stake. Even an outcaste person in India who is humiliated and still nowadays suffers atrocities, will be considered part of the national state (the lowest and more discriminated part of the country, but part of it). Its belonging is not challenged as it will be in the case of a person from North East India, whose belonging will be permanently contested because of racial, cultural and religious differences. The questioning of the belonging of Northeasterners to India occurs even if they are formal citizens and even if some of them are in a good social position with good amount of economic, cultural and social capital. This does not mean that the life of Northeasterners is more difficult than other people in India but it means that their citizenship has been delegitimized and because of that, one dimension of their social position is less valued. This devaluation in one aspect of their lives interacts with other categories of classification affecting their positioning in the social structure. They are discriminated against, sometimes even humiliated and that affects their dignity, which also affects the opportunities they have.

Conversely, this delegitimation of the belonging dimension of citizenship is a specific kind of inequality that questions the belonging to the nation-state, affecting the recognition of people and devaluing their dignity as citizens in a specific form. They are constituted as illegitimate and ethnicized citizens and this produces and reproduces inequalities, having effects on the opportunities they have to live a valuable life. This aspect will be analyzed in Part II of this dissertation, where the empirical case of Mapuches in Chile and Northeastern Indians will be analyzed.

The constitution of illegitimate ethnicized citizens is not a new phenomenon and has deep historical causes, but the mechanisms that delegitimize these groups have changed and are becoming subtler and difficult to recognize. The main mechanisms are the belief in a homogeneous national culture within the nation-state; the presence of contemporary racial devaluations (Weiss, 2001 and 2010; Terkessidis, 2004; Essed, 1991; Balibar, 1991) and the invisibilization of their own history (Foucault, 1972; Bourdieu, 1998; Wallerstein, 1991; Laclau, 2000).

Chapter 3: Nation State building: Homogenization and legitimacy

As mentioned in chapter 1, illegitimate citizenship is an ethnitized citizenship another way of naming a colonial citizenship or a citizenship inserted in this capitalist/patriarchal/white/military Eurocentric and Christian centered world system. This illegitimate citizenship is a culturally devalued citizenship. The illegitimacy of citizenship is based on the historical-cultural dimension of boundary construction. This analysis of citizenship explains how historical experiences gave form to culturally “legitimate” membership in a nation-state. The illegitimacy I am analyzing is centered in the cultural dimension of citizenship, the one that is referred when we talk about the concept of **nation**.

In order to understand the concept of citizenship, its different dimensions and its relationship with inequalities, in this chapter we will describe and analyze the Nation State Building: the process of homogenization and formation of legitimacy.

Section 1: Nation-state building³⁰: the concentration of capital and the achievement of legitimacy

For Bourdieu the state is the result of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or informational capital, and symbolic capital. Moreover, he gives a central importance to symbolic capital. He argues that the state functions as “*a kind of central Bank for symbolic capital*” (Bourdieu, 1993a; 268). That means that the State is not only a legal-political institution but it also administers symbolic capital.

The Nation-State building occurred inside this colonial world system, where different hierarchies and expressions of oppression take place. These hierarchies operate in different levels. Not every Nation-State has the same value in this hierarchy in the world-system. There is a transnational, interstate level and intra-national level. Inside every Nation-State there is a constitution of inferior and superior people based mainly in class and ethno-racial oppressions (González Casanova, 2006; Wallerstein, 1991). Ethno-racial oppressions have been conceptualized by some Marxist perspectives as internal colonialism (oppression of one ethnic group against other ones) as it was mentioned in chapter 1 (González Casanova, 2006; Hind, 1984). In this interaction between Nation-States and people, there is a group that result privileged and conform a transnational elite.

Consequently, citizenship constitutes a capital with an exchange value that became evident when people move across countries. Beyond the Nation-State, citizenship becomes a resource or capital in a hierarchical colonial world system, granting people with more or less value, depending on their class but also on the value attached to their country of origin and their ethno-racial features. Therefore, this capital (citizenship) intersects with other factors of oppression as class, gender and ethno-racial features. Hence, citizenship entails in itself a clear contradiction as a principle supposed to ensure equality, while instead it forms part of a dispositive that hides inequalities inside and beyond the Nation-State.

³⁰ By process of nation-state building I am not referring only to the formation of nation-states within Europe- by unification and reunification. I am referring also to the process of independence of colonized countries as is the case of Latin-America and the Caribbean, African and Asian countries and also the nation-state re-building of ex socialist countries.

Bourdieu's (1998) definition of the state uses a variation of Max Weber (2002 (1922)) famous formula that proposes that the state is an institution which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force or violence over a specific territory and over the totality of its population. To this definition, Bourdieu (1998) adds that the state also has the monopoly over the symbolic violence. The state is competent in the application of symbolic violence because it incarnates itself simultaneously as objective and subjective structures.

Objective structures are specific organizational structures and mechanisms while subjective structures are composed by mental structures and categories of perception and thought. Therefore, the state realizes itself in social objective structures and social mental structures (Bourdieu, 1998) as well as citizenship.

*"By realizing itself in social structures and in the mental structures adapted to them, the instituted institutions make us forget that it issues out of a long series of acts of **institution** (in the active sense) and hence has all the appearances of the **natural**"*³¹ (Bourdieu, 1998; 40)

Bourdieu (1998) proposes that for a rupture with this naturalization and essentialization of institutions the more potent tool is the reconstruction of the historical genesis as it has been also posited by Michel Foucault and his concept of genealogy. Historical genesis means a review of the early beginnings of institutions (Foucault, 1972). It entails an examination of the conflicts and confrontations and therefore all the possibilities discarded, making with it clear that things could have been and still could be otherwise. Through this revision, it is possible to question the "possible", which among all others alternatives was actualized (Bourdieu, 1998)

One of the major powers of the state is to produce and impose - especially through the school system - categories of thought that are spontaneously applied to all things of the social world, including the state itself (Bourdieu, 1998).

Bourdieu (1998) outlines a model of emergence of the state in order to illustrate the historical logic of the process of its institution. In this historical revision he does not analyze essences but uncovers variants.

*"The state is the **culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital**: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital. It is this concentration as such which constitutes the state as the holder of a sort of metacapital granting power over other species of capital and over their holders. Concentration of the different species of capital (which proceeds hand in hand with the construction of the corresponding fields) leads indeed to the emergence of a specific, properly statist capital (**capital étatique**) which enables the state to exercise power over the different fields and over the different particular species of capital, and especially over the rates of conversion between them (and thereby over the relations of force between their respective holders)"*³² (Bourdieu, 1998; 42)

Therefore, the building of the state leads immediately to the construction of a *field of power*, defined as the space of play where the holders of capital (of different species) struggle in particular for power over the state. In other words, they struggle over the statist capital, which grants power over the other

³¹ Highlighted words are from the original text

³² Highlighted words are from the original text

different species of capital and over their reproduction (mainly through the school system) (Bourdieu, 1998)

Although all different aspects of this historical process of concentration of capitals are interdependent, Bourdieu (1998) examines them separately due to explicative reasons. He shows that most models of genesis of the state have privileged in first place the concentration of the physical force capital. The forces of coercion (army and police), which are institutions mandated to guarantee order, were progressively separated from the ordinary social world. Physical violence could only be applied by a specialized group, centralized and disciplined, especially mandated for such an end and clearly identified as such within society. The professional army progressively causes the disappearance of feudal troops. Therefore, this army obtains the monopoly of military function (Bourdieu, 1998).

The concentration of physical force capital requires the establishment of an efficient fiscal system in order to maintain this professional army. Thus, the concentration of physical force capital goes together with the unification of the economic space and the creation of a national market. The concentration and specialization of physical force is directly related with the institution of a tax system that allows having economic capital for the development of armed forces, necessary for the expansion and defense of the territory under control. Consequently, it progressively established a specific economic logic, founded on taxes without counterpart and redistribution. With time these taxes that at the beginning were imposed by force, were considered legitimate and recognized as valid, which was the basis for the conversion of economic capital into symbolic capital. This symbolic capital was at first concentrated in the person of the prince and later into the groups that participate actively in the building of the modern nation-state (Bourdieu, 1998).

Even today the state imposes via constraint the payment of taxes but it also enjoys legitimacy and recognition. The institution of the tax was the result of internal war waged by the agents of the state against the resistance of the subjects. Therefore, the concentration of armed forces and of the financial resources necessary to maintain them needed to achieve legitimacy through the concentration of a symbolic capital of recognition. Hence, the official collector of taxes had to be officially identified as such and had to be recognized as legitimate by the taxpayers (Bourdieu, 1998).

At the beginning taxation was conceived illegitimate. Nevertheless, it was slowly considered as a necessary tribute to the needs of a beneficiary that transcends the king, constituting a “fictive body” incarnated in the state.

Bourdieu points out that many authors (Elias, 1982; Tilly, 1992; Duberge, 1961) agree that the progressive development of the legitimate recognition of official taxation is related with the rise of a form of nationalism. These authors even argue that the broad-based collection of taxes has presumably contributed to the unification of the territory or *“to the construction, both in reality and in representation, of the state as a unitary territory, as a reality unified by its submission to the same obligations, themselves imposed by the imperatives of defense”* (Bourdieu, 1998; 44-45).

The state progressively inscribes itself in a space that is not yet the national space or the national state it will later become. It starts proclaiming itself as a fount of sovereignty, with for example the monopoly of the right to coin money as the basis of a transcendent symbolic value.

Together with the concentration of economic and symbolic capital linked to the establishment of unified taxation, there exists also a concentration of informational capital. Cultural capital is one dimension of informational dimension, which is itself correlated with the unification of the cultural

market. Since long time ago authorities perform surveys such as census to have a registration of the resources inside a territorial unity. Hence, the state concentrates, treats, and redistributes information creating a theoretical unification (Bourdieu, 1998).

Section 2: Homogenization and legitimacy

Culture is unifying and homogenized. Nassehi (2010) posits that all national building processes were political processes that produced imaginations of unity, of a common world and of reasonable claims for solidarity. Bourdieu (1998) argues that the state contributes to the unification of the cultural market by unifying linguistic and juridical codes, and by effecting a homogenization of all forms of communication, including bureaucratic communication, educational structures and social rituals. Therefore, the state shapes - especially through education- mental structures and imposes a common vision and forms of thinking that are commonly designated as national identity.

Universally imposing (within the limits of its authority) a dominant culture constituted a legitimate national culture. This has also been conceptualized as hegemonic culture by some post-structuralists authors. Laclau (2000) argues that hegemony presupposes the existence of unequal power relations. For hegemony to exist the dichotomy universality / particularity has to be overcome by universalizing one particularity. Universality exists only if it incarnates some particularity, thus no particularity can have political effects if it is not universalizing. This leads to an inherent problem of hegemonic relationships; if the universal and the particular need and reject themselves simultaneously, they become impossible and necessary at the same time. Therefore, for a hegemonic relationship to exist a particularity needs to be represented as universal even when it is a particularity in strict sense. Therefore, hegemony entails always an imposition that is contingent and historically determined. Bourdieu argues that the state guarantees all acts of authority, which are arbitrary and misrecognized as such; they are "*acts of legitimate imposture*" (Bourdieu, 1998; 51-52).

Consequently, the legitimate national culture is the hegemonization of one particular culture universalized as the legitimate one for the whole nation-state. From the perspective of internal colonialism there is not only class oppression inside the Nation-States but also some ethnic based domination. Thus, there is not only imperialism and class oppression but also an ethnic oppression (González Casanova, 2006; Hind, 1984; Wallerstein, 1991). Therefore, many authors have studied how the culture of one specific group is enacted as the legitimate national one because they have the power to do so, even though they are just a particular group as well as the groups that have been relegated as secondary ones (Bourdieu, 1998; Nassehi, 2010; Wallerstein, 1991). This legitimate national culture is reproduced mainly at the school system, especially through the teaching of history, where the fundamental presuppositions of the national self-image are inculcated, in a similar way of a true "civic religion" (Bourdieu, 1998).

Cultural unification is accompanied by the imposition of the dominant language as the legitimate one and by the rejection of all other languages into indignity (denoted as local dialects) (Bourdieu, 1998). A particular culture and language is enacted as the universal inside the nation-state while the others are considered particular and relegated to have less power. Universalizing one particular culture is a hegemonic process attached to legitimacy, while the process of marginalizing other collectivities has been conceptualized as ethnification (Oommen, 1997; Grosfoguel, 2004). For Spivak (1988), this process implies always the use of an epistemic violence (violence in knowledge production) that constructs the other as a subaltern of a self; a self that is putted at the center as reference of the valid, true and legitimate.

However, this universalization of requirements from the legitimate or hegemonic culture, which is officially instituted, does not come with a universalization of access to the means needed to fulfill them *“This fosters both the monopolization of the universal by the few and the dispossession of all others, who are, in a way, thereby mutilated in their humanity”* (Bourdieu, 1998; 47).

As a result, we can appreciate that the creation of a national culture is directly tied to the building process of the nation-state and the accumulation of capital, which finally allows the state to have the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence. As a result of all these processes, together with the emergence of a nation-state and national culture, a particular privileged group and subaltern groups are established. The privileged group or groups are different in diverse nation-states depending on the historical context of their formation.

Section 3: Legitimacy and the constitution of groups through symbolic power

For Bourdieu, Laclau and Foucault legitimacy is achieved in the social world by an arbitrary imposture of the dominant groups in society, who have the means and power to do so. For Bourdieu, the agents apply structures of perception and appreciation that are issued out of the objective structures themselves. Therefore, they seem evident and are not a deliberate symbolic imposition. For Laclau, in a hegemonic operation, the agents also use the signifiers that were inscribed as legitimate in a determined historical period. This brings coherent meaning to the social relations at that period and therefore, they also seem evident (Laclau, 2000). Every particularity has the tendency to universalize its claims and they always have pretensions of power; the same way that for Foucault every discourse also has it. Political struggle of different particularities in society becomes a resistance to the current hegemonic power. Consequently, for Laclau, the concept of hegemony, as legitimacy of the group with more power in the nation-state, can be more easily defied through counter hegemonic movements. While from Bourdieu's perspective, a resistance requires a more structural and whole encompassing change that could be achieved revealing the arbitrariness of the current structures.

“Legitimation of the social world is not, as some believe, the product of a deliberate and purposive action of propaganda or symbolic imposition; it results, rather, from the fact that agents apply to the objective structures of the social world, structures of perception and appreciation that are issued out of these very structures and which tend to picture the world as evident” (Bourdieu, 1989: 21).

Even though Bourdieu as well as Laclau and Foucault highlight the symbolic universe, they also emphasize the fact that symbolic codifications have effects in objective structures. Foucault, through his concept of *dispositif* (apparatus, device), articulates in a configuration power and discourse, and also its consequences for social institutions and practices (Rehbein, 2015). Laclau has a discursive approach of the social construction of reality and he also recognizes that the symbolic reality is at the same time a practical reality; rejecting the distinction between existence and conscience. However, both authors situate their analysis in a discursive level and from there they connect it with the analysis of social relations, that might create a structure or not. While Bourdieu conceives the structures themselves as symbolical, they are objective and subjective structures at the same time.

Despite the differences encountered between these three authors and their concepts of legitimacy, hegemony and discourse, I consider hegemony to be a complementary concept to understand legitimacy especially in a discursive level. Legitimacy is broader and more precise to understand the formation of the state and its configuration of power through the concentration of symbolic capital. However, hegemony opens space for understanding the resistance or new claims for recognition of

groups relegated as secondary, and it also helps to explore the cultural heterogeneity of the dominant group or groups. Hegemony evokes a concept of power that goes beyond a homogeneous symbolic universe and posits a socially differentiated and multiple one. Symbolic power over the state entails one kind of domination but there are many others. Hegemony expresses the power struggle in a multiple discursive level while legitimation of the social world shows the coherence that subjective structures have with objective social ones, as well as the construction and classification of groups. Hegemony does not explain the creation of groups or their nomination but influence this process from a discursive and a more politically oriented level³³.

Objective relations of power tend to reproduce themselves in relations of symbolic power. In the symbolic struggle for the production of common sense, or more accurately, for the monopoly over legitimate naming, agents put into action the symbolic capital they have attained in previous struggles. This symbolic capital is not necessarily juridical. It can be expressed for example, in titles of nobility, educational credentials, or the recognition of bureaucrats (as official representatives of the state). They become true titles of symbolic property, which give social recognition and as such the right to profit from it (Bourdieu, 1998).

Symbolic capital is officially guaranteed and juridically instituted by *official nomination*. *Official nomination* is the act that grants someone a title or a socially recognized qualification “*is one of the most typical expressions of the monopoly over legitimate symbolic violence, which belongs to the state or to its representatives*” (Bourdieu, 1989:21). The state, which produces the official classification, is in one sense the “*supreme tribunal*” The state, thus, acts as the central bank of symbolic capital, which guarantees all certificates (experts, physicians, jurists, etc.) (Bourdieu, 1989:21). This is why the concept of Weber regarding the state may be generalized, arguing that the state **is the possessor of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence**, or more precisely, the state act as a powerful referee in struggles over this monopoly.

This is a different approach of legitimacy that the one proposed by Habermas and the rule of law, where citizens as a political community recognize the state and law as legitimate, if rules are created under certain democratic procedures that ensure political participation and deliberation (Habermas, 1998).

However, in the struggle for the production of the legitimate vision of the social world, the holders of bureaucratic authority never possess an absolute monopoly, even if they add the authority of science to their bureaucratic authority, as government economists and other experts do. There are always conflicts between symbolic powers that aim at imposing the vision of *legitimate classifications*, that is, at constructing groups from their own points of view. Symbolic power, in this sense, is a power of world making. World-making creates social classifications that “*organize the perception of the social world and, under certain conditions, can really organize the world itself*” (Bourdieu, 1989:22).

Symbolic power can build groups or form peoplehood as Wallerstein (1991) posit it, but in order to do that, the possession of symbolic capital is necessary. The power to impose social divisions depends on the social authority acquired in previous struggles. “*Symbolic capital is a credit; it is the power granted*

³³ Laclau took the concept of hegemony from Gramsci, who defined it as the power of ideas that the dominant group exercises throughout society, which are uncritically accepted. Even though the concept has been reformulated, its political intention and focus on the discursive level remains.

to those **who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition**" (Bourdieu, 1989; 23). In this way, the power of making a new group can be obtained only as the result of a long process of institutionalization, where also a representative is instituted. This representative receives from the group the power to make the group (Bourdieu, 1989).

*"symbolic power is a power of consecration or revelation, the power to consecrate or to reveal things that are already there (...) A group, a class, a gender, a region, or a nation exist as such, for those who belong to it as well as for the others, only when it is distinguished, according to one principle or another, from other groups, that is, through **knowledge and recognition (connaissance et reconnaissance)**" (Bourdieu, 1989: 23).*

Therefore, symbolic power is the power to make groups, to construct people and subjects and therefore, to influence the objective structure of society. Therefore, the group (the class, the nation, the ethnic group or any other social collective) exists when there are individuals who can affirm that they are the group, by the mere fact of speaking on its behalf and of being recognized as allowed to do so by the people who thereby recognize themselves as members of this group. As a result, for the group to exist there might be a representative and it has to be **recognized as legitimate by the group**. It has to **bear symbolic capital**. Therefore, any group as a class, a nation, or any other social reality needs to be distinguished from other groups; for their own as well as for the others (Bourdieu, 1989).

Legal consecration of symbolic capital confers an absolute and universal value even though the relativity is, by definition, inherent to every point of view. Thus, legal consecration is also a particular point of view taken from a particular position in social space. Consequently, the concentration of juridical capital is one aspect of a larger process of concentration of symbolic capital in its different forms. This capital is the base of the specific authority of the controller of state power and in particular of a very mysterious power; the power of nomination (Bourdieu, 1998).

In the formation of the state *"there is a shift from a diffuse symbolic capital, resting solely on collective recognition, to an objectified symbolic capital, codified, delegated and guaranteed by the state, in a word bureaucratized"* (Bourdieu, 1998; 50 - 51).

Therefore, nomination, as a completely mysterious power of the state is instituted as the power of designation. The state is thus constituted as the source of honor and privilege and it is in charge of distributing them (Bourdieu, 1998). The nomination or the certificates are official acts or discourses; they are symbolically effective only because they are accomplished in a situation of authority by authorized people. These people are acting in the name of a function or a position assigned by the state.

"The sentence of the judge or the grade of the professor, the procedures of official registration, certified reports or minutes, all the acts meant to carry legal effect, such as certificates of birth, marriage, or death, etc., all manners of public summons as performed with the required formalities by the appropriate agents (judges, notaries, bailiffs, officers of état civil) and duly registered in the appropriate office, all these facts invoke the logic of official nomination to institute socially guaranteed identities (as citizen, legal resident, voter, tax payer, parent, property owner) as well as legitimate unions and groupings (families, associations, trades unions, parties, etc)" (Bourdieu, 1998; 52).

Therefore, as an authority, it is stated what a being (thing or person) is allowed to be, what they have a right (and duty) to be, which is the *social being* that they might claim to be. In these cases, the state

exercises a genuinely creative “quasi-divine” power (Bourdieu, 1998). This is what happens in the case of the creation of peoplehood as citizens, nations or ethnic groups, made by the State.

Part II: Empirical Analysis

Chapter 4: The Illegitimate and ethnicized citizenship of Northeasterners in India

Introduction

This dissertation aims to demonstrate how the citizenship of certain ethnic groups has suffered a delegitimation in two current democratic countries. Citizenship is a legal and symbolic status that expresses membership in specific nation-states. A delegitimation is produced when the legal dimension is recognized while the belonging dimension is denied or recognized only as folklore or “exotization”. The delegitimation of citizenship is mainly produced by the process of ethnification of these groups through the invisibility of their history as well as racist devaluations.

Many Northeasterners have features denoting Tai, Tibeto-Burman, and Mon- Khmer lineages that are better known as “mongoloid features”, which mark them as different from the rest of the Indian population with the exception of some Northeasterners from Assam. India contains many communities considered as “others” based on religion, caste, and even ethnicity, such as Muslims, Dalits and Adivasis. However, the citizenship and origin of these communities are not questioned in the same way as in the case of Northeasterners. The other minority communities can integrate to the heartland (rarely completely) in ways that North-East migrants cannot. This does not mean in any case that these other “others” do not face devaluation and violence; but the devaluation is different. In the case of Northeasterners, they face a specific kind of racism related to the similarity of their features with people from Southeast Asia and this puts at stake constantly their belonging to the Nation-state.

The ethnification process started during the process of nation-state building, where a cultural and linguistic homogenization took place. One particular language (Hindi) and culture (Hindu) was enacted as universal and legitimate. The cultural groups with less power and legitimacy were constituted as ethnic groups and suffered a process of ethnification. This process constituted them as the “other” opposed to the “self” (Oomen, 1997; Spivak, 1988). They were constituted as the “others” inside the nation-state because their culture and identity was different from the one defined as legitimate. They were constituted as citizens with less power and social recognition. Simultaneously, every nation-state wrote an official history where its legitimate (and hegemonic) identity is defined; relegating other identities and cultures as less important.

This delegitimation of the citizenship of ethnic group affects the access to certain resources and opportunities that exist in society, even when this access also depends on the social class. Illegitimate citizens are considered less valuable and with less dignity due to the ethnic/racist devaluation they suffer and therefore they encounter certain barriers to access to resources and have to constantly prove that they are trustworthy. These barriers in the case of Northeasterners are not only economic as most of the Northeastern migrants belong to the relatively high segments of society. Their barriers are symbolical and related with their origin as a negative symbolic capital. Therefore, they are forced to constantly prove they are valuable and have to fight against stereotypes. Consequently, illegitimate citizenship is a particular form of inequality as it was widely discussed in chapter 2 on the relationship between citizenship and inequalities.

In this chapter, I examine how the Northeastern part of India has been historically constituted as peripherality, not only geographically but also politically and socially. Their history has been made invisible and they suffer racist stereotypes and devaluations, which constitute them as the “others” inside India. Even though they are not the only minorities inside the country, they suffer a specific kind of inequality: the belonging aspect of their citizenship has been denied, constituting them as illegitimate citizens.

In order to demonstrate the process of citizenship delegetimization of Northeastern Indians, a historical as well as an empirical analysis has been performed for this dissertation. The empirical qualitative study focused on analyzing the experiences of delegetimization that Northeasterners migrating to Delhi face. The purpose is to focus on their experiences of devaluation outside their own regions and confronted with the so called “mainstream India” (places where the hegemonic identity of India is exacerbated)³⁴. However, the reference to their region and their experiences back home is always present.

To be able to understand the formation of Northeast India as peripherality, it is necessary in the first place (Section 1), to contextualize Northeast India and describe its specific characteristics as well as the migration process to “mainstream India” and the profile of the Northeasterners that migrate to Delhi. Secondly (Section 2), the chapter presents a historical perspective showing the progressive constitution of Northeast as peripherality. Thirdly, (Section 3) this chapter presents a detailed analysis of the mechanisms that produce and reproduce the Illegitimacy of citizenship, using the interviews conducted during fieldwork in India. Here the tensions with the Indian legitimate culture are shown as well as the racist classificatory devaluations they suffer, besides the lack of knowledge about this region from the rest of the Indian population. This chapter finishes by describing the ways in which Northeasterners develop strategies of resistance regarding the illegitimation of their citizenship (Section 4) and with some conclusions.

Section 1: Contextualization and specific characteristics of Northeast India

1) The region

Northeast India, as the name itself refers to, is a region located in the north east border of India. It is a region lying on the crossroads between India and Southeast Asia. This region is composed of 8 federal states connected to East India via a narrow corridor squeezed between Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan as it can be seen in the map. It comprises the contiguous “Seven Sister States”: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura—and the Himalayan state of Sikkim, the “brother state” included as a part of the Northeast India only in 2002 (Mac Duieu-Ra, 2012a).

³⁴ This concept will be defined in this chapter.

FIGURE 1: MAP OF INDIA AND NORTHEAST INDIA



In terms of geographical size, Northeast India constitutes about 8% of India. Northeast India's population (all the 8 states together) is approximately 39 million (Indian census 2011). This represents 3.1% of the total Indian population (1,210 million) (Indian Census, 2011). The Siliguri Corridor in West Bengal, with a width of 21 to 40 kilometers (13 to 25 miles), connects the North Eastern region with central India. The region shares more than 4,500 kilometers of international border (about 90% of its entire border area) with China (South Tibet) to the north, Myanmar to the east, Bangladesh to the southwest, and Bhutan to the northwest (Mac Duieu-Ra, 2012a).

The states are officially recognized under the North Eastern Council (NEC), constituted in 1971 as the acting agency for the development of the 8 states. The North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd (NEDFi) was incorporated in 1995 and the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (DoNER) was set up in September 2001 (Mac Duieu-Ra, 2012a).

FIGURE 2: MAP OF NORTHEAST INDIAN STATES



Sikkim was included as a part of Northeast India mainly due to public policy reasons. Many authors and analysis do not consider it as a part of Northeast India because of the geographical and cultural difference with the other states of the Northeast and because it was included as part of it very recently in the history (Dikshit and Dikshit, 2014). In this research it was also not possible to find anyone from Sikkim to conduct interviews, which is due to the fact that only few people from this state migrate to Delhi. This research also does not include any person from the district of Darjeeling. Even though Darjeeling belongs to the state of West Bengal, many people - especially the Nepali-speaking population- consider themselves geographically, ethnically and historically closer to Northeast than to West Bengal. In West Bengal Nepali-speaking people constitute a minority whose attempts for autonomy were violently suppressed. Many consider they face similar illegitimization as the Northeasterners do. These Nepali-speaking ethnic group from West Bengal have more similarities with the Northeast than with West Bengal and many do not understand why they do not belong to Sikkim, which is the only state in India with Nepali ethnic majority. Until the early 19th century, some parts of Darjeeling were even controlled by the kingdom of Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal (Dasgupta, 1999). Therefore, the history of Darjeeling is more intertwined with Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan than it is with the rest of India³⁵.

a) Fewer opportunities

The Northeast of India is one of the less developed areas in India. Industrially it is the most backwards region (Prasain and Singh, 2008). Therefore, it offers limited educational and employment opportunities, which is one of the main reasons for emigration.

There are many conflicts and tensions in the region, which include religious, ethnic and communal clashes; tensions between local and migrant population³⁶ and insurgency and tensions between locals and army (presence of AFSPA). All these conflicts affect the presence of schools in the more disturbed areas. Therefore, besides the lack of infrastructure and resources, the conflict also affects education. Not many teachers want to go to the Northeast as it is considered a disturbed area, which is added to the already existing high levels of absenteeism of teachers that affects the whole of India.

“the government school that is there, the so called Government free education, there are no teachers, teachers don’t go there, people don’t want to go to Assam, because supposedly is a disturbed area” (Female master student, 23 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

This fact also helps to build the stereotype of Northeasterners as backwards and not so good with studies. Private sector and non-governmental business establishments are lacking in the region. Private sector companies do not invest in North East India due to the sociopolitical crisis.

³⁵ In an interview conducted with a woman from Darjeeling, she argued she considers herself part of Northeast India as they are confronted with the same discriminations and problems. She also stated that even the fact that they are excluded from the Northeast and are not considered part of Sikkim, seems to her to be a “exclusion within the exclusion”. When looking into the map, Darjeeling seems to be part of the Northeast even geographically as it is the northern part of West Bengal and limits with Sikkim. On the other hand, the desire of every ethnic group to have a state on their own within India would be an extremely difficult enterprise as there are many different ethnic groups in different areas in India. From my point of view, this idea of making coincide every ethnicity with a territory is not the best solution for this problem but rather to make India more plural in accepting difference without putting always an identity as the “true, valuable and hegemonic culture”.

³⁶ The migrant population comes from other states inside India but also from Bangladesh, as in the case of Tripura.

However, in many places missionary schools were built. These schools teach especially good English (with British pronunciation) which has been transformed in a cultural capital for Northerners. Because of this good domain of English without the “characteristic Indian accent” they are preferred for certain jobs, as in call centers and in other services (Mac Duieu-Ra, 2012b).

“Only some of the people who are lucky get the chance to study at a good missionary school, they achieve more. But otherwise, government school is just hopeless, government schools just nobody come to class, nobody teaches and they just give a degree like that” (Male social activist, 26 years old, from Manipur living in Delhi)

“I was put into a boarding school running by the missionaries of Don Bosco, so all my education is from the missionary school (....) So in the Northeast you will find a missionary school everywhere! We all thanks to God, thanks to the foreign missionaries, they came, many of us were converted and also they established a lot of schools, colleges, hospitals, health centers” (Male, Human Resources University service, 43 Years old, from Manipur living in Delhi)

b) The presence of AFSPA

The Armed Forces Special Powers Acts (AFSPA) is an act that declares some areas as “disturbed areas” due to the existence of violent insurgency and separatist movements in the area. It was declared in 1958 for Nagaland and extended to the other regions of the Northeast afterwards. The Northeastern states are in a region that shared border disputes with China and East Pakistan (today Bangladesh). This act gives special powers to the military, similar to the ones that exist during dictatorship, as arrest under suspicion and use of force and even the right to kill if necessary. The army members are not responsible under civil law but under military law, which leads to impunity. AFSPA has been also the subject of wide debate and discussion between the government and NGOs as there have been reports on human rights violations. In 2001, there were some agreements of ceasefire with some states of Northeast and in 2005 the Jeevan Reddy committee submitted its recommendations. Anyways, AFSPA continues operating now with some changes (especially with ceasefire) and differently in every state of Northeast and it is still criticized by many³⁷ (The Armed Forces (Special Powers Act), 1958; Chadha, 2012)

2) The people

a) Tribal groups

North-East has more than 200 tribal groups. These groups arrived at different times and assumed different names. The present society of the North-East region of India is constituted by broadly two major ethnic groups: Mongoloids and Indo-Aryans, with a smaller Austric group represented by the Khasis and Jaintias. Features denoting “Mongoloid features” mark them as different from other Indian population.

There are suggestions that there is also a Negroid element in the population of the North-East, though it is not very visible. There is little doubt that the Mongoloid group appeared in the mountains, plateaus and valleys of North-East India much before the Indo- Aryans arrived in the Gangetic plain. This is clear

³⁷ AFSPA has been applied to the state of Jammu and Kashmir since 1990.

not only from the geographical spread of the Mongoloid group occupying even the remotest parts of the region, but also from the contiguity of the Tibeto-Burman region in the states of the North-East. The composite Hindu (i.e. Austric, Dravidian – Aryan or Indo- Gangetic) civilization reached the Mongoloid peoples of the North-East mountains and plains around 10th century BC, when the Vedas³⁸ were compiled (Chatterjee, 1950).

While there is almost a total absence of Indo-Aryan ethnic elements in Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and even the North Cachar Hills and Karbi- Anglong of Assam, the situation is not similar in the Assam valley, which shows an ethnic hybridization and the coexistence of Indo-Aryan ethnic elements with Mongoloid elements (Dikshit and Dikshit, 2014).

The Assam valley is a model of ethnic hybridisation of various groups, which descended in the valley at different periods. Here it is important to point out that religious affiliations were not directly related to either ethnicity or sequent occupation. Many of the early Mongoloid groups, initially perhaps without an established religion, were converted to Hinduism, particularly after the 15th century, and many others embraced Christianity during the last 150 years. Some other groups adopted Buddhism in close proximity to Tibet. The large number of tribes in North-East India represents groups and subgroups depending on the chronology of their arrival and their adaptation to local environment conditions. The major ethnic groups and areas of occupation can be defined on the basis of linguistic roots³⁹.

Three main regional groups based on linguistic roots, following Grierson's (1967 (1905)) *Linguistic Survey of India* and Chatterjee's (1950) elaborations on Grierson's scheme can be distinguished as follow:

1. Peripheral mountainous group (Tibeto-Burman languages)
 - (a) Arunachal Pradesh
 - (b) Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram (their languages are different but allied)
2. Central Assam and Tripura group (Tibeto-Burman speech of Assam and North Bengal)
 - (a) Bodo group
 - (b) Chin–Naga–Kuki Lushai group
3. Distinct Khasi- (Austric or Austro-Asiatic spoken languages)

b) Present categorizations

³⁸ The Vedas, which means "knowledge" in Sanskrit, are a large body of texts originating in ancient India. Composed in Vedic Sanskrit, the texts constitute the oldest layer of Sanskrit literature and the oldest scriptures of Hinduism (Radhakrishnan, S; Moore, 2006; Flood, 2003)

³⁹ For more information, see (Dikshit and Dikshit, 2014; 265-266)

Mac Duieu-Ra (2012a) argues that the region is populated by **3 main categories of people**, which is a consequence of the classification done during the British rule. This is useful for understanding the diversity and commonalities of the Northeastern population and how they were classified.

The first group that can be distinguished is the so called **Scheduled Tribes**. They make up the majority of the population in four out of the eight federal states in the region: Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland. They also compose the majority of the population in different autonomous districts in the other states.

The second are **ethnic groups** that share lineage with East and Southeast Asia but are not classified as tribal. As members of consolidated polities at the time of British expansion, neither of these groups was designated as a “backward tribe” or later as a Scheduled Tribe. In the colonial era, it was not simply ethnicity that determined whether a community was tribal or not, but also perceptions of political order, production methods, and the degree of “civilization” (see Guha 1999; Robb 1997). These communities include valley-dwellers, principally the Ahom of Assam, who trace their lineage to Tai-speaking people of Southeast Asia, and Meiteis of Manipur who speak a Tibeto-Burman tongue and trace their lineage to Yunnan in China and perhaps further east. This second group also includes the Sikkim population, itself a complex mix of ethnicities including Bhutia (Tibetan), Nepali, and Lepcha under various local reservation policies. The majority of the Ahom and Meitei communities practice Vaishnavite Hinduism, however with amazing degrees of variation and incorporation of older faiths and rituals (Mac Duieu-Ra, 2012a). Though Sikkimese people are both Hindu (60.9%) and Buddhist (28.1%) (Census of India, 2001), even the Buddhists celebrate all major Hindu festivals (Choudhury, 2006).

The third group is constituted of **migrant communities from other parts of India and surrounding countries**. In the Brahmaputra and Barak valleys, waves of migrants arrived through the expansion of the colonial economy, from the violence of the Partition in 1947, and from the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. Migrants continue to be drawn by construction work, the expansion of the agrarian frontier, and the lucrative illicit trade across international borders. Thus in some parts of the region such as western Assam, Assamese speakers coexist with speakers of Bengali, Bihari, Nepali, and tribal languages like Boro, Garo, and Santhali. By contrast, in the Mizo hills, a long armed struggle against the Indian state in the 1960s and 1970s led to the creation of the federal state of Mizoram in 1986 (a division from the former state of Assam). Bordered by Burma, Bangladesh and parts of Assam, Mizoram has maintained strict entry controls for non-Mizos. As a result, the Mizos, a Tibeto-Burman people, dominate most areas of the economy, government, and police. Thus, while internal diversity in Mizoram is limited, the distinctness of Mizo people from the rest of India is stark (Mac Duieu-Ra, 2012a)

The first group, the **Scheduled Tribes**, refers to communities listed under the **Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution**. It is important to point out that in India the concept “tribal” applies to two broad categories: **Fifth Schedule tribes** and **Sixth Schedule tribes**. This name refers to the section of the Indian Constitution where these tribes are “scheduled” or listed. **Sixth Schedule** tribes are primarily of Tibeto-Burman, Mon-Khmer, and Tai lineage and thus trace their roots to Southeast Asia and Southern China. **Fifth Schedule tribes** are mostly located in eastern and central India and are also referred to as

Adivasis. Adivasis are considered as a separate population from Sixth Schedule tribes from Northeast India. Indeed, until the colonial era, they inhabited different and unconnected territories. Their respective places in contemporary India are geographically, economically, politically, and socially separate. During the colonial era, many Adivasis were transported to an area of what is now Assam to work on tea plantations (Saikia, 2004). Many remain to this day, and some advocate for the recognition of their tribal status (Baruah 2010). Confusion arises when “tribal” is used interchangeably to refer to the different communities.

This dissertation refers only to tribal populations from the Northeast – that is, people identified as tribal by the **Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution**, who also identify themselves as tribal in the Northeast, and who trace their lineage to Tai, Tibeto-Burman and Mon-Khmer peoples. The **Sixth Schedule** protects tribal land from being owned by non-tribal people, and provides reservations in government employment at the federal, state and local levels and in universities and colleges. It also recognizes traditional institutions of governance at the local level and gives authority to traditional institutions to oversee land use and resolve customary disputes (though this varies in different parts of the region). In a very general sense, Scheduled Tribes in Northeast India are hill-dwelling communities (often called “hill tribes” in other parts of Asia) and speak Tibeto-Burman and Mon-Khmer languages. Many have strong ties to communities across international borders, particularly in Burma and China, and also further afield in Southeast Asia. Christianity is the dominant religion among tribal populations, with smaller communities of Buddhists and Animists (Mac Duieu-Ra, 2012a; 15).

In order to understand how different groups and categories were created in the Northeast, it is very useful to understand the reservation policies. Reservation is an affirmative program started in 1950. It was created for the most disadvantaged castes and tribes in India and grants quotas in universities (including scholarships), jobs in the public sector, and seats in political representation. The main purpose of reservations was to compensate these groups for millennia of discrimination based on birth and especially due to the practice of “untouchability”. In 1989, reservations were extended to the so called **Other Backwards Classes** based on the recommendations of the Mandal Commission. **Other Backward Classes** are other non-upper castes who are economically disadvantaged but also historically unprivileged groups like the Muslims (National Commission for Backward Classes, 1980).

Mac Duieu argues that as a result of the Sixth Schedule, tribal people dominate the bureaucracy and politics in the tribal majority states and in autonomous districts in tribal minority states. In non-tribal majority states and areas, the picture is more complex. In Meitei areas of Manipur, the Meitei ethnic group controls the bureaucracy and government; though within the Meitei ethnic group there are different reservations for different castes and sub-groups. In Sikkim, reservations for Sikkimese people ensure a similar scenario, and new reservations are continually being created for different ethnic and tribal groups in the state. In Assam, the situation is quite different. Non-Ahom migration and the capture of political constituencies and much of the bureaucracy incited the Assamese liberation movements that grew in the 1970s and continued through to the present (Baruah, 1999; Mac Duieu-Ra, 2012a).

This political-administrative classification of the population affects the social classification and valuation of people. Reservations are also a controversial topic. Northeastern Indians benefit from the

so called reservation as well as other people from Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes. Reservations in the case of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes only consider the aspect of membership to Scheduled Tribes and Castes but not the economic situation, while the category of Other Backward Castes takes both into consideration. Therefore, many people with relatively high income obtain the benefits of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. This practice is considered unfair by many people who do not fall into these categories, especially those with lower socio-economic positions. The majority of people from the Northeast who migrate to Delhi are usually those with more resources and they are the ones who apply for the reservations in studies and employment (Remesh, 2012). They possess the necessary cultural and social capital that gives them access to the information required and thus makes it possible for them to apply for these benefits.⁴⁰

3) Religion

In order to analyze religion in Northeast India, it is necessary to consider Assam as a separate case. Assam is the most populous state of the Northeast. Of the total population of about 39 million Northeastern Indian inhabitants⁴¹ 80% (around 31 million⁴²) live in Assam (Indian census 2011). In Assam, the majority of people (approximately 64.8%) are Hindu; 30.7% Muslim; 3.7% Christians; 0.2% Buddhist and 0.1% from other tribal religions (Bajaj, Joshi and Srinivas, 2003). The culture of Assam is also described by the interviewees and experts as more similar to the so called 'mainstream India' regarding culture and religion. Even the features of people are similar to the rest of India compared to other states of the Northeast such as Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya.


From a religious perspective, India can be divided in three different areas shown in the following figure.

⁴⁰There is no accurate data regarding the reservation policy in India. It is not possible to know the economic situation of those who obtain the benefits for ST and SC, in order to prove the common argument of the creamy layer monopolizing the benefits. However, it is an argument even used in academic economics papers as a presupposed reality. However, for the case of Northeast India, there is data showing that the majority of people who migrate to Delhi from the Northeast are those with more resources and they are the ones who apply for reservations in education and employment.

⁴¹ The total population of Northeast India is 38.857.769 people.

⁴² The total population of Assam is 31.169.272 people.

FIGURE 3: MAP OF INDIAN SHOWING RELIGIOUS MAJORITIES PERCENTAGES



Source: Bajaj et al, 2003; 17

The white area in the map is where more than 85% of the population belong to some Indian native religion (*Indian Religionists* as defined by the author as those which entail all Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains, and several smaller groups, some of whom, like Parsis and Jews, may not be of Indian origin)⁴³ (Bajaj et al, 2003).

The light grey area in the map is where Muslim population has been growing as it has been the case in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Assam, being the *Indian Religionist* population between 65% and 85%. Christians in those regions are less than 1%.

The third area is the darker colored one in the map, where *Indian religionists* are less than 65%. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, only around 30% of the population is *Indian religionists*; in Goa 30% are Christians and 5% Muslims. In Kerala there are many Christians and Muslims and 57% *Indian religionist*; in Lakshadweep 91% are Muslim and in Nicobar Islands, off the Indian coast, 70% are Christians.

Most of the states of the Northeast experienced an intense movement of conversion towards Christianity during the independence decade of 1941-1951, except Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura and Assam. Hence, in the Northeast *Indian Religionists* do not have a dominant presence (Bajaj et al, 2003).

In Nagaland 88% of the population is Christian; in Mizoram 86%; in Meghalaya 65% and in Manipur 41%. Manipur is mainly divided between Christians (41%) and Hindus (43.8%) with a 10.3% from other tribal religions and 8.3% Muslims. Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura are also special cases regarding religion within Northeast India, even though they share other cultural and ethnic characteristics with the other states. In Arunachal Pradesh only 10% of the population is Christian, while 37% is Hindu, 36% belong to other tribal religion and 12.8% are Buddhist. In Tripura 86.5% is Hindu, Christians are less than 2%, Muslims are 7.1% and Buddhists are 4.6%. In Sikkim only 6.6% of the population is Christian,


⁴³This is a very problematic concept in itself because of the definition of these religions as "Indians" and because of the mix in the same concept between Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and Jainism with Parsi and Jews. However, it is useful to use this map with this concept and data, in order to show how in India in some specific states, other religions as Christianity and Islam have been growing significantly.

the majority of 60.9% of the population is Hindu, 28.1% Buddhist; 3.4% other religions and 1% Muslim (Indian Census, 2011).

Northeast is considered to be so different than the other states of India, mainly due to its culture and religion. Christianization of Northeast (except Assam) is a relatively new phenomenon. In 1901, Indian Religionists formed more than 90% of the population of the Northeastern states while Christians formed less than 2%. Most of this change occurred during the period following Independence. In 1941, Indian Religionist still formed nearly 90 percent of the total population of Northeastern States except for Assam; while Christians were only about 2% and 8% were Muslim. In 1951, there was already a diminution of Indian Religionists to approximately 70% and an increase of Christians to 22%, while Muslims continued being 8%. This trend of diminishing Indian Religionists and increasing Christians continued progressively. In 1991, the proportion of Indian Religionists is reduced to about 56%, while that of Christians rise nearly to 39% and Muslims diminished to almost 5% (Bajaj et al, 2003).

In the following graphic, one can clearly note the change of religion tendencies in the Northeastern States (excepting Assam). It is clear how Indian Religionists diminished drastically during the 20th Century while Christians increased. Muslims, on the other hand, diminished after 1971 and remained in the same proportion until 1991 (1971 is the year of Independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan; Bangladesh has a Muslim majority).

FIGURE 4: RELIGIOUS CHANGES IN NORTHEASTERN STATES



Source: Bajaj et al, 2003.

4) Caste in Northeast Indian states

Caste is a complex phenomenon. It has been mainly defined as an ancient institution of the Hindus based on the ideas of *varna*, *karma* and *dharma* written in a text called the *Manusmriti*. These ideas were translated into a hierarchical organization structured by notions of purity and pollution. The *varna* system divided the Hindus into four categories, with the Brahmins at the top, followed by the Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras and with the untouchables at the very bottom. However, this is an oversimplified and “textbook” definition of caste (Jodhka, 2012). It is not enough to describe the complex reality and its important regional variations. The *varna* system was useful as a hierarchical model, especially during the British administration of India but it is different to the *jatis*; the actual social units or the concrete endogamous social groups. The *varna* system is supposed to be in the whole spread across India, while the *jatis* are regional. Every region has many *jatis* and its sub-units,

being around 200 to 300 or more. The colonial administrators recognized this diversity but continued to treat it as a unified system of hierarchies with common features across the Subcontinent (Jodhka, 2012).

In India, the caste system is practiced mainly by Hindus but this stratification is also found in the case of some Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, Jains and even Buddhists. Most of them continue following the Hindu caste even after they converted to another religion (Leach, 1971; Bayly, 1999; Mills, 2003)

However, in the Northeastern states where there is majority Hindu population, caste operates in a different way. For instance, in Assam, where 65% of the population is Hindu, there is a caste system but it is more flexible than in mainstream India. In states with majority Christian population as Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya, caste does not really exist because Christianity replaced some former tribal beliefs. In religiously mixed states as Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, where the amount of Hindus and other religions such as tribal religions and Christianity are followed in the same proportion, caste is only significant within the Hindu population (Bajaj et al, 2003).

The Indian Constitution designates **Scheduled Castes** as well as **Scheduled Tribes** to refer to groups that have been historically disadvantaged in India. The **Scheduled Castes** are sometime referred to as Dalits. **Scheduled Castes and Tribes** are provided with reservation status that guarantees political representation, positions in the governments and access to universities and colleges. These reservations also apply to **Other Backward Classes (OBC)**. **OBC** is a collective term used by the Government of India to classify castes which are socially and educationally disadvantaged. It is one of the several official classifications of the population of India, along with **Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs and STs)**. The **OBCs** were found to comprise 52% of the country's population by the Mandal Commission report of 1980 (National Commission for Backward Classes, 1980).

5) Migration to the “mainland”

When talking about the migration process from Northeast India to the “mainland” or “mainstream” India, it is necessary to define these concepts. “Mainstream” and “mainland” India are concepts widely used by Northeasterners in order to distance themselves from the rest of India but specifically from North India. When they refer to mainstream India or mainland India, they are talking about a typified North Indian society, as the representation of the hegemonic Indian culture, to which they don't belong to. This is an empirically weak generalization and sometimes even a stereotyped caricature of North Indian society, but it reflects the fact that in India there is a hegemonic or dominant culture, which is identified by most of the Northeasterners as a North Indian culture. Therefore, when discussing Indian society, respondents would warn that what they were saying about “India” did not apply to South Indians or to Kashmiris.

“Mainland means the central state with Delhi being the center of the country... it is an attitude of being the center... the Hindi speaking areas mainly. Even the South Indian states have a problem with the Hindi speaking states because it is kind of hegemonic what they are trying to establish over the whole of the country” (Female PhD student, 28 years old, Assam).

Mac Duieu-Ra, (2012a) also uses the concept of “mainstream India” to refer to the ‘heartland’ mainly the North Indian states from which Northeasterners distance themselves from:

“It is the hegemonic society that they don’t belong to but that characterizes the space they live in when they migrate to heartlands. Whatever the flaws of the generalization, it is one that ethnic minorities from the frontier make to distance themselves from the mainstream and reproduce their minority identities” (Mac Duieu-Ra, 2012a;32)

Therefore, mainstream India is a fuzzy idea, but constitutes a reality for Northeasterners allowing classifying themselves and the rest of society. It is a stereotype that caricaturizes North Indian society - even sometimes Northeasterners themselves are conscious of this caricature- however, it allows them to understand and explain their own position in the social structure.

a) Migration to urban centers

During the last year migration from Northeast India to big cities like Bangalore, Kolkata, Mumbai and Delhi has increased. A report released by the North-East Support Centre and Helpline (North East Support Centre and Helpline NESCH, 2011) in early 2011 states that over 314, 850 (414,850 estimated by 2010) people from North- East India migrated to other big cities during the period between 2005-2009. The annual average increase in the number of migration out of the north-east for the same period of years was 13.62%.

Until early 2000, most of the people who used to come to cities like Delhi were those working in central government jobs and in a less proportion those pursuing higher studies. North Easterners could easily access government jobs because of their good educational background and because of the reservation in government jobs as Scheduled Tribes (NESCH, 2011).

The large number of migration began only after the year 2000 and has rapidly increased. The main reason for migration are pursuing higher studies and the employment opportunities in the growing services sector like BPO (Business process outsourcing) and KPO (Knowledge process outsourcing) in main cities in India. A small proportion still continues migrating to work in the central government.

A record of migration from Northeastern states created by the Northeast Career Centre at Guwahati posits that from a total of 314,850 that migrated from Northeast until 2009, 66.35% does it to pursue higher education, while a 33.65% migrates to work in either private or public sector (NESCH, 2011). Since 2005 the amount of people migrating to study was higher than the ones migrating for jobs, even though the migration for both reasons has been growing (NESCH, 2011).

Between all the mentioned cities the most preferred destinations for North-East migrants is Delhi with almost half of the total migration from North-East (48.21%) moving to it (NESCH, 2011). This means around 200,000 people have migrated from the North-east to Delhi. However, as McDuié-Ra (2012b) argues, these survey figures could be underestimated as movement back and forth between the North-east and Delhi is constant and periods of stay vary dramatically from a few months to several years.

i. Migration to Delhi

Delhi is an interesting city; it is the capital of India and receives migrants from other states of India as well as from other countries, which makes the city very heterogeneous. Therefore, arriving in Delhi is known as a drastic transition.

Nevertheless, the nature and dynamics of migration from North East is different to the widely understood migration patterns from rural to urban or urban to urban migration, or interstate migration within the rest of India. Thus, it is wrong to conceptualize the reasons and determinants of migration of people from the Northeast to urban centers in a similar way to those who migrate from other parts of the country to Delhi; for example, the migration from Bihar or Orissa to Delhi (Remesh, 2012; 3). As it was stated before, 66.35% of migration from Northeast is in order to pursue higher education while a 33.65% migrates to work in either private or public sector (NESCH, 2011).

Almost half of the migration from people from North-east goes to Delhi to work or study, or both, while other cities are usually known as destinations for work (Bangalore, Hyderabad) or study (Kolkata).

In the Northeast, Delhi is known as an unpleasant city, as an unfriendly, expensive and violent one but also as a city that provides opportunities that do not exist to the same extent in the North east (McDuie-Ra, 2012a).

McDuieu-Ra (2012a) argues that migration from the Northeast to Delhi has a great symbolism. Delhi is the capital of India, where most of the central government political decisions are taken while many ethnic groups in the Northeast project their identity by rejecting the Indian one and by opposing most of the central Indian government decisions. Due to six decades of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Northeast, there is a strong feeling of living in an occupied territory, especially in some states. In addition, there exists anger with the central state which has not taken care properly of the region and its development, which leads in some cases to new armed conflicts. *“Successive Indian governments have responded through increased militarization, the maintenance of extraordinary laws, and a paternalistic approach to the region’s development and governance”* (McDuie-Ra, 2012a; 21) and Delhi is the place where all these policies are formulated. Therefore, from the point of view of Northeast, Delhi is the center where the occupation of the Northeast is conceived, executed, and justified. Thus, *“Focusing on Delhi provokes questions that go beyond the material aspects of migration and draws upon questions of identity, citizenship, and nationalism”* (McDuie-Ra, 2012a; 21). The relationship between citizenship, nationalism, nation-state and belonging will be analyzed in this research.

Due to North East's geographical, economical, social and political peripherality within India, when scholars and policymakers discuss the way India has changed, they rarely refer to the Northeast region. The communities of the Northeast are seen in almost the same way they were viewed at the time of Indian Independence in 1947. Scholars remain preoccupied with the incompatibility of ethnic-minority aspirations within the institutions of the modern nation-state, especially among tribal communities, not worrying about an analysis of everyday life and the new changes such as the new Northeastern migration to big cities (McDuie-Ra, 2012a)

Therefore, studying Northeast migrants in other cities in India opens up scholarship on the region by focusing on those who leave it, as McDuie-Ra has done it in his insightful research. Big changes in India also touch the Northeast as they are not “people without history” even though they have been treated like this by the successive central governments, by official historiography and by some anthropologists.

“According to common portrayals, Northeasterners – and tribal in particular – are meant to be fighting for their land, opposing mines, and in the case of the Northeast, engaging in armed struggles against India. When they are not doing these things, they are supposed to be dancing in traditional outfits, weaving colorful shawls, and curing sicknesses with forest products. These portrayals are reproduced

through numerous outlets, from museums to government policy documents, from tourism advertising to environmental campaigns, and even among activists and ethno-nationalist groups from these communities” (McDuaie-Ra, 2012a; 20).

Northeasterners are part of Indian social structure; consequently, they get affected and affect social structure. Thus, changes in the national (and international) economy influence the migration to main Indian cities in the search for better opportunities of education and work and at the same time, migration of Northeasterners to big cities affects the cities’ dynamics and social relations.

More people are leaving the Northeast than ever before, and the high level of migration is relatively new. Therefore, to study Northeasterners migrating to Delhi will allow studying how this process of migration and the new life in heartland affects the sense of belonging in contemporary India, which is directly related with the concept of citizenship; as a legal and symbolic concept.

ii. Who are the North Easterners that migrate?

As it was mentioned before, the dynamics of migration from Northeast India to urban centers is different from the usual patterns of migration of rural poor to urban centers. Compared to the migrants from other parts of India, the migrants from North East are from better economic and educational backgrounds. Due to this, a large mass of migration is not due to abject poverty or search of basic manual employment.

“We could hardly see any rickshaw pullers or urban street vendors from the North East. Further, the presence of north east population is also very minimal in factories in National Capital Region” (Remesh, 2012;8)

People that migrates from North East Region to other big cities belong to the relatively high segments of North East, which is true for both rural and urban as suggested by the Analysis of disaggregated data pertaining to different Monthly Per Capita Expenditure (MPCE) quintile (Remesh, 2012: Appendix Tables 3,4 and 6). This explains that abject poverty or search for basic employment is not the pressing reason for migration from these states as is the case for migration from other states like Bihar and/or Orissa to big cities. On the other hand, migrants from North East Regions tend to stay in the receiving place longer than other migrants at a national level (Remesh, 2012)

Only very small proportions of migrants from these states belong to the category of illiterates, compared to the national average. Most of the migrants come to Delhi to do their graduation and other studies. From the ones already working in Delhi, except for Assam and Tripura, all the other north eastern states have high proportion of migrants with education “graduate and above” (Remesh, 2012; 7).

Given the better educational background of migrants from the Northeast regions compared with the regular migration, they are more inclined towards pursuing higher studies or entering into office jobs or white collar occupations in government or private sector firms. The proliferation of jobs in the modern service sector industries, in the recent years also opened up considerable occupational opportunities for the youth from North East, who have the desired skills for the customer oriented service economy (good English, light skin, exotic looks) (Remesh, 2012). The better environment for educational opportunities with multiple choices of courses has attracted the young generation from North East India to other big cities. It attracts all students in the Northeast region, but only a small percentage of the population can afford to migrate; the ones with a relatively good economic situation.

Accordingly, a big number of them are working in private sector or multinational companies' occupations in Delhi and other parts of the National Capital Region (including administrative and office jobs, BPO jobs, customer care activities, hospitality jobs – waiters/waitresses, receptionists, sales executives and so on) (Remesh, 2012). 85% are employed in private companies while only 15% are employed in government sector (NESCH, 2011; 9, 16).

The majority are young people. In a study conducted by Remesh (2012) on Migration from North East India to Delhi, from the 400 Northeasterners migrants interviewed around 74.8% of the respondents were in the 25-30 age group and 15.2 % of the respondents were still younger (18-25 Age group). 93 % of the respondents were unmarried; a small proportion of them (1.2 %) were either separated/deserted. This pattern can be explained as follows. As the influx of Northeasterners youth to the new economy occupations is new, the age profile is rather young. Partly, recruitment of youth is also an objective function of the firms in the new service sector occupations. Further, as most of the respondents are within the first five years of their migration/ entering into work, they are mostly single and sharing same residential location mostly with their friends from North East (preferably from the same locality or same tribe). The initial settling at the city is mostly managed with the help of these friends and relatives (Remesh, 2012).

“67.4 per cent of the respondents reported that the present occupation is their first job, which points towards the phase wise shifting from studentship to worker status. 81.1 per cent reported their job as a regular job” (Remesh, 2012; 12)

An important aspect to be noted is the linkage between the migration for educational purpose and for employment purpose. It is widely understood that a major pattern of migration of Northeastern youth to Delhi region, involves two stages. In the first stage, the youth come to the city as students and after the completion of their course or after few years of study, they get into some available jobs in the city (Remesh, 2012).

While most of these migrants came for graduate or post-graduate education, in most recent years, several of the youngsters are found coming for undergraduate studies or even for basic schooling. In such cases, the migration often becomes family migration. For instance, some of the respondents pointed out that their primary aim of migration to the city was to educate their children. This is due to the fact that education in Northeast is generally not so good because of lack of infrastructure or because of the multiple conflicts (insurgency or inter-ethnic conflicts) (Remesh, 2012)

Most of the migrants are Christians or Hindus. In the same study conducted by Giri National Labour Studies (Remesh, 2012), the majority of the respondents reported themselves as Christians (49.7%) or Hindus (45%), 5% declare itself as Buddhist and 0.2% as Muslim. However, it is important to note some religious differences between the states. While people coming from states like Mizoram or Nagaland are mostly Christians, varying from 98.6% to 96.4%. In Assam, on the other hand, the percentage of Christians is very small, the Hindu population being the majority, followed by Muslims. Buddhism is also present in these regions, 48% of the interviewed from Arunachal Pradesh reported themselves as Buddhist while from Manipur and Tripura the percentage reported is 6% and 4.2% of Buddhists respectively. (Remesh, 2012; 11 and 12)

In the same study 57% reported themselves belonging to Schedule tribes (STs), 35.1% as Forward Caste (upper Caste); 6% per cent from Other Backward Castes (OBCs) and other 1.7% from Schedule Castes (SCs).

In the same study (Remesh, 2012), they draw a representative sample of respondents. Thus, the higher proportion of Manipuris in all the study areas reflects the overall dominance of the people from this state among the migrants. This increased presence could be because of the increased intensity of socio-political tensions in the state, compared to other states of North East. Though many of the states in the North Eastern Region have some internal tensions, the intensity of such troubles is much more in the case of Manipur. Due to this fact, a large number of Manipuris prefer to move out of the state for educational and livelihood options. Even after continuing their education, many of these youth prefer to stay back in the city or move to some other destination, as they find it difficult to find a job in their native states and they also look for a better environment in the city for education and development of their children. Thus, it is the “higher retention rates” of migrants from Manipur compared to migrants from other states that result in their predominantly higher share among the overall migrants from North East. The absence of migrants from Sikkim in the sample is partly due to the small proportion of people from this state that migrates to Delhi. In Sikkim, compared to other states in the region, there are not much acute internal tensions or instabilities, which to some extent explain the lower presence of migrants from this state in Delhi⁴⁴.

Seasonal migration, which is a prominent pattern with those migrants from other North Indian states is almost absent in the case of migration of Northeasterners youth. Compared to migrants from Bihar, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh the Northeasterners stay longer and a larger portion subsequently opts for permanent stay in Delhi region (Remesh, 2012; 11 and 12). This pattern is related with the better financial status and educational profile of migrants coming from Northeast India.

The patterns of savings and remittances showed interesting results. Unlike the migrants from other states to Delhi (for example those from Bihar or Kerala), the Northeasterners are not found remitting considerable portions of their income to their family in the native states. Many respondents reported that their parents are not expecting any financial help from them. Rather, the parents are even ready to send some money, in cases of requirement. This pattern also reaffirms that it is not poverty that pushed the migrants from their native states. Rather, it is the perspective of better opportunities for education and employment, along with perceived notions of peace and wellbeing in Delhi that encouraged the migrants to move to Delhi (Remesh, 2012). As the North Eastern states lack higher educational infrastructure (but are endowed with good educational system up to secondary level, specially through missionary schools) such migration for educational pursuit is prominent among aspirant youth who have completed some level of education at their native places. The other implication is that after obtaining better education in the city most of them find that in order to “best utilize” their capacities they need to continue in the city.

The preference for continuing in the city is also due to the tensions in native states. Almost all the states in the region face some tensions – be it insurgency and the presence of AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act), ethnic clashes or tensions between natives and new comers. These conflicts encourage those who have some resources to migrate to the cities, especially for education of their children. AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act) is an act that declares some areas as “disturbed

⁴⁴The National Sample Survey Office 2007-2008 (NSSO) data shows higher migration rates for Sikkim people and lower rates for Manipuris than the ones that the study from Giri National Labour Institute (Remesh, 2012) shows. However, the rates of the National Sample Survey Office 2007-2008 (NSSO) are not concentrated in showing the migration to Delhi specifically, while the study conducted by Remesh 2012 is concentrated in Delhi Region.

areas” because there is insurgency and/or violence. It was declared in 1958 for Nagaland and extended to the other regions of the Northeast afterwards. In 1990 it was declared for Jammu and Kashmir.

These states are in a region that share border disputes with China and Pakistan. This act gives special powers to the military, very similar to the ones that exist during dictatorship, like arrest under suspicion and the use of force and even the right to kill if it is necessary. AFSPA has been the subject of wide debate and discussion between the government and NGOs as there have been reports of human rights violations. AFSPA continues operating now with some changes (especially with ceasefire) and differently in every state of Northeast and it is still criticized by many (The Armed Forces (Special Powers Act), 1958; Chadha, 2012).

Thus, while tensions and lack of educational infrastructure act as the driving force for the first stage of migration, it is the lack of employment opportunities (which are also related to tensions) that discourage the return back of migrants (Remesh, 2012)

Compared to migrants from other states, those from Northeastern regions live in neighborhoods where there are more people from the same region/locality/tribes. This pattern of staying in blocks gradually brought into existence several Northeastern migrant neighborhoods in Delhi region (Remesh, 2012). To live in these neighborhoods provides them a secure feeling; even many of the tensions between different groups back home are forgotten there. For instance, it can be seen that members from communities which are clashing in Manipur are living harmoniously in a Delhi settlement. Thus, urban settlement provides them a feeling of togetherness and binding, which is often lacking in their native places. The migrants feel that the neighborhood community is very important and plays an important role when they have problems at work and in the city. (Remesh, 2012)

“As we do share common food habits, eating habits and cultural background, being together means a kind of mutual support to each other” says a Manipuri women respondent in Vijay Nagar” (Remesh, 2012; 13)

As we could see, migration from Northeast Indian to Delhi is a particular kind of migration different from the migration from other states to Delhi. In this case migrants are not poor seasonal migrants who come to Delhi to send some remittances home but on the contrary, most of them are people with good economic and educational background who come to Delhi mainly in search of better opportunities of not only education but also employment. To migrate is also an opportunity to be away from conflicts in their regions.

iii. Reasons to migrate

The reasons to leave North-east are mainly the limited higher educational opportunities in the region and the lack of employment opportunities, as well as problems with insurgency in some regions (especially Manipur and Assam) and other conflicts (inter-ethnic conflicts)

“Regarding the limited educational opportunities, it is widely understood that despite a high literacy rate, the region has a lack of adequate avenues for higher or technical education or vocational training. There is also a felt mismatch between the demand in the job market and the weak local educational system –specially to meet the requirements of the new economy occupations and professional service

sectors (Lyndem & De, 2004). These conditions, coupled with inadequate economic infrastructure, may have definite implications on the migration decisions of educated and ambitious youth to urban centers for higher learning. It is widely understood that a good proportion of this youth continue in urban centres after education, for employment” (Remesh, 2012; 4)

The weak employment prospects in the local labor markets are perhaps the most important determinant of migration of youth from the Northeast to urban centers. Increasing educated and youth unemployment in the North Eastern states is due to the abysmally lower level of industrialization and lower expansion of modern service sector occupations in the region. The recent saturation in the government/public sector jobs also intensifies the unemployment situation. Lower labor absorption, the capacity of local labor markets and perceived employment prospects in the urban centers together encourage the aspirant youth from the Northeast to migrate to cities to explore better opportunities.

The political unrest, violence and poverty of the region are the other main factors that influence youth to migrate. As it was mentioned before, some of the states in the Northeast (or specific areas or districts within the states) have unrests and tensions. These tensions include religious/ethnic/communal clashes⁴⁵; tensions between local and migrant population; insurgency and conflicts between locals and army (AFSPA). Due to these tensions, the normal life of people in the region is affected. For instance, reports suggest that in Manipur in recent years the life has become difficult for the ordinary people. With 100 days of public strikes a year, market shut, schools closed and public transportation off the road; people find it very difficult to pursue their studies and livelihood in the state. The socio-political unrest has affected education, economic and employment opportunities in North East India, but especially in the state of Manipur, from which migration is higher due to the conflicts.

North East people live in their villages, towns, and cities in the middle of all these unrests for years, but people did not desire to leave their home states until globalization reached the mega cities of India. Thereafter, the young generation of Northerners was attracted and started migrating in pursuit of employment, mostly in BPO (Business process outsourcing), call centers, shopping malls, and hospitality industries.

The attraction of working in cities /and in new economy jobs adds to their decision regarding migration. It is widely reported that relatively better command over English (among educated) and friendly attitudes of the youth from the Northeast often help them to easily find a job in the cities – especially in services, hospitality and care works.

Employment opportunities lack in all Northeastern states. According to the National Sample Survey (NSS) 50th, 55th and 60th Round data, compared to 1993-1990, during 2004 (Jan-Jun) the unemployment rate in terms of usual principle status has remained almost the same, except for females in rural areas. Government employment is only a small percentage of the jobs available and

⁴⁵Two major ethnic communal conflicts occurred in state of Manipur between Naga-Kuki in 1992-1999, Meitei-Pangal (Manipuri Muslim) conflict in 1993 and Kuki-Paite conflicts. Currently communal tension is being created between Nagas and Meiteis on Manipur state integration issue. Naga-Kuki clashes left 231 villages burnt, 285 villages deserted, 6,000 houses burnt, 10,000 families affected, 15,000 school going children affected, 60,000 people internally displaced and 1,300 people killed. Consequences continue till today, many children who are internally displaced, are not able to return to their schools. Communal affected people migrate to other cities of India in search of livelihood and children suffer as they are targeted by human traffickers. Communal violence has become a factor for North Easterners seeking to migrate from the region (North-East Support Centre and Helpline report, 2011; 12)

usually some political connections are needed. The educated poor, who have no political networks, have no hope for government employment in the region (NESCH, 2011).

The private sector and non-governmental business establishments are lacking in the region. Private sector companies do not invest in North East India due to sociopolitical crisis *“The region has considerable unexploited and untapped natural resource potential. Industrially, the region continues to be the most backward and main factors are poor governance, lack of infrastructure development, inadequate supply of electricity, violence and extortion etc.”* (Prasain and Singh, 2008; 142)

North East Indians migrate to Delhi and other mega cities due to socio-political unrest, lack of opportunities of studies and motivated by the growing opportunities for studies and employment in big cities in India. However, they face challenges, especially racial discrimination and sexual violence, particularly in Delhi. This topic will be treated in Section 3 Racist classificatory devaluations.

Section 2: Historical perspective: Understanding the peripherality of North East India

Contemporary India and specifically Northeast India can only be understood against the background of pre-colonial and colonial history.

Boike Rehbein (2007) posits the persistence of social structures from the past, which coexist simultaneously with current structures. This is what he coins as “Sociocultures”. The term alludes to present structures that always carry structures from the past. Therefore, past structures still have a present influence in society and are historically specific. That is why it is so important to consider the particular history of every configuration in order to understand the current social structure.

Northeast India can be characterized by its peripherality in relation to Indian society, not only in a geographical sense but also socially and politically. To understand the history of these states and how they became part of India is fundamental to comprehend the particularity of this region and also the main differences that every state has with each other. Until now only similarities has been shown and only the particularity of Assam as a state with more commonalities with the mainland India has been highlighted. Northeasterners are considered as a whole in this research as it focuses on the ones that migrate to mainstream India, specifically to Delhi. When they migrate, they identify themselves as Northeasterners and pay less attention to differences and tensions that occur back in the Northeast. Even the ones coming from Assam identify themselves as Northeasterners. Therefore, together with understanding the historical origins of its peripherality, their different and common history will be shown in order to understand the complexity of this region and its culture. To understand the context from where migrants come helps to understand them and their reaction and behavior in Delhi.

North-East India, as we know it today, is very different from what it was centuries ago. The region was not part of what today is India until the British unified it with the rest of India at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The region was governed by the Ahoms for 600 years until the British arrived. The British, besides establishing their rule and administering Assam, expanded the Assamese territory, before they left India in 1947 (Dikshit and Dikshit, 2014).

After Independence the state of Assam was divided into four states, in a series of administrative procedures; Assam, the parent state; Nagaland; Mizoram, and Meghalaya. Besides, the two princely

states of Tripura and Manipur were merged in the Indian Union and came into existence as independent states. Another territory, North-East Frontier states, between the Himalayas and the Brahmaputra, was converted into the state of Arunachal Pradesh in 1971. Thus, the seven states of North-East India came into existence (Dikshit and Dikshit, 2014). Only in 2002 the state of Sikkim was added as part of Northeast India.

Unlike the rest of India, the North-Eastern part of the country was colonized much later and in a gradual way⁴⁶. The process of expansion is considered to have started in 1826 and to conclude only in 1914 (even though some parts were already annexed in 1769 as the Goalpara part of Garo Hills and Sylhet district). This can be attributed to its relative isolation, not only because of its peripheral location, but mainly because of the formidable barriers that surrounded it from all sides:

“India’s North-East is as much a physical divide between the two continental drainage systems, one leading to the Pacific and the other to the Indian ocean, as it is between the two cultures, the Indo-Aryan and the Mongoloid. The Eastern Himalayas, attaining a height of 6,000 meters, bend southward and merge into the Indo- Burma orographic chain, effectively separating the East and Southeast Asian region from South Asia. For millennia, this region has been one of the most inaccessible regions of the world. The chain of mountains – the Patkai, Naga and Lushai Hills from north to south in that order – dissected, forest covered and experiencing heavy rainfall and sparsely inhabited by tribal people, some of them head hunters, with hardly any contact with the rest of the world, did not induce any significant immigration. Any east–west movement was virtually blocked. North-East India remained for long a nature preserve” (Dikshit and Dikshit, 2014; 21)

1) Territorial reorganization after 1947

The dawn of independence kept the people of Assam in suspense for some time, in view of a proposition to transfer the entire state of Assam with East Bengal (now Bangladesh), to Pakistan. Therefore, the post-independence political status of the Northeast was settled in a gradual manner. Finally, only the Sylhet district of Assam, with a majority of Muslim population, was divided and a major part of its area merged into East Pakistan, and a small eastern part, with the dominance of Hindu population, remained in Assam (Dikshit and Dikshit, 2014).

The separation of Burma from British India had already divided hill communities a decade earlier. The princely states of Tripura and Manipur acceded to India as centrally administered territories, while the Khasi states and Cooch Behar were dissolved into Assam and West Bengal, respectively. On the other hand, Nepal remained sovereign, while Bhutan and Sikkim became monarchical protectorates; the latter was annexed to India in 1975. Bringing these areas into newly independent India was sometimes a fraught process, often marked by coercion. Controversy over accession to India contributed to three separatist insurgencies within the first decades of the country’s independence. In 1956, the Naga National Council (NNC) declared independence from India; a separatist insurgency began in 1964 in Manipur; and, in Assam, the Mizo National Front (MNF) rebelled two years later. Tactical factors aggravated accession-related violence in the Northeast compared to, for example, Hyderabad, where resistance to accession was put down relatively quickly. Until the 1970s, the Indian government used

⁴⁶The British rule in India started with the East India Company in 1757 (Bose and Jalal, 2004; Metcalf, Barbara and Metcalf, Thomas, 2006)

collective punishment, forcible relocation, and military occupation in an attempt to end insurgencies in the Northeast and even in some areas of the Northeast the Armed Force Special Arms Act still operates. Besides creating a severe sense of grievance among some groups, this strategy rendered civil and political institutions virtually meaningless by concentrating power over local affairs with the security forces. Even today, the military remains the only Indian institution with any significant presence in parts of this region (Lacina, 2009)

The territorial reorganization in the North-East has been taking place during the last six decades. The emergence of seven states following sequential division of Assam and creation of small states is not entirely governed by efficiency. The phenomenon reflects the aspiration of some ethnic and cultural groups who think they can better manage the affairs as a separate unit, rather than being an insignificant and often neglected part of larger Assam. The Nagas, the Mizos and the Khasis are fiercely proud of their culture and tradition and express apprehension of being lost under the Assamese, which they perceive would swallow them unlike under the colonial rule when they were directly governed by the crown as excluded area (Dikshit and Dikshit, 2014). Nowadays there is no interstate hostility except in small border disputes. The present phase was one of integration and since most of these states are still to develop to their potential, each one is preoccupied with its own problems and prospects (Dikshit and Dikshit, 2014).

Regarding the territorial reorganization, there are some decisions without clear reasons, as the question of why Sikkim was considered part of Northeast India while Darjeeling was not. Darjeeling is geographically and culturally very close to Sikkim, it also has a Nepali speaking population and had belonged before (historically) to Sikkim (Dikshit and Dikshit, 2014).

The purpose of these brief historical contextualization was to show how Northeast India has been a geographically but also historically periphery within India. Historically was annexed later to the British domination than the rest of India and some of its states were princely states and very autonomous. Their culture and features are very different to the one of mainstream India. This region has been constituted as the “other” within in India because the culture and features of their inhabitants do not coincide with the image of a “legitimate Indian citizen”. This also happens in other region as in Jammu and Kashmir, where their otherness is given by the fact that they are Muslims. However, in the case of Northeasterners race plays an important role in the classificatory devaluations they suffer, as it will be analyzed in the next section.

Section 3: Mechanisms that produce and reproduce the illegitimacy of the citizenship of Northeasterners

1) Belief in a homogenous culture


As stated in the section 1. Contextualization and Specific characteristics of Northeast India, this region has been constituted as periphery. Consequently, Northeasterners become the ‘Other’ within the Indian legitimate culture characterized by a Hindu Brahmanical patriarchal culture, which leaves in second place the identity of other cultural, ethnic or racial groups.

The process of constitution of the ‘Other’ implies always an epistemic violence, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak argues in her text “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988). Here she analyzes how this concept of

epistemic violence developed by Foucault is used in the construction of the colonial Indian subject. Epistemic violence explains the violence of knowledge production. Thus, the colonial Indian subject was constructed as opposed to the European Self, as an unnamed subject constituted as the Other of Europe (Spivak, 1988). I argue that the same process of constitution of otherness took place inside India regarding the internal 'Others' during the independence process. Northeasterners (and also other minority groups) have been constituted as the 'Other' of the Indian self, characterized mainly by the Hindu Brahmanical culture. This process of otherness has consequences until today.

Therefore, the region of Northeast India was constituted as the 'Other' - backward and primitive. In India there was a double process of constitution of the 'Other' through epistemic (symbolic) violence⁴⁷. First, it was the formation of the 'Other' in the colonized India, using for this construction the binary distinction of Self (civilized Europe)/Other (barbarian colonized). Here the Self (civilized Europe) is considered the example to follow as the legitimate subject. Furthermore, inside that distinction another additional distinction was created to classify the tribal population of this 'Other' barbarian colonized country (India); using again the same binary distinction. Thus, inside the distinction 'Other' (barbarian colonized India) there is again a Self more civilized (the hindu upper cast) and the 'Others' inside of India itself (backward castes, muslims and tribal communities).

FIGURE 5: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SELF AND THE OTHER



Source: Self elaboration

Consequently, Northeasterners were considered the others of the others; that is, one of the most primitive and backward part of India. Thus, this binary distinction of Self (civilized)/Other (barbarian) was reproduced inside of India as well; first by the British colonizers, who defined the Northeast as tribal and barbarian and later on by the nationalist who put in the center a homogenizing Hindu Brahmanical identity; reproducing a center-periphery dynamic within India.

⁴⁷ Epistemic violence could be considered a kind of symbolic violence.

Spivak (1988) clearly demonstrates how the British propose the construction of the Indians (especially Brahmins), as the 'Other' who need to adapt to the English way of life in order to become the group that will lead the country. Therefore, from the period of British domination the Hindu upper caste culture was enacted as the "self" inside of India. Anyhow this self continues being the other of Europe; an 'Other' that is subaltern and lacks the good virtuous of Europe. In this process of colonization, the Hindu upper caste male group was acquiring the privileges, power and some western elements such as science and even some nationalistic ideas coming from Europe.

Spivak quotes Macaulay's "Minutes on Indian education" (1835)

"We must at present do our best to form a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals, and in intellect. That class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population" (Spivak, 1988: 77)

This epistemic violence in the constitution of the Other was also used in the interpretation that British did on the codification of Hindu Law. They argued that the Brahmins preserved their society because of the writing of its rules, which is something that the British wanted to do in order to control and administrate India.

Spivak (1988) argues that there was a version of history established by the British, where Brahmins were shown as having the same intentions as them, which provided a legitimation for the British codification of Hindu law *"In order to preserve Hindu society intact (the) successors (of the original Brahmins) had to reduce everything to writing and make them more and more rigid. And that is what has preserved Hindu society in spite of a succession of political upheavals and foreign invasions"* (Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasad Shastri, 1925. in Spivak, 1988: 77).

Therefore, Brahmins were constituted as the guarantors of Indian culture. They were the group acquiring the privileges and being reaffirmed as the original but also useful "Other", "the good ones" who acquired the British ways but continue being "Indian in blood and color". The Indians that are worthy and useful and that share many characteristics with western societies.

Here it is pertinent to ask, what it means to be Indian and how was it constructed? During the process of independence this definition was necessary. The leaders of Indian independence, who learnt modern ideas of democracy and nation-state formation in Europe, tried to define it. They had to reaffirm their nationalistic identity as opposed to the empire and the identity most frequently expressed was the Hindu way of life. However, this hegemonic idea was also fought, especially by the political thinker B.R Ambedkar, who together with challenging the Caste system also argued that the Hindu way of life would perpetuate the atrocities committed under this system, especially against the outcaste people.

"You cannot build anything on the foundations of Caste. You cannot build up a nation; you cannot build up a morality. Anything that you will build on the foundations of Caste will crack and will never be a whole" (D. R. Ambedkar, 2004; 102)

Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India and leader of the Indian independence separates the Hindu religion from what India means. He implicitly expresses Indian culture as a Hindu culture, imagining India as a secular Hindu State, he argues:

“A Christian or a Muslim could, and often did adapt himself to the Indian way of life and culture, and yet remained in faith an orthodox Christian or Muslim. He had Indianized himself and become an Indian without changing his religion” (Jawaharlal Nehru, 2004; 71).

In the quotation it is only expressed that Christians and Muslims have to adapt to the *Indian way of life*, which means that the Hindus don't need to adapt to anything because they are already *“Indians”*, they already have a Hindu culture, so they don't need to adapt their ways of life. This sentence is very expressive of the way Indian nationalism has been constructed. The idea of national identity is related to a secularized Hindu culture, a way of life or culture where others have to adapt to become Indians (Akoijam, 2006). It is recognized that they have freedom in faith, which is even recognized in the Constitution of India. However, there is an imposition of a hegemonic culture relegating all the others cultures as secondary and less valuable, delegitimizing them as not really *“Indian”*. Therefore, there is no multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism in India but freedom of faith, tolerating certain different religious practices (especially in certain States) but considering the Hindu culture as the legitimate one. In this process all the other religions and cultures have been relegated as less important or legitimate; ethicizing them in this process as minorities. Certainly in India there are many other minorities as the outcaste, muslims and other tribal communities.

As it was mentioned in the theoretical chapter, the ideological hegemonic idea of national identity is related with the hegemonic group who led the process of nation-state formation and fixed to it a unique identity. This not only happens in India but is related with the very process of the formation of the nation-state, where the idea of citizenship is directly related with the concept of a nation. A nation-state, even if it is multicultural, puts one national identity over others, as is the case in India, where this multiculturalism is understood as an adaptation of all the other religions, cultures and nations under the Hindu culture, not as a religion but as a way of life.

It is important to mention that devaluation is faced by various sections of Indian society and it is not just by the North East Indian communities. Muslims are discriminated as a community, Dalits still suffer discrimination and atrocities, woman as a group are target of violence, poor people are treated very bad and other tribal population as well. Therefore, only one group seems to enjoy of all the benefit of the Indian Hindu culture and society; Hindu upper class and upper caste men. All the other categories suffer some kind of oppression; some of them more than others and the kind of oppression are also different.

2) Tensions with Indian hegemonic identity

Most of the interviewees expressed that they consider themselves part of India but they have the feeling they have to permanently adapt to other cultural practices. They have the impression that India welcomes them but only if they adapt to the *“Indian way of life”*, which implies certain dressing codes, foods and different gender relationships. Therefore, they have the impression that cultural diversity is not accepted at least in mainstream India and specifically in Delhi.

“I do feel as part of India, just sometimes I feel India doesn't want us (laugh)... the kind of attitude towards our history from the government... that is the sad part that we want to be... a lot of people will not say that they feel Indian but I do feel Indian because India has given us protection against a lots of things but at the same time the responses of the government has always been like a step mother really rude, they never treated us as equals, so sometimes you feel that it hasn't been a good thing on our

part that we would always try to say "oh we are Indian" (Female PhD student, 27 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

"It is a very different kind of treatment, it is not that you are part of us and we are happy the way you are, it is not like that... it is more like you should be like us, like mainstream India.... you know the integration of Northeasterners Indians in the mainstream Indian population. Why do we have to become like them? We can be like ourselves and still at peace; I don't know it is very homogenizing" (Female master student, 23 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

"I feel Indian more as a country but not culturally" (Female professor, 45 years old, from Meghalaya living in Delhi)

The sense of belonging is related with participation in others spheres of society and with the recognition of them as legitimate belonging to the nation-state. However, when the question "Do you feel Indian?" was asked, some of the interviewees only answered in a concrete and territorial conception of nation-state, considering that they feel Indian because their state belongs to India and because India bring defense to them. This fact is very interesting because it expresses the different dimensions that the concept of citizenship/nationality has and how it is always interpreted considering either territorial, political, belonging or ethnic differences

"Researcher: Do you feel Indian?"

Interviewee: Yes (almost inaudible and with nervous laugh) but it is very difficult. As I am a part of India, North East is a part of India so I feel I am an Indian" (Male, bachelor student, 21 years old, from Tripura living in Delhi)"

"It is a very subtle way of saying that yeah.... "mainland India, we are India and all of you just come and join us and be India with us" That is a very subtle way of saying it and yeah... the very romantic picture which they represent to you if you talk to someone about India "ohh we are a diverse country, we have so many different languages and cultures all together, we are living in harmony" but that is not the real picture. This is how they represent India but I am different and that I am one with everyone is not possible, it is forced...a kind of forced uniformity. It is a nation which was held together by force and they are trying to reinforce it again and again, and the ones that are different, they are kind of ignored because they want to stay in this dream and romantic world "we are one and we are all happy with each other" though that happiness has a lot of costs, there is a huge price to be in that picture of happiness, but yeah, that is how being Indian means" (Female master student, 23 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

In some states like Nagaland most of the people do not feel Indian and they would like to have some kind of independence. They argue that they are culturally very different and they would rather be independent but the Indian government does not allow them to do so.

As in the case of migration Northeasterners are considered citizens with a 'lack' or 'incomplete citizens'. They have to adapt themselves and their differences are only considered as folklore to emphasize them as exotic. This exotization means devaluation in the difference; they are not considered as equally valuable. The exotization is related with the process of ethnization and with the constitution of a group as a minority. During this process, racism plays a role emphasizing the differences of the exotic group as something strange and only valuable in certain aspects of life but not in all of them. When Northeasterners migrate to Delhi, they are encouraged to change their food habits, the way they live

(for example sharing a flat as a single person with persons from different genders is not generally accepted in mainstream India) and women are encouraged to dress in a different way. This is done under the pretext of security measures to stop the violence experienced by Northeasterners in Delhi.

A famous case was when the Delhi police distributed a pamphlet to the Northeasterners migrants with some advice of how to behave in Delhi. The pamphlet has been described as racist and discriminatory as most of the Northeasterner everyday practices are considered inappropriate.

"A Delhi Police booklet suggesting a code of conduct for students and visitors from the northeast has sparked outrage among people from the region (Northeasterners), with a MP (member of Parliament) planning to take up the issue with the Union Home Ministry" (Hindustan Times, 2007)

The introduction speaks of unfortunate experiences of Northeasterners where they are shown as the responsible for the offenses. In the booklet some of the following descriptions from the experiences of Northeasterners can be found: "A proud father sent his only daughter in Delhi to make her IAS/IPS, but she returned back as a drug addict"; "late night parties with loud music landed six youngsters into police case"; "Landlord threw out four youngsters for lascivious behavior of living together "; "revealing dressed up party lass was molested and thrown out from moving vehicle badly bruised after being outraged". The pamphlet gives advice on "Food habits and parties" and on "dress code" (*Delhi Police, 2005*)

"If they are dictating food habits and a dress code, then it is a cultural imposition," said Khiren Rijju, a Lok Sabha Member of Parliament from Arunachal Pradesh (Hindustan Times, 2007)

Furthermore, the title of the booklet says "word to seven sisters", ignoring the fact that Sikkim is also a part of the Northeast since 2002 and is always overlooked. This also contributes to the lack of knowledge regarding the Northeast.

Interestingly the booklet has an introduction written by Deputy Commissioner of Police (West District) Robin Hibu, who himself comes from the northeast.

"Most unfortunate part is that the guidelines were framed by a person from the northeast," said Utpal Borpujari, general secretary of the Northeast Media Forum, a body of journalists based in the national capital" (Hindustan Times, 2007)

As we could see, there is a systematic and institutional discourse that permanently communicates to them that they are not completely part of India. Anyhow the problem is not specific to this community but to all the different ones that exist in India as there is only one identity that is considered the legitimate one; the Hindu culture (not as a religion but as a way of life).

a) Different cultural practices as a threat to Indian Hindu culture

As mentioned above, many different cultural practices of Northeasterners are seen as a threat to Indian Hindu culture. The main ones are; the different gender relationships in North East India in comparison to mainland India, food habits, religion and dressing.

i. Different gender relations

In North East India, gender relationships are different than in the so-called mainstream India. The interviewees described their gender relations as more egalitarian. In the Northeast in general, women have more freedom in the way of dressing, have male friends, there is no dowry and they are not expected to get married in a certain age or within a certain Caste. They also argue that they are more used to do things together between men and woman than in mainstream India (McDuie-Ra, 2012a and 2012b).

“Relations between men and women are a problem in the mainstream society here in India but in the North East, it is very open! That has to do with the Christianity there...we go to church together, we sing songs, we worship our God together and we learn songs together but it does not have to be always sexual” (Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, from Manipur but grew up in Delhi).

“Everybody here is so worried that I have not been married... in Northeast we marry very late, there you can marry whenever you want but here you know that you have to get married very early, the same happens in South India, so they are not very happy that we have not married yet and that we have had a relationship since the past 5 years. But my parents are fine, my father is fine with it” (Female PhD student, 28 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

“Northeasterners women whose culture and social background are different from mainstream socio-cultural setup, when migrated to Delhi and National Capital Region they continue having the same style of lifestyle. Therefore, they are considered as strangers, outsiders and not part of the larger society. They are even thought as polluting the society, which defies existing North Indian culture” (NESCH , 2011; 26)

Therefore, the behavior of youth from the Northeast is often mistaken in cities like Delhi – where the social norms are largely shaped in the orthodox patriarchal lines. Their conduct is often misunderstood as absence of moral values, which eventually leads to adverse social profiling and resultant atrocities – especially towards women.

This consideration of Northeasterners as loose and immoral, affects Northeastern women and men in different ways. The women are cast as sexually promiscuous, considering that India has a strong patriarchal culture where women face a lot of restrictions in dressing, going out alone, having male friends, etc. Many of the Northeastern women work in highly visible occupations where their sexuality is emphasized, while men are considered heavy drinkers and violent (McDuie-Ra, 2012b). Northeasterners men usually get involved in fights when they are discriminated and cannot answer back with words, this way the stereotype is reinforced.

“Northeastern woman usually live in shared houses, most are not yet married, they move around the city for work without male chaperons almost always on public transport, those who work have some financial independence (subjecting them to speculation that they achieved this independence through “immoral” means), most of them dress very differently to (certain) Indian women, and they socialize with friends of the same sex and opposite sex. Northeastern men are also subject to some of the loose and immoral assumptions but are also cast as heavy drinkers, unpredictable, and potentially violent” (McDuie-Ra, 2012b: 71).

“One problem faced by the student community in Delhi is that they are not very well versed in Hindi, so people who are new to Delhi, they use to face problems in communication. You see why people get

angry? Because they cannot communicate properly, if you cannot communicate properly you cannot immediately answer back... so sometimes the students get involved in physical fighting". (Male, Human Resources University service, 43 Years old, from Manipur living in Delhi)

All these prejudices regarding Northeasterners are due to the lack of exposure of most of the local people to everyday cultural practices in Northeast India. They just know or learn about Northeast as a tribal society, which make them think on a backward society, a society of the past. That is reinforced by the media or history books where they are mainly presented either wearing the traditional outfits or as insurgents or terrorist. Even at school their history started to be taught only in 2001 with focus on them as an archeological culture and in 2006 as an example of 'First Farmers and Herders in India'⁴⁸. That is quite contradicting with the present lifestyle and way of dressing of Northeastern people, which has adopted more the western outfits and lifestyle. Even they consider themselves as more cosmopolitan than the rest of the Indian population.

The way Northeastern women dress is a major cause of prejudice. As mentioned before they wear more "western" clothes, which are different from mainstream Indian clothes and are considered as more revealing as they show parts of the body that are not revealed by saris or other traditional "Indian clothes". Some interviewees from Northeast complain and make evident this point when they mention that the clothes they use just reveal other parts of the body as legs or sometimes arms, but argue that saris are also extremely revealing as they show the stomach and sometimes big parts of the back; nevertheless, they are not considered provocative.

"It is an obvious truth that women from Northeast are generally looked down because our dressing is different from the way of the so called mainstream Indian dressing, some people mockingly say that our way of dressing is vulgar and provocative. But, look, when you wear a sari the whole back is shown and your whole stomach is shown and when you wear this kind of blouse.. the sari has a top and the top are usually very thin and tight, very revealing sometimes, no? And all we wear, sometimes we wear tops or t-shirts which cover the whole back and stomach areas and so..... and the concept of being vulgar...some girls, they use to give me this example, they wear saris, we wear t-shirts, which covers everything, so why do they look down on us?" (Female PhD Student, 28 years old, from Nagaland living in Delhi)

This fact shows how dressing codes are part of cultural customs and how they are interpreted in a different way; parts of the body that are appropriate to be shown varies in different cultures. Furthermore, we can notice that in India the control and protection of customs and traditions are more focused and stricter in women. They are seen as the object (bodies) to which the tradition is attached. They are considered to be responsible for keeping the tradition through their behavior and way of dressing. Tradition and culture are represented in their bodies and as every patriarchal society, men have the responsibility to take care that women follow these traditions (see Srivastava, 2007).

ii. Religious culture of Northeasterners in Delhi

As it was mentioned before, most of the people that migrate from Northeast India to Delhi are Christians (49.7%) or Hindus (45%)⁴⁹; 5% declare itself as Buddhist and 0.2% as Muslim. This is an important fact if we consider than in Delhi the majority of the population (80%) is Hindu.

⁴⁸ More information on the lack of knowledge about the Northeast will be deeply analyzed later in this chapter.

⁴⁹ In this same chapter in the point "2.3 Who are the Northeasterners that Migrates?"

Even though 45% of Northeasterners migrants are Hindus in religion, they argue that their religious practices are not as strict as in North India. Most of the Hindu Northeasterners come from Manipur (where 43.8% are Hindus) and Assam (where 64.8% are Hindus). People from Manipur have mostly mongoloid features and therefore they experience similar treatment as having loose moral than other Northeasterners who are mostly Christians. In the case of migrants coming from Assam, their features are generally more similar to the ones from people coming from mainstream India, therefore they only face devaluations when people know the region they come from. Therefore, in the stereotype of Northeasterners there is a generalization of them as people with loose moral not taking into consideration their religion but their features and cultural practices, which are seen as a threat to Hindu culture.

As mentioned before in the point 1.3 on contextualization regarding religion, there are religious differences between the states the migrants come from. While people coming from states like Mizoram or Nagaland are majority Christians, varying from 98.6% to 96.4%. In Assam, on the other hand, the percentage of Christians is very small, being the Hindu population the majority, followed by Muslims. Buddhism is also present in these regions, 48% of the people coming from Arunachal Pradesh for example, reported themselves as Buddhist while from the ones coming from Manipur and Tripura the percentage is 6% and 4.2% of Buddhist respectively (Remesh, 2012; 11 and 12).

Even though Assam is described as the state from Northeast that has more cultural similarities to mainstream India, it shares with the other states from the Northeast some cultural practices that are seen as a threat to Hindu culture. Gender relationships are also more open, dressing codes are not so strict and interreligious and inter-caste marriage are not such as critical as in other parts of mainstream or mainland India. Even between the Hindus the rituals and customs are more flexible.

“Yes it is very different because here (Delhi) you see too much of rituals (.....) We do have idols but we are not fixated in rituals, it is very different, Hinduism there (Assam), Hinduism here (Delhi) is very different. Here is very rigid, there is not rigid at all” (Female PhD Student, 28 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

Here we could see that the migrants consider that religious practices are different in the Northeast than in mainland India. Even Assam that is different to the other Northeastern states, still present differences with mainland India. Therefore, Assam is an especial case. This coincides in certain respects with the map showed before on religion in the Northeast (Figure N°3, where Assam is not grouped religiously with the rest of Northeast India but with mainstream India)⁵⁰.

The predominant religions in the North East are considered minorities in India and in the case of Assam, the way of practicing Hinduism is different than in mainstream India. Therefore, their religious practices expressed in cultural patterns are still seen as a threat to the dominant Hindu culture.

iii. Food habits

Food is also an issue that creates conflicts between Northeasterners and locals in Delhi. Food habits from people from Northeast are also very different to the ones from people in mainstream India and especially to North India. Therefore, there is no doubt why the booklet made by *Delhi Police* suggesting

⁵⁰ This map is not so accurate to analyze all the dimensions of the cultural differences of the states, but gives a macro vision regarding the religious complexities of certain states. There we can see that Assam is grouped with Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal, places where there are less Indian religionists (mainly Hindus) than in other states in India.

a code of conduct for students and visitors from the northeast focused in two main issues that caused great conflict between the two cultures; dress and food cultural habits.

As it was already extensively explained, mainstream India is mostly Hindu and Hindus have mostly a vegetarian diet or at least they exclude pork and beef. They venerate cows; therefore, to eat beef is forbidden and considered a sin, especially in mainstream India, which refers mostly to Northern Indian states. Christians and Muslims eat beef but both are minorities in the Hindu majority mainstream India. Northeasterners are mostly Christians, especially in Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya.

The tension with food is a cultural issue and not only a nutritional one. Other food habits different than the Hindu are considered a threat to Hindu culture. It is necessary to remember that Hindu culture has always felt at risk, during the British colony and afterwards during the independence (see Akoijam, 2006). Therefore, the issue is not simply the food but the cultural meaning of it. Eating beef is not only related to the Muslim “internal” enemy but also with Christian culture, which is related with western culture. The Northeast was evangelized by Christian missionaries and they also have adopted many of the western life styles and dress. Regarding food, they keep their own habits but it creates conflicts with local people.

“Northeasterners are generally looked down upon because our food is different.... when I was staying in a rent house throughout my masters and my bachelor, I had issue with the landlords.... whenever we cooked our stuff they will come and they will complain...in some houses we would be forced not to cook the food that you want to eat but instead cook something else that your landlord wants you to eat” (Female PhD Student, 28 years old, from Nagaland living in Delhi).

In some cases, this is even a reason to not rent apartments or to throw away people from rented apartments. This is a typical discrimination that migrants face in different cities and countries (see Weiss, 2001).

“...So there were many cases of boys, even girls, who were refused to be given an apartment because of the kind of food they eat. Just because the landlord is a vegetarian, it doesn’t mean that even you eat the kind of food that he or she eats” (Female PhD Student, 28 years old, Nagaland).

These conflicts are also based on prejudices and stereotypes about Northeasterners. People think of them as backward tribal that live in the forest and just eat everything they find, so they called them pejoratively as “dog-eaters” or “insect-eaters”.

“They think that mostly Northeastern people...are tribal people, they eat weird stuff, they eat and they mix, generally people think “they are from the forest and so they are looking for animals and they will find something, they will kill something and eat here”” (Female Master student, 23 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

These issues show how prejudices and ideas people in Delhi have about Northeasterners as backward tribal affects the experience of Northeasterners in Delhi. These prejudices are reinforced by the lack of knowledge about them, which make people think of them as people coming from the past. This idea of Northeasterners as wild people gets even worse when they behave according to their more liberal patterns of dressing habits and more equally gender relations, as girls and boys living together.

iv. Different caste relations

As stated in the contextualization at the beginning of this chapter, in India caste system is practiced mainly by Hindus but this stratification is also found in the case of some Christians, Muslims, Sikhs,

Jains and even Buddhists. However, in the Northeastern states where there is majority Hindu population, Caste operates in a different way. For example, in Assam where 65% of the population is Hindu, Caste system is supposed to be more flexible than in mainstream India. In some cases, people from Assam don't even know to which caste they belong to because in their state it does not play an important role for their lives.

"I: Even the caste Hindus there (Assam) are not like caste Hindus here (Delhi), caste system is very different there as well, so like I am a Kshatriya but I did not know that I am from this particular Caste until I came to Delhi

R: I found interesting what you say about the caste, that you didn't know before...

I: Yes, I didn't know, we never discuss that, because first thing is that in caste there is two things; one is endogamy, endogamy means that you have to marry within your caste and you should eat with your Caste, because there are like ten rules of Caste or something like that...when I was a young girl, my father never said, you know, you should marry a person from our caste, so there is no discussion about our Caste, nothing" (Female PhD Student, 27 years old, Hindu from Assam living in Delhi).

In states with majority Christian population as Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya Caste does not really exist because Christianity replaced some former tribal beliefs. In religious mixed states as Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, where the amount of Hindus and other religions as tribal religions and Christianity are followed in the same proportion, caste is only significant within the Hindu population.

In case of Muslims in Assam they also don't need to know to which Caste they belong to.

"I: Caste also does not really matters and in fact, here when you talk to people they know their caste so clearly but in Assam, people you ask them which is your caste and they will have to ask their parents or maybe try to find out on the names that lineated them, but it is not so pronounced (...) so ok I am a general caste or Other Backwards Caste (OBC)⁵¹. But in Delhi the belief in caste is very strong in marriages and also children are born in these practices and everything, it is not as pronounced there (Assam)" (Female master student, 23 years old, Muslim, from Assam living in Delhi).

Interviewees argue that in mainstream India to know the Caste of a person is extremely important. The fact that in Northeast caste does not play such an important role is seen as a threat to Hindu culture, since following Caste system means as strict control over marriage. Following Caste system is related with a stricter way of following Hinduism and any flexibility is seen as a loose moral behavior. As mentioned before, this strict way of following Hinduism and its cultural practices is stronger toward women, because they are seen as the object (bodies) to which the tradition is attached.

"Here the first thing they ask, which Caste do you belong to... because we do not conform to the Caste restrictions and norms, we can marry anybody ... and they feel this is against their Hindu identity, so they fear our identity.... because we try to keep our identity, of course we will not overnight dress up in saris, become very quiet and marrying within our Caste, is not like that, we are liberal minded so they do not see this as something which is good and maybe there is some jealousy towards us" (Female PhD Student, 27 years old, Hindu from Assam living in Delhi).

⁵¹OBC are defined as the socially and educationally disadvantaged castes in addition to the Scheduled Castes, that are the Dalits or the untouchable outcaste people.

This flexibility is also expressed in the way marriages are practiced. Inter-caste and interreligious marriages in Northeast are more accepted than in mainstream India.

"R: So how do you know to which caste do you belong to if you don't talk about it?"

I: We don't know because there is no need to. Here (North India) there is a need to know because you have to marry within your caste otherwise they might burn you, or kill you, they actually burned out couples and murdered them, they might do terrible things to people who marry outside their caste, but there (Assam) is not like that at all so why do you need to know that? And you can mix up with everybody so all these things are seen as antagonistic to Hindu Caste system" (Female PhD Student, 27 years old, Hindu from Assam living in Delhi)

"They (the parents) might have a bit of problem because as I said the generation preceding us, they have a slight tendency to worry about these things but it is not as they are going to kill me for that, they must just said "ohh why you didn't get a Muslim boy", even for his family they might say "why you didn't get a Hindu girl instead of finding a Muslim girl" but eventually it does not really matter so much ... it is not going to affect our love" (Female master student, 23 years old, Muslim from Assam living in Delhi)

"R: Are there more love marriages?"

I: yes... and if you come to North East India you will see couples, freely moving around, the parks are full of couples making out, you know, it is very different and nobody will come with a gun "why are you marrying in so or so caste or in so and so tribe". It is not like that, it is probably because is more dominated by tribal population..." (Female PhD Student, 27 years old Hindu from Assam living in Delhi)

In the case of Manipur, where 43.8% are Hindus and 41% are Christians, there is a geographical division in the state. Hindus, mainly Meitheis and Bamons (Manipuri Brahmin) live in the valley; while Christians live in the hilly areas (90% of the population of hilly areas are Christians) (Bajaj et al, 2003)

"I am from Manipur, I am tribal, so in Manipur all hill people are tribal and the majority of the hill people, almost 95% are Christians, we are peace loving people actually, go there a little, there are some insurgent problem areas but at large people are peace loving" (Male Human resources administrator, 43 years old, Christian from Manipur living in Delhi)

Christians Manipuris as well as people coming from Nagaland and Mizoram think that Caste system is the main cause of discrimination and inequalities.

"In the North East we don't have a caste system, except for the Meitheis because they follow the Hindu religious system and of course Caste system is either societal or economical or religious, something still to study because there seems to be different opinions about that. The North East as a whole is a prevalently Christian society where there is no Caste" (Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, from Manipur but grew up in Delhi).

"Researcher (R): Why do you think is so equal there (the hill areas of Manipur)?"

I: See we don't have any Caste system, no? no discrimination, here you will find, you learn, high Caste, low Caste, we don't have a Caste system, even ladies are given equal opportunities and they have a lot of liberty, we don't discriminate male and female" (Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, from Manipur but grew up in Delhi).

“That is a problem with India, there is a Caste system, what can you do about that? That is the main source of discrimination, as long as a Caste system prevails it is very difficult to solve this problem” (Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, Manipur but grew up in Delhi).

Racially North Easterners look different from the rest of Indian society. Features denoting Tai, Tibeto-Burman, and Mon- Khmer lineages, better known as “mongoloid features”, mark them as different from other Indian population (something that is different in the case of Assam). Therefore, they are not classified according to caste hierarchies in the everyday social classifications that people do. In the everyday classifications and stereotyping Mongoloid looking people are considered to be out of the caste system, as well as Dalits. Hence, India’s caste-based society always looks upon them from caste perspective and consider them outcaste as well as untouchable Dalits (NESCH, 2011). Many authors and studies that analyze the phenomenon of racial devaluation in India and especially the ones that study the devaluation of Northeasterners, argue that Caste is one of the causes of the racial discrimination they face. Not in a direct way but as a consequence of the hierarchical system (NESCH, 2011; Remesh, 2012; Ma Duieu, 2012a).

I agree that caste is strongly intermingled with racist discrimination, especially when other ethnic groups or cultures are interpreted as outcastes. However, racism does not only exist where there is Caste system. Other forms of racial devaluation in other countries in the world operate in a similar way. In Chile and other countries in Latin America, native people have suffered racism and nowadays in Europe some ethnic groups and migrants coming from the global South are facing the same problem. Therefore, racism is embedded in social structure and is a social factor of social inequality. Other factors of social inequalities are caste, as we have been analyzing, class, gender, nationality, ethnicity and religion (in some countries) and all of them are strongly related with racism. Racism operates as a symbolic capital and it is not merely an epiphenomenon of class but it constitutes a category of the social structure by their own, as it was explained in the conceptual chapter following the argument of Anja Weiss (2010)

Therefore, is true that in India caste is one of the factors that causes racist devaluations but it does not mean that racist devaluation exists only where there is caste system.

In this research the main point is to show how the citizenship of Northeasterners in India and Mapuches in Chile has suffered delegitimation trough racist mechanisms. This delegitimation is produced when only the legal dimension of citizenship is recognized while the belonging dimension is denied or recognized only as folklore or “exotization”. The delegitimation of citizenship is mainly produced by racist devaluation and ethnification. Racism is expressed not only in classificatory devaluations regarding their features but also regarding many other cultural practices as food, way of dressing, religion and lifestyle.

3) Racist classificatory devaluations

As mentioned in the theoretical chapters, social classifications constitute the social reality in which we live in by organizing our perception of the social world. These meaningful classifications are done thanks to symbolic power, which “aims at imposing the vision of legitimate divisions” (Bourdieu, 1989; 22).

The phenomenon of racist classificatory devaluation is related to the classification of groups (they could be ethnic groups, migrants or others) based on a certain power hierarchy. During the expansion

of Europe, there was a racial division of people, which was mainly between white and non-white. This division was based on the position that the countries took in a world hierarchy, distinguishing core countries from peripheral ones. As it was analyzed in chapter 1, for Wallerstein (1991), the creation of concepts like race, ethnicity, and nation are used to justify and sustain present structures in the world's hierarchy.

For Wallerstein the concept of nation derives from the political structuring of the world-system. The states are all creations of the modern world-system, where "national" sentiments are developed in order to prevent threats of internal disintegration and external aggression. Therefore, the governments in power are always interested in promoting nationalist sentiments.

For Wallerstein "ethnic group" is the new name given to minorities. When a group is ethnicized, it is embedded with less power and considered inferior. The ethnic group is constituted as a minority opposed to the nation. This situation entails lower social valuation and sometimes even lesser rights to these groups. This happens to ethnic groups within a nation-state such as Northeasterners in India and Mapuches in Chile and it is the case today with ethnicized migrants such as people with Turkish background in Germany and Turkish and Moroccans migration background in the Netherlands (Grosfoguel, 2004). Not all migrants are ethnicized migrants, but only those who come from countries who have experienced some kind of colonization⁵² by the host country and therefore, have been defined as peripheral and inferior (Grosfoguel, 2004).

For Weiss (2010), there is racism when some stable marker based in some biological, linguistic, religious or cultural difference is enacted as a visible otherness. This otherness impacts the social classification, practices and institutions in a manner that attributes lesser rights to collectives of that category. As a result, the rights of these people constituted as "others" are contested and they are frequently asked to prove why they should be accepted as equals.

Therefore, racist classifications and stereotypes are related with the value that the ethnic or migrant group has in each specific country. In the case of ethnic native groups such as Mapuches in Chile and Northeastern Indians, their valuation depends on how international power hierarchies were configured during the Nation State building and on the respective symbolic value (or devaluation) that were attached to their features, customs, and culture. In the case of ethnic migrants, this valuation depends on the hierarchy of power between their country of origin and the host country. These international power hierarchies and valuation criteria are still reproduced in certain forms in the different nation states, since colonial power structures continue even after the end of territorial colonization. Thus, the value attached to cultural specificities and features of ethnic groups constitute their symbolic capital, which influence all other capitals as well (economic, cultural and social).

Northeasterners Indians have less symbolical capital than the so called "mainstream" Indians, who constitute the nation. As it was mentioned before, Northeasterners have been constituted as the "other" in opposite to the Indian nation; hence, they have been delegitimized as citizens. Formally, they belong to India but are constantly reminded of their outsider status as ethnic groups.

⁵²The colonization can be a political territorial colonization (colonization of Latin America or of Africa and India), but it can also be an economic or power colonization in the global order. For example, the colonization power that Germany or Great Britain have in Latin America or other countries.

a) Negative racist symbolic capital: The stereotype of Northeasterners

Following Weiss (2010), the value attached to the cultural specificities and features of Northeastern Indians constitutes their racist symbolic capital. The Racist Symbolic Capital influences and is influenced at the same time by all other capitals (economic, cultural and social).

Northeasterners possess lower or negative racist symbolic capital than the so called “mainstream Indians”. This devaluation is mainly influenced by the historically low power that the North-eastern region has had in India.

As McDuie-Ra (2012a) argues and as it was shown in the interviews conducted for this research, Northeastern migrants experience high levels of racism in Delhi. As stated before, their “mongoloid features” already mark them as visually different from the rest of Indian population with the exception of some Northeasterners from Assam. Even though India contains many communities considered as “others” based on religion, caste, and even ethnicity, the citizenship and origin of these communities are not questioned every time as in the case of Northeasterners. The other communities can integrate more easily to the heartland (rarely completely) in ways that Northeastern migrants cannot (McDuie-Ra, 2012a). This does not mean that these other communities do not face devaluations and violence, but the kind of devaluation is different and their belonging to the nation is not questioned, at least not in a direct way. In the case of Northeasterners, they face a specific kind of racism related to the similarity of their features with people from Southeast Asia. Their “outlandish” appearance put at stake constantly their belonging to the nation state, even if not legally, but as social recognition.

*“To put it simply, they look different from the other peoples of India. They are not viewed as yet another ethnic group in the vast Indian milieu; they are an exceptional population. As such, they are subject to different perceptions and treatment than other groups. This makes it **“difficult for them to escape from their ethnic identity if they wish to” (Eriksen 2002: 6)**” (McDuie-Ra, 2012b: 71).*

“Before judging what you are in profession, in life, whatever, they judge you with your face, this is all that they see” (Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, Manipur but grew up in Delhi)”

However, devaluation based on features is experienced in a lower level by migrants coming from Assam as their looks are mixed and some of them don’t have “mongoloid” looks; therefore, they are usually considered as “mainstream Indians”. Nonetheless, when people know where they are from, discrimination starts. Consequently, people from Assam usually don’t experience much discriminations on the streets or at first sight, but only when people know they come from the Northeast. This expresses the importance of features for discrimination but also points out that the meaning of the features is related with the understanding of the Northeast as a region lagging behind; a backward, problematic (with insurgency) and exotic region. In this sense we can see that racism is not only a discrimination and classification based on features but is also related to cultural practices and a devaluation of a specific group of people (in this case people coming from Northeast India).

“See I don’t look like a Northeasterner so in many ways I sometimes escape those discriminations but then when I tell them I am Northeasterner so they ask me, so why don’t you look like a chinky⁵³?” (Female master student, 23 years old, from Assam living in Delhi).

⁵³ Pejorative term to refer to people from Northeast India with mongoloid features.

“the moment that you say you are from the Northeast they have a different view point, they ask you so many questions, maybe some of them are just out of curiosity but the kind of questions they ask you.... usually when they see that you speak English and you said that you learnt it at school, they ask: Is Guhawati a North Indian city? Do you have electricity there? Even bachelor students ask those kind of questions” (Female masters student, 23 years old, Assam living in Delhi)

McDuie-Ra (2012a) also states that for most respondent racism in Delhi is expressed by the epithet “chinky”. They are constantly subject to the epithet as they move around the city, in their workplace from colleagues, from other students in their classes at university, and even from friends. He argues that “chinky” is not used by northeasterners to refer to themselves or each other. During my fieldwork, respondents referred to themselves as chinkies, especially to explain to me (a foreigner) the meaning of this word. Consequently, they were using the epithet only with explicative intentions but it was not used as an identity label.

Nevertheless, other groups are also subject to this derogatory term: Bhutanese nationals, Burmese refugees and migrants, Chinese nationals, Ladakhis, Nepalis from certain ethnic groups (Limbus, Magyars and Rais), and Tibetans. All of these groups are present in Delhi. They share some of the same places of work, education and neighbourhoods and sometimes even faith with the Northeasterners migrants, but for the most part they occupy different niches in the city (MacDuie-Ra, 2012a)

Another label used in a derogatory way is the word “Bahadur”, which means Nepali but it is used to insult, implying that someone is a worker of very low strata. For woman it means prostitute, especially when they use the specific word “Kharanshi”, which means a woman who is a prostitute or will become one. For men the term Bahadur does not have a sexual connotation but evoke very low rank works, the most common as gatekeepers. So for them is not the word itself that disturb them but the meaning behind, which is done with the intention to insult. As MacDuie-Ra argues, epithets matter because they reflect embedded stereotypes about Northeasterners (MacDuie-Ra, 2012a).

“I used to be in tears after going out in a bus, they called me Kharanshi, which is apparently a term for a Nepali woman who is a prostitute or will become one, you know?” (Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, Manipur but grew up in Delhi)”

*“a lots of comments, common word is **chinky** because of our eyes... and other word is Nepali, I find, the word Nepali is ok, because there is a Nepali community right? But the idea behind Nepali is, if you know this, that a lot of guards and people who, I mean, the low grade people who work in Delhi for the house, cars, for street selling things, most of them are Nepali, so when they connote us as Nepali, they are not just, connoting us with a community member but they are connoting us with somebody that is lower, who is you know, who is mostly known as somebody who is in a low grade, that kind of thing” (Female PhD Student, 28 years old, from Nagaland living in Delhi).*

This fact demonstrates how racism and the intersection with class and occupation operate in India. In Delhi there is a Nepalese population that migrates to do some low skilled jobs and forced prostitution. Therefore, this group is identified as a community and ethnicized labour force, as Wallerstein (1991) expressed it in his concept of ethnic group. In this case, some jobs considered derogative (gate keepers, street sellers, prostitutes) are related with a specific migratory group coming from Nepal. The fact that these jobs are considered derogatory means that they are considered to be below the line of dignity (Rehbein and Souza, 2014a; 2014b)

On the other side, the fact that my informants feel insulted with this word and what it implies, as an ethnicized work force, bring us the information about the social position in which my interviewees are placed. People from the Northeast that migrate to Delhi are not the poorest ones from those regions and they migrate looking for better opportunities for studies and work (NESCH, 2011; Remesh, 2012). In the case of my informants, they all have a relatively good position in society for Indian standards and earn enough to live and at least are in a better condition than some Nepali migrants or Tibetans refugees. Therefore, the fact that they are confused with an ethnicized work force that is in a lower social position makes them feel insulted. Anyways, the word Nepali has a pejorative connotation even if it is said to a Nepali migrant because is used with the intention to insult.

In universities and colleges, Northeasterners are considered not as smart as the rest of Indian population. It is true (even recognized by some of the interviewees) that in some cases the academic background of Northeasterners is not so good (especially from some disturbed regions or areas, where it is difficult to have good education). The problem is that these cases are enough to build racist stereotypes. Instead of considering that some students do not perform very well, all the Northeasterners are treated as a whole, which is known in race studies as “the construction group markers” (Weiss, 2001). It is also said that in some cases teachers tend to give less marks to Northeasterners because of this prejudice.

“R: And have you experienced some discrimination yourself?”

I: I do...In college just because two or three people are not doing well in the class, they discriminate the whole North East people. I even study in Hindu College which is considered one of the good colleges in Delhi and also in India, there we face discrimination” (Male student activist, 26 years old, Naga from Manipur)

“I was just doing my initial state of joining in the office, so when we were assigned as trainees, they don’t know about our quality, they haven’t experienced my performance. So they think “he just keep quiet, he just ask a few things” and you don’t talk in the class room but they (mainstream Indians) will try to convince the instructor, the superior, the boss and naturally the affection of the boss to his students is more than he has for us because we don’t express much, we don’t talk much but, but on the other side, when we do things... when we do our work as an employee our performance is much better, which surprises them” (Male self-employed and social activist, 38 years old, from Manipur living in Delhi).

It is also interesting how the discrimination and racism regarding Northeasterners does not come only from people without education or from lower strata (as is usually said) but it is present in prestigious educational institutions as Hindu College or Delhi University. Also people who study there do not know much about Northeast.

“(…) and yes as a teacher... I also... I faced a lot of discrimination, being from the Northeast people studying in such elite colleges that have no knowledge about Northeast and they make racial comments, they make cultural comments, stereotypical comments” (Female PhD student, 27 years old, from Assam living in Delhi).

When students from Northeast perform well or better than locals, they are questioned for having come to Delhi; teachers and some students accused them of taking the places of some North Indians.

"Discrimination ... also from my teachers, even my teachers would say... sometimes try to not give me marks or something like that and openly say that "why have you guys come here? go back to your state"(Female PhD student, 28 years old, Assam).

On the other hand, some of the devaluations they suffer at universities are the same that people belonging to other "backward groups" suffer. This devaluation is related with the reservation system that exists in India for Scheduled Caste and Tribes (SC/ST) and for Other Backwards Classes (OBC), which comprises reservations and quotas in universities, jobs in the public sector, and seats in political representation. As stated in the contextualization, the reservation policy is a contested issue, because many people perceive it as an unfair benefit, because it does not consider the economic background of the beneficiary⁵⁴. People from the Northeast regions are allowed to obtain these benefits irrespective of their social and economic background. Hence, they are eligible to benefits that other groups cannot apply to, even if these other groups are more disadvantaged economically. This is because the criterion for selection of the reservation at universities, government jobs and political representation is not the economic situation, but either the belonging to Scheduled Tribes and Castes, or to Other Backward Classes. Reservation was not created to be a poverty alleviation program but one aiming to bring more opportunities to the most affected groups within the hierarchies of Indian system; caste system, tribal populations and other backwards classes (other non-upper castes but also historically unprivileged groups as Muslims).

These debates are common in the case of positive discrimination policies in general. A group is targeted with a benefit in order to end some kind of discrimination, and thereby a new discrimination is created⁵⁵. In the case of Northeasterners, reservation potentiates their ethnic devaluation. They are seen as the ones obtaining the benefits without deserving it either because they already have a good economic situation or because as a backward person, they are considered less capable of performing well in studies and jobs. Northeasterners express that at universities people tend to think they have no merit at all (or less merit) to obtain the reservations in jobs or scholarships, and that their only merit is being a member of a Scheduled Tribe.

"I: There are still discriminations, intellectual discrimination it is always also very prevalent at the university.

R: Could you please give me an example?

I: For example, India is a ruler country, India has several castes and classes, and we belong to the reserved groups; as a Northeasterners we belong to the Schedule Tribe. So for example, if a seat is open for a Schedule tribe or if a seat is reserved in the quota, and if you get your seat through this quota, people tend to think that you have no brains that you got that seat only because you are reserved." (Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, Manipur but grew up in Delhi)

Ethnicity/race operates as a symbolic capital; the same source of discrimination can be sometimes transformed in a resource. Exotization is discrimination because one difference is enacted; therefore,

⁵⁴ There has been a lot of controversy regarding reservations and its relation to income, which can be a symptom of a problem. The relationship between caste and social class is not one-dimensionally correlated in India. There is a tendency for Backward Castes, especially Dalits and tribal population like Adivasis to be poorer, but the direct correlation has been contested lately, for example with the protests of the Patel Caste in the state of Gujarat in India at the end of August 2015. See, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/hardik-patels-call-for-reservations/article7596766.ece>. For the impact of political reservation policies in poverty alleviation, see Chin and Prakash, 2011.

⁵⁵ There is an extended discussion regarding positive discrimination. There are many arguments for and against it (see Ambedkar, 2004; Sowell, 2004; Gosvami, 2011).

the person is not considered as equal because is seen as an object with a particular characteristic. Nevertheless, in some cases the same source of discrimination is considered a resource. Northeastern men and women are preferred for certain jobs because they give the impression of cosmopolitanism, which is reinforced by their knowledge of good English. In the case of women, this is even reinforced since they are considered pretty and sexy. This is how a discrimination can be capitalized as a resource that gives certain benefits (a job), even though it continues being a discrimination.

In the cities they face devaluations for being a different ethnic group. They have different features, language, customs and religion.

The most common characteristics to describe people from Northeast are to cast them as backward and exotic; as antinational, loose and immoral (especially in the case of women). All these categories are reconfigurations of classifications constituted during the colonial era; in the ways Northeast region was governed (Barbora 2008; Zou 2009) as well as in popular representations of north-easterners – especially tribals – in museums, tourism campaigns, guidebooks, schoolbooks, and national parades (Patil 2011). In almost all of these cases tribal people are represented as “unchanged”, “unrestrained” and “uncivilized” (Echtner and Prasad, 2003).

All these stereotypes are present in the classificatory devaluations that Northeasterners face in the city as they have to constantly challenge notions that they are from a pre-modern society “untouched” by modernity. In addition, they are cast as anti-national, insurgents or terrorist.

b) Everyday devaluations in public places

Following the concept of *everyday racism* developed by Philomena Essed (1991), *everyday devaluations* refers here to the different devaluations a person faces frequently in his/her life. If we consider every episode of discrimination isolated from each other they don't seem to be so problematic. However, if we consider them all together we can see that they constitute an experience of life because they are present every day and constitute a pattern and structure. Hence, they configured an everyday devaluation. Everyday devaluations are also related with racial and gender discriminations.

“I: And I wanted to ask you if you have experienced some kind of discrimination here in Delhi for being from the Northeast?”

I: ALWAYS! Even as a teacher, as a faculty member until today, I mean your face plays a role in the first place, no? You are not Caucasian, you are not completely black, you are Asian, but you are an Asian to the level that people start calling you local Asian, and Northeast is a problem, since my childhood, although I had the privilege of having all the education, my language also is an advantage because I can answer them back in Hindi, when they say something to me. But on the other hand there are students coming to Delhi after finishing the class 12, and studying for graduation or coming directly to do masters or PhD, and then is a problem because they cannot answer them back, they cannot understand what they are saying because there is always a discrimination because of who you are...”
(Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, Manipur but grew up in Delhi)

These experiences of everyday devaluations are a mosaic of small but repetitive acts of discriminations that frame a generalized experience of devaluation that is difficult to explain. Therefore, when someone is asked for these experiences, they have to start explaining the small but frequent discriminations they suffer almost every day in different places and activities.

"you know, right now all the abuses and the kind of attitude which cannot be explained in words, has always been relevant, the abuses, even until today, we have a problem, me and my husband and with my kids going out, for example, you are parking the car and the parking lot guy wouldn't see you or will say "you please go away" and then it will be another car coming with people from the mainstream population and they say just park here, see in small, small things you can see there is a lot of discrimination I would say "(Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, Manipur but grew up in Delhi)

"I: You are standing in a line to get a railway ticket, they will not listen to you, they will say "we don't understand what you are saying, please move away from here because your Hindi is bad". They don't listen out, and we are so invaded in the personal everyday life!!! This discrimination it is very difficult even for me that I grew up in Delhi and speak good Hindi...

R: Because it is the whole time in small details?

I: Yeah!!! it is there, it is the way they talk, the way they speak to you, the way they behave to you, their body language, it is present I would say EVERY PASSING MOMENT THEY ADDRESS TO ME, except from the people who are friends, literate, educated people, then you don't feel it; educated Indians as a whole "(Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, Manipur but grew up in Delhi).

Some experiences of discrimination can get more physical or offensive as the case of verbally abusing, sexual harassment, rapes and fights. And also some public offenses as when they are in the rickshaws some people throw things at them or pee.

"I: when passing the rickshaws, they throw some things, when we are travelling in the rickshaws from behind their backs they pee.

R: The rickshaw driver or someone else?

I: Someone from a bike, that is what they do, because that kind of incidents, because I am also a student leader so I get so many calls from different people, 3 or 4 times a day I got a call like that, they pee..." (Male student and social activist, 26 years old, from Manipur living in Delhi)

There are also other common practices of discrimination that happened to many of the interviewees. A situation that is subtle but very common is that people ask them to give the seats in public places as buses or railway stations. They target them asking for the seats as implying that between all the people that are seated in that public place, they are the ones obliged by the hierarchy to give the seats.

"When you go to railway stations if you have to sit there waiting...and once happen to me that I was just sitting and there were no enough seats, and then somebody came and said "I need to sit, stand up, I need the chair" so they just look around and see a different face and then ask to stand up... and this is something very frequent...." (Male Self employed and social activist, 38 years old, from Manipur living in Delhi)

"I was just 14 years old, I was travelling in a bus with my father, we were going somewhere and suddenly this person started talking rashly to my father asking to stand up because he wanted to sit in the bus, everybody was sitting but he asked only my father because we were different in that place, and my father asked "Why? Why me? Ask the others". Then, the person who asked my father started saying "why are you replying back?!" and started abusing my father, then it was really shocking for me, then we went home and my father explained to me...

R: What did he explained to you?

I: This will happen in the future, prepare yourself up, you will have to face it. But my father never told me that we will have to accept it, so we are treated like, we give them back we don't take it, we are not submissive, most of the Northeasterners here are really submissive and that it's a disadvantage for them, they cannot answer, they cannot say it, when this happens you have to fight that, when something is wrong you should fight that" (Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, Manipur but grew up in Delhi)

Language is very important, not all of them speak Hindi or a good Hindi and that is why they cannot answer or "fight back" to the discriminations. The fact that they don't speak good Hindi also plays a role in reinforcing the prejudice that considers them as less intelligent or less capable.

"In the time of the training my face used to be different from others so they used to get the better ones" (the internships). What kind of discrimination was that? But later on when they realized the quality of the person.... you have to perform better than them, otherwise until you cannot express or talk, as soon as you can form a part and you can argue your points then you are the winner" (Male Self employed and social activist, 38 years old, from Manipur living in Delhi).

They also feel that reporting some cases to the police does not help, especially because the police also discriminate against them *"you go to the police and they say "you Nepali!" and things like that"* (Male Self employed and social activist, 38 years old, from Manipur living in Delhi).

This fact has changed in the last 3 or 4 years, because more measures have been taken to protect the Northeast population and there have been policies to sensitize the police. All this policies and sensitization towards this problematic has been influenced by the formation of the "North East Support Centre & Helpline"⁵⁶ and other associations from Northeasterners in Delhi like the Naga Student organization and the North East Students United Forum.

"I think here teasing is very common and many cases are unreported, because sometimes if we report nothing happens. Now, however, the police are becoming a little bit serious compared to 2 or 3 years ago. Back then our people didn't have much idea about the law" (Male student and social activist, 26 years old, from Manipur living in Delhi)

c) State-violence: The presence of AFSPA

Northeasterners suffer discrimination not only from other people but also from the central state. There is a different attitude toward people coming from mainstream India and the Northeasterners.

A lot of resources are extracted from the Northeast, especially from Assam. However, its inhabitants do not benefit from them; fact that is considered an injustice and discrimination

"The discrepancy in the kind of attitude the government has towards Delhi or mainland and Assam, I really get angry, because we have resources but we are not getting the outcome of our resources, if we extract and someone else get the benefits I don't understand the point of being in a nation-state. If this

⁵⁶North East Support Centre & Helpline (www.nesupportcentre.blogspot.com) is a joint initiative of various human rights activists, social workers, students, journalists and lawyers seeking to prevent harassment and abuses meted out to North East People and tribal communities of other states. All India Christian Council, All India Confederation of SC/ST, All India Catholic Union and the North East Students United Forum are the four organizations spearheading the centre.

is how the people have to be treated there is always the center-periphery debate, which early I didn't understand. But yes, there is a lot of effort to install the idea of being a nationalist, school text books teach you that you are an Indian first and everything, but I think that all these voices of dissent that are coming up now do make sense. Guwahati is considered to be the center of Assam and it has all the privileges, all the facilities but then when I look at other places in Assam they are not getting anything out of it" (Female master student, 23 years old, Assam)

This different attitude the government has towards Northeast is considered one of the causes of discrimination together with the different cultural practices, the lack of knowledge about Northeast and the existence of AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Act).

"R: And why do you think this kind of discrimination happens?

I: Yes, because we look different and we have cultural differences, racial differences and also because we are doing well. Probably they have some kind of a fear that we are enclosing upon them, what is their right. But all this comes from the lack of education, it is also a government failure, because the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in Manipur and Kashmir allows the army to arrest anybody ... they say North East is a disturbed area so they have the forces since 1958 but now they have to withdraw it from some parts, but in Manipur and other areas is still there. The government will always try to forcibly have its way. It is not through understanding but it is through violent domination, which is also something reflected in the mainstream population. They think that "ok. The government looks down upon them; you can also look down upon them" "(Female PhD student, 27 years old, from Assam living in Delhi).

As explained before, Armed Forces Special Powers Acts (AFSPA) is an act that declares some areas as "disturbed areas" because there is insurgency and/or violence. This grants special rights to the military, as arrest under suspicion, the use of force and impunity. AFSPA continues operating now with some changes (especially with ceasefire) and differently in every state of Northeast and it is still criticized by many.

"My grandfather was also tortured by Indian army and then died of a sickness, so that is why we still have the strong feeling that we are not Indians at all, because many villages were burnt out, many were raped, many were killed...

R: And this is because the Armed Forces Special Powers Act?

I: Yeah! That is because of that...but we have ceasefire so there is not much problem with that now. Earlier, they will kill anyone and they would say you are insurgent but with the ceasefire they cannot do that" (Male social activist, 26 years old, from Manipur living in Delhi)

"Mainly Manipur is considered to be the main focus of that act (AFSPA)..., also in Assam in some places it is there, but yes in Manipur they have no freedom of their own, so if that is the kind of national security they are providing (the army), it is highly questionable. Still the government says "no, we still need the army there". The army is supposed to have a very glorifying connotation, they say they are the protectors of the nation and everything, but when they do something wrong then accept it!... they are not doing that and that is the problem" (Female master student, 23 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

The fact that AFSPA is operating in Northeast is seen as a discrimination against the Northeast by the state. However, for some people, the presence of AFSPA is justified as a protection against insurrection. Not all Northerners are so critical regarding the Indian government and for some there are no major problems because of the presence of the army; but they have problems with the excesses committed under the AFSPA. These opinions belong mainly to people that are members of regional governments or of the Indian army, who are very proud of being Northerner, understand the insurgency and separatist movements but think that is not viable to be independent. Anyhow, all the interviewees condemn the abuses committed with this Act but only some understand the presence of the army.

“As for my personal opinion, my father was in the Indian Army until he took a voluntary retirement to join the state administrative service and I have my younger brother who flies for the Indian Air force, so obviously my opinion and views greatly differs from a conventional Naga...and also I have been fortunate to have a relatively privileged and sheltered life and have never had the feeling of inequality and discrimination, in fact I have enjoyed more privileges than an ordinary Indian might have, so really I have no complains” (Male PhD student, 37 years old, from Nagaland living in Germany)

“R: How do you feel about the idea of Nagaland of being independent?”

I: Everyone has the right to think whatever they want to think. But you have to think, do we have enough resources, are we prepared to be independent?” (Male PhD student, 37 years old, from Nagaland living in Germany)

The fact that the North East is declared a disturbed area provoke that there are less teachers in those areas, affecting the education. Furthermore, Northerners are stereotyped as insurgents; a dishonor for some of them.

They also consider that the State does not care about the Northeast and that even some protests against AFSPA are not heard by the Indian government.

“the government school that is there, the so called Government free education, there are no teachers, teachers don’t go there, people don’t want to go to Assam because supposedly it is a disturbed area but then we are losing our honor... what is this kind of national identity? If people here don’t think we are part of the nation, why do we have to call us as Indians? In Manipur a woman has been on hunger strike for almost 12 years now but the center does not give a damn! She is underfed because they say she cannot take her life. She cannot take her life but you can take her life?⁵⁷, so all these things really make me question, why should I call myself an Indian if this is how I am going to be treated?” (Female master student, 23 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

d) Sexualization of women

Northeastern women are seeing as sexual objects while men are stereotyped as heavy drinkers and violent.

⁵⁷ This is the case of Irom Sharmila a Manipuri activist who has been on hunger strike since 2000 demanding the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Power Act, see http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/03/04/woman_on_hunger_strike_for_12_years_charged_with_attempted_suicide.html

"I: As a female northeasterner you are automatically looking upon as a sexual object, someone who is very frivolous, someone who is slutty, someone who understands nothing but just how to dress, that does not have anything in the brains, someone who is easy... as you know..."

R: Sexually easy?

I: Yes, sexually easy. "(Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, Manipur but grew up in Delhi)"

This sexualization of woman is related to multiple factors that have to do mainly with the different cultural customs of the Northeasterners. As mentioned before, in the Northeast gender relations are more egalitarian; friendship between men and woman is considered normal; therefore, women tend to be friendlier to a man, which is misunderstood as a flirtatious behavior. Furthermore, they dress in a more western way, which is considered "revealing" for mainstream India culture. In Northeast there is more flexibility in marriage, which is considered morally loose or at least suspicious for mainstream India. To all these it is necessary to add the fact that in India there are prostitutes coming from Nepal and other countries (and lately also coming from Northeastern states in conflict as Manipur). As a result, the prejudice against women with mongoloid features as a sexual object is bigger.

However, the sexualization of ethnic groups and migrants is a common pattern not only in India but in different countries *"From a variety of perspectives and over a long period, analysts have noted that situations that involve 'race' also often involve 'sex'. The opposite may not necessarily be the case; that is, it is less often"* (Wade, 2009;1).

The sexualization is related with the exoticization; this "other" is seen as an object/body that can be possessed; thus, they are sexualized⁵⁸.

e) Violence and sexual assaults

Together with sexualization and racist discrimination there is also violence against men and women as well as sexual assaults.

Delhi is known for being a city where sexual violence and rape is very high. In 2010, every 18 hours, a woman was raped and every 14 hours, a woman molested (NESCH, 2011). This happens to all women in Delhi and not only to Northeastern women. However, this fact together with racist discriminations and sexualization of Northeastern women make the whole experience harder.

Due to the sexualization and different cultural customs, North Eastern women became vulnerable to sexual violence in their homes, in work places and in market areas, while men suffer physical attacks, especially when they react to some discrimination.

Many Northeasterners work in call centers and they have to go to work or come back at random hours, time when these attacks occur more frequently.

⁵⁸ Sexualization of black woman (and also men) or Latin-American-migrants is very common in the US and Europe (Nagel, 2001).

4) Invisibilization of Northeastern history

The lack of knowledge about Northeast India is much extended. At school, Indian children from other regions outside the Northeast do not learn about this region. Only in 2001 the history of Northeast India was included in the national syllabus. This absence of Northeast is also reproduced by media; they appear in television mainly as terrorist, separatist or as folklore, showing them as a figure from the past.

a) Lack of knowledge in education

Even highly educated people don't know much about Northeast India. The interviewees argue that they think one of the important reasons for discrimination is the ignorance that exists about Northeast.

"Even friends from my own class, so highly educated in Delhi university, the most looked up university, they have such stereotypes about the North East!Firstly they do not know where Northeast is, although is North East! Can you imagine?! Then I said I am from Northeast and they are like "ahhh, which state is that?" "ohhh we have never been to South India!!" (Female PhD student, 27 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

"If you interact with anyone, if you tell them you are from Nagaland they will think you are from another country. That is because in the syllabus there is no mention of our history, Northeast History. Like, I am not sure about the current syllabus but even I want to work on higher education, so I want to look to all these things, but yes in the high school we have read about the whole history of India, we have read about the ancient, the medieval, the modern history; I have read about all the political parties since I am from a Political Sciences background. So I have read everything about the so called Indian history but when people meet me and they don't know where I am from, they don't know my history, they don't know anything about me, that is because they haven't read and I don't blame them, sometimes there is always... I don't like the victimized mind set, you know, I am not victimized. I don't feel inferior because I am from the Northeast, from Nagaland, I feel that every person is a person and it is a human being, and so I don't blame them for not knowing (Female PhD Student, 28 years old, from Nagaland living in Delhi).

"R: And why do you think this kind of discrimination happens?

I: I think lack of knowledge, I think they lack some things, I find it very intriguing because when we are at school, we were taught about the whole country, we were told about all the states, all the capitals, we have to know them a lot but then it seems in other parts of the country, they don't even know how many states are there in the North East, which capital belong to which state, you know? Common things that they don't know, I think that is one thing that should be taught in school" (Female administrative at the Australian embassy, 33 years old, from Meghalaya living in Delhi)

"See the educational system, which is NCERT, this is the central board of education so they provide textbooks for most of the states in India and if you go through the history textbooks or any Political Science one, you won't find too much of mention about the Northeast. Actually it is very different, I have read is not so much, or even for the matter of South India, not completely, but still they don't mention it so much. About Northeast, people don't know that Manipur is different from Meghalaya, most people who are not interested in actually going through the map and looking, they don't know,

furthermore it is not really taught or mentioned at school” (Female Master student, 23 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

It is very clear that Northeasterners are invisibilized through the teaching of history. In Chapter 1 it was analyzed how one important mechanism to delegitimize certain groups is through the invisibilization or lack of knowledge of their history. Their history is relegated as secondary; they have been constituted as a different kind of people inside the nation-state, which entails a symbolic devaluation. In order to legitimize the hegemony of one national identity over others, the use of knowledge in the form of “an objective national history” is fundamental. Therefore, in the consolidation of nation-states, education played a main role. History teaching focused on creating national pride and unity.

Until 2001 the history of the Northeast region was not included in the syllabus, which shows that the history of Northeast India was relegated as not important for the whole population in India; being taught only in the region⁵⁹ (Banerjee and Stöber, 2007). In the new syllabus in 2001, the history of Northeast region was included only in class 11 of higher secondary education, where the subject is an elective, which means that not all the students will learn about it. The unit had the following contents:

“Unit VII: South and North-East India: South India from Megalithic Culture to Sangam Age – The Archaeological Cultures of North-Eastern India – Antiquity of Iron in South India” (Banerjee and Stöber, 2007; 424)

Only in the syllabus of 2006, the history of Northeast was finally included from the 6th grade onwards. First, the Northeast as a case study of the “The First Farmers and Herders” was included together with the case study of the North-west. In the 7th grade a study of the different regional cultures, languages and art, shows an intention to pay more attention in the teaching of the diversity of India and not only centered in the mainstream North Indian culture. In the 8th grade North East is again mentioned; with the study of the topic: “Colonialism and Tribal societies: changes within tribal economies and societies in the nineteenth century” with a regional focus in Chotonagpur (in east India) and Northeast (Banerjee and Stöber, 2007; 6).

The consequences of including more contents about Northeast India in the syllabus will be only seen in some years more. Therefore, in my interviews is not reflected as all my interviewees were older than 23 years old. Nevertheless, in the inclusion of Northeastern history within Indian history, Northeast and its inhabitants are only shown as part of the past; as tribal, exotic and backward people; exactly the concept that Anthropology had of them during colonial times.

Some interviewees argue that in the Northeast there were also some freedom fighters not considered or taught at school. As a result, their role is not seen as constitutive of the Indian state but as an accessory part, coming from the past and somehow left behind there.

“even freedom fighters from Northeast, they have NO SPACE AND NO MENTION in the curriculum, nobody knows about freedom fighters in North East who fought for Indian independence! , nobody knows!, only we and this is sad, but we have questioned that this has not been all right” (Female PhD student, 27 years old, from Assam living in Delhi)

⁵⁹ In India there is a common syllabus for the whole country with some specificity for every state. But in the case of teaching national history, this is very centered in “mainstream India”, leaving South India, Northeast and Kashmir as specific history for every region.

b) Lack of knowledge in mass media

Reporting on violence and “terrorism” in the north-east is one of the few times that the region and its people are mentioned in the mainstream media (Hasan 2004, 2009). *“Here the backward frontier-dweller meets the violent anti-national separatist bent on destroying India”* (McDuie-Ra, 2012b: 71).

“They do not have the Northeast regions described in the national song, described in the National Anthem, we are never included in the mainstream programs of the television” (Female University professor assistant, 28 years old, from Manipur but grew up in Delhi)

“I don’t blame them, even for the kind of looks they give to us, because they have never been exposed, there was never a proper media who reach, who can explore us” (Female PhD Student, 28 years old, from Nagaland living in Delhi).

Northeasterners are also shown in media when India wants to appear as a multi-ethnic and diverse country. Nevertheless, in this case they appear as backward and exotic, dancing in traditional outfits. They are not shown in their current life as a present culture but only as a past one.

Section 4: Ways of resistance

Despite all the devaluations and racial prejudices Northeasterners face, they find ways of resistance. They organize themselves in student unions with help from the church and they have created a support centre and helpline; Northeast East Support Center and Helpline (NESCH). NESCH is a joint initiative of various human rights activists, social workers, students, journalists and lawyers seeking to prevent harassment and abuses against North East people and tribal communities that live outside their own states. All India Christian Council, All India Confederation of Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes, All India Catholic Union and the North East Students United Forum are the four organizations spearheading the centre.

On the other hand, they also teach each other to not care and ignore some of the simpler discriminations but to denounce the ones that constitute offenses. The helpline received calls from people from Northeast that denounce different kind of discriminations; from the fact that people pee them when they are travelling in the rickshaws until rapes or problems at the workplaces (sexual harassment, dismissal without payment, etc).

The work these organizations have been doing together with multiples protest and complaints, provoke that they have been heard and today more measures are taken. Hence they have been constituted as an important stakeholder.

“Now they have opened their eyes, now they are awake to not ignore us anymore because it is infiltrated so much now...so many emigrated to the capital cities, we have become so much, people are building houses, coming to study here, people are getting jobs everywhere in all the kind of ministries and becoming more, so they cannot afford to ignore us anymore because we are a lot now but we are STILL DISCRIMINATED because we are minority”(Female Professor assistant, 28 years old, from Manipur but grew up in Delhi)

A way of gender resistance is that some Northeasterners girls reject to start dressing as mainstream Indians and continue wearing their western clothes. However, this is not so generalized, as some girls prefer the security of dressing as the locals do in order to avoid more discriminations and harassments. Some student unions are trying to create more spaces of encounter where Northeastern can meet and share more experiences with locals. They recognize that usually people coming from Northeast prefer to stay with other people from the same state, city and even tribe and do not share much with others. However, student leaders and social activists have realized that mixing with other Indians and exchanging the different cultures reduce violence.

Conclusion

In this chapter it was demonstrated how Northeastern Indians have been constituted as illegitimate citizens since the formation/independence of the Indian nation-state and how this illegitimation has been reproduced by the different Indian governments, mass media and the racist devaluations they suffer, especially when they migrate to other cities in India like Delhi.

As stated before, delegitimation in citizenship is produced when the legal dimension is recognized while the belonging dimension is denied or recognized only as folklore or “exotization”. The delegitimation of citizenship is mainly produced by the process of ethnification of a group, through the invisibility of their history and racist classificatory devaluations.

During the process of Nation-state building/achieving independence in India, a cultural and linguistic homogenization took place, even though many different languages, cultures and religions were recognized as a part of the country. However, the Hindu culture was established as the dominant one. Other languages, cultures and religions could co-exist with Hinduism, Hindu culture and Hindi but subordinated to this hegemony.

The idea of having a hegemonic identity and culture was based in global ideas of the historical period when independence was achieved; a state should be the expression of a sovereign nation. In this sense, nation-states were formed under a particular historical discourse of the nation-state. Following this idea, the nation in which the formation/independence of Indian state was based, was the Hindu nation, even though it was supposed to be a multiethnic national state. Nevertheless, what really happened is that other cultural and religious groups were constituted as minorities of different kinds and some of them were even ethnicized. It is the case of Muslims, Christians, Northeasterners, other tribes and even some non-Hindi speaking populations. It is true that there is freedom of faith in India and many languages are recognized as official languages but they do not seem to have the same social value and legitimacy as Hinduism and Hindi in a national scope.

In this configuration of the nation-state, the Northeastern States have been politically and administratively reorganized several times; first dividing Assam to form different states out of it; denying Darjeeling to be part of the Northeast and finally considering Sikkim as part of Northeast Indian Region. Hence, the particularity of the Northeast is its geographical, economic, social and political peripherality.

Northeast has been constituted as the “Other” of the Indian Hindu “Self” and in this process less value was attached to them. Northeasterners are legally Indian citizens but their value as belonging to the nation-state is less compared to the legitimate citizens, who are the ones that adopted the Hindu

culture not as religion but as a way of life. The history of Northeast has been invisibilized; their cultural customs are seen as suspicious and impure; their religion is accepted but less valued and their food is also rejected. As a result, their belonging to the nation-state is illegitimated.

It is important to notice that the term illegitimate citizen does not mean that Northeasterners are the more oppressed or discriminated persons in India. There are many others discriminations and oppressions suffered by Dalits, other tribal groups, Muslims, extremely poor people, etc. The concept of illegitimate citizenship in this context describes a specific kind of inequality related with the belonging dimension to India and with ethnicity; thus, to the concept of citizenship in a broad sense and to the concept of racism.

Furthermore, in the specific case of declared “disturbed areas” of Northeast India, even the formal citizenship of the people is not fully guaranteed, due to the presence of AFSPA. AFSPA was supposed to be a temporary state of exception but it still operates in some places with some small modifications. If those states or areas where AFSPA operates were independent nation-states, they will be considered dictatorships. Thus, in some places of Northeast as some areas in Manipur and Assam and other small areas within other states, people are not only illegitimate citizens but even non- citizens at all.

The most embedded and unconscious mechanism of illegitimation of Northeasterners in India together with the invisibilization of their history is their racist devaluation. Different kinds of stereotypes are built, affecting the valuation society has of them. The phenomenon of racist devaluation is related with the classification of the ethnic group regarding a hierarchy of power within the Nation-state but also internationally. When a group is ethnicized, it is embedded in less power and it is considered a minority, usually attaching to it less value and sometimes even rights. This happened to ethnic groups inside a nation-state as in the case of Northeasterners in India and Mapuches in Chile and it happens today also with migrants who are ethnicized. Therefore, the valuation of these ethnic groups depends on how the power hierarchies were configured during the times of nation-state building and what symbolic values (or devaluation) were attached to their features, customs and culture. This process of attachment of a symbolical value to certain *signifiers* as features, customs and culture has been called by Laclau (2000) the moment of the *inscription*. It is a historical process but requires hegemony and as such it is also an arbitrary process.

The value attached to the cultural specificities and features of Northeastern Indians constitute their racist symbolic capital. Northeasterners possess less or a negative racist symbolic capital than the amount that the so called “mainstream Indians” have. They all experience some kind of racist devaluation being it based either in their “mongoloid features” or in their cultural practices. This devaluation has been influenced by their historical construction as an “other” backward and lying behind and by the less power that Northeast region has in India. In addition, Northeast is an economically and educationally underdeveloped region, a fact that reinforces the less value conferred to it. On the other hand, Northeast is also a region affected with many conflicts and insurgency in very strategic places that share borders with China, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan. Therefore, they are also considered a potentially dangerous “internal enemy” (Akoijam, 2006).

Racist/ethnic devaluation is intimately related to citizenship, a reminder that certain groups do not legitimately belong to the nation-state, which is reinforced by the invisibilization of their history. Illegitimation of citizenship is an inequality problem and it is also related with race. This fact has been empirically found for the case of India.

This inequality related to citizenship intersects and is influenced by many other classification categories in India such as class, gender, religion, caste etc. However, in this research a comparison between Northeastern migrants from different social classes was not achieved as most of Northeastern migrants come from the relatively high segments of Northeast and most of them migrate to pursue higher studies. Therefore, only this group of migrants from the higher segments of society was interviewed. Nevertheless, this fact does not affect negatively the research as it focuses in demonstrating the specific inequality provoked only by their ethnicity. Therefore, the relationship of illegitimate citizenship with class, caste, religion and gender was only theoretically analyzed. More analysis and studies interconnecting different kinds of inequalities with citizenship are needed, especially showing how illegitimate citizenship gets affected by them.

Ethnicity/race as a symbolic capital can also be transformed into a resource. Through the phenomenon of exotization the same source of devaluation can be considered a resource, under certain circumstances. However, it continues being a classificatory devaluation because only one characteristic of the person is enacted. Northeastern men and women are preferred for certain jobs because they give the impression of cosmopolitanism, which is reinforced by their knowledge of good and accent-free English. Therefore, a devaluation is capitalized as a resource that gives certain benefits (a job), even though it continues being a devaluation. The same happens with the obtainment of benefits as scholarships and other reservations. Their ethnic/racial characteristic is capitalized as a resource. They obtain the benefit, thus, a positive discrimination in the form of reservation but this potentiates their devaluation. They are targeted as a group that obtains benefits without deserving it. They are considered as not deserving this benefits either because they already have a good economic situation or because they are supposed to not fulfill the requirements due to it hypothetically backwardness.

Chapter 5: The illegitimate and ethnicized citizenship of Mapuches in Chile

Introduction

This dissertation aims to demonstrate how the citizenship of certain ethnic groups has been historically delegitimized. As explained earlier, citizenship is a legal and symbolic status that expresses membership to a specific nation-state. The hypothesis of this dissertation is that delegitimation is produced when the legal dimension of citizenship is recognized while the belonging dimension is denied or recognized only as folklore or “exotization”. The delegitimation of a group of citizens is mainly produced by the *invisibilization* of their history as well as racist discriminations during and after the building of the nation-state. Illegitimate citizenship is a kind of inequality (of course not the only one) that affects negatively the access to resources in at least one dimension of people’s life.

In this chapter I analyze how the Mapuches have been dispossessed not only of their lands but also of their right to be a different but equal folk within the Chilean Nation-state. Their history has been made invisible and they suffer racist stereotypes and discriminations, which constitute them as the ‘others’ inside Chile⁶⁰. Therefore, their citizenship has been constituted as an illegitimate one.

In order to show this process of delegitimation of Mapuche citizenship, especially regarding the belonging dimension, I will analyze the experiences of Mapuches living in the city and mainly in Santiago de Chile.

The purpose is to look at the current dynamic of Mapuche life, which cannot be defined as purely urban or purely rural, as they transit between both areas. However, when they are in urban areas their identity as ‘true’ Mapuches is contested and they tend to face more discriminations, given that as they are a minority. Therefore, in the city they strongly feel the opposition with Chilean identity.

In order to understand the process of illegitimization of Mapuche citizenship, this chapter begins by contextualizing the Mapuche population in Chile: outlining the Mapuche characteristics, and explaining the process of migration and the new phenomena of reassessment of Mapuche culture in Chile (Section 1). Secondly, this chapter brings a historical perspective showing the progressive dispossession of Mapuches in Chile (Section 2). Thirdly, I analyze the mechanisms that produce and reproduce the Illegitimacy of citizenship, using fieldwork interviews conducted in Chile. I analyze different mechanisms such as the belief in a homogenous culture in Chile, the tensions between the Mapuche identity and the Chilean hegemonic identity, and the way Mapuche culture is seen as a threaten to the Chilean hegemonic culture. I also examine the discriminations faced by Mapuches, the lack of opportunities they have in comparison with the rest of the population, and the lack of knowledge regarding Mapuches in Chile (Section 3). Finally, I analyze the strategies of resistance that Mapuches develop to fight their delegitimation (Section 4), before moving to a general conclusion.


⁶⁰ The same process of otherness and discrimination has happened to other indigenous groups in Chile as well.

Section 1: Contextualization and specific characteristics of Mapuches in Chile

The Mapuche indigenous group has its roots in the southern part of what is Chile and Argentina today⁶¹. In Chile, 11% of the population declares to belong to some indigenous group⁶² and the majority of those (84%) belong to the Mapuche ethnic group. Therefore, Mapuches compose the biggest indigenous group in Chile with around 1.4 Million people (Chilean Census, 2012).

Mapuches are mainly concentrated in the South of Chile in Region IX - “Región de la Araucanía” (Araucania Region) and Region X - “Región de Los Lagos”⁶³ (Los Lagos Region). However, they also have a strong presence in the Metropolitan region around the capital; Santiago de Chile. In terms of distribution: 33.6% of the Mapuche population is concentrated in Region IX - “Región de la Araucanía”, 30.3% in the Metropolitan region, and 16.7% in Region X - “Región de Los Lagos”. Considering the proportion of population in every region, the density of the Mapuche population in Regions IX and X is higher than in the Metropolitan region (National Statistics Institute, 2002).

FIGURE 6: MAP OF CHILE WITH CURRENT REGIONS



In general, Mapuches tend to live in rural areas more than the rest of the population. Only 13.4% of all non Mapuches Chileans live nowadays in rural areas, compared to 37.6% of the Mapuche population that live in rural areas (National Statistics Institute, 2002).

⁶¹ In Argentina, 2.4% of the population declares to belong to some indigenous group and among those, 21.5% declare to be Mapuche (Argentinian Census, 2010). Overall, Argentina has a population of around 41 million people, the Mapuche population counting around 250,000.

⁶² It is a small percentage of indigenous population in comparison to Peru or Bolivia, for example.

⁶³ In 2007, new administrative divisions of some regions in Chile were built. The region X, Region de los Lagos was divided into two; the XIV Region de los Ríos and the other part remained with the same name the X region de Los Lagos. When referred to data before 2007, I refer to both regions (XIV de los Ríos and X de Los Lagos) as only one (X Región de Los Lagos).

1) Fewer opportunities

The Araucanía region is the least developed region in terms of GDP per capita, even though it is very rich in natural resources. This has been the case since 1960. The inequality index (Gini) in the region is one of the highest in the country⁶⁴ being almost 0.6 in 2000 (Cerde, 2009), and decreasing only to 0.55 in 2009 (Chilean Parliament, 2012; Arredondo, 2008) which is even higher than the national Gini coefficient for that year (0.52) (World Bank, 2015).

Rates of poverty in general are higher for the indigenous population than for the non-indigenous population (National Statistics Institute, 2002). Rates of poverty and extreme poverty faced by Mapuches in the Araucanía region are considerably higher than the Chilean average, reaching levels greater than 20% between 1996 and 2003 and declining but remained above 16% in 2006 (Cerde, 2009).

The indigenous population has in average less years of study than the non-indigenous population (National Statistics Institute, 2002). Only 7.9% of indigenous people reach higher education⁶⁵, half of the percentage of non-indigenous people who enter higher education (16.8%) (National Statistics Institute, 2002). Mapuches is the indigenous group that has lower educational attainment in Chile, measured in years of education and in educational outcomes. Over 12% of the Mapuche that live in the Araucanía region declared themselves as illiterate between 1996 and 2006, while the figures in the rest of Chile are around 4%. The Rapa Nui is the indigenous group in Chile that has more years of education and even 19,1% of them manage to access to higher education, while Mapuches is the indigenous group with the lowest percentage of people getting into higher education⁶⁶ (National Statistics Institute, 2002).

Mapuches also have a lower income compared to the rest of the population, which is explained in part by the lower educational level and the higher rate of informal work they do (Cerde, 2009).

Therefore, Mapuches have fewer opportunities not only than the rest of the non-indigenous population but also than other indigenous people in Chile. Mapuches are the indigenous group that has the lowest educational attainment and live in the least developed region (IX region) and the second with more social inequalities in the country (Cerde, 2009). In addition, this is a very racist region against indigenous people (Bengoa, 1999), where there is an extended belief that it is the least developed region due to the laziness of Mapuches. This is of course a vicious way of conceiving the problem. It is not a surprise that Mapuches are the poorest and has fewer opportunities if they live in a region where power is concentrated in the hands of a few landowners, logging enterprises and hydro-power dams and where there is a latent and increasingly violent conflict. The increasingly violent conflict is due to the recovery of ancestral land. Mapuches were dispossessed of their land, first, during the colonial

⁶⁴ The tendency from 1996 to 2006 has been that The Araucanía and the Metropolitan region present the highest Gini coefficients (Chilean Parliament, 2012; Arredondo, 2008).

⁶⁵ The main barriers for access to higher education in Chile are the tuition fees and the quality of education received in primary and secondary education. Tuitions fees are very expensive and scholarships and credits are not enough. Furthermore, for many a high quality education at primary and secondary levels is very difficult as the gap between the upper- and lower-income groups persists in relation to training for learning, the quality of education received and the levels of student attainment. These structural inequalities impact on access and participation in higher education (Ann Matear, 2006).

⁶⁶ This tendency has been changing for the Mapuche population. Now there are more indigenous people attending higher education due to scholarships and other benefits.

period; afterwards, during the consolidation of the Chilean republic and today by the activities of multinationals and other enterprises

2) Being Mapuche in Chile: A problematic identity

Being Mapuche in Chile is a problematic issue because of two main reasons. First, Mapuche people have been facing devaluations since the colony, which led many people to reject their Mapuche identity or even change their surnames (Llanquileo, 1996). Secondly, statistics on the size of the Mapuche population have been very uncertain. Even though it is well known that they are the biggest indigenous group in Chile.

In 1907, a census on Indigenous population was conducted (“El Censo de los Indios Araucanos”) and the size of the Mapuche population turned out to be larger than expected. Other censuses were later conducted whereby people were considered indigenous only based on the fact that they reside in rural areas. Survey enumerators took the initiative of marking all respondents residing in rural areas as indigenous without explicitly asking them the question. (De la Maza, 2015). Therefore, these censuses resulted in very imprecise numbers.

It was only in 1992, when Chile returned to democracy after 17 years of dictatorship and many changes in social policies started taking place, that the category of indigenous people was incorporated in the census questionnaire. However, the statistics about the exact number of indigenous people in Chile has changed during these measurements, making still uncertain the exact number of indigenous people. In 1992, 998,385 people older than 14 years old considered themselves indigenous people (10.3% of the total population). In 2002, this number decreased to 692,192 (4.6% of the total population) even though the question was directed to the whole population and not only to people older than 14 years old. In 2012, the number of indigenous people increased again but this time to 1,842,607 (11.1% of the total population) and here the question was also directed to the entire population and not only to the ones older than 14 years old. Of the total population that declare themselves indigenous a majority of 84% are Mapuches: in 1992, 928,060 people considered themselves as belonging to the Mapuche culture (9.7% of the total population), in 2002, 604,349 (4% of the total population) and in 2012, 1,504,722 (9% of the total population).

These changes in the figures related to the proportion of indigenous people in Chile are mainly due to changes in the census questionnaire. In 1992, the question that was addressed to people above 14 years old was for cultural self-ascription to only three indigenous groups: Mapuche, Aymara and Rapa Nui. However, this question combined two distinct concepts: being Chilean and belonging to an indigenous culture⁶⁷. In 2002, the question changed; it was not focused anymore on cultural self-ascription but on ethnic belonging to indigenous or native groups. The alternatives of indigenous people were more comprehensive, incorporating the 8 ethnic groups recognized in the Indigenous Law approved in 1993⁶⁸. Based on the results of this census, the number of indigenous people appears to have decreased. This decrease has different explanations, but the main analyses posit that it is due to the phrasing of the survey question: the 1992 survey emphasizes self-ascription in belonging to an

⁶⁷The question was: If you are Chilean, do you consider yourself as belonging to one of the following cultures? The answers: 1. Mapuche; 2. Aymara; 3. Rapa Nui; 4. none of the above.

⁶⁸The question was: Do you belong to one of the following indigenous or native people? The answers: 1. Alacalufe (Kawaskar); 2. Atacameño; 3. Aymara; 4. Colla; 5. Mapuche; 6. Quechua; 7. Rapa Nui; 8. Yamana (Yagan); 9. none of the above.

indigenous group with the expression “do you consider yourself as belonging to,” while the 2002 survey uses the more direct expression “do you belong to”, which could have been understood by people as a more objective belonging criterion than self-ascription, discouraging them to answer that they “objectively” belong to a certain indigenous group. (De la Maza, 2015). This is not a minor topic, as there are many people who are indigenous or recognize themselves as such but who are not officially registered as indigenous. Therefore, a question asking about belonging without self-ascription can be understood as a question about the official status and not about individual identity. Other explanations argue that the decrease was provoked by political and social variables that are not controlled in the survey question, such as discrimination, prejudice, and the criminalization of the Mapuche conflict (Valdés, 2004).

The increase of the size of the Mapuche population in the 2012 census can also be explained by methodological and social factors. The question changed again but this time after a process of consultation and participation of the indigenous population. This census also considered the whole population and not only people above 14 years old but this time two questions were formulated in order to identify belonging to an indigenous group. The first one asked again as in 1992 about self-ascription to some indigenous or native group and the second question asked about belonging to a list of specific and recognized indigenous groups and even adds an open alternative in case the person considers she or he belongs to other indigenous group not mentioned on the list⁶⁹.

Another important factor was that for this census many indigenous intellectuals called indigenous people to answer the self-ascription question: *“In the census 2012 answer with pride “I am Mapuche”*⁷⁰ (Mapuchetimes, 1: 4, May, 2012). Others focused on breaking the stereotypes and making people understand that Mapuches are not only those who fit the traditional and romantic idea of what a Mapuche is. They argue those are statics and idealized ideas from the past. Today many Mapuches live in the city, do not speak the language and do not practice the traditional customs, but still consider themselves as Mapuches. This is a problematic that will be analyzed in depth during this research.

“It is possible to be Mapuche without speaking the language and without practicing the traditional customs. The traditional folkloric image of Mapuches is nothing more than that; an image that has remained static within Chilean imaginary and even for some Mapuches as well. However, it is necessary to make clear that it is only an image; a romantic image of what means to be Mapuche in Chile. The majority of Mapuche live in urban centers as Santiago, Temuco and Concepción. That same majority do not practice rituals from our worldview and they don’t speak the language and nevertheless we still continue feeling different and somehow society frequently remind us of that difference” (Huenchunir, 2011)⁷¹.

Furthermore, there has been a social reassessment of the Mapuche people, due to the institutional recognition that is given to them through laws, international conventions and public policies but also a revival of Indigenous pride motivated by global and local social movements. Consequently, the identification of people as belonging to indigenous groups has been growing.

⁶⁹The questions were: 24. Do you consider yourself as belonging to some indigenous people (native)? 1. yes; 2. no 25. To which indigenous people (native) do you belong to? 1. Mapuche; 2. Aymara; 3. Rapa Nui; 4. Lincan Antai; 5. Quechua; 6. Colla; 7. Diaguita; 8. Kawesqar; 9. Yagán o Yámana; 10. Another one, please mention it ...

⁷⁰ All the quotations from interviews conducted in Spanish have been translated to English by the author of this dissertation.

⁷¹ Original text in Spanish, the quotation has been translated by the author of this dissertation.

3) The migration of Mapuche

37% of the people who declare themselves Mapuches live in the Metropolitan region. Mapuches who live in the city are the offspring of Mapuches who migrated mostly during the fifties in search for better opportunities. Poverty was very high (and still is) in the communities living in the countryside. Some Mapuches did some qualified jobs as schoolteachers but they constituted a small Mapuche elite. The majority of Mapuche migrants occupied low skill job with low payment and low prestige and they were subject to exploitation. Therefore, they got integrated to the poor and marginalized non-indigenous population that migrated at that time from the countryside and the *haciendas* (plantations) in search for a better life in the city. Most of the Mapuche migrant men worked as bakers and the women as maids (housekeepers) (Álvarez and Imilán, 2008).

a) Who are the urban Mapuches today?

It is no longer possible to classify Mapuches as either urban or rural. Many people study or work in urban areas but they are still connected to their rural communities. This is a new phenomenon that has been described in recent studies about Mapuches in Chile (Bengoa, 2002; Bengoa and Caniguan, 2011; Álvarez and Imilán, 2008). Most of them switch between land and city, with the help of new communication technologies (cell phones and internet) and the improvement of the transportations system (better highways and more connections). Many young Mapuches study at regional universities, live in the main provincial city and regularly go to the rural areas to visit their families or even to help working the land (Bengoa, 2002; Álvarez and Imilán, 2008).

The censuses of 1992 and 2002 showed a greater tendency among women to migrate towards the cities. Women have better working opportunities in urban areas, mainly as housekeepers. As for young men, they tend to transit more between the community and the city. In any case, both Mapuche men and women transit between the supposed traditional world of the indigenous territories and the urban modernity of the 21st century. They are no longer purely rural or urban actors but a complex combination.

This fact has been very important for the articulation of the Mapuche movement. Mapuche leaders also circulate between cities and their communities. This is opposed to the idea of a 'true' Mapuche who is supposed to live in communities and be very traditional.

4) New appreciation of Mapuche culture

In the last 25 years, since the recovery of democracy in Chile, there has been more recognition of Mapuche culture in Chile. There is a reemergence of the pride of being Mapuche. Mapuches who live in the city consider that nowadays it is not as difficult to be Mapuche as it was some time ago.

The reasons are diverse and related to different historical processes. There is an emergence of a very strong Mapuche social movement influenced by indigenous social movements from Latin America and other parts of the world such as Australia. In addition, different social policies were implemented in order to improve the situation of Mapuches in Chile (Bengoa and Caniguan, 2011).

“Today it is not as difficult to be Mapuche in Chile as it was some time ago. I think that now we can stand in front of the world and say “I am a Mapuche” without feeling ashamed about it. Now it is easier to recognize we are Mapuches in front of everybody”. (Female Mapuche student, 24 years old)

The situation of Mapuches in Chile has changed since the 90's thanks to some politics of recognition, which were at the beginning conceived as multicultural policies and evolved today to the new concept of intercultural⁷². The educational policy has been very successful and allowed the formation of new educated and politically active Mapuche intellectuals, who have studied in schools and universities in the city and live simultaneously in the city and in their communities. Many of them lead Mapuche organizations together with local leaders; creating a big Mapuche movement. This social movement is very diverse and has different tendencies but they all seek for more recognition and the recovery of lands, although differing in the ways to attain this goal. Some communities think it is not worth it to continue negotiating with the Chilean State anymore and propose to return to the strategy of occupying land, while others are more integrated or trust a more institutional path.

“I also think that now we have the conditions to make being Mapuche a more acceptable topic, maybe because people are less afraid of doing their payers, to walk with their traditional dresses, they do not think that people will point at them with the finger anymore. I have met many old people here in the city who tell me “peñi (brother in Mapudungun) twenty years ago I could not walk with my attire in the city because people started insulting me”. Today this does not happen. People respect you and do not look at you in a bad way if you are dressed in the traditional Mapuche way; it is not seen as something negative anymore, like it was before. This is maybe an answer to many different political processes that have been happening lately, we can see in some political demonstrations, that many Chilean people are raising the Mapuche political flag, the Wenufoye.” (Male Mapuche student, 25 years old)

Technology - mainly mass and social media - is also considered a useful tool to spread Mapuche culture and to benefit Mapuche people. All these information technologies are used to inform about Mapuche history and current conflicts: topics not well acquainted with in mainstream media in Chile, where Mapuches are either criminalized or exoticized.

“Hence, this generation has been growing together with technology; technology is a big arm, it is strong but it is also a double-edge sword. People are now more interested in knowing their origins and because of that a lot of people have awoken; when they watch the news; when a peñi (brother in Mapudungun) dies; people know that they have a Mapuche surname but they ask themselves why all these conflicts are happening. I think that in this generation the Mapuche topic has been released much more than before” (Mapuche male school teacher, 24 years old)

The Mapuche youth are getting more interested in knowing more about their culture, in learning the language and in using their knowledge to do something useful for their people. Together with the use of information technologies, formal education in the 'Huinca'⁷³ (foreigner, white, non-indigenous) system is also considered as an important tool.

⁷² Interculturalism has been defined by many as an improvement of the concept of multiculturalism and it has been replacing it in public policies and educational policies. Interculturalism is allegedly more oriented toward interaction and dialogue than multiculturalism and is conceived as less 'groupist' or more flexible than multiculturalism (Meer and Modood, 2012).

⁷³ Huinca means white or foreigner in Mapudungun, the language of Mapuche people. It was used mainly to refer to the Spaniards but nowadays is also used to refer to the Chilean non-indigenous people.

“For me to use the Huinca things, like education, to get education comes from centuries ago... Lautaro (A Mapuche hero) went to look for knowledge at the Huinca places, so he could make war using the Spanish strategy against the Spaniards; the same way... we have to do the same. We have to look for those tools.” (Mapuche male school teacher, 24 years old)

Coming to the city today is used sometimes as a strategy to learn and to study something that will help and beneficiate the community; thus the city is also a new place for Mapuche struggle. In the city, a new Mapuche intellectual group is being formed. Many young Mapuches come to the city (Temuco, Santiago or other) just to study but they maintain contact with their communities or live simultaneously in the city and their communities.

“Because what is happening today is that Mapuche customs are being recovered, they were lost in many places but now they are being recovered, youth are asking the older ones about it. Young people were losing that somehow, maybe because the elder did not want to teach them their customs or because the youth were not interested anymore. Many young people used to go study in the city or in a place close to the countryside and they used to lose contact with their communities. When young people finished school, they didn’t want to come back to their place of origin. However, now this tendency is being questioned; people want to recover their Mapuche customs” (Male Mapuche student, 25 years old)

Even some people who were ashamed of being Mapuche some years ago are now feeling proud of their origins. With this reemerging pride, many young people want to know more about their culture, to learn the language and to fight for their rights.

“When I was a child I was ashamed of being Mapuche but now that I am a grownup I think that it doesn’t have to be like that; I have to be proud of my roots. Also last year I realized that my cousin speaks a bit of Mapudungun, so I got more interested in knowing more about my culture, about the language, about the traditions and now I am learning more about myself” (Mapuche female student, 23 years old)

In some cases, these young educated urban Mapuche have helped their parents, especially the mother⁷⁴ to stop being ashamed of being Mapuche. Youths are able to access information and existing organizations and show this emerging process to their parents.

“You should talk with the mother and the aunt of Rodrigo⁷⁵. Both women migrated and worked taking care of sick people and they both know and have experienced the migration process. And for example now the mother, the mother of this guy, now that she has seen her son participating in Mapuche activities and organizations, she is re-encharmed with Mapuche culture. Before she was very ashamed but now that she sees her son participating, she realized that being Mapuche is not something bad or something to be ashamed of.” (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

“I think that some time ago my mother would have never dressed with the Mapuche attire to walk on the street. But we have the confidence now to be able to talk about it, to show her some videos, or to read her some texts. Today she dresses as Mapuche and walks on the street very proud. It is something that did not happen six or four years ago. It is something very new.” (Female Mapuche student, 24 years old)

⁷⁴ In the case of my interviewees, it was mostly the mothers who were ashamed of expressing their Mapuche culture.

⁷⁵ The name has been changed to protect the identity of the interviewee.

Some Mapuche people think that even sometimes self-recognition as Mapuche can be a trend. Some argue that people who never knew they were Mapuches or were never interested on it now want to recognize themselves as such.

“Now there is this entire boom, it is like a fashion to be Mapuche, people who as children never knew they were Mapuche and never worried about it, are now older and, they say “ohh I am Mapuche” and they search and search in the family for a Mapuche ancestor. Now there are many people who say “The second surname of my grandmother was Mapuche”, which means that the great grandmother had a Mapuche surname, something very tricky. And it is ok that more Mapuche people are joining but... attention! It is something that we always say; if you want to be Mapuche it is ok but you have to behave like one; you have to be decent, do the right things, don’t do bad crazy things, don’t disrespect people, in a ceremony you need to know how to behave, there are certain protocols.” (Female Mapuche student, 24 years old)

However, this could be more than a trend; it could be a consequence of the new appreciation of the Mapuche culture. When being Mapuche is valued in a positive manner, more people want to belong to this culture. This is how a Mapuche surname of a great-grandmother, which 20 years before was something everyone in the family would have wanted to forget, became now a resource, a symbolic capital. As a valuable symbolic capital it is something that can be shown with pride and that can even be useful to obtain certain social benefits such as scholarships.

a) Reasons for the new appreciation

The main reason argued for the new appreciation of Mapuche culture is the knowledge attained through information technologies, especially through social media like Facebook, Twitter, blogs or websites. My interviewees called it education as well; an informal way of education on Mapuche culture that is shown on social media and spread by the Mapuche movement. This “education” and broadcasting on Mapuche culture has also reached non-indigenous Chilean people and most of them are appraising Mapuche culture more.

“There is more education now; people are also politically more mature; before this was not the case. People knew only a bit about Mapuches, about indigenous people. Now people know that Mapuches are not only a part of history but they still exist; they still want to recover their lands, the same way their grandparents and three generations before have done. That is why I think that technology is so good because through it you can get informed, you can see the real history. So this has played an important role. Thanks to technology, a lot of Mapuche people have awakened and have become educated in the use of technologies; we have used technologies in a very good way.” (Male Mapuche student, 25 years old)

“I think it is from both sides. Mapuche people have had more access to education but also the Chileans. Years ago the humbler and simple person felt that she or he could discriminate against Mapuches even if the Mapuche had a better position than him or her. By the fact of being Mapuche the person was looked down upon. So education has been for both: Chileans and Mapuches. However, this education has not been given by the State but it has been a mass media communicational education, so to say. As Rodrigo⁷⁶ said before, people have been informing themselves through mass media; through internet;

⁷⁶ The name has been changed to protect the identity of the interviewees.

social networks (Facebook, Twitter, etc) and through some activities that are done here and there. I think this information has been boosted by Mapuches themselves, by Mapuches who have been educated and know the importance of being known in mass media. I think this a cause of the change, of the acknowledgment of Mapuche culture today” (Female Mapuche student, 24 years old)

There has also been a social upward mobility of some Mapuches and this has provoked the emergence of new educated Mapuche intellectuals, who work to potentiate the Mapuche movement. This does not mean that this group of intellectuals is the main pillar of the movement; Mapuche leaders who live in community are as important as this new intellectual group. Even sometimes the same person is simultaneously a community leader and a social movement leader. The so-called “urban Mapuches” live also in communities or have contact with them. As stated earlier, nowadays it is not useful to distinguish between rural and urban Mapuches; the same applies for the leaders of the movement.

Social movement leaders have helped to spread information and knowledge about Mapuche culture and also to conciliate the demands of Mapuche people living in the countryside with the ones of Mapuches living in the city.

“People now are not as discriminative as before. It is as if people understood and learnt. Before, you as Mapuche were considered an ignorant. At this point not anymore; there are professionals who are Mapuches, Mapuche lawyers, so it is not considered a weird thing anymore.” (Mapuche female, domestic worker, 39 years old)

It is also necessary to consider the role of the State and certain public policies in the new recognition of Mapuche culture. Since the re-democratization of Chile, the State took responsibility in releasing and enhancing the expression of Mapuche culture. This helped increase the knowledge and recognition of Mapuche culture, which also led to a greater appreciation of this culture. This does not mean that racism or discrimination ceased to exist, because being “white” in Chile is still considered more valuable than being “darker” (Contardo, 2008; Barandarián, 2012). Nevertheless, more space has been given to cultural expressions and new public policies are implemented to potentiate cultural diversity and to provide scholarships and other benefits. It should be noted that these policies do not necessarily entail a new distribution of resources or power and do not bring back all the lost lands. This process has been coined as “neoliberal multiculturalism” by Charles Hale and it is used by many authors to interpret how the Chilean State has dealt with the indigenous issues (De la Maza, 2014; Hale, 2003; Richards, 2010; Terwindt, 2009). In this neoliberal multiculturalism, the economic benefits of hydropower dams or forestry industries are always more important than the indigenous demands for lands and autonomy. Therefore, the main conflictive points between the Mapuche movement and the Chilean State are claims on political autonomy and the recovery of land.

Section 2: Historical perspective: Understanding the dispossession of Mapuche in Chile

The contemporary and complex relationship between the Mapuche people and the Chilean State can only be understood through the lens of the historical particularities of this configuration, including the pre-colonial and colonial periods. These past structures persist and affect the current dynamics.

Boike Rehbein (2007) posits that old social structures persist from the past and coexist simultaneously with current structures. This is what he coins as 'Sociocultures'. The term alludes to the present structures that always hold structures from the past. Therefore, past structures still have a present influence in society and are historically specific. This is why it is so important to consider the particular history of every configuration in order to understand the current social structure.

Today Mapuches face a sociopolitical conflict with the Chilean and Argentinean states, mainly because of land dispossession. This dispossession has been historically perpetuated; first during the colonial period, afterwards during the consolidation of the Chilean and Argentinean republics and today by the activities of multinationals and other enterprises. The Mapuches have been the "people without name", people whose identity has been denied. They have been dispossessed not only of their land but also of their identity. This has been a process of denying the other; of assimilation and forced integration (Bengoa, 1999). Bengoa argues that the so-called Mapuche conflict has become into one of the most important current conflicts in the country.

Lately, the Mapuche conflict has been conceptualized as an ethnic conflict. Contemporary ethnic conflicts consist mainly of claims for indigenous rights and a more intercultural society, aiming to achieve the recognition of indigenous people as legitimate citizens of Chile. In order to achieve this, a social movement emerged. In Chile, the Mapuche movement is very diverse and is composed of various organizations with different positions regarding the conflict and the way to solve it.

The Mapuche movement challenges contemporary Chile in the search for a more diverse society where more space for self-governance and self-management is needed, not only for Mapuche people but for everyone. For some non-indigenous Chileans, this new indigenous movement represents alternative values and a new world view, different from the one offered by the neoliberal system (Bengoa; 2002). From the discourses of these indigenous movements together with some anti or alter globalization and environmental movements, emerged the concept of "Buen Vivir" that defies the current concepts of development.

According to Eduardo Gudynas and Alberto Acosta, "Buen vivir" can be defined as an *"opportunity to build a different society sustained in the coexistence of human beings in their diversity and in harmony with nature, based on recognition of the diverse cultural values existing in each country and worldwide"* (Gudynas and Acosta, 2011; 103; Beiling and Vanhulst, 2014; 56). The concept of "Buen vivir" (sometimes also termed "Vivir bien" or good living) is an extrapolation of different indigenous concepts that converge in a principle which could be synthesized as *"living in plenitude, knowing how to live in harmony with the cycles of Mother Earth, of the cosmos, of life and of history, and in balance with every form of existence in a state of permanent respect"*⁷⁷ (Mamani, 2010; 32, Beiling and Vanhulst, 2014; 56)

The "Buen vivir" discourse performs a dual role as a critique of European modernity, on the one hand, and as a proposal for a cultural, social and political renewal on the other. It includes the idea of interdependence between society and its natural environment and a conception of the "universal" as

⁷⁷ The different indigenous concepts that express this idea of living in harmony with nature are especially the Quechua concept "Sumak Kawsay" and other similar notions from other indigenous people in Latin America: the Aymara ("Suma Qamaña"), the Guarani ("Ñandereko"), the Ashuar ("Shiir waras") and the Mapuche ("Küme Mongen") (Jiménez, 2011; Beiling and Vanhulst, 2014).

plural reality⁷⁸ (Beling and Vanhulst, 2014). In the analysis, we will see how this critique of European modernity and the call for social, cultural and political renewal is present in the Mapuche discourse.

The emergence of “Buen vivir” is an example of how ethnic conflicts are not only identity movements seeking recognition but they also defy the society in which they live to be more plural and inclusive.

Most of these ethnic conflicts have their roots in the colonial past and have only slightly changed, while the configuration of the conflict and the interests in dispute still remain. The structures from the past persist until today and are part of the new social structure.

As we will see later, Mapuche issues confront Chilean society with redefinitions of citizenship regarding belonging and rights in a modern world. The state needs to redefine the ideological foundations that constituted the nation-state at the beginning of the nineteenth century; two hundred years ago. This is the reason why for many non-indigenous Chileans this conflict represents the peak in the fight for a construction of diversity in Chile. Chile has been constituted as a homogenous country, following the nineteenth century idea of nation-state, which postulates that the state needs a nation to exist. However, for many it is time to challenge this concept of nation-state.

In the following section, I proceed to a historical analysis of the particular configuration of the conflict between Mapuches and the Chilean State, in order to understand the past structures and how they still persist and affect the current conflict.

1) Mapuches before the Spanish invasion in 1540

a) Particularity of the Mapuche social organization

Contrary to the Incas and Aztecs who had centralized governments and internal political divisions, the Mapuches had a non-hierarchic structure. In Mexico and other Andean regions, once conquerors had overthrown the central political power, they dominated immediately the whole empire. This was not possible in the case of Mapuches, as there was not central power but many different independent groups and families who joined forces only in times of war, although they were not dependent on a single authority. This allowed the Mapuche to stay independent both during the rule of the Inca Empire and afterwards during the Spanish conquest of Latin America (Bengoa, 2003).

The southern border of the Inca Empire is believed by most modern scholars to have been situated in Chile between Santiago and the Maipo River or somewhere between Santiago and the Maule River; most of the Mapuches that lived south of those rivers escaped the Inca rule. Through their contact with Inca invaders, Mapuches met for the first time people with state organization. Their contact with the Incas provoked a collective awareness, leading them to distinguish themselves from the invaders and to unite in loose geopolitical units, despite their lack of state organization (Bengoa, José 2003).


⁷⁸ In Bolivia and Ecuador the concept of ‘Buen Vivir’ has been incorporated by the political sphere and has even acquired constitutional rank (Beling and Vanhulst, 2014).

FIGURE 7: THE INCA EMPIRE "TAWANTISUYO"



When the first Spaniards arrived to Chile, the largest indigenous population was concentrated in an area spanning from the Itata river (Río Itata) to the Chiloé Archipelago; that is the so-called Mapuche heartland (Bengoa, José 2003).

FIGURE 8: MAPUCHE TERRITORY DURING THE 16TH CENTURY WITH CURRENT CITIES AS A REFERENCE POINT



2) Spanish invasion and the Arauco War: The first dispossession

Before the Spanish invasion in 1540, Mapuches were highly decentralized. Only in times of war did they form, provisionally, more central authorities. As a consequence of the permanent war, Mapuches kept the war-time organizational structure with a centralized authority for a longer period of time. This is a key point for understanding the politics of the Mapuches towards the Chilean government during the 19th century (Bengoa, 2000).

While the conquerors subdued without major problems the indigenous populations of Chile's Central Valley (the historical heartland of the country), they failed to conquer the Mapuche in southern Chile.

Instead, the Mapuches and Spaniards signed a series of more than 30 treaties establishing the Bío-Bío River as the border between the Chilean and the Mapuche territories. Thus, the Mapuche territory was declared independent of the Spanish crown in 1641 – a unique situation in the colonial history of South America (Richards, 2009).

*“Unlike the indigenous in other parts of the Americas, the Mapuche (or the Araucanos, as the Spanish called them) were not **indios cristianos** (tribute-paying indigenous communities subject to the crown) or **indios bravos** (those who remained outside settled areas and were subject to Spanish punitive campaigns). Rather, they were people whose rights to independence and sovereign territory, while precarious, were officially recognized by the Spanish”* (Richards, 2009: 61)

They defended their territory for almost three centuries⁷⁹ (Navarro, 2008; Richards, 2009). This was known as “The Arauco War” (Approx 1540-1818). This longsome war consisted in a sequence of violence and peace periods, thanks to the intermittent celebration of agreements called “parliaments” between the Spanish crown and Mapuche leaders (Zapater, Villalobos and Pinto, 1985).

Even though they stayed independent and had extensive periods of peace, Mapuches lost some of their land and were pushed further south. Therefore, the Spanish conquest was the first land dispossession for the Mapuche. After Chilean and Argentinean independence from Spain in 1810 and 1816, respectively, both republics continued with the dispossession, taking away not only Mapuche lands but also their right to be legitimate citizens, as will be further analyzed.

Despite the loss of territory, during this long war/peace period the two different nations - the colonial ruled creoles and the Mapuches - co-existed in what is today Chilean and Argentinean territory. During the last century of colonial rule (19th century), especially during the last 50 years, the Mapuche society experienced an important transformation. The frontier with Chile (Bio Bio River) was a stable reality that separated two people. However, during this period, they traded, had fluid contacts and influenced each other in different aspects. The Mapuches became wealthier during peace periods, changed some of their customs and dominated a large territory *“During this period, the Huntsmen gave way to the wealthy farmer and horseman”* (Bengoa, José, 1996; 41). Although they lost territories, this was a relatively good period for Mapuches and they still remember and long for it. The big dispossession and impoverishment were still to come (Bengoa, 1999).

3) Dispossession by the Chilean Nation-state: The beginning of the delegitimation of Mapuche citizenship

The process of the dispossession of Mapuche land and identity can be understood as the beginning towards the delegitimation of their citizenship. Indigenous groups have specific characteristics such as language, religion and culture; they belong to a different and recognized ethnic group (recognized by the others and by themselves). Their history and culture are not considered as legitimate parts of the nation-state; they have been devalued within the realm of a homogeneous concept of Chilean citizenship. With the formation of the Chilean nation-state, a homogeneous citizenship was created according to which everyone should be assimilated: The Republic should have one national culture without space for diversity. This is exactly what the new Mapuche movement is contesting today.

⁷⁹Some authors attribute this resistance of Mapuche people to their flexible organizational structure and to their war strategies; they also learned how to use the horse; an unknown animal in South America (Jara, 1971.)

Jose Bengoa (1999) recognizes seven historical periods in the process of dispossession of Mapuches perpetrated by Chilean Republic⁸⁰. Since Chile's independence from Spain, the consolidation of the nation-state entailed an offensive strategy to occupy more territory to the north (the Pacific War against Peru and Bolivia) and to the south (the so-called Pacification of the Araucanía).

a) Military occupation of the Araucanía (Approximately 1860-1880)

The first period analyzed by Bengoa (1999) is the military occupation of the Araucanía and the reduction of Mapuches to the indigenous reservation after Chilean independence in 1810. This period explains the socio-cultural context that existed when the dispossession started. It shows how, since the founding of the Chilean Republic, Mapuches were constituted as illegitimate citizens, treated as part of the state but considered less valuable to completely belong to Chile. Therefore, they were included but as others.

As mentioned earlier, during colonial times, Mapuches were the only indigenous group in South America recognized as independent by the Spanish crown. The Chilean revolutionary nationalists, as their counterparts elsewhere, wanted to incorporate indigenous people in their fight for independence from Spain (1810). For the nationalist leaders (*patriotas*), the "rebel indigenous" represented love for the soil and irrevocable liberty, high values that had impelled them to fight victoriously during long centuries against the Hispanic conquerors and against the royal army. For the nationalists, Mapuches were an example to follow (Bengoa, 2000). However, this symbolic incorporation of Mapuches in the independence struggle failed to gain Mapuche support. Instead, most Mapuches sided with the Spanish. They preferred to uphold the established treaties over an unknown future with the Chilean nationalists. (Bengoa, 1999; 28)⁸¹

The new Chilean State maintained border relations with the Mapuche until 1862. However, around the 1850s, there was a prominent shift in the discourse towards Mapuches due to economic and geopolitical interests and due to the influence of the philosophy of positivism and its scientific racism⁸². The Mapuche were portrayed by politicians and the media as barbarous and uncivilized people whose conquest could no longer be delayed.

Strengthened by this discourse; the State began a war of extermination in 1866, formally titled "*Pacification of Araucanía*"⁸³. In 1883, the State defeated the Mapuche. Surviving Mapuches were relegated to small parcels of land called "*reducciones*" (reductions), which made up just 5% of their previous territory⁸⁴ (Bengoa, 1999; 61). Much of the seized land was deeded to Chilean creoles and European immigrants, who farmed it for internal consumption and export. Practices such as shady purchases, manipulated debt, contradictory land titles and running fences soon resulted in further

⁸⁰Bengoa (1999) proposed only six periods but already visualized and mentioned the 7th one, which was developed in later writings (Bengoa, 2009; Bengoa and Caniguan 2011). Bengoa is one of the main researchers of Mapuche population in Chile. He has dedicated his entire academic life on it.

⁸¹Original text in Spanish, the quotation has been translated by the author of this dissertation.

⁸²During the 19th century, the influence of positivism philosophical line of thought was very strong in Latin America.

⁸³Today, this term has been contested. Mapuche organizations and pro Mapuche historians refer to it as "Occupation of Araucanía", while school curricula changed the term from "Pacification of Araucanía" to "Incorporation of Araucanía".

⁸⁴From approximately 10 million hectares that Mapuches inhabited in the South of Chile, the State reduced it to approximately 475.194 hectares that were given as free titles "Merced titels".

losses of significant portions of the already reduced land (Bengoa, 1999). The evolutionist ideas, founding ideas of the Republic, not only justified the “Pacification of the Araucanía” but also supported the idea of bringing “civilized” people from Europe to the uncivilized lands of the South of Chile. A process named “colonization” started.

From 1850 onwards, the first German “colonos” settled in the cities of Valdivia, Puerto Octay and Puerto Montt. They started industrializing the region, producing various goods that were exported to the center of the country and to Europe. During 1850 and 1860, the Chilean State reached until Chillán and Concepción. Afterwards, there was a gap until Valdivia where German immigrants lived. The Mapuches lived within this gap where the presence of the Chilean State was minimal. They were trapped between two expansive fronts: on one side, the agricultural plantations (“haciendas”) of the Chilean Republic, and on the southern end, the successful industrial German colony. During that period, these were the only two models of development that were conceived as possible: plantations and industry (Bengoa, 1999).

The Mapuches in the South of Chile lived in a very similar way to other non-indigenous farmers. The actual social difference between them was not based on lifestyles but on race and culture. These differences were only justified by supposedly “scientifically” evolutionist theories that considered indigenous people as inferior. In that period, the differences were based in allegedly biological factors. The same racist devaluation occurs today, but the justifications of inferiority are based more on culture than in race, as explained in Chapter 1, Section 2. Racism.

Chileans thought that southern lands had little population and that Mapuches living there were worthless citizens. Thus, the State enforced not only a war to reduce - “pacify” - the Mapuches but also potentiated an organized migration process to populate the South. The authorities in Santiago wanted to expand their control over the Mapuche region in order to seize new land for nationals and incoming migrants. However, the government ignored the fact that these lands were not empty and there was already a property system in that area. The army controlled an estate outside the Temuco fort, but the rest of the huge territory was owned by different Mapuche leaders (Caciques). There was no empty space, everything was populated by Mapuches. The idea of an empty land was only an imagination propagated in Santiago and based on the invisibility of Mapuche people (Bengoa, 1999).

When the Chilean government physically measured the territory, it became evident that the indigenous lands were indeed very big and in some areas occupied almost the whole territory. Every Cacique knew exactly the limits of his property. Yet the Chilean State did not step back but decided that it was necessary to reduce the indigenous people to smaller territories (*reducciones*). The government announced its first law of occupation in 1866. The land was declared property of the State to avoid appropriation by adventurous land speculators. The law also established that the indigenous would receive a free title of the new allocated and reduced territory. These titles, called *títulos de Merced* were given out for free as a favor by the State⁸⁵.

This process was all but peaceful. The Mapuche were not willing to leave their property, so they fought back the Chilean authorities. The government called this military occupation “Pacification of the Araucanía”, but it was a civil war, killing around 30,000 civilians (Bengoa, 1999). Over a period of 15

⁸⁵ The Word “merced” means favor in Spanish.

years, the destruction of houses, stealing of cattle, and firing continued and forced many Mapuches to leave their land.

This war, euphemistically called “Pacification”, was the foundation for the delegitimization of Mapuche citizenship. In 1813, with the promulgation of the liberal laws of the new Republic of Chile, Mapuches were officially recognized as Chilean citizens. However, they were citizens that needed to be pacified and tamed. They were considered barbarians, not completely humans, and therefore their rights could be legitimately violated. Until quite recently (even during most of the 1990’s), schoolbooks uniformly discussed the Pacification as a victory of civilization over barbarism; disregarding Mapuche losses in human life, territory and autonomy (Bengoa, 1999). This fact shows very well the delegitimation and loss of rights that these recognized citizens faced. It should be noted that during this period other citizens in Chile were also treated as second class citizens and not only the Mapuches. Women, peasants and underprivileged urban populations were also dismissed. But the difference is that the legitimacy of their belonging to Chile was not put at stake through racist classificatory devaluations as in the case of Mapuches and other indigenous groups. The lesser value of women and peasants was based on gender and class distinction and not on racist devaluation; thus, their belonging to Chile was not under dispute.

There also existed romantic ideas about Mapuches. Indigenous were valued but rather in a more abstract than concrete manner. There were no cultural connections that allowed a dialog between the society of central Chile and the Mapuches of the south. This kind of romantic valorization of the Mapuche constitutes a phenomenon of exotization that is also encountered in the case of Northeasterners in India. Exotization does not consider the other as an equal because their value is given by their cultural difference and not simply by the fact of being an equal human being with the same amount of dignity. At that time there were no frames of thought that allowed thinking differently. Nevertheless, this perception regarding Mapuches is still prevalent in Chilean society as we will see in this chapter in Section 3.

b) Legalization of the usurpation (1880-1920)

The establishment of the Chilean State and its “pacification” war impoverished the Mapuches and reduced them to small farms (*reducciones*). This was an inflection point in the collective memory of the Mapuche people; the decline of heroic warriors and wealthy horse riders to poor farmers. Bengoa (1999) argues that this fact marked the genesis of the feeling of hate and resentment of the Mapuche towards the Chilean State.

The process of reduction and imposing the *Títulos de Merced* took place during 1884 and 1929. The reduction to smaller lands and the usurpation of land by the non-indigenous provoked internal conflicts and a crisis in the Mapuche society. These conflicts could not be solved exclusively inside the indigenous communities but had to be managed by the government.

The State determined in an arbitrary way how the Mapuche society should be organized. They determined who were the *Caciques* (Mapuche authorities) and provided them with *Títulos de Merced* (free title of the new allocated and reduced territory given by the State as a “favor”). The State also relocated other families that already had their own chiefs (*Caciques*) into new reservations.

The intervention of the State in the Mapuche society was violent. It not only dispossessed them from their lands but also grouped them arbitrarily and forced them to live within a completely different community. Therefore, the bases of Mapuche societal organization and solidarity were destroyed. This even led to the division of entire families, which is the origin of an internal division that exists until today, causing strong distrust among them⁸⁶.

Much of the reduced Mapuche land was sold to non-indigenous people. Some new immigrants (*colonos*) arrived from different parts of the world to the Araucanía, especially from Spain and Switzerland. There were even colonization enterprises that bought some land and hired migrants in Europe⁸⁷.

However, this immigration at the end of the century was not as big as the one that took place fifty years earlier in Valdivia, Osorno and Puerto Montt where German people arrived and settle down there, as it was described before in the section 3 a) Military Occupation of the Araucanía. While the arrival of Germans fifty years earlier was based on a State policy, this new immigration at the end of the century involved small groups of migrants from different countries and languages (especially Spain and Switzerland) who arrived without any real support from the State.

During this period, the government gave concessions to some companies to conduct logging activities in Mapuche land. This caused deforestation and contributed to the impoverishment of the Mapuches. The permits and rights to exploit these lands were obtained in Santiago through social networks and friendship. The directors of these companies were members of the national oligarchy, whose successors maintain until today a high level of economic and political power in Chile. This shows how structures of power that were constituted in the past continue until today, proving the presence of Sociocultures in the Chilean social structure. As Bengoa (1999: 67) argues: "*The history of dispossession of Mapuche resources is recent and has first names and surnames*"⁸⁸. Therefore, it is easy to determine which social groups were the ones who benefited from the dispossession⁸⁹. These historical events explain the origin of the Mapuche conflict in the South of Chile. At the heart of indigenous discrimination lies this long and ongoing process of usurpation of Mapuche resources.

The Mapuche introduced the term of "usurped land" to refer specifically to the property that was provided to them under the "Títulos de Merced-scheme", which was taken away from them afterwards with pressure and unclear legal situations. This happened within an agrarian culture where agreements were commonly set in an oral form. Mapuches had little knowledge and skills to cope with the pseudo-legal takeover by the new landowners. The current owners of the land based their possession on the legality of those papers without considering the historical facts. The Merced titles were sold under pressure and sometimes even with the use of violence and/or tricks. Afterwards, those papers were legalized at the "National Assets and Registry Offices". They were "legalized" under the laws of that time but their origin was neither legal nor legitimate (Bengoa, 1999).

⁸⁶ For specific data on the dispossession, see Bengoa, 1999. Pp 57.

⁸⁷ For more information about it, see Bengoa, 1999; pages 64-66.

⁸⁸ Original text in Spanish, the quotation has been translated by the author of this dissertation.

⁸⁹ During the dictatorship between 1976 and 1983, the State gave again the concession to certain companies to extract wood. The legal regulations at that time, devoted exclusively to the exploitation of timber, led to an extraction called "clear-cutting" that diminished the forestry potential. "By 1983, the forest had been cut to zero" (Bengoa, 1999; 74).

Thus, the usurpation of land was the expression of the unequal, racist and discriminatory relationship between the Chilean Republic and the indigenous people.

c) The struggle for a respectful integration (1920-1964)

Since the beginning of the twentieth century the “Araucano” leaders fought for a “respectful integration” into Chilean society. Even though “Araucano” was a term introduced by the Spaniards, the leaders adopted it for the purpose of better integration into Chilean mainstream society.

The leaders got involved in politics on different levels. Some were elected to parliament where they publicly denounced the dispossession they suffered from. They tried by all means to have a place in society but they were rejected. The racist thinking of politicians did not allow any further inclusion of Mapuches into Chilean society (Bengoa, 1999).

At the same time, indigenous organizations emerged, such as the “Corporación Araucana” (Araucana Corporation), “Federación Araucana” (Araucana federation), “La Sociedad Caupolicán” (Caupolicán Society) and the “Unión Araucana” (Araucana Union). These Mapuche organizations followed different tendencies - from traditionalism to assimilationist Catholicism. But they all had the same aim: to recover the usurped land in order to maintain their own culture.

With the rising of civil organizations, the Mapuche began to act in the public and political sphere. They interacted with political parties but always retained their particularity. This process reached its climax in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

These organizations were led by a young generation of leaders that during the 1920s and 1930s trusted the possibilities of integration in Chilean society. They were mostly descendants of Caciques (Mapuche leaders) who had learnt Spanish. “La Sociedad Caupolicán”, one of the most active organizations back then, was led by young primary school teachers who aimed for a “respectful integration” within Chilean society⁹⁰. The Mapuches tried very hard to be closer to the Chilean State but politicians did not hear them out and their opinions were not seriously taken into consideration.

The political organizations of the Mapuche were all but unity. Mapuches were not used to political centralization and they only accepted a central leadership in case of war.

The Christian missions were a key factor in the formation of the first generations of Mapuche leaders and their line of thoughts. There were two main missions in the south of Chile; one was the Anglican Mission called “Misión Araucana” and the other was a Catholic German Capuchin Mission. The Anglican mission followed a rather modernist thinking. They advocated for the replacement of the old culture by a new way of life; adapting the ancient culture to a modern one. On the other hand, the Catholic German mission had another vision about the future place of Mapuche in Chilean society. They feared that the Mapuche culture might disappear. The Catholic German Capuchins were the first great ethnographers of the Mapuche culture, even constructing a syncretism between Mapuche and Catholic rituals.

⁹⁰ For more information about Mapuche organization see Foerster and Montecinos (1988).

However, during this period the Anglican modernist ideas had more influence on the Mapuche organizations as they were more synchronized to contemporary thinking.

Using the term “societies” which was commonly used to refer to Chilean *huinca*⁹¹) organizations, Mapuches formed their own “societies”; the Caupolicán Society, the Galvarino Society and numerous others. With the emergence of “development corporations” they did the same, creating the “Corporación Araucana” (Araucana Corporation). When the concept used was “fronts”, they formed their own fronts; the “Frente único Araucano” (Araucanian United Front). This shows the need the Mapuche felt for an understandable communication and dialog with society. From Bengoa’s perspective (1999; 2000), this was an extremely frustrating effort for the indigenous leaders. They have always sought through diverse methods to achieve a minimum of dignity for their people through respect and the abolition of discrimination. However, they have not succeeded. They have seen a closed, inflexible and racist society, unable to hear their words.

Some organizations such as the Corporación Araucana intended to integrate to Chilean society, forming the same kind of Huinca institutions but resignifying them with Mapuche elements. They aimed to create their own institutions and follow their own paths of development. By promoting economic development, the Corporación Araucana is the Mapuche version of the non-indigenous Chilean Corporation of Productive Development (CORFO).

Mapuches denounced all the abuses, litigations and land confiscations. They took part in both the left- and right-wing political spectrum, searching for different paths to achieve their purpose; but they were neither heard nor understood. The Mapuche demands were already articulated during this period and were not so different from ones they have nowadays.

Over the years, the Corporation Araucana (the Mapuche version of the Chilean Corporation of Productive Development, CORFO) gained more political power. It won some seats in the parliament and had governors. The first institution for indigenous affairs was created; Dasin (Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas - “Indigenous Affairs Department”). Scholarships and small credits to Mapuche farmers were introduced as well.

However, more radical groups appeared in the 1930s when Chile was hit by the world economic crisis and the bankruptcy of the saltpeter industry. Some Mapuches formed the “Frente Único Araucano” (Araucano Unitary Front) which was an equivalent of the “Frente Popular”⁹² (Popular Front of the Socialist Party); a coalition of different leftist parties. (Foerster and Montecinos, 1988)

During the 1950s, the economy grew on the basis of the ‘Import Substitution Industrialization Model’⁹³ (ISI). Employment increased and many migrated from the countryside to the cities. The Mapuches also took part in this process as it was described in Section 1.

⁹¹ Huinca means white or foreigner in Mapudungun, the language of Mapuche people.

⁹²The Popular Front in Chile was an electoral and political left-wing coalition from 1937 to February 1941. It gathered together the Radical Party, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Democratic Party and the Radical Socialist Party, as well as organizations such as the *Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile* (CTCH) (Chilean workers Trade-Union), the Mapuche movement which unified itself in the *Frente Único Araucano* (Araucano Unitary Front), and the feminist movement *Movimiento Pro-Emancipación de las Mujeres de Chile* (MEMCh) (Pro-Emancipation of Chilean Women Movement). The creation of a Chilean Popular front was inspired by the popular *Front strategy* that had led the center-left coalition to power in France in 1935 and Spain in 1936 (National Digital Library, 2014a)

⁹³ Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) came to emergence in the post-World War II era in Latin American countries. ISI seeks to protect local industries through various avenues such as tariffs, import quotas and subsidized government loans. Those countries practicing ISI seek to develop production channels for every stage of a product, not just the final product. ISI runs counter to the economic theory of comparative

However, in the 1960s, with the crisis of the *National Development Model* and the exhaustion of the Import Substitution Industrialization Model, the discourse of Mapuche integration into Chilean society was discredited and replaced by a radical discourse of old Nativist positions. Nativism has been conceptualized in Anthropology as a trend that highlights the need to go back to the origins; to the basic and simple "native" culture (Linton and Hallowell, 1943)⁹⁴.

During the twentieth century, there were two main positions within the Mapuche society: the developmentalist position and the nativist position. The developmental perspective deemed modernization of the Mapuche as necessary for a respectful integration. Developmentalist ideas were a consensus for the Chilean political parties from the right to the left wings. As for Nativism, it distrusted modernity, claimed traditional values and customs, calling people to reject the values and conducts of the modern occidental society and instead to return to the past and recover the values and customs of their ancestors⁹⁵.

d) The occupation of plantations: A response to dispossession (1964-1973)

After Mapuches tried to integrate into Chilean society in a pacific manner, a more radical reaction emerged against dispossession, also influenced by the historical context and the radicalization of political and social movements in Chile and in the whole world. This fourth period is characterized by the occupation of plantations (haciendas) in a joint action with labor and peasant movements during the 1970s, before and during Salvador Allende's government.

The Chilean land reform (*Reforma agraria chilena*) was a process of land ownership that occurred in different phases from 1962 to 1973. For much of the 20th century, agriculture was one of the most backward sectors of Chilean economy. The land reform was initially supported by Chilean right, centre and left political parties, in addition to the Catholic Church and the United States in the framework of the "Alliance for Progress" program. The first land reform law was promulgated in 1962, allowing the redistribution of State lands between peasants and organizing public institutions to carry out the reform in the countryside. However, it was from 1964 onwards that the land reform grew stronger during the government of Eduardo Frei Montalva (National Digital Library, 2014b).

advantage, where countries specialize in the production of goods in which they have a particular advantage, and then engage in international trade. Import Substitution Industrialization was applied in many Latin American countries from the 1950s until the 1980s. The theories behind Latin American structuralism and ISI were organized in the works of Raúl Prebisch, Hans Singer, Celso Furtado and other structural economic thinkers, and gained prominence with the creation of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAL or CEPAL). While the theorists behind ISI or Latin American structuralism were not homogeneous and did not belong to one particular school of economic thought, ISI and Latin American structuralism and the theorists who developed this economic framework shared a basic common belief in a State-directed, centrally planned form of economic development. In promoting State-induced industrialization through governmental spending through the infant industry argument, ISI and Latin American structuralists approaches to development are largely influenced by a wide range of Keynesian, communitarian and socialist economic thought. ISI is often associated and linked with dependency theory, although the latter has traditionally adopted a much broader Marxist sociological framework in addressing what is perceived to be the cultural origins of underdevelopment through the historical effects of colonialism, eurocentrism and neoliberalism.

⁹⁴Nativism has also been conceptualized from a political point of view as the position of demanding a favored status for certain established inhabitants of a nation as compared to claims of newcomers or immigrants. From this perspective Nativism is defined as opposition to immigration and support of efforts to lower the political or legal status of specific ethnic or cultural groups who are considered hostile or alien to the natural culture, upon the assumption that they cannot be assimilated (Curran, 1966)

⁹⁵Bengoa (1999) argues that the deepest Mapuche discourse goes against the occidental concept of development as integration to Chilean society. Nowadays Mapuches reaffirm and try to rescue the once denied ancient knowledge. They call for a "conversion" to the old values and regret for having fallen into the greatest sin: the adoption of *Huinca* values (the values of the white).

Under the slogan "land to the tiller", the reformist program of the new government sought modernization of the agricultural world through redistribution of land and peasant unionization. To achieve this objective, new Land Reform Laws were adopted in order to enact peasant unionization. Based on these legal instruments, 1,400 agricultural lands and 3.5 million hectares were expropriated, and more than 400 unions grouping more than 100,000 farmers were organized. At the same time, strikes and land occupations occurred, and the Chilean agrarian society was polarized.

The Land Reform initiated in 1964 did not involve the Mapuches. Later on, the communist party encouraged indigenous people to join workers in the cities and peasants in the countryside, in order to undertake together a struggle against the landlords. The communist discourse towards the Mapuches mainly revolved around the idea that they should join the revolution as an "oppressed class". Following this line of thought the communist party deemed necessary to build trade unions in the countryside expecting Mapuches and peasants to unite under the same purpose.

Communist Mapuches founded trade unions in the countryside and fought for the right of "land for those who work it" (National Digital Library, 2014b). For them, the Mapuche problem would only be solved through a revolution that was led by a strong worker-peasant alliance.

Chilean leftists considered the Mapuche just as poor peasants. The ethnic dimension was never seen as an important factor by Socialists and Communists and even by some Mapuche groups themselves. An example of the hybridism was that the Socialists, instead of using the hammer and the sickle as their symbol on their coats of arms, used the axe of the indigenous Toquis (Mapuche leaders during war times). This was considered indigenist enough not to worry much about the ethnic difference. Some modernist groups like the "Sociedad Galvarino" even advocated for the end of indigenous communities and for the distribution of land ownership together with peasants instead (Bengoa, 1999).

The socialists of that period believed that the indigenous issues would be solved by dividing the communities and forming cooperatives organizations in the countryside. The Communists did not advocate for the division of indigenous reserves but considered the Mapuche issue as a peasant matter (Richards, 2013). However, in that period, also the Mapuches themselves had diverging perceptions of their culture ranging from outright denial of their distinct cultural identity to the romantic and folkloric recovery of their culture (Terwindt, 2009).

The Mapuche situation changed during the 1970s with the implementation of the Land Reform. The Land Reform in the Arauco region started in 1966-1967. The occupation of land continued in almost all plantations in this region during the government of President Eduardo Frei Montalva. In 1970, expropriation of farms and not only occupations started in the region, where settlements and cooperatives were organized. The lands were managed collectively and some communities remain in those lands until today (Correa, Molina y Yañez, 2005). However, after the military putsch, many farms were given back to their old owners. Some other lands were tendered, auctioned or given at very low prices to Forestal Arauco (logging company) and other famous companies that operate in the region until today (Bengoa 1999). The Mapuches fought for years for those lands and they are still doing so today.

Bengoa (1999) argues that during this period the occupation of lands became a legitimate action within the Mapuche community to solve the enormous unfairness and violence of land dispossession, since

the legal justice never solved the issue satisfactorily. Even Mapuche communities and leaders who had no leftist tendencies or lines of thought occupied terrains that used to belong to them.

Nevertheless, during that period, some cooperatives were not exclusively Mapuches; they were shared with Chilean peasants. Peasants and Mapuches transformed their small lands into larger communal land, overthrowing the fences that separated their small properties with the big farms owned by oligarchic landowners (Hacendados) (Correa et al, 2005).

Unsurprisingly, the owners of the big plantations (Hacendados) were offended by this situation. The descendants of Spanish, German, Swiss, Italian and non-indigenous (Huincas) Chilean settlers in the area, who used to have the power, did not remain quiet. They moved their own people, armed themselves and ran around the fields with their big trucks (Bengoa, 1999).

In the context of the cold war at the time, the landlords considered themselves not only fighting to protect their lands and the *status quo* but also fighting communism. Therefore, landlords and opponents of the occupations and the land reforms denounced the occupation as the action of guerrillas. Yet, this was not the case. There were no guerrillas in Chile, unlike other countries in Latin America (Bengoa, 1999; Correa et al., 2005) ⁹⁶.

Mapuches were not strictly revolutionary people but were mainly led by the desire to recover their lands. Their aim was to recompose their lost community. That is why this mobilization turned out to be so powerful; they wanted to restore their destroyed life due to colonization first and by the Chilean State later. Thus, when they saw the possibility of leaving their reductions and extending to the land that belonged to their ancestors, they did (Bengoa, 1999).

For a long time, Mapuches were confident that Chilean leftist parties and organizations would open spaces for them to recover their own lost community. However, this idea was destroyed with the military putsch. Since then, Mapuches lost their faith in the good will of the Chilean State and organizations and started trusting their own decisions. The utopian ideal of "Mapuche and poor *Huincas* together" petered out gradually (Bengoa, 1999; Richards, 2013).

e) The neoliberal counterattack during the dictatorship (1973-1989)

The military putsch and the implementation of the community division law marked the beginning of the fifth period. During the following years, new organizations emerged and for the first time the Mapuche claimed their own identity in distinction to the Chilean one. They began emphasizing their differences and the idea that Mapuches have to live in a different way with special rights got stronger (Bengoa, 1999; Foerster y Montecinos, 1988).

The period between the coup in 1973 and 1980 had a symbolic value for the Mapuche people. It was a point of inflection. Up to the year 1973, the discourse in the Chilean society regarding the Mapuche was centered on their integration. The dominant idea was to incorporate Mapuches into the Chilean political parties as shown in the previous period. However, the repression and violence against the rebellious Mapuches during the dictatorship provoked a break with this line of thought (Bengoa, 1999; Richards, 2013). Mapuches started separating themselves from the Chilean culture and politics. They

⁹⁶ Like the case of Sierra Maestra in Cuba for example.

wanted to affirm their own indigenous characteristics, rejecting the assimilation and the idea of integrating into Chilean society (Terwindt, 2009).

In 1978, the military dictatorship created a law to divide the reservations, despite empirical evidence that this measure would not have a positive impact on development. The approach was mainly geopolitical and military and followed neo-liberal reasoning (Richards, 2009). The military dictatorship presupposed that market forces would finally solve the Mapuche issue. If land was privatized, a natural selection would occur; some people would sell their lands and others would buy it. For example, companies would make use of territories suitable for logging. Therefore, many Mapuches would abandon the field and this would solve the indigenous conflict. This was one of the geopolitical issues detected by the military leadership. The initial draft of the decree-law stated: *"These lands will cease to be indigenous and their inhabitants will cease to be indigenous as well"* (Bengoa, 1999; 171)⁹⁷. Hence, these lands would stop being reservations and would be as every other property in the country. The draft also added that the legal category of indigenous and the legal category of reservation would be abolished. Some people described this law as *"an attempt to legally kill Mapuches"* (Bengoa, 1999; 171).

Ricardo Hepp, one of the creators of the measures for the division of land noted: *"This policy aims to be a solution to the problem of the Mapuche people. It will show them the positive way to the future, a future that integrates them to the economic and productive development of the country"* (Bengoa, 1999; 174)

However, the Catholic Church, especially through the intermediation of the order of the German Capuchins, requested Pinochet to establish a period of 20 years during which the small lands resulting from the division could not be sold. Bengoa (1999) argues that thanks to the addition of this clause the lands could not be sold completely; they were divided but not completely sold.

Furthermore, with the mediation of the church, Mapuches formed social and cultural organizations called Mapuche Cultural Centers. These cultural centers were a response to the dictatorship policy of community-division. The communities felt threatened and they reacted. The outcome was an ethnic movement that lasts until today (Bengoa, 1999)

The year 1978 can be considered the starting point of a new indigenous emergence. The characteristic of the new discourse was a strong ethnic reaffirmation, through which the Mapuche differentiated themselves from the Western Creole society and the "huinca" (white) world text (identity). Unlike the former period (1964-1973), during which the indigenous movement had joined the Peasant and Land Reform, from the 1980s onwards, the Mapuches start emphasizing their difference and distance with other social movements, forming autonomous claims and associations. The ethnic issue was considered a different aspect with its own specificity. These new autonomous associations criticized and rejected the intermediation of political parties (Bengoa, 1999; 2000; Terwindt, 2009).

Meanwhile, the division of communities appealed to individualism and to the break of solidarity. When dividing the community, the land was allocated to the Mapuche still living in the countryside, and all of those who lived in the cities (even though they were also members of the family) were declared "absent". The rights of the "absent" over these lands were abolished and the State allocated a very small amount of money to compensate "the rights of the absent". Many Mapuches who lived in the

⁹⁷ Original text in Spanish, the quotation has been translated by the author of this dissertation.

city found out later that the division had taken away their rights to the land of their ancestors. Many families ended up in strong conflicts, since those in the countryside never warned their urban relatives that their land would be taken and instead took the opportunity to own the entire land. Later on, the urban Mapuches received a reminder informing them they could get a compensation for their once-owned land at the Department of Indian Affairs. However, many refused to receive the money as this would have meant to formally accept the division of the land (Bengoa, 1999).

These measures also had political effects. By the end of Pinochet's government the measures were accompanied by targeted subsidies to poor Mapuche families. The combination of an autocratic and repressive government with strong welfare schemes in the region led the majority of the electorate in Temuco to vote for Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite – a countrywide exception⁹⁸. Many Mapuches voted for Pinochet at that time; he gained large majorities even in pure indigenous communes as Puerto Saavedra and Nueva Imperial. As stated earlier, the indigenous electoral behavior is a highly complex issue in which multiple factors come into play (Bengoa, 1999; Richards, 2013).

By the end of the Pinochet regime in 1989, most Mapuche communities were divided. Only 18 communities had refused to accept the division. More than 2,000 communities were divided without appeal. Many Indigenous organizations emerged but they were not able to resist the process effectively. The Mapuche Cultural Centers became the association of smallholders and Mapuche artisans. Finally, this organization became politicized and was divided into several others; Caupolicán (or Callfullicán); Lautaro; Newen Mapu; Wall Mapu or “Consejos de todas las Tierras” (“All the lands Board”) and numerous other denominations. The State did not take them seriously. It repressed, controlled, monitored and finally neutralized these organizations, separating them from the Indian voter masses.

The only place in the whole country where organized Mapuches could openly talk and have their meetings was at the Retreat House of the Diocese of Temuco (“Casa de Ejercicios del Obispado de Temuco”). During the last years of the Pinochet regime, they were devoted to prepare themselves, conducting seminars and discussing the future to refine their demands for the time they could finally express them. That would only happen during the 90s.

f) Return to Democracy: the search for an institutional agreement (1989 – 1998 approx.)

A sixth period started with the return to democracy and the Nueva Imperial Pact between the new democratic government party “Concertación” and the Mapuches, which allowed to promulgate laws and a new image of Mapuches in society.

The most important aspect of the Nueva Imperial Pact was that the government agreed on proposing a constitutional reform to formally recognize Mapuches and other indigenous groups as a different people (folk) within the Chilean territory. A commission including Mapuches and other indigenous groups was created to prepare a new indigenous law. Meanwhile, the indigenous were asked to express their demands through institutional channels and not through the occupation of land. This clause expresses the fear from the old occupation of lands as there were many people who believed that once

⁹⁸The 1988 Chilean national plebiscite was a national referendum held on 5 October 1988 to determine whether Pinochet should extend his rule for another eight years. The “No” side won with nearly 56% of the vote, thus ending the military's almost 17 years in power.

democracy would be reinstalled, the Mapuche conflict and the situation in the South would become unmanageable (Bengoa, 1999).

The question of giving up the land occupations as a strategy was intensively discussed among Mapuche leaders but they finally agreed to sign the clause in order to ensure a peaceful transition to a new democracy; which was still not completely recovered when these discussions took place. The Nueva Imperial Pact was a concrete agreement. It stated that indigenous issues would be taken into consideration in the Chilean democratic construction; their cultures would be respected and they would participate and have a say as valid actors in decision making.

The slogans of the Mapuches at this time were “we want development but we also want to continue being Mapuches”, “we do not negotiate our identity in pursuit of development and modernization” (Bengoa, 1999; 2000)⁹⁹. There was a strong emphasis on particularities. “We are different” was repeated in all the meetings and they wanted development but respecting this difference (Bengoa and Canihuan, 2011).

As a preparation for the Nueva Imperial Pact, discussions were held in communities, in local and regional forums and finally in the large congress in Nueva Imperial¹⁰⁰.

The main demand was for the respect of indigenous dignity, as a woman speaking at the Nueva Imperial Convention argues: “*The Mapuche issue is not only about one more or one less bag of wheat, or about one more or one less fertilizer, or about one credit less, or one more scholarship; it is necessary to go to the core of the problem. It is necessary to see how indigenous people are respected. It is necessary to understand how things have been, how we see the future, how we feel, to understand our own worldview.*” (in Bengoa, 1999; 186)¹⁰¹

This quote shows why the demand for a constitutional reform that recognizes the existence of indigenous people in Chile was crucial. It was a symbolic claim but with enormous practical consequences¹⁰². It would have meant that Chile would finally accept its diversity, recognizing the existence of different people. Yet, until today, this constitutional change has not turned into reality, because many politicians fear that this recognition threatens the unity of the supposedly Chilean homogenous culture.

Lands were and still are a huge issue. There were discussions on how to solve the conflict regarding the usurped lands. For decades, there was no efficient legal instrument to tackle this issue. Then step by step a public land fund was created in order to buy land and give it back to the indigenous families and communities. Many did not agree with this. They complained that wealthy people were going to receive money for the lands that had long belonged to the Mapuches. Others highlighted the practical and legal problems related to this. It was not sufficient to just claim the ownership of a land; it had to be resolved in court and that was very difficult or downright impossible.

⁹⁹ Original text in Spanish, the quotation has been translated by the author of this dissertation.

¹⁰⁰ During the congress that led to the Pact, even the concept of indigenous was discussed and voted. There was a proposal of being called “native people” to show this was a new movement but particularly to get rid of the pejorative character associated with the word “Indios” indigenous. “Native” referred to the North-American idea of “the first nations”, the first inhabitants of these lands. However, other indigenous people (the Aymaras) wanted to conserve the term. They argued that “as indigenous they dominated us and as indigenous we are going to liberate ourselves” (Bengoa, 1999; 186). Finally, it was decided that they will continue to be named indigenous and the new law would be called the Indigenous Law. The articles of this draft law were also voted one by one during this historical meeting.

¹⁰¹ Original text in Spanish, the quotation has been translated by the author of this dissertation

¹⁰² As it was stated in the theoretical chapter, all social realities are at the same time symbolic.

However, the land fund was approved and exists until today. It is a legal mechanism that allows the resolution of historical conflicts but it has been very difficult to implement (Terwindt, 2009)

The indigenous law was approved in 1993 at the end of Patricio Aylwin's government, but was not accompanied with the expected constitutional reform. The constitutional reform was interpreted as an attempt to divide Chile and as "too revolutionary" for a transition to democracy. It was just the second electoral period after 17 years of dictatorship and nobody wanted to seem unpatriotic or put democracy at risk.

This law stipulated the creation of an Indigenous Development Corporation (CONADI) with the purpose of promoting, coordinating and implementing social policies oriented to indigenous people in Chile. Originally, the headquarters of CONADI was to be located in Santiago, the center of political power. However, the Parliament decided to base CONADI in Temuco - the "Indigenous capital of Chile" as some enthusiasts proclaimed. The idea to strengthen the regions was strong at that time and nobody listened to the warnings of José Bengoa himself and other experts on indigenous issues. They warned that decentralization would only apply to indigenous people who were already decentralized and regionalized, resulting in a marginalization of the indigenous problem. In fact, no other issues such as mining, agriculture and forestry were regionalized or decentralized to the respective regions where they are practiced.

Temuco (Araucanía Region) is probably the worst place for an Indian national authority to be. Racist classifications tendencies against Mapuches are rather common in this region. The first director of CONADI, Mauricio Huenchulaf, a national authority, was treated as an unimportant clerk by regional and local authorities. Huenchulaf was only in position for ten days when he started receiving strong critiques about his management. The parliamentarian Miguel Hernandez was quoted in a local newspaper, only ten days after Huenchulaf assumed his position saying: *"It's an aberration what is happening in CONADI"* (Bengoa, 1999; 207-208)¹⁰³. It was the first time that an institution with this power was headed by a young Mapuche professional and people from the region were already rejecting it. Racism and discrimination against indigenous people is present all over Chile but it is especially strong against Mapuches in the Araucanía Region.

Nevertheless, Mapuches and the Chilean State reached a consensus on one of the most important issues of indigenous law; the protection of indigenous lands. It was forbidden to sell ancestral lands to non-indigenous persons; the Indigenous Development Corporation (CONADI) had a fund to buy ancestral land. In this corporation, indigenous counselors elected by the communities participated in the decisions. However, a conflict erupted when two Mapuche directors of CONADI were removed from their positions for supposedly opposing the relocation of Mapuche families for the construction of a dam in Alto Bio Bio. These Mapuche directors were ethically and legally convinced that the land swap necessary to build the dam violated the spirit of the Indigenous law. There was no voluntary consent by the indigenous families for the construction of the dam and there was no compensation plan that ensured that the transferred Pehuenches (northern Mapuche group) would enjoy an equal quality of life (Bengoa, 1999)¹⁰⁴.

The problem with this project was the lack of participation in the decision making. At the very beginning of the project, the Pehuenche community was not informed about the plans to build a dam

¹⁰³To see more information about the discriminatory way Mapuches are treated in the press in Chile, see Djik (2005) and Richards (2010).

¹⁰⁴ For more information on this issue see Bengoa, 1999 Op cit; 211-213.

- neither by the State nor by the company (Endesa). When the construction of the dam had already begun, ENDESA hired a group of professionals who went to every house requesting people to sign the swap agreement. People were pressured to sign. They were offered food baskets, cows, oxen and even the famous "saddled horse." Pressured in this way, most of the Pehuenches signed the agreement – even some illiterate persons who did not know what exactly they were approving on.

The agreement stated that the families would be moved to their new homes despite all the reports alleging that the new territories were unsuitable lands to maintain the same level of subsistence. Only a small group of families refused to sign the swaps.

One of the causes of this failure is that the provisions concerning megaprojects in indigenous lands and their impact on communities were not part of the law. The Indigenous Law was left without any mechanisms of conflict resolution in the case of implementation of megaprojects on indigenous land. Originally, the bill discussed by the communities identified a number of procedures of consultation for the implementation of projects such as hydro-power dams in indigenous territories. Furthermore, the ILO Convention 169 "Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries"¹⁰⁵ that entered the Chilean parliament in 1991 in order to be ratified established systems of compensation according to International Law (Mereminskaya, 2011). However, these compensation systems were left outside the law by the Parliament.

In August 1998, during Eduardo Frei's government, some of the councils of CONADI convened to sign the agreement of the land swap without the presence of the indigenous councilors, who were against the agreement and were protesting outside the building while the agreement was being signed. These Mapuche councilors were the same people who years earlier had signed the Nueva Imperial Pact. It was thus considered that in 1998 the Pact of Nueva Imperial between the State and indigenous people came to an end. An institutional bond which was built with high hopes and efforts was broken. The Malleco, Arauco and Cautín communities began new demonstrations, abandoning the agreement that indigenous people would only use institutional channels to solve conflicts. A new generation of young leaders emerged, who did not feel involved and did not participate in the Nueva Imperial Pact.

The three main agreements of the Nueva Imperial Pact were not completely fulfilled. The first deception was that Mapuches were not recognized as a different folk in the Constitution because it was considered to be against the constitutional principles; therefore the constitutional acknowledgement was not acquired¹⁰⁶. Secondly, ILO Convention 169 was not ratified by Chile during this period even though Chile voted in its favor in 1991 and it was admitted to parliament in order to be processed¹⁰⁷ (Mereminskaya, 2011). Thirdly, politicians failed to include Mapuches into the decision-making process and to consult them on issues that affect them. These rejections were a clear

¹⁰⁵This convention is a legally binding international instrument that deals specifically with the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples. India has not ratified the ILO convention 169 from 1989 until now. However, India ratified the ILO convention 107 on Indigenous and Tribal population from 1957 in 1958. The main difference between both conventions is that convention 107 is founded in the assumption that Indigenous and Tribal population were temporary groups destined to disappear with "modernization" while convention 169 is founded in the belief that Indigenous and Tribal peoples are permanent groups. Therefore, convention 107 makes reference to "Populations" and encourages integration, while convention 169 refers to "Peoples" and encourages recognition and respect for ethnic and cultural diversity. See <http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Activitiesbyregion/Asia/SouthAsia/India/lang--en/index.htm>

¹⁰⁶ For more information on this topic see Bengoa, 1999; 199-201 and Sierra, 2003.

¹⁰⁷When the voting process of the convention 169 took place at the ILO in 1989, Chile opted to abstain. Afterwards in 1991 the convention was voted and was admitted to the parliament but it was only ratified in 2008. For More information about this process see (Mereminskaya, 2011)

message to the indigenous society. Indigenous people were only recognized as individuals who benefit from special laws but not as a human group with a particular history; as a folk. There was an extreme fear of being a pluri-national state; a deep fear from diversity that remains until today.

The subsequent failure of the agreements between Mapuches and the Chilean government in less than one decade triggers the formation of new organizations that no longer followed the institutional path to solve conflicts. These organizations are more radical and started using land occupation as a strategy to reclaim their land. They no longer respected the institutional agreements, since they were initially broken by the Chilean state. These new leaders are young and generally were not leaders during the dictatorship. In 1997 a very important organization was created: the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM) (Arauco Malleco Coordination). This organization or "coordination" as they named it has led numerous land occupation and many of its members were tried under the terrorist law (a law that stems from the dictatorship) (Bengoa and Caniguan, 2011; Richards, 2013).

This resurgence of indigenous movements is a common process to all of Latin-America. In 1992, with the five-hundred-year anniversary of the "discovery" of America, indigenous people took the opportunity to finally speak and rally for the indigenous resistance against the Spanish conquest of America¹⁰⁸. In all Latin American countries, indigenous organizations affirmed their ethnic status as a different and oppressed people. It was the beginning of the *"indigenous emergence in Latin America"*, *"one of the major social and political processes in the recent history of Latin America"* (Bengoa, 2009; 7; Bengoa and Caniguan, 2011)¹⁰⁹

g) Challenge for a diverse citizenship (1997, 1998 onwards)

The seventh and last period started in Chile around 1997 with the creation of the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM) and with the conflict regarding the hydropower dam in Alto Bío Bío, already mentioned in the previous period. Demands on ethnic issues have increased from 1997-1998 until today. Mapuche organizations have re-interpreted their own culture and history¹¹⁰. This period is characterized by a radicalization of the strategies used for the recovery of lands and rights. Some Mapuche organizations started occupying lands and resisting violently to which the State reacted by using violence, imprisonment and accusations of terrorism. All these processes reached their peak in the great Hunger Strike of 2010 (Bengoa and Caniguan, 2011).

In September 2010, the Bicentennial of the Chilean Republic was "commemorated". The rhetoric of the celebration followed the famous: "one people, one nation, one State". In these contexts Mapuches were included but in a populist and folkloric way, through exoticization and highlighting their courage against the Spaniards. However, the injustice they suffered since the formation of the Chilean Republic was not mentioned. Therefore, subaltern memories appeared: Mapuche activists began their hunger strike in protest for being charged under anti-terrorist laws for their role in the lands dispute, and being accused of arson and armed assaults against private property (Bengoa and Caniguan, 2011). They considered themselves as political prisoners and as such they argued they should not be treated as

¹⁰⁸ In Ecuador, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities started a revolt that challenged society and politicians of that country. In Chiapas, Mexico, thousands marched to the federal capital, giving impulse for the uprising of the Zapatistas two years later (Bengoa and Caniguan, 2011).

¹⁰⁹ Original text in Spanish, the quotation has been translated by the author of this dissertation.

¹¹⁰ The reinterpretation of the concept of Weichafe or warrior, is perhaps the most important as it stated that Mapuche folk is in a period of war against the Chilean State and as such they have to organize themselves as in times of war. (Bengoa and Caniguan, 2011).

terrorist suspects or face trial in military courts, especially under a law that was adopted during the dictatorship.

A new Mapuche consciousness was slowly built in Chile from the 1990's onwards. The discussion of the Indigenous Law -finally approved in 1993- took place in 1990, in a context of democratic transition and before the boom of indigenous movements in Latin-America after 1992. This explains in part, the soft character of this law regarding indigenous rights and why it didn't consider issues related to political rights.

During this phase, after 1992, indigenous movements around the world raised the challenge of building a new form of indigenous citizenship that will give form later to the concept of "Buen Vivir". Concept mentioned earlier in this chapter at the beginning of section 2.

This is a new phase of the process of "internal decolonization" that indigenous movements started in 1992, when the concept of ethnicity was put at the center¹¹¹. This new phase in the indigenous resurgence entails a deep challenge to the "traditional" concept of citizenship existing in Latin American countries. They argue indigenous people do not need to give the power to the colonialist current states to decide on their issues, they can take their own decisions in the issues that attain them (Bengoa, 2009).

The claims varied, depending on the situation of the indigenous people in the different Nation-states. In those where indigenous people were the majority like Guatemala, Ecuador or Bolivia, the aim was to control the National State. In cases where the indigenous are local or regional majorities but national minorities, the strategy was to take control of local public institutions as a way of exercise the autonomy and self-determination stated in international documents. The focus was a new definition of citizenship or at least a challenge to the traditional one (Bengoa, 2009).

It is necessary to mention that the influence of indigenous movements from North Atlantic countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Denmark, etc.) was very big during this period. However, in North Atlantic countries, the relation between the white colonizers and the indigenous people was one of total separation; there was no so much mix as the one that resulted from the conquest of Latin America. This distinction is crucial when trying to understand the autonomy concept. Most of the surviving indigenous population in North Atlantic countries (aboriginal) hid themselves in territories of difficult access for the colonizers. The biological contact was limited and the new republics did not integrate in their culture as many elements of the aboriginal cultures as in the case of Latin American states formations (Bengoa, 2009).

On the other hand, the Bolivian indigenous movement set a new path in Latin America with the instauration of the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

"Now the old dominant groups are the ones who are starting to demand autonomy and special treatment in a very unsupportive and anti-democratic attitude"¹¹². Evo Morales won 67% of popular

¹¹¹ During the 1990's the main claim was the autonomy of indigenous population. However, during the 2000's, there was a tendency across Latin America to establish public institutions to implement social policies for indigenous populations, as well as afro-descendants. This process of institutional building was a consequence, among others, of the World Conference against Racism and Xenophobia in Durban, South Africa in 2001, and the series of subsequent meetings to evaluate their plan of action to which different countries of Latin America were committed. For more information on the topic see Bengoa (2009).

¹¹²After Evo Morales won the elections in 2006, the wealthier regions in Bolivia started asking for autonomy, especially Santa Cruz de la Sierra that is also characterized for having mainly non-indigenous population and predominantly "white".

support in the recall referendum of 2008 in Bolivia. Why does the absolute majority have no right to hold, manage and benefit from the Federal Government apparatus? Why should the indigenous population of the State of Oaxaca in Mexico, which constitutes an absolute majority in that State, not become an autonomous structure within the rich Mexican State? Why should they receive only the crumbs from the state budget like all cases of autonomy? Why should the Mapuche Indians of Puerto Saavedra, who are 87% of the population of the municipality, take refuge once more in their remote indigenous communities, in a sort of "self-apartheid" and not control and benefit from the local state apparatus? Are Indigenous people not citizens of the countries of Latin America? Are they not the citizens par excellence; the first citizens?" (Bengoa, 2009; 19-20)¹¹³

In Chile, with the hunger strike in 2010, the rejected and forgotten Mapuche culture appeared in full force for the Bicentenary of Chilean independence, challenging radically the common citizenship. Two completely different worldviews were confronted during this period. On one hand, the Chilean worldview that considers itself as belonging to the western and modern world and on the other hand, the indigenous worldview with a profoundly damaged identity, due to a long, violent and relentless colonization.

The new Mapuches do not accept this subordinated position anymore. Their violated identity is expressed in a program of decolonization that becomes stronger every day in all areas of life from political to personal ones. This indigenous Mapuche resurgence is caused by the simultaneous transformation occurring in the country and inside the communities. The young hunger strikers were educated actors; they received formal education, knew their history, had knowledge of political theories and discussed and wrote their statements using this knowledge and their global contact with other indigenous groups around the world.

This is a new configuration in the relation between Mapuches and the State and a new reaction of the Mapuches against the suffered dispossession already explained in the seven different historical periods. The configuration of the conflict has been integrating new aspects but the core of the conflict remains the same: proving once again the presence of simultaneous structures in the Mapuche conflict, a phenomenon conceptualized as Sociocultures (Rehbein, 2007).

There have also been some political achievements in Chile during these seven periods. ILO Convention 169 was ratified in 2009 and was first applied to legal cases in 2010, where the maturation and positioning of a modern indigenous discourse was shown¹¹⁴. After 25 years of indigenous social policies, the challenge that indigenous Mapuche movements posit to the concept of citizenship and to the Chilean democracy is clearer. Mapuches are looking for an effective participation in democracy; they want citizenship as political equality (Mujica, 2010) and as recognition of their legitimate belonging to the Nation-state.

Section 3: Mechanisms that produce and reproduce the illegitimacy of citizenship of Mapuches in Chile

The white male hegemonic Chilean culture fears losing the unity of the country that they think could lead to disintegration.

¹¹³ Original text in Spanish, the quotation has been translated by the author of this dissertation.

¹¹⁴ With the hunger strike in September 2010 the Mapuche issue was in the center of the political debate.

1) Belief in a homogeneous culture

There is an extended belief in Chile that there is a homogeneous mixed race (mestizos)¹¹⁵ and a homogenous Chilean culture (Barandiarián, 2012). The indigenous population has been historically *invisibilized* or perceived as exotic, as shown in the historical perspective above. Indigenous people have been either ignored or only taken into consideration as folklore. They have been considered as an exception, as the “other” in this supposedly homogenous country.

The Chilean hegemonic legitimate discourse posits that there is only one folk in the country and this is expressed in the Constitution. As a result, Mapuches have not been recognized as a different people in the Constitution of Chile until today. Politicians have been afraid to consider Chile a multicultural country as it was done in Bolivia, Ecuador or Mexico. Most of them, especially right wing politicians, believe that recognizing Mapuches or other indigenous people might cause a division and disintegration of Chile (Bengoa and Canihuan, 2011). Chilean policy regarding Mapuches was for a long period aimed at assimilating them in the supposedly homogeneous Chilean culture. It is only from the 1990's onwards that more multicultural policies started to recognize the Mapuche difference. However, these policies do not bring enough autonomy and have been conceptualized for many authors as “multicultural neoliberalism” (Richards, 2010, De la Maza, 2015; Hale, 2003; Terwindt, 2009).

It should be noted that the so-called Chilean culture is just the hegemonization of a particular culture: the culture of the Chilean elite. The elite are the offspring of white *creole* landlords and other Europeans foreigners that arrived to Chile. Race was a central characteristic for social classification during the colonial period and afterwards and mattered even more than class (Stabili, 2003). These Elites were open to marriage with non-elites but only if they were European newcomers without any mix with indigenous population, even if they were poor.

During colonial times, society was divided in castes related to the “purity” of race. Every caste was attached to a specific socio-economic situation. Caste was a social hierarchy dominated by the Spaniards, both *peninsulars* (born in Europe) and *creoles* (descendent from Europeans but born in Latin America). They were a minority of privileged people who formed the colonial aristocracy of European origin and “white race”. On a lower level, were different mixed races called *mestizos*, a mix of Europeans (Spanish or others) with indigenous or black people forming different “mixtures of races”. People with an indigenous and Spanish (or European) mixture were called *mestizos*; people with an indigenous and black mixture were called *zambos*; people with a white and black mixture were called *mulatos*, etc. (Navarro, 1989). At the bottom of this social stratification were the indigenous and black people, who had less political and economic power and considered of less dignity.

Colonization in Latin-America like in India used the binary distinction of ‘Self’ (civilized Europe) versus ‘Other’ (colonized barbarian) where the ‘Self’ (civilized Europe) was considered the example to follow as the legitimate subject. As in the case of India, white Europeans (Spanish and other European migrants) maintained the white supremacy and racial endogamy. However, in the case of Latin America these descendants were the ones who formed the national elite and led the nationalist movements for independence. White Europeans that were not members of the elite mixed more with indigenous population, which did not happen so frequently in Indian, North American, Australian or New Zealand's

¹¹⁵ Mestizos is the name given in Latin America to the people who were a mix of European (Spanish, Portuguese and others) and indigenous.

colonization. Nevertheless, *mestizos* as well as indigenous and black people continue to be considered of lower rank until today, though not formally. During the nineteenth century, Chilean elite considered themselves civilized and reproduced all the ideas coming from Europe, influenced by social Darwinism and positivism. The indigenous culture and way of life were considered barbarian and the *mestizos* were considered suspicious as they were already influenced by barbarianism (indigenous blood). All these characteristics were and still are related to skin color and to socio-economic situation.

In Chile today there is a strong correlation between phenotypes and class. The fact that there are more white people in upper than in lower classes has been ignored even by social sciences and there is still a discourse of Chile as a society without races and thereby a non-racist society (Barandiarán, 2012). The truth is that not only family lineage is important in access to education, wealth, and power, but also as mentioned earlier, exhaustive research has shown how, for more than a century, the elite did not mix with the large *mestizo* population, at least not through marriage¹¹⁶ (Collier and Sater 2004; Stabili 2003). Until today people who seek upward mobility need to find strategies to whiten themselves because the white phenotype is preferred, therefore they color their hair, use make up or look for other strategies as marriage with a “whiter” person (Barandiarán, 2012).

“A majority of the population seeks to whiten itself to conform to the desired European phenotype, which remains an attribute of upper-class Chileans and/or of a sizable minority” (Barandiarán, 2012;167)

Racial differences exist also among the mestizo non-indigenous population, even though this racial difference have not been recognized because they are subtler than the ones faced by indigenous people. These racial differences are associated with socioeconomic status and devaluations. However, only racial devaluation against the indigenous population and lately against migrants has been recognized as a problem. This is an outstanding issue in Chile and cannot be analyzed here in depth, but it is important as a constitutive part of the phenomenon of racism. Most of the population in Chile consider themselves white *mestizos* (Barandiarán, 2012).

Consequently, colonial castes based on race, which bring different access to privileges, continue operating nowadays on social structure. Privileges and access to resources are still conditioned by skin color. Race operates as a symbolic capital that facilitates or inhibits access to resources.

“Because in Chile the first trace of belonging is in one’s own body; in the face; in the eyes; in the hair... here (Chile) the proportions of white skin within the racial mix are unequally shared, as well as the income per person, as well as the social distribution of respect and dignities. In Chile we are all unequally equals.” (Contardo, 2008; 59)¹¹⁷

Together with race, the origin of surnames is also very important in Chile. Surnames are related with social class and with skin color. In a study conducted by Núñez and Pérez (2007), it was demonstrated that in Chile is very probable to know the socioeconomic background of a person based on her surname. However, they dismissed another important finding. The classification of the surnames for the study was based on their ethnic origin, but the researchers did not conduct further analysis of the ethnicity dimension. The study focused solely on the relationship between surnames and class.

¹¹⁶ There were a lot of mixed child that were born out of marriages. The landlords use to have affaires with the peasant women at the plantations but the children were not formally recognized.

¹¹⁷ Original text in Spanish, the quotation has been translated by the author of this dissertation.

Barandarián (2012) criticized this slant of Chilean scholars who tend to push race out of the public space of discussion and consider Chile as a “raceless” and homogeneous country.

However, it is just enough to observe Chilean society or interview any person from any social strata in Chile and they will be able to clearly distinguish the differences between social classes and their relationship to surnames, skin color and race. This is clearly expressed in Contardo (2008):

*“Is **Vial** (a surname) the same as **Vidal** (another surname)? Surely for a foreign person this difference does not make any sense. However, just a single letter can change the sense of the whole word (...) But which word (surname) is better? (...) This lucubration only makes sense for a Chilean compatriot and in the context of comparing surnames. Because a **Vial** would never ever be the same as a **Vidal**. There are **Vidales** who would kill to be **Viales**, but, are there **Viales** who would like to be **Vidales**? Or García-Huidobros who would like to get rid of the Huidobro to save energies and space for the signature?” (Contardo, 2008; 97)¹¹⁸*

For any Chilean it is well known that the surname Vial has more symbolic value than a Vidal. Vial is an Aristocratic surname and even though many people can ignore this, they will realize that being a Vial carries a higher status than being a Vidal. It is only a one-letter difference but it leads to a big distinction.

The same distinction and relationship between surnames, social class and skin and hair color applies to surnames of ethnic origin.

“R: How would you describe being Chilean?”

I: Being Chilean is always considered related to... people always say “Ahh you are Mapuche” when you have a Mapuche surname and they say “ahh you are Chilean” when someone has a Spanish surname like Rosales I don’t know, I have always felt that... that Chileans are the ones who have a more, so to say a more upper-class surname and this is often related with skin and hair color. I understood it like this, but afterwards I understood that you can consider yourself Chilean even if you have a surname that is different from the rest. I learnt this later; before I thought that because I have a Mapuche surname I was not properly Chilean” (Mapuche female, maid (domestic worker), 39 years old)

The legitimate Chilean culture expresses the culture of the Chilean elite, which is an assimilation of European culture. As mentioned before, the elite are the offspring of European colonizers and even though they were formally very endogamic, some cultural hybridization took place outside of formal marriages. However, there has been a denial of this cultural hybridization in some aspects. An example is the general denial of the influence of indigenous languages on Chilean Spanish. Chilean Spanish has borrowed many words from indigenous languages like Quechua and Mapudungún but most people ignore this fact. Even at school, this information is not given, although it should be part of the study of the Spanish language¹¹⁹.

2) Tensions between the Mapuche and Chilean hegemonic identity

There are many tensions between Mapuches and the Chilean hegemonic culture. Mapuches oppose their identity to the Chilean and occidental culture. They consider these are avaricious cultures based

¹¹⁸ Original text in Spanish, the quotation has been translated by the author of this dissertation.

¹¹⁹ This also happens in other countries of the Spanish speaking Latin America. For more information, see Hernández (1981).

on the exploitation of nature and other human beings. They also consider that Chilean culture does not have an identity; it is just a copy of other occidental countries and cultures.

Mapuches oppose their own values to the occidental civilization. They resist the binary distinction of *Self* (civilized Europe)/*Other* (barbarian colonized) where the *Self* (civilized Europe) is considered as the example to follow. They consider that occidental people are too greedy and always want to excel; it is in this attempt that they do not respect others properly.

Mapuches identify themselves more with all non-occidental worldviews. Traditionally, Mapuches have a communitarian way of life, which is more respectful with others and with nature. It is not a culture based in the accumulation of goods. Their worldview does not adapt to the capitalist values proposed and imposed by the current economic system and by the Chilean Republic.

"Most of the time occidental people, the Chilean, is too daring, too insolent, he wants to speak more, he speaks louder, he wants to say more, he thinks he knows more, he wants to lead everyone. But we Mapuches are not like this; nobody is more or less than anyone else, we all have the same rights. When people say that Mapuche people are shy, I think we are not shy but respectful and that is different" (Female Mapuche student, 24 years old)

Mapuche people criticize the fact that occidental people (white people or *Huincas* as they called them) conceive nature as something to be dominated and exploited. They criticize the worldview that gives priority to progress and money instead of nature and human values. Indigenous thoughts have been the base of alternative and anti-capitalist thinking in Latin America, for example under the "Buen vivir" movement that was already described in Section 2: Historical perspective: Understanding the dispossession of Mapuche in Chile.

"Clearly a Mapuche is not going to allow the construction of a hydroelectric plant next to his or her home, understanding that in that place there is some spiritual energy, which is something important for us. A Mapuche with a clear mind is not going to allow that; of course the Huinca (White people) or Chileans do not care about anything; the only thing they care about is to become rich." (Female Mapuche student, 24 years old)

This is why most Mapuche people do not feel Chilean. They consider that Chilean nationality is too homogenizing and does not bring space for diversity. This homogenizing tendency is expressed in everyday situations that Mapuche face.

"I do not feel Chilean at all, I demand a different nationality, I mean, I think it cannot be possible that when they impose on you a nationality they don't even allow you to state... your Mapuche nationality at least besides the Chilean one, for example in the National identification card." (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

"R: Do you feel Chilean?"

I: It is a difficult question.... mmm I have a lot of respect for the occidental society but to be honest I do not feel Chilean at all. The truth is that I consider myself Mapuche, for me it is the biggest honor because I have lived it since I was a child. Imagine my whole life I have lived in a community, my grandfather is Lonko (Tribal chief) in the community, my grandmother is Machi (indigenous healer), so I come from all this current, so to say, and I have lived the process since I was a kid." (Male President of the Mapuche student Association, 22 years old)

Mapuche people criticize Chilean culture arguing that they take elements or traditions from foreign people instead of appraising the culture of the natives.

“R: How would you describe being Chilean? Do you feel Chilean?”

I: Not really, because I feel that Chileans kind of take traditions from other countries, it is like they don't have anything of their own, they don't have anything that enhances more the autochthonous, like the Mapuches or the Rapa Nui or the Atacameños; they celebrate the arrival of Christopher Columbus ... to be Chilean, I feel they should take more from the tradition of native people than from other foreign countries” (Mapuche female student, 23 years old)

“I: Chileans do not have a culture of their own; they have a copied culture. It is not ancient, it is an adaptation of cultures that are not their own. I think Chilean people adopt many things but Chilean culture in itself is nothing. In fact, the first creoles that came to conquer here were immigrants from Europe but they were very low rank people; criminals, uneducated, very poor... These people were brought here, therefore they just copy because they do not have an identity of their own. With all the respect, I believe that Chileans lack their own ancestral culture.” (Mapuche male school teacher, 24 years old)

a) Homogenizing tendency of Chilean hegemonic identity

This homogenizing tendency is also reflected in the legislation and in the educational and health systems. Mapudungun is not recognized as an official language even though some Mapuche people, especially the older generation, do not speak Spanish. The accumulation of different experiences of discrimination and being forced to practice certain “Chilean” customs makes Mapuche people feel outraged and reject Chilean identity. They do not feel they belong to Chile because they feel Chile denies their culture. This feeling of rejection and of not belonging to the country is strengthened by the impossibility of freely expressing their culture without being discriminated against. This tension with the national hegemonic identity is also experienced by Northeasterners in India as it was shown in Chapter 4.

“(Homogenization) is reflected in these kinds of situations; in the legislation; it is reflected in the fact that when an old Mapuche woman goes to an hospital in Temuco and she only speaks Mapudungún the medical doctor cannot understand her and he sends her to the waiting room and she could be dying... Why? Because he discriminates against her. Why? Because she does not speak Spanish. Why? Because she is not completely Chilean, she is like a second-class citizen. Those are things from an Apartheid regime maybe, from Africa, and it is so unbelievable that we experience this until today. The sum of all those experiences make you feel you don't belong to the Chilean Nation. That for the 18th September (celebration of the Chilean Independence day) maybe you feel forced or even outraged to hang the Chilean national flag at your home (In Chile this is an obligation by law during these celebrations); or that as a kid you feel forced to sing the national anthem at school; or to dance Cueca (national dance) because of course you live a different reality...” (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

From 1990 onwards, many reforms oriented towards improving the situation of indigenous people started to be implemented through social policies in Chile. In this framework, some health programs were created in order to promote a more intercultural health system; Bilingual Information Services were created to serve the Mapuche population in the Araucanía Region and Patient Care Services were

designed to greet and accompany patients and their families from admission to discharge at the hospital. Currently, people who speak Mapudungún are working at the regional hospital of Temuco with the specific function of helping with language and cultural translation (Park, 2006).

However, the experience referred to by the interviewee in the above-mentioned quotation might be stemming from discriminations that happened either before the health programs tailored for indigenous people were implemented or as an exception. The interviewee might also have used that case as an example to demonstrate how the homogenization process forced Mapuches to assimilate to Chilean society. Either way, it expressed the feeling that Mapuche people have regarding the homogenization process.

The process of homogenization of Mapuche people started with the “pacification of Araucanía”, called today “incorporation of Araucanía”; a State strategy to assimilate the indigenous population and occupy the lands in the South. After this process, Mapuche consider the homogenizing education system as the second big process of homogenization. Educational contents were conceived to create a homogenous nation: the ideal of a Nation-state.

“There is a very political context, there are various texts that argue about that, that after the pacification of the Araucanía in 1915 or 1920, they started talking about the ahuincamiento, or chilenization of the Mapuche, denying them to speak their languages at school. All that is a political process; a sort of pseudo-integration...everything has a reason to be, that is a consequence of 100 or almost 200 years of militarization in the Mapuche territory, we cannot say that it is a simple topic because all is caused by strategies of the State. It has to do with what they want to do with us (Mapuches); even the teachers they have to follow a program from the Ministry of education, who tells them what they have to teach.” (Mapuche male student, 26 years old)

Education has been a powerful tool used for the homogenization of Chilean culture established with the consolidation of nation-states and the creation of a national system of public education during the fifties.

“Regarding the topic of discrimination and how Chilenization is being established through education, I think education is also a political tool where you put one idea over another. I think the most hidden purpose of education is that one; with education you have the tools and the power to put one idea over another in a positive or negative way. It depends on how you use that tool called education; it has a lot of power” (Mapuche male student, 25 years old)

Therefore, despite the attempts for potentiating interculturalism¹²⁰ in Chile, the homogenizing tendency that started with the occupation of the Araucanía is still present.

We will further conduct a deeper analysis on the way Mapuche culture was treated in education, in Section Lack of knowledge in education.

b) Christian religion as an imposition

¹²⁰ As stated before, interculturalism has been defined by many as an improvement of the concept of multiculturalism and it has been replacing it in public policies and educational policies. Interculturalism is allegedly more oriented toward interaction and dialogue than multiculturalism and is conceived as less ‘groupist’ or more flexible than multiculturalism (Meer and Modood, 2012)

As mentioned in Section 1, 2) Being Mapuche in Chile: A problematic identity, only 0.9% of Mapuche people above 15 years old declare indigenous spirituality as their religion (Censo, 2012). This is not a surprise since the majority of Chilean population is Christian and Mapuches were evangelized progressively as part of the colonization process.

In Chile, 85.1% of people above 15 years old declare themselves to be Christians; 69.96% Catholic and 15.14% Protestant or Evangelicals¹²¹ (Including Pentecostals) (National Statistics Institute, 2005)¹²². In the case of the indigenous population, the amount of people who declare themselves Christians is even a bit higher than the non-indigenous population (94.6% compared to 92.7%) mainly because the evangelical population is twice as large among the Mapuche. A total of 94.6% of Mapuches are Christians, 63.5% are Catholics and 31.1% Evangelicals. As for the non-indigenous population, 76.8% are catholic and only 15.9% evangelicals Protestants (National Statistics Institute, 2005). In fact, most of my interviewees are or were Christians, but the younger ones have started to learn more about Mapuche spirituality.

“My community is Christian so I grew up going to the Seventh-Day Adventist Church until I met Magaly¹²³ and she taught me about our own faith” (Mapuche male technician, 26 years old)

In Chile, the religion taught at school is mainly the Catholic religion, even though other confessions are allowed. Depending on the school, parents can authorize their children not to attend the religious class, and some schools offer alternatives such as the study of “ethics” or other activities¹²⁴.

Some Mapuches who never converted to Christianity feel that the attempts to evangelize them is another violence added to the one they experienced with the rejection of their Mapuche identity and nationality. There has been some religious syncretism with Christianity. Mapuches were polytheistic and they believed in an organizing principle composed of four parts but represented by four spirits; an old man, an old woman, a young man and a young woman. This quadripartite principle is the basis for the Mapuche deity Ngünechen. However, the first missionaries translated this principle as a unique God in order to assimilate it to the Christian God and to be able to evangelize. This religious hybridization is also seen as violence and as an imposition on their culture.

“I didn’t join the religion subject at school. I said “no, here in the name of God a lot of indigenous population and not only Mapuche were killed, raped, exterminated. In the name of God land was stolen; in the name of God the greatest crimes were committed and this is not written in the official history”. On top of that, I cannot accept that if I am 10 years old they impose to me that I have to be Chilean and on the top of that to be of a particular religion. Nooo!! That was already a double shock, because they are telling me “Mapuches believe in Chau Ngünechen”. Chau Ngünechen is a word created to translate the word God, but the word God has no translation to Mapudungun, there is no translation, it does not exist, it is that simple. Chau Ngünechen is a created word, Chau means father and Ngünechen is like an owner, like the owner of the people, but this composed word does not exist! We Mapuches believe in Ngünechen but it is a principle and it is something very different than a God. I do

¹²¹ In Chile, Protestants are called mainly Evangelical and include Pentecostals in this classification.

¹²² These figures changed only a bit in the last Census of 2012. Of the total population above 15 years old, 83.99% declare themselves to be Christian; 67.37% Catholics and 16.62% Evangelic (National Statistics Institute, 2012).

¹²³ The name has been changed to protect the identity of the interviewed people.

¹²⁴ The instrument that regulates this is a presidential decree made by Pinochet in 1983 and is still effective (Decree 924).

not know if you understand me, so I said "Ok I will not attend the religion class" my sister also didn't take it at school." (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

3) Different Mapuche culture as a threat to Chilean legitimate culture

On the other hand, the Chilean legitimate culture considers the different indigenous culture as a threat for the Self. As mentioned before, this homogeneous legitimate Chilean culture is only a hegemonization of the particular culture; the culture of the Elite presented as general for the whole country. Therefore, there is a denial of the Mapuche nationality and of their constitutional recognition as a different folk inside the Chilean State. This fear of facing a disintegration of the country led the Chilean State to adopt a homogenizing tendency that was imposed through education and through the suppression of indigenous languages. Besides, the land conflict and the attempts for Mapuche autonomy are also seen as a threat to the Chilean State and they are criminalized. As for the Mapuche spirituality and worldview, they only become a threat to the Chilean hegemonic culture when they are connected with the recovery of land and challenge Chile's neoliberal development model.

a) Fear of Mapuche nationality

Asking about belonging to Chile immediately brings the concept of nationality into the discussion. In Chile, the concept of nationality has been assimilated to the concept of country, assuming that in Chile there is only one nationality. This is related with the idea discussed before that Chile is a homogeneous country. Indigenous movements have been challenging this conception and claim they have a different nationality.

Mapuches consider they lost their nationality that was once recognized by the Spanish crown.

"R: Do you feel Chilean?"

I: Let's see; let's start with the concept of Chilean. The word Chilean is a nationality; it is a nationality that entails a sense of belonging to a common history, to a common territory, to a common language and of those things I do not share anything, not even the language. I mean, when I claim a different nationality to the Chilean one, I am referring to it as a claim because it is a right that we had before and we lost during history but we had it." (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

Therefore, people who recognize themselves as Mapuches feel they are Chilean only regarding the country they were born in but they identify themselves mainly as Mapuches.

"I feel Chilean because I was born in Chile but I am Mapuche Mapuche¹²⁵, daughter of Mapuche mother and father. I think I feel Chilean because I was born in a country called Chile but I am never going to deny that I am Mapuche because unfortunately there are people who deny it but I don't. I have always been very proud of what I am and I inculcate this to my kids, who know they are Mapuche and are also proud of it." (Mapuche female, maid (domestic worker), 39 years old)

Even in the national census, when people were asked if they belong to the Chilean nationality, the alternatives for answering were "yes" or "another nationality". Under the alternative "another

¹²⁵ In Chile, people tend to repeat the words when they refer to something as true, authentic or pure. For example, people say "coffee, coffee" to refer to the "authentic" coffee and not the instantaneous coffee.

nationality”, the respondents were asked to specify a country. The construction of this instrument shows the concept of nationality that officially exists in Chile; nationality is considered to be the same as belonging to a country. For the census of 2012, a process of indigenous consultation was conducted and some Mapuche leaders argued it was necessary to change this question because for them it was not possible to declare their indigenous nationality. Consequently, the question changed and allowed to choose more than one nationality and since then the answer is no longer related to a country.

The census results showed that 99.5% of those who identify themselves as Mapuche declare they belong to the Chilean nationality; only 0.2% declare they belong to both Chilean and Mapuche nationalities and only a 0,1% declare they belong only to the Mapuche nationality (De la Maza, 2015). These results can be due to the fact that the question asks “What is your nationality?” and does not enquire about the nationality they consider they belong to. Since Chile does not legally recognize other nationalities or people, it is predictable that people will give their recognized nationality, even if they feel it is imposed upon them, because the question is about facts and not wishes or preferences. In Chile, there is no official documentation where people can add other nationalities, for example in identification cards or passports. During my fieldwork, I asked interviewees if they *feel Chilean* in order to grasp their sense of belonging and most of them responded that they either do not feel Chilean at all or just feel Chilean because it is the country they were born in but they do not feel it as an identity category.

*“In the ID card you could have the possibility to write you are Mapuche besides the Chilean nationality or the possibility of appearing in the picture with your traditional Mapuche dress. I have the case of my sister. We went to take the ID card and they took the picture and all. Afterwards when we went to pick it up they told us **“The ID card was rejected because the picture was with problems for identification”** ...*

R: Was she with the Mapuche traditional dress?

I: Exactly, with her traditional attire but her face was easily recognizable, everything was very easy to identify, so I had to send a claim to the director of the Civil Registration Service because of a discriminatory attitude. Nowhere can it be forbidden to use your attire, it is like if... I don't know... someone tells you “you should only go out with that kind of dress to the street” is like a nonsense thing. So this shows that we obviously live in a society that seeks to homogenize identities, namely Chilean identity is considered to be only one and that is reflected in everyday situations like the one I am telling you about now.” (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

b) The Mapuche land conflict and struggles for autonomy

The “Mapuche conflict” refers to all the different struggles between Mapuche communities and organizations and their specific adversaries. Mapuche activists demand the return of ancestral lands from forestry companies and private landowners and they fight against the megaprojects affecting Mapuche territory. However, not all Mapuche organizations are in favor of autonomy (Lavanchy, 1999). Demands for political autonomy are one of the main focuses of tensions for the Mapuche movement with the government, with other Chileans and also among their own organizations.

My interviewees argue that Chilean people and the Chilean State do not really understand what autonomy means. They claim autonomy to decide on issues that concern them and they are not

proposing to create an independent country.

“To be honest, we would like autonomy in the topics that affect us as Mapuches but I think this is very difficult for the Chileans. I think Chileans say “let’s support the Mapuche folk” but they do it only until a certain limit; when we talk about autonomy as a different nation, then they stop supporting us. When you touch things that belong to them there is a clash and they say “What do you want? That we divide here into two countries?” I have heard this very frequently. It is very complicated this topic; how far are they willing to compromise.” (Female Mapuche student, 24 years old)

Again we see the idea that the concept of a Nation is at the same considered as a State and a State is assimilated to the concept of Country. This idea of homogeneity is very present in Chile.

“I heard something very important. During the Ñielol Mapuche summit¹²⁶, there were very different people, even very radical ones and they talked about autonomy. But people do not understand that autonomy does not mean that you are going to build an island and all the Chileans are going to live on one side and the Mapuche on the other one. It is something that needs an adaptation. In an autonomous Mapuche territory we are going to respect the poor Chilean peasants that are there and respect us. The people who will have to leave this territory in order to have autonomy are the big logging companies, the hydropower dams. Even Mapuches are thinking to use new technologies to have other kinds of energy. The proposal of autonomy is not a blind radicalism; we are not proposing to live again in Rucas (traditional and old Mapuche dwelling); it is not possible and it is not going to be like that. About the autonomy, there are many things I got to know just now, for example about the political line that they are following. Many educated Mapuches are also demanding autonomy. For example, if there is one Mapuche person that is an economist, so he or she can do something on the economy in that region. What is the problem? A Mapuche will be leading the process. It is the same thing that Mapuche majors do now when they are elected in a Mapuche territory; they govern there because they have more affinity with the Mapuche culture and he or she is not going to agree with the construction of a hydropower dam there because it is going to disturb their worldview and in that case he/she is going to defend his or her point of view. So to talk about autonomy, it is a global topic and you can understand it from certain ideas that have been discussed for some time.” (Mapuche male school teacher, 24 years old)

However, the way of implementing this autonomy is interpreted in a different way by different Mapuche organizations. The first two proposals for autonomy were made by the NGO “Centro de Estudios y Documentación Mapuche Liwen” (Liwen Mapuche Studies and Documentation Center) and by the Asociación Gremial de Pequeños Agricultores y Artesanos Mapuches (Association of Small Mapuche Farmers and Artisans - “Ad Mapu”). The Liwen Mapuche Studies and Documentation Center proposed to have regional autonomy in order to potentiate inter-ethnic coexistence. They wanted to implement a “regional assembly” and a regional government elected democratically in Region IX (Araucanía) (Lavanchy, 1999). The Association of Small Mapuche Farmers and Artisans - “Ad Mapu” considered that autonomy entails Mapuche control of a territory, where the Mapuche Nation could express and develop its culture, be it in the form of a State or not. They advocated for a representation of 10% of Mapuches in all the regional governmental institutions (Lavanchy, 1999).

¹²⁶This Summit took place in Ñielol Hill, in Temuco on January 2013. Organizations, communities and Mapuche people were convened by the organization “Consejo de todas las Tierras” (All the Lands Board) and other communities and independent Lonkos to discuss about Mapuche self-determination; compliance and enforcement of treaties and demilitarization of the Araucanía region.

In 1998, the Mapuche organization Aukiñ Wallmapu Ngulam - Consejo de Todas las Tierras¹²⁷ (Board of All Lands) proposed the elaboration of a "Statute of Autonomy" or a "Political Constitution of the Mapuche Nation", which would regulate the internal order of the Mapuche population and the relationship with the Chilean State (Lavanchy, 1999). This organization questions the dominant relationship of the State over the Mapuche people and seeks to elaborate a proposal on political autonomy invoking concepts such as "co-government", "Mapuche autonomy" and "parallel government" (Mariman 1995, 1997).

The most radical organization is Coordinadora Arauko-Malleko (CAM). They are not willing to start any dialogue with Chilean authorities on the terms imposed by them. They argue that the problem with the Mapuche people is not about land but about territoriality and recognition of the Mapuche as a nation. Thus, they want to recover the usurped and ancestral land. Their priority is to recover the 200,000 hectares of land usurped by the forestry companies Arauco and Malleco in order to reconstruct spaces to develop their culture, worldview, spirituality, and sense of belonging to the land and to start rebuilding a "Mapuche nation" (Lavanchy, 1999).

Another organization is Identidad Territorial Lafkenche de la Provincia de Arauco (Lafkenche Territorial Identity from the Arauco Province), who also presented an autonomy proposal. Lafkenche is the name given to those Mapuche who live in coastal areas of the region of the La Araucanía and Valdivia provinces. They propose the creation of a "Territorial Assembly" composed by a "Territorial Coordinator" elected through universal suffrage by the communities and by community leaders of different territorial spaces. The functions of the Territorial Assembly would be to define the objectives of Lafkenche development, seeking to harmonize them with the rest of the region and the country; to promote economic, social and cultural projects in the communities; to promote exchanges with non-traditional Mapuche civil society; and to promote national and international trade. Moreover, the management of territorial spaces would fall into a "Regional Council" composed of "Regional Directors", who would assume responsibilities in the following areas: urban management, rural management, culture, education, health, tourism, fishing, etc¹²⁸. The members of the Territorial Assembly and its Coordinator should be recognized in instances of communal, provincial, regional and national participation in matters that affect their territorial spaces. Despite the fact that the proposal was explicitly formulated for Lafkenche Mapuches, its promoters consider that this was the best proposal to solve the problems of territoriality and autonomy of other Mapuche territorial identities as well (Nagche, Wenteché, Williche and Pewenche)¹²⁹.

All these organizations and their proposals have in common their criticism on the relationship the Chilean state has with Mapuche people and they all consider it necessary to have constitutional recognition. A constitutional change is fundamental for the recognition of Chile as a multinational state. Even until today Mapuches are not recognized as a different people within the nation-state. The assumption is that the Chilean republic is only one homogeneous Nation, because the plurality has been invisibilized as stated in *Section Belief* in a homogeneous culture.

¹²⁷ This organization is conducting a protest action since its separation from Admapu in 1989.

¹²⁸ Other highlights of the Lafkenche proposal were: the creation of a "Truth and Historic Debt Commission", which was finally created in 2001 under the name of "Historical Truth and New Deal with Indigenous People"; the ratification of ILO Convention 169, which was ratified in 2009 and the constitutional recognition which has still not been made.

¹²⁹ It can be also written as Nagche, Huenteche, Huilliche and Pehuenche

c) Spirituality as an alternative to neoliberal development

As stated before, the Mapuche spirituality and worldview only become a threat to the Chilean hegemonic culture when they are connected with the recovery of land and challenge Chile's neoliberal development model.

The violent dispossession of lands and culture (language and worldview) was performed by the Chilean State in the building of a homogeneous and "civilized" Republic, following the occidental ideal. The conversion to Christianity started with colonization but continued after the formation of the Nation-state. Therefore, the Mapuche movement and its diverse organizations and leaders aim to recover not only their land but also their lost traditions, especially their worldview and its spirituality.

The younger generations have started to learn more about their own traditions. Mapuches who live in the city and belong to an organization maintain contact with the Mapuche leaders from the South, who are urban and rural at the same time.

They argue that Mapuche spirituality is not a religion but a faith, differentiating it from the occidental conception of spirituality. This spirituality is also called worldview in order to express that more than a religion Mapuche spirituality shapes the whole life; it is a way of being in the world.

The following excerpt from a focus group, quoting a young Mapuche men and woman clearly shows the differentiation they make between Mapuche spirituality and western religion. Mapuche spirituality is presented as a belief that is all encompassing. In this sense, the philosophical base of this spirituality is closer to the oriental and old western spirituality and philosophy, where there is no strict differentiation between the individual and the environment nor a differentiation and separation between body and soul. The separation between body and mind has a long tradition in Western philosophy since Plato and Saint Augustine. The old western philosophical traditions and many Oriental and indigenous worldviews emphasize the absence of dichotomies or dualities (Cavallé, 2008). This means that there is no separation in the ultimate reality; everything is connected at the end and is part of the same. Every duality is part of a unity that we live as divided, mainly because our rational thought and language work that way (Cavallé, 2008, Rehbein and Souza, 2014a).

"R: What is the name of the Mapuche religion?"

Men (M) 3: It is not a religion, it is a belief, the Feyetún Mapuche, Feyetún comes from faith, from believing in something.

Woman (W)1: It is the Mapuche belief; it is to believe in what you are.

M3: It doesn't have a specific day, or a church, no, it is a belief. It is to believe that a tree is a living being and can hear you, that every living thing on earth can hear you. For me before, everything was only God; the occidental God in whom everyone believes, but then I joined the Mapuche world and I realized I could also contribute despite my ignorance because I had another knowledge that I saw and lived. It is something I treasure in me.... that is, my life in the countryside. People who live here in Santiago do not really know how life in the countryside is. Maybe some people know but not completely. However, they believe in a Millatún; they know what a Machitún is. So, I complemented myself here in the city, I complemented my countryside wisdom with the Mapuche belief and in this many people helped and influenced me" (Focus Group with young Mapuche technicians and professionals between 24 and 27 years old)

Being Mapuche not only means to live in Mapuche land but also to follow the spirituality and worldview, which means to be a “conscious” Mapuche. Many Mapuches who live in the city are considered to be “conscious” as they have adopted the Mapuche worldview but they are missing the fact of living in Mapuche lands.

“We as Mapuches are always thinking in the South (the South of Chile). For a Mapuche it is very difficult to disconnect oneself from the South, from the countryside. With whoever you talk, let’s say if they are Mapuche people and have been raised as Mapuches; they will always be longing for the South.” (Female Mapuche Student, 24 years old)

On the other hand, it is mentioned that for Mapuches who have not been raised according to the Mapuche worldview (“non-conscious” Mapuches) it is more difficult to long for the territories in the countryside.

“R: People who have not been raised as Mapuches. Do they also think about the South as a territory?”

I: For them it is more difficult I think, because they have lost already a lot of contact with the countryside, their grandparents came here (to the city) already.” (Female Mapuche Student, 24 years old)

Behind this idea of being a “conscious” Mapuche, there is the presupposition that there is such a thing as a “true” or “complete” Mapuche, which has already been researched by Terwindt (2009). The “true” Mapuche is an idealization of what a Mapuche should be and has been used by Mapuches to create an identity and to distinguish themselves from negative stereotypes. The “complete” Mapuche should know how life is in the countryside, in the land, should speak Mapudungun and follow the Mapuche spirituality. But as seen before, only a small percentage of the Mapuche population fits this description. Many Mapuches have migrated or/and converted to Christianity and only very few speak fluent Mapudungun. Therefore, these distinctions are more an ideal type in order to create an identity and mobilize people. Nowadays Mapuche leaders are more aware that only a few Mapuches can follow this image of “true” Mapuche and they have been promoting the idea that someone can be fully accepted as Mapuche *even* while living in the city, not speaking Mapudungun, and having Chilean friends, or a Chilean mother or father.

To be considered a complete Mapuche they need to follow certain protocols (Terwindt, 2009). The main conditions for being considered a conscious Mapuche seem to be first to follow the Mapuche worldview and second to complete the Mapuche protocols. Many people, even those who live in the countryside, can only be *ethnic* Mapuches (consider themselves as descending from Mapuches) but they cannot be conscious ones because they have a different faith or religion. In the following quotation a young Mapuche explains how he was always an ethnic Mapuche and had knowledge about the land but didn’t have the Mapuche worldview, which made him a “non-conscious” Mapuche.

“I had the idea of selling my part of the land, I was feeling Mapuche but I was also not showing to everyone what I was, I wanted to go unnoticed. I arrived to Santiago with this idea, I wanted to earn money, start a good career, have an apartment and have a good life here, but what happened? Well, I arrived here in 2007, I worked two years in a supermarket and I joined Facebook; there I saw a video of Matías Catrileo¹³⁰ and when I saw that video, there was a before and an after in my life. The before is that I was born and raised as a Mapuche and I didn’t need to say I was Mapuche as I grew up with that identity. Nobody needed to tell me what to be a Mapuche meant because I was born in the countryside

¹³⁰ Matías Catrileo was a Mapuche student who was killed by a policeman in 2008, while participating in a land occupation.

and I knew what it was like. Here no, here (in the city) people go out with their attire and everything because they need to show who they are, so when I saw the video of Matías Catrileo by chance... well, I also joined by chance a Mapuche demonstration in the city center in 2010 because of the Mapuche political prisoners and I met Richard Curinao¹³¹ and I went with them to paste posters at night... so when I saw the Matías Catrileo video I said to myself “I am Mapuche”. Afterwards I met Alejandro¹³² and other people like Natividad¹³³. I didn’t know her and I just said hi to her as to every person and she was the spokesperson of the CAM (Coordinadora Arauko Malleko) here in Santiago, I didn’t even know what CAM was, as ignorant as I was, I was like an “non-conscious” Mapuche, as we name it. Then Alejandro told me who she was and that she was a very important person, afterwards we occupied a Chilean University and then I met all the other peñis (brother in Mapudungun), who are my friends now. Afterwards I met Magaly¹³⁴ very quickly but we had an amazing feeling, we got along very well. She made me Mapuche in depth, because I knew how being a Mapuche was like regarding plowing, sowing, chopping, threshing and so on, as I lived in the countryside, but I was missing the Feyetún which is the faith that we Mapuche have. My community is Christian so I grew up going to the Seventh-day Adventist church until I met Magaly and she taught me about our own faith.” (Mapuche male technician, 26 years old)

Thus, a “complete” Mapuche should have mainly two characteristics: to be somehow related to the countryside, either being born there or going regularly, and second follow the Mapuche worldview and spirituality. A “complete” Mapuche should have both, but it does not matter which one is acquired first. A “complete” Mapuche can be born in the city but learn the Mapuche protocols and worldview and fight for the land claims, or she can be a rural Mapuche living in communities but being a Christian who later converted to the Mapuche spirituality. In both cases, there is a necessary process; it is necessary to “awake” or to become “conscious”.

The image of a “complete” or “conscious” Mapuche is now more flexible than it was a few years ago. Urban Mapuches are no longer perceived with as much skepticism but there remains an image of an ideal Mapuche that does not coincide completely with reality. As already shown, a large amount of Mapuches consider themselves Christians and only less than 1% considers that they follow the Mapuche spirituality¹³⁵. However, following Mapuche spirituality is a characteristic that Mapuche activists or politically involved Mapuches have. Consequently, to be a “conscious” Mapuche also means to be politically involved.

Another important characteristic of the Mapuche worldview and spirituality is secrecy and protectiveness. The Mapuche don’t like to reveal everything about their culture. They are afraid to reveal to non-Mapuches what it really means to be Mapuche; especially in the spiritual sense. They distrust *huincas* (white people) and the occidental culture, as they consider western people just want to conquer and dominate everything. For that reason, they argue that some spiritual and philosophical

¹³¹ The name has been changed to protect the identity of the person.

¹³² The name has been changed to protect the identity of the person.

¹³³ This name is the original one as she is an important a famous Mapuche leader of CAM

¹³⁴ The names of my interviewees have been changed to protect their identities. However, the name of the Mapuche activist was kept as they are publicly known and help to understand the facts.

¹³⁵ It could be that the tendency to follow Mapuche spirituality is only re-emerging slowly now and the result will be shown only in the next census in 2022. It could also be that many people consider the Mapuche worldview and religion as something different but complementary. In Latin America there has been a religious syncretism or hybridization between indigenous spirituality with Christianity; therefore, a majority considers themselves Christians even if they also practice their own spirituality or if they merge it in Christianity (see García Canclini, 2005 and Foerster, 1986).

aspects of their culture cannot be completely revealed in order to protect their culture. Therefore, we can see how Mapuches live with a distrust of the culture they are immersed in.

“Old people are very reluctant to give information, even with us (Young urban Mapuches) but I think that has been the key for us to be here as Mapuches until now. You can tell some things but not everything, there are things that you don’t tell even to a very nice Huinca with the best intentions. There is something that is peculiar to our culture that you don’t tell (...) it is the essence and I think that if at some point it comes out, I think then it will be the end of Mapuche people. Because unfortunately occidental people always want to invade everything, to know everything, to research everything and it is not like that, there are certain things that do not have an explanation and you only have to believe, you believe it and that’s it. Not to tell everything has been a survival strategy for our people.” (Female Mapuche student, 24 years old)

As stated before, the Mapuche worldview is closely related to nature and in a different way than Judeo-Christian spirituality; it conceives human beings as inseparable from their environment. Therefore, it is very important for them to take care of nature and live in harmony with it. They are against the occidental thinking that nature should serve human beings, justifying profit and exploitation. This worldview is at the same time spiritual, philosophical and political and as such will have consequences on the decisions they make. This is why for instance they would not allow the construction of hydropower dams or the operation of logging companies.

“It is the same thing that Mapuche majors do now when they are elected in a Mapuche territory; they govern there because they have more affinity with the Mapuche culture and he or she is not going to agree with the construction of a hydropower dam there because it is going to disturb their worldview and in that case he/she is going to defend his or her point of view.” (Mapuche male school teacher, 24 years old)

Due to the importance of their worldview and its difference with the Chilean non-indigenous, many Mapuche movements seek autonomy in the decisions that concern them. Worldview is an important point for their claims and a key topic for the identification and mobilization of Mapuche people.

“I think Mapuches have to be leading things that concern them. Clearly a Mapuche is not going to allow a Hydropower dam to be constructed next to their homes, understanding that the spiritual energy is also there and that these are important things to us. A Mapuche with a clear mind is not going to give up on this.” (Focus Group with young Mapuche technicians and professionals between 24 and 27 years old)

4) Racist classificatory devaluations

In Chapter 4 on illegitimate citizenship of Northeasterners in India, there is a subchapter analyzing the same topic: Section 3, 3) Racist classificatory devaluations. Therefore, in the present section on classificatory devaluations, the conceptual introduction will be mostly the same. The conceptual introduction to the analysis is repeated since the idea of both empirical chapters is that they can be read independently.

As mentioned before, social classifications that organize the perception of the social world, construct the social reality we live in. These meaningful classifications are established through symbolic power, which “aims at imposing the vision of legitimate divisions” (Bourdieu, 1989; 22).

In Chapter 4 it was mentioned that the phenomenon of racist classificatory devaluation is related to the classification of groups (they could be ethnic groups, migrants or others) based on a certain power hierarchy. During the expansion of Europe, there was a racial division of people, which was mainly between white and non-white. This division was based on the position that countries took in a world hierarchy, distinguishing core countries from peripheral ones. As analyzed in chapter 1, Wallerstein (1991) posits that the creation of concepts like race, ethnicity, and nation are used to justify and sustain present structures in the world’s hierarchy.

For Wallerstein the concept of nation derives from the political structuring of the world-system. The states are all modern creations of the world-system, where “national” sentiments are developed in order to prevent threats of internal disintegration and external aggression. Therefore, the governments in power are always interested in promoting nationalist sentiments.

When a group is ethnicized, it is embedded with less power and considered inferior. The ethnic group is constituted as a minority opposed to the nation. They possess less power and are considered inferior. This situation entails lower social valuation and sometimes even lesser rights to these groups. This happens to ethnic groups within a nation-state such as Northeasterners in India and Mapuches in Chile and it is the case today with ethnicized migrants as well (Grosfoguel, 2004).

For Weiss (2010), racism is a stable marker based in some biological, linguistic, religious or cultural difference enacted as a visible otherness. This otherness impacts the social classification, practices and institutions, attributing fewer rights to collectives of that category. As a consequence, the rights of these “others” are frequently contested.

Hence, racist classifications and stereotypes are correlated with the value that the ethnic or migrant group has in each specific country. In the case of ethnic native groups such as Mapuches in Chile and Northeastern Indians, their valuation depends on how international power hierarchies were configured during the Nation State building and on the respective symbolic value (or devaluation) that were attached to their features, customs, and culture. In the case of ethnic migrants, this valuation depends on the hierarchy of power between their country of origin and the host country. The international power hierarchies and valuation criteria are still reproduced in certain forms in the different nation states, since colonial power structures continue even after the end of territorial colonization. As a result, the value attached to cultural specificities and features of ethnic groups constitute their symbolic capital, which influences all other capitals (economic, cultural and social).

As mentioned earlier on this chapter, Mapuches have less symbolic power and have been constituted as the “other” of the Chilean nation-state. They have been delegitimized as citizens; they formally belong to Chile, but they are constantly reminded they are outsiders.

Mapuches face devaluations like other indigenous populations in Latin America and in other parts of the world. Mapuche activists and Mapuche intellectuals recognize that classificatory devaluations come from the dominant Eurocentric world order that affects many people who are considered less valuable; they have been conceptualized as subaltern following a postcolonial point of view (Spivak, 1988). In this framework, Europe has been put at the center of the world and Mapuches criticize the fact that Europeans claim to possess the unique knowledge about everything. Many Mapuche criticize

the fact that the conquerors in America had this Eurocentric point of view, expressed religiously through Christianity and secularly through positivism and the belief in science and progress. Positivism was the paradigm at the base of the formation of the new republics in Latin America.

Although Mapuches have assimilated themselves to Chilean society and many converted to Christianity, they still face devaluations. As argued before in Section 1, 2) Being Mapuche in Chile: A problematic identity, older generations suffered more overt discriminations than the ones faced today by the younger generations; today discriminations are subtler.

a) Negative racist symbolic capital: The stereotype of Mapuches

Following (Weiss, 2010), the value attached to the cultural specificities and features of Mapuches constitute their racist symbolic capital. Racist Symbolic Capital influence and is influenced at the same time by all the other capitals (economic, cultural and social).

Mapuches possess less or negative racist symbolic capital than the amount the rest of non-indigenous Chilean population have. This devaluation is mainly influenced by the historical less power that Mapuches have had in Chile.

Discriminations against Mapuches are racist. They are discriminated against because of their skin color; surname or treated as terrorists. The way in which Mapuches are portrayed as terrorists and treated in a racist way has been described in many studies (Richard, 2009; Dijk, 2005).

Van Dijk (2005) analyzes the discriminatory discourse used in Chilean mass media against Mapuches when describing the conflicts in the south of Chile. Mapuches are always portrayed as the cause of violence, and the reasons behind the conflict are never mentioned. The issues Mapuches have with logging companies or building of dams thus seem irrational, while the Chilean State, police and private companies are always portrayed as the victims of violent and extremist Mapuches (Dijk, 2005; 123-133).

From 1997 onwards, many conflicts started in the South of Chile between Mapuches, logging companies and farms. Some Mapuches burned trucks of logging companies and took over lands as a protest in their fight to recover ancestral lands. Even children in Chile became aware of this conflict, probably through the mass media coverage or through comments from their families. Children used the same stereotypes presented in mass media to tease their Mapuche classmates at school.

"I didn't like school that much because as a child they are always going to tease you, bullying in this case, but a bit more calm... they teased me a lot for being Mapuche and that is why I didn't inherit so many things from my culture because I was ashamed. They teased me and they called me "wood burner" because at that time there were people in the South who were burning the forest and they always said they were Mapuches, so then I got intimidated. They also teased me because I was a bit darker than the others, so they told me: "go wash your face with milk!" such a shame!" (Female Mapuche student, 23 years old)

At school, children also discriminate against those with darker skin. As stated in *Belief in a homogeneous culture*, skin color plays a role in Chile because it operates as a symbolic capital within the social space (Weiss, 2010). Having a white skin is considered to be better than someone having a darker skin. This characteristic comes from the time of colonialism and slavery. Mapuches with white

skin do not experience discrimination because of their looks but discrimination starts when people know they are Mapuches, either because of their surnames or because they say they are Mapuches.

“Look, I have not faced discrimination, maybe it is an error, what I am going to tell you but what I believe is this; I was born in a city and when I arrived to the countryside people called me pichihuinca (small huinca, small white person) and I had huinca attitudes; I was able to express myself, I had a lot of personality. In the countryside people are shy. I was born and raised in a city so I had more personality... Unfortunately, Chile is like that and here white complexion is considered to be better. So when I was a child I was white, I didn’t get any sunburn because I grew up in the city; that is why they called me pichihuinca because of my skin color. Of course afterwards I was getting sunburn and I became brown as I am now (general laugh), so that is why I didn’t experience discrimination.” (Mapuche male technician, in Focus Group with young Mapuche between 24 and 27 years old)

In Chile, there are only a few research that include racism, as described by Barandarián (2012). Racism is not considered to be a problem in Chile, even though it is related with other phenomena like social class, social mobility or migration.

In one of the few empirical studies of racism in Chile (Contardo, 2008), the author describes the story of a white Mapuche, who was an exception during the nineties. He went to university and created a very successful business idea. One day he was invited to an informal dinner at the house of one of the CEOs of the company because the other managers wanted to get to know the creative man behind the idea.

“Naturally the other managers wanted to situate this person in the social map and the first step was to ask for the surname:

-Soo... you are Miguel...

-Caniqueo.

-What did you say!?

-Caniqueo

-Heyyy stop playing with us! We know you are from the South but not because of that are you going to be an “Indio”¹³⁶ (Contardo, 2008; 85)¹³⁷

This is a great example of how skin color is the first reason for discrimination and the second one is the surname (Núñez and Perez, 2007). If he only had a Mapuche second surname¹³⁸ he could have hidden his Mapuche identity until he was discovered.

This happened to one of my interviewees who had a Mapuche classmate with a second Mapuche surname and she hid it. She was white, so nobody could notice her Mapuche identity and her first surname was not Mapuche.

“I remember that at school I had a girl classmate, who had a Mapuche second surname but I didn’t know and she always used to tease me; but one day I realized that her second surname was Mapuche

¹³⁶ Indio is a derogatory word that refers to native people in Latin America.

¹³⁷ Original text in Spanish, the quotation has been translated by the author of this dissertation.

¹³⁸ In Chile as well as the whole Latin America and Spain people has two surnames; the first one comes from the father and the second one from the mother. Therefore, to have a second Mapuche surname means that the mother had a Mapuche surname.

and I asked why she was teasing me if she was Mapuche as well. So these are the contradictions; she had a Mapuche second surname but she was white so she went unnoticed.” (Male Mapuche student, 25 years old)

In Chile there are many Mapuches who change their surnames arguing that they provoke moral prejudice; one of the reasons allowed in Chile for changing names and surnames (Llanquileo, 1996).

This phenomenon is due to the fact that many Mapuches have internalized the dominant normative ethnic image existing in Chilean society. Findings in social identity research and other research on Mapuche identity posit that Mapuches who negate their descent and climbed or want to climb the social ladder often discriminate against other Mapuches more emphatically than Chileans (Terwindt, 2009). These people are ashamed of their Mapuche background.

“Mapuches who have internalized the dominant ethnic image believe in the negative stereotypes of Mapuches and think that for those who employ Mapuche as an ethnic category there is no socioeconomic mobility; they assert that the Mapuche culture is backward and the language is not worth learning. Some ethnic-category Mapuches thus adopt the strategy of illegitimate assimilation¹³⁹, which is an individual strategy to achieve a personal, not a group, solution to achieve a high-status categorization (...) Some Mapuches have adopted another strategy described by Tajfel and Turner as “social creativity.” These ethnic-category Mapuches have decided to be proud of their ethnicity and defend it. They posit another ethnic image that is an inversion of the dominant ethnic image. These Mapuches emphasize their Mapuche background rather than negating it.” (Terwindt, 2009; 244)

In the same study, the author argues that multiple factors can be relevant in adopting this different strategy. Even within families, siblings have chosen different paths of either “illegitimate assimilation” or “social creativity” (Terwindt, 2009).

Before the nineties, discrimination against Mapuches was stronger than it is now and was even stronger in the city than in Southern rural areas, where the amount of Mapuche school students was higher.

“Earlier in my life I felt discriminated against, not when I went to school, because when I was a child at school in the rural area we were all Mapuches, but afterwards, when I was 14, 15 years old, yes. At the most difficult age as a teenager I felt discriminated against.” (Mapuche female, maid (domestic worker), 39 years old)

“R: Have you felt discriminated against in Chile for being Mapuches?

I: Yes, totally, I think they do that; here in the city more than in the countryside because in the countryside almost all your classmates are Mapuches. But what I have experienced I have been discriminated. When you are a child in your class: How many are Mapuche? Maybe one or two... Even the one who is Mapuche treats you as “Indio”¹⁴⁰. They discriminate a lot and you can notice this since you are a child and this is something learnt in families. I remember when I was a child I had very close friends who when they were angry at me, even they called me Indio. Even the parents told them not to become friends with me, so it is also something related to the education of people. During the nineties,

¹³⁹Illegitimate assimilation is a concept used by the Terwindt (2009) to describe an assimilation to the society through the rejection of their own ethnicity, accepting the negative dominant ethnic image regarding a certain ethnic group.

¹⁴⁰ It is a derogatory word that refers to native people in Latin America.

people were very ignorant in that sense; only because they saw you were darker and you don't have Spanish surnames they considered you as something weird." (Male Mapuche student, 25 years old)

As my interviewee expresses, classificatory devaluation is something that people learn inside the families. Indeed, Bourdieu argues it is in the family institution that people learn to classify others and themselves in the social space (Bourdieu, 1989).

Discrimination can even come from members of the extended family like brothers or sisters in law. Together with the word "Indio" or "India", the word "China"¹⁴¹ is also used to discriminate against Mapuche women.

"Also from my family, the family of my father... ehh the other offspring of my father, my half brothers... their wives called us "Indias", the Mapuches, the "Chinas", that is the way they call us in a discriminatory way." (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

Contrary to the case of Northeastern Indians who migrate to Delhi, nowadays Mapuches in Chile do not face violent discrimination by the common people or on the streets. That discrimination is rather subtle. They argue that violent discrimination rather comes from the State. Since the formation of the Republic of Chile, violence was exercised first through the reduction of lands¹⁴² and it continues until today with the repression of Mapuche activists and the application of anti-terrorist laws.

i. Everyday devaluations

Following the concept of *everyday racism* developed by Philomena Essed (1991), *everyday devaluations* refers to the different devaluations that a person faces frequently in his/her life. If we consider every episode of discrimination isolated from each other they don't seem to be so problematic. However, all together compose an experience of life as they are present every day, constituting a pattern and forming a structure. Hence, they configure an everyday devaluation.

Among my 7 interviewees and the 5 participants of the Focus Group only two women mentioned discrimination by unknown persons in public spaces. One was faced by a Mapuche cashier woman who was abused by a client in a supermarket and the other episode was an abuse in a bus.

"Something very annoying happened to me. I was waiting for a bus in a queue to get in. So I was in the queue and behind me there were four other male Mapuche student activists and in the other queue there was a woman with her daughter. When I got in, the woman told her daughter "don't get in, wait until this India goes in" I was wearing jeans and a t-shirt with a common plait and with my Mapuche earrings. So when I heard that, I waited until she got in, I took her from her t-shirt and I told her "who do you think you are calling "India"? (with an angry voice) and I swear to her and I even wanted to hit her. How does she dare disrespect me if she didn't even know me?! And it was because she didn't want to get on the bus with me. Imagine! I felt awful, I was so angry, it was a shock for me and this happened in July-August 2011. It was so shocking, I mean, that someone who doesn't know you discriminates against you like that." (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

Experiences of humiliation were only described as something that used to happen to older generations, to people who are old now or who are no longer alive. For the generation of the parents of young

¹⁴¹In Chile the word "China" refers to the indigenous or mixed (mestiza) women that used to do the domestic work in houses (maid). It is used with a derogatory intentionality.

¹⁴² Colonization is also considered very violent but some agreements were achieved with Spanish people.

people, discrimination was very hard but they used strategies to protect their offspring, such as not teaching them the language and trying to make them more educated.

In the following case, this Mapuche woman says she had a great childhood, mainly thanks to her grandfather, who decided to give his son a very good education as a strategy to prevent him from facing the same humiliations he faced in the farms. Her father was a school teacher (something very good for Mapuches between the years 1930 and 1950) and with her he used the strategy of not teaching the language but potentiating her education (which during those years meant finishing high school for women).

“My grandfather wanted my father to be different from him, because he used to say that he suffered a lot; he was humiliated. He used to work in the fields of the gringos (foreigners) who arrived there, but this was Mapuche land before. The gringos arrived and took away or bought these lands, I don’t really know. The fact is that they had farms there and afterwards they gave jobs to the Mapuches on the fields. They used to arrive on Sundays and as on Sunday people used to eat well, they used to kill a lamb or a cow and they used to throw the left overs to the Mapuches as if they were animals. They didn’t give it by hand! That was very humiliating!! But my grandfather didn’t complain, nobody complained because they wanted the job. However, he used to say “once I get married and have children, they are not going to face the same humiliations I have experienced” and this is what he did. So this is the story of my grandfather, who was very intelligent and his son (my father) was very educated. Pedro was the name of my father and people use to ask him things like a lawyer. Every person who suffered injustice used to tell him the case to get some help from him and they used to win the case. I don’t know how he used to do it but he was very intelligent, he used to explain things very well. So the lands that were taken away by the gringos were given back to the Mapuches, so he played the role of a lawyer, but he was a school teacher not a lawyer. There were many Mapuches who lived a very humiliating life but in my case it was not like that; my childhood was very beautiful”. (Mapuche female housewife and maid (domestic worker), 74 years old)

b) State generated devaluation and violence

Mapuches argue that classificatory devaluations from non-Mapuches towards Mapuches have now decreased in comparison with earlier periods. However, they still face devaluations and even violence from the State.

“That is why I believe that today it is not so difficult to say “I am Mapuche” because people discriminate less than before. However, there is discrimination from the State today; that is clear. In the media the State makes it look like this... Mapuches are treated as terrorists, lazy, alcoholics... However, today people can learn from history more independently, so you can know things were not exactly like that; we were not as lazy and as alcoholic as they say. There is a historical context behind all this and I suppose you know it. What the Mapuche people suffered from was genocide and in all of Latin-America it was like this with the native people... and well, from there we are going to revive again.” (Female Mapuche student, 24 years old)

The main State violence against Mapuches is treating them as terrorists and criminalizing their struggle. There are also other negative stereotypes that are attached to them and reproduced by mass media. Mapuches are portrayed as lazy, alcoholics and terrorists but the causes of these problems and conflicts are not mentioned. They do not mention the dispossession of ancestral land, and the poverty

and lack of opportunities they are condemned to.

Mapuches also consider that the Chilean State does not represent them. Their struggles and demands for autonomy have not been fulfilled, even now that the State has been promoting social policies focused on them and has potentiated a cultural recognition (but without the constitutional recognition of indigenous groups as a different people inside the country). Furthermore, in the conflicts happening in the South of Chile, the State and the media consider the no Mapuche landlords or companies as the victims and Mapuches as the criminals. This shows how Mapuche lives are considered less valuable than the lives of others.

"I believe that the Chilean State does not represent us. As we told you before, we separate being Chilean from being Mapuche and that in a certain way means that we reject the Chilean State as something that represents us. Being Mapuche means that we need our space, our place of origin... I think that when Mapuche culture started changing from Chilean culture, we did not feel represented by Chilean institutions anymore. Maybe there are some agreements regarding the relationship with Mapuches, regarding work and other things, but that does not necessarily mean that the State represents us. I mean, it is a consequence that we have to suddenly link ourselves to the State but the State does not represent us. Starting from the educational system; now we are remembering how the Chilean State tried to eradicate Mapudungun from our people since more than 100 years ago... Or having always the same position of linking us with terrorism. We cannot say that we feel represented by all this repression and all these Chilean politics that complains about our completely valid struggle. I think that a person who understands or recognizes his or her Mapuche identity should not feel represented by a State that is so extremely repressive with our people. If we see it in a practical way, they say that in the South our people are arson terrorists, but how many Mapuche people have died in all these struggles for the recovery of lands? And how many Huincas and landowners have died? Our people are the ones who are dying, not theirs... so they cannot say that we are the ones messing things up, so to say, and that we are killing people to achieve our goals because it is not like that. We can see the example with the Luchsinger- Mackay family¹⁴³ that is clearly a lie, a conspiracy on our own people." (Male Mapuche student, 25 years old)

c) Devaluation due to language

In the 2012 Census, it was revealed that only 1% of the population above 5 years old can sustain a conversation in an indigenous language. Among those who consider themselves as Mapuches, 8.2% declare they can have a conversation in Mapudungún. These results confirm that indigenous languages are disappearing in Chile. However, the tendency differs for the age groups between 5 and 14 years old. For those age groups, the knowledge of indigenous languages is increasing instead of decreasing (De la Maza, 2014). These numbers confirm the reassessment of Mapuche culture as a new phenomenon that was analyzed in

¹⁴³ In January 2013, a group of hooded Mapuches broke into the Villa of the Luchsinger-Mc Kay Family, a landlord family that has multiple land conflicts with the Mapuches. This was on the commemoration day of the murder of Mapuche student activist Matias Catrileo, who was killed by a policeman in January 2008 while participating in a land occupation at one of the Luchsinger Family properties. The Villa was burned with the old couple, Werner Luchsinger (75 years old) and Vivian Mackay (69 years old) inside the house. Many Mapuches argue that this violent action was not committed by Mapuche people but was a conspiracy to blame the Mapuches and continue with the repression of the Mapuche movement and the application of the Anti-Terrorist Law.

New appreciation of Mapuche culture. Specialists argue that old people have chosen to teach the language to new generations. Sometimes, summer schools are organized in order to teach the language, there are websites and Facebook groups that promote learning Mapudungun. This trend is also due to the impact of linguistic public policies that introduced indigenous languages in the school curriculum during the nineties (De la Maza, 2014).

However, in the past, the Mapuche language was heavily repressed and the consequences of this repression are still felt to this day. The Chilean State wanted a homogenizing education and only Spanish language was to be taught at school, while other indigenous languages were forbidden. In some cases, teachers used to hit the students in order to teach them not to speak their mother tongue, even though some of those teachers were Mapuches themselves

“My dad had a teacher who was Mapuche and used to hit his students with rods if he found them speaking in Mapudungun. My dad tried to make me understand that it was not the fault of the teachers but of the education system that established that children should only speak in Spanish.” (Male Mapuche student, 25 years old)

This repression of Mapudungun at school was really strong for the generation of people that today are 50 years old or above, who are the parents of the young Mapuche generations. They suffered a big repression of their language at school.

“I have the story of my aunt. A teacher used to tell her “Lucía, when your parents speak Mapudungun cover your ears, do not listen to them because here you come to learn to speak, read and write Spanish” and he used to reprehend her in front of the whole class because sometimes she wanted to speak more Mapudungun than Spanish and it was complicated for the teacher to teach her. But that was a big ignorance from the side of the teacher. The Chilean State arrived with rural schools to the Mapuche communities but an educated teacher should not have denied the language of a people in such a way... It is such a lack of knowledge and ignorance of this person; language is part of the history of a people... as a consequence of this, for the generation before us (our parents) it was not so common to speak Mapudungun anymore. Of course, if they experienced discrimination because of the language, they had less motivation to teach us the language; it is a very logical thing.” (Female Mapuche student, 24 years old)

In some cases, the parents themselves did not want to teach their offspring the language in order to protect them from discriminations.

“R: Did your father know a lot about Mapuche culture?”

I: Yes, he knew a lot. The only thing I did not like is that he used to tell me “My daughter, I do not want you to speak the language that we speak.” (Mapuche female housewife and maid (domestic worker), 74 years old)

“My parents did the impossible for me not to learn Mapudungun as they were discriminated against for speaking our language. So, out of love, they did not teach me Mapudungun. It is very strong for me to say this... but out of love they didn’t teach me Mapudungun because they didn’t want me to experience what they experienced.” (Mapuche male technician, 26 years old)

d) Institutional devaluation based on language

Devaluation based on language has occurred in Chile for long time and even though it has been regressing since 1990, it is still perceived to be high. Today, there are intercultural facilitators in many social services in the Araucanía region and in some communes in the metropolitan region where the presence of indigenous population is high. Therefore, the example of an old lady who was denied attention at the hospital because nobody understood her should not happen today in a public hospital or other services in Temuco (referencia).

I mentioned this example again to point out that devaluations based on language is still perceived as present in Chilean society even though there are currently some public policies oriented towards reverting this situation. Therefore, even though today translators are available at hospitals, it can be that the experience of discrimination was so strong for such a long time before the measures were taken, that it is strongly installed in the collective memory and in the narratives of devaluations of older indigenous people.

My interviewees also argue that they witnessed devaluation due to language when they were children. The implementation of intercultural policies in health, education and public services has been a slow process¹⁴⁴. Therefore, the Mapuche population still perceives discrimination regarding language as something very present, even though some measures were taken to revert that.

“When I used to go with my grandmother to Galvarino, a small town, to the municipality there to do some paper work, the Chilean people, the huincas, used to tell her to come back another day because they did not understand her language (...) so I was feeling really impotent because as a child they were not going to respect me, they would not listen to me, so I wanted to study law to defend the rights of my people.” (Mapuche male juridical technician, 26 years old)

Even though the census states that only 1% of the population can have a conversation in an indigenous language, there are still some Mapuche communities in the south of Chile where people only or mainly speak Mapudungun.

“I know that in some places Mapudungun is the main language, mainly in some communities.” (Mapuche male technician, 26 years old)

5) Invisibilization of Mapuche history

In Chile, most of the knowledge about Mapuches is obtained through formal education and mass media. In schools, Mapuche culture is taught as something very static; their characteristics are presented in a very descriptive way and disconnected from the historical context and its tensions. Formal education teaches students some main characteristics of the Mapuche as people belonging to the past, of whom Chile is proud. As for knowledge of current Mapuches, it is obtained through mass media (TV, internet, social media, newspapers) or through personal experience (for people who share spaces with Mapuche people).

¹⁴⁴The indigenous law was approved only in 1993; from 1997 onwards another set of policies was implemented; only in 2009 ILO Convention 169 was ratified and still the constitutional recognition of the indigenous population as a different people in the Chilean republic has not been achieved.

a) Lack of knowledge in education

Students in Chile learn mainly about the past of the indigenous population and some of its cultural characteristics such as territorial location, customs, beliefs, family organization, etc. and about the wars and fights with the Spanish conqueror and afterwards with the Chilean army. The old-school text books contributed enormously to construct racist and stereotyped images of indigenous people (Rojas, 2010). From the nineties onwards, some reforms were implemented in Chilean education in order to improve the quality of education and to reinstall democratic values after the dictatorship (Gazmuri Stein, 2013)¹⁴⁵.

The current school syllabus brings more recognition to the cultural heritage of indigenous people. However, the focus remains on their contribution to Chilean culture, silencing the political and historical conflicts, especially in the Mapuche case (Rojas, 2010). There is an *invisibilization* of the Mapuche conflict and an absence of the indigenous perspective in the discussion of historical processes, especially concerning the occupation of Araucanía (called in textbooks before the nineties “Pacification of the Araucanía” and now “Incorporation of the Araucanía”). The Mapuche point of view regarding the occupation is not shown; the conflict is not problematized and discussed. This treatment of Mapuche history within the Chilean history does not provide tools to understand the current Mapuche conflict and the processes of discrimination the Mapuche people have faced.

“So it is not as they told us at school; the Mapuche is not with a loincloth making fire, the Mapuche is next to you; it is your classmate. I believe that many people have understood it like this, I mean the Chileans. Many Mapuches have risen and are proud, even though there are still Chilean people that look at Mapuches with mistrust but I think it is just lack of knowledge.” (Female Mapuche student, 24 years old).

As in the case of Northeasterners in India, the Mapuche also argue that one of the causes of discrimination is the lack of knowledge about Mapuche people, history and culture. This lack of knowledge generates prejudices and stereotypes. However, devaluation patterns in Chile, as analyzed in *Section Belief* in a homogeneous culture, is strongly influenced by racism against indigenous people. This classificatory devaluation is also extended against migrants with indigenous or Afro-Americans features, such as Peruvians or Colombians. Lately, migration from Peru, Colombia, Haiti and other Latin-American countries has been growing. When most migrants were coming from other European countries (1850-1960) or from Argentina (a country with few indigenous people), it was not considered a problem. Only now that migrants are poorer and dark-skinned it is conceived as a problem¹⁴⁶.

“I think that in Chile there is a big lack of knowledge on the reality that indigenous people live and this lack of knowledge is present in education. People learn through education; therefore, they don’t know

¹⁴⁵Three syllabus reforms were implemented; one after 1996; another one in 2009 and others in 2012-2013. Currently, there is a bill under discussion in the parliament. This bill proposes not only changes regarding curriculum but a complete and structural reform.

¹⁴⁶In 1970 the main migrant groups were coming from Spain (18.4%) and Argentina (15.1%). In 1982 both groups maintained greater presence, but they reversed the order, as the Spanish migration fell to 14.6% of all migrants and Argentina rose to 23.4%. In 1992 the difference between the two countries increased, since Argentina came to represent 30% while the Spanish reduced its stake to 8.6%. Until 1992 the majority of migrants were coming from Spain and Argentina and Migration was not considered to be a problem. Yet in 2002 the Peruvian migration increases 400%, being 20% of the total migration to Chile but still Argentinean migration was 25% of the total migration to Chile. In 2012 the majority of 30% of migrants come from Peru and Argentineans are 16,79% of Migrants, Bolivians have increased a little bit from 6% to 7,8% and a new migration group coming from Colombia already make 8% of the total of Migration. (see Stefoni, 2011; National Statistics Institute, 2012)

the reality of Mapuche population. Chilean people discriminate a lot; they are very discriminatory with indigenous people but also with immigrants, especially with the Peruvians and Colombians or people from other countries like this. With European people this discrimination does not take place. So this is a very paradoxical situation..." (Male President of the Mapuche student Association, 22 years old)

As mentioned before, the perspective of indigenous people has neither been included in the way history is taught at school nor in the "official" history. Only after the dictatorship there were a number of historians and social activists who tried to reconstruct an indigenous perspective of their history. The main controversy is the historical claim of Mapuche people as a different nation. This status was granted by the Spanish crown in 1641 but taken away by the Chilean Republic during the Occupation of the Araucanía. Therefore, this event has been described as a trauma in the relationship between Mapuches and the Chilean state and has consequences until today. This historical fact is not given so much importance in Chilean history but is crucial to understand the current conflict and tensions. As analyzed in *Section Fear of Mapuche nationality*, there is a fear in Chile to recognize other nationalities inside the country because of the hegemonic idea that Chile is a homogeneous culture. The concept of nationality is considered equivalent to state and country: "one people, one country, one State" is at the base of the hegemonic idea of Chile. However, this idea of nation-state (or country) as a synonym of nation and folk, also exists in other countries. The building of the concept of a Nation-state was supposedly related to one nation or one national identity, relegating all other identities as secondary¹⁴⁷ (Bourdieu, 1998).

It is very clear that Mapuches are invisibilized or visibilized as barbarian through the teaching of history. In chapter 1, it was analyzed how one of the most important mechanisms to delegitimize certain groups is through the invisibilization of their history. Their history is relegated as secondary; they have been constituted as a different kind of people inside the nation-state, which entails a symbolic devaluation. In order to legitimize the hegemony of one national identity over others, the use of knowledge in the form of "an objective national history" is fundamental. Therefore, in the consolidation of nation-states, education played a main role. History teaching focused on creating national pride and unity. Thus, problematizing on the occupation of Mapuche territories would not help this purpose.

To learn and understand the indigenous perspective on Chilean history is crucial to some Mapuche activists, who think that the lack of knowledge is the main cause of devaluations. This lack of knowledge, together with the way the Mapuche conflict and struggle are treated in mass media, do not help to understand its complexity and multiple dimensions.

"I think that when you ask a classroom which was the first independent country in America, they will answer the US.... false! The first independent country in America was the Mapuche country in 1641, something that was ratified even by Chile. When Chile was born as a country... a lot of historical events were hidden to the Chilean population. When I talk about the Mapuche country I am trying to emphasize that when a world-power like the Spanish crown realized that there were many violent conflicts with Mapuche people and that they could not go forward south, they decided to establish a frontier and they did a peace agreement; the Quilín peace agreement in 1641. So the Spanish crown, a world empire at that time, recognized us as an independent country. They even said they were going

¹⁴⁷ This violence in the creation of nation-state is somehow revived in the case of migration when citizenship and national identity are put at stake.

to apply the rules of international law with the Mapuche people, the right of peoples, that's what... And if you look in the historical records it is there. I remember that last year a very controversial letter written by Bernardo O'Higgins was revealed. There he recognizes that the relation that the Chilean republic should have with Mapuche people was a relationship of international law. This kind of things are not taught at school, they just teach you that we are all Chileans and that we all belong to the same history but it is not like that. I mean, I am telling you that the first independent country in the world was the Mapuche one; an indigenous people, and I think that if you tell that to people they won't believe you because they do not know about it. You just have to look a bit more in the history and you will realize that." (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

"So when you belong to a country, you belong to a nation too and my nation is the Mapuche one; therefore, my nationality is also Mapuche because I have a history in common; I have a language; a way of seeing life in common and at the end it is... it is a common national feeling; something that you are building; that is the identity of a people's Nation. Throughout history, the Chilean republic tried to erase the identity of Mapuches as a different nation. So there is a big lack of knowledge of history and because of the same reason I used to say "I have to study history, I have to show these facts" and maybe because of the same reason I started working on a student association, where one of the main purposes is to modify the school syllabus. We want the contents of education to be according to the reality of indigenous people." (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

The concern to promote interculturalism in Chile has not been reflected in school syllabuses, especially regarding the Mapuche perspective on history and culture and the conflicts that emerge from it. The ancient and current conflicts with Mapuche people should be discussed critically in all schools and not only in schools with a majority of indigenous population¹⁴⁸.

b) Lack of knowledge about Mapuches in mass media

As mentioned in *Section* Racist classificatory devaluations, the media portrays Mapuches either as terrorists (Dijk, 2005; Richards, 2009) or as part of the folklore, showing ancestral customs that form part of Chilean culture such as food and dressing¹⁴⁹. Therefore, they are not treated as a valid actor and their struggle is criminalized.

Internet and social media have been used by Mapuche activists as a tool for the reassessment of Mapuche culture as already analyzed in *Section* 1, 4 a) Reasons for the new appreciation.

The lack of information on Mapuche conflict and history in Chilean mainstream media like TV and newspapers¹⁵⁰ is counteracted by the information and analysis of the Mapuche situation through internet and social media. The main platforms being used are social media like Facebook or Tweeter but also alternative online newspapers, websites and blogs by Mapuche and non-Mapuche social activists from Chile but also from other countries (as in the case of the newspaper Aljazeera).

¹⁴⁸ Nowadays there exists intercultural education (Intercultural Schools) but only in regions with majority of indigenous population and not in all the schools of Chile.

¹⁴⁹ For more information on this topic see, Aguilera, 2012.

¹⁵⁰ Chilean mass media property, especially television and newspapers, are highly concentrated on few economic groups. Furthermore, the way mass media operates in Chile is mainly regulated by the market because the funding comes mainly by publicity (Mayorga Rogel, Del Valle Rojas and Nitrihual Valdebenito, 2010)

Section 4: Ways of resistance

Mapuches have different ways of resisting devaluations. On one hand, there is a Mapuche movement with diverse organizations and positions. On the other hand, there are some personal strategies to face discrimination that consist of affirmation and positive valuation of one's own culture. Furthermore, education is seen as a tool for resisting discrimination either from a Mapuche movement perspective or as a personal strategy.

As seen in the first two sections of this chapter (Contextualization and Historical perspective), CONADI (a government agency for indigenous affairs) has to manage a fund specifically designed to buy lands claimed by indigenous communities in order to return them to natives. Nevertheless, the fund is not sufficient to respond to the number of requests, and the agency can only buy lands when the owner is willing to sell voluntarily (Terwindt, 2009). This fact, together with the expansion of forestry plantations, the construction of hydroelectric dams and the construction of a coastal highway lead to the emergence of several groups and organizations that defend Mapuche interests. Some of these organizations use more radical strategies like land occupation and violence.

This conflict provokes different reactions in the economic and political sphere in the region and the country. The government resorts to political strategies such as repression, police control and rejection of violence acts implementing the antiterrorism law on one hand¹⁵¹, and creating new social programs and resources oriented towards the indigenous population on the other hand (De la Maza, 2015).

In the year 2000, Chile saw a cultural and political blossoming of the Mapuche movement. The debate was active and emerging organizations and demonstrations were very common. The message was: the conflict cannot be denied anymore. Chilean society was confronted with a contemporary 21st Century ethnic conflict. This is a conflict that in its root questions the arbitrariness and violence under which the Nation-state has been formed. It is the emergence of a new actor, who is claiming the establishment of their own space in Chilean society. They claim recognition, a differentiated treatment, compensations for their minority status, and the right for autonomy in their management of resources, both natural and economic.

The new movement is mostly led by young Mapuches. Many of them accomplished university education, mainly thanks to scholarship programs for indigenous people implemented in 1991 (Blanco and Meneses, 2011). These young people have re-read the history and have attached new meanings to it (Bengoa, 2002). They join the fights for claiming ancestral land and are involved in practices to make Mapuches aware of their identity and the conflict issues in order to mobilize them to take action. These practices vary, for example, from history lessons in Mapuche student houses, to a theatre traveling throughout Mapuche communities, to music groups singing about national liberation, to language and leadership schools (Terwindt, 2009).

An interesting point regarding the Mapuche movement is its link with other Chilean social movements. Mapuche movement maintains a distance with them in order to protect an identity approach but they share common values and perspectives of a more egalitarian society. Chilean social movements include the Mapuche struggle in their purposes, considering it a very important effort in order to build a plural society. In return, the Mapuche movement joins certain causes to bring in the indigenous perspective.

¹⁵¹ An anti-terror law created during dictatorship.

This reciprocal relationship gives the Mapuche movement strength and recognition in front of different and important social actors, helping in resisting devaluations and fighting old stereotypes.

One of the big synergies between Mapuche and non-Mapuche movements took place during the Chilean student movement with a series of protests during 2006 and 2011. In 2006, many student protests took place, giving birth to the so-called “Penguin Revolution” (a term that refers to the students’ white and black uniforms); the direct antecedent of the series of protests that took place in 2011. In these protests, many students were Mapuches and even some of them were important leaders.

“The other thing that marked me very strongly was the “Penguin Revolution” that happened in our high school and I participated actively. Then we started questioning the education in a very detailed way and the material conditions of the spaces where we were getting educated. When it rained, for example, our books and notebooks were all wet; afterwards we had to throw them in the rubbish and we could not study. This experience was very crucial for us and we decided to organize ourselves in order to claim for infrastructure improvement. We also talked about the abolition of LOCE and PLG (Chilean education laws established during the dictatorship). Afterwards, when I went to university I also participated in organizing different activities from different organizations in an internal level at the indigenous student dormitory as well as with other Mapuche organizations from the Frontera and Catholic Universities and also generating other spaces. Even at the university where I studied which is a private one. This way I was getting more involved in the topic. Lately I was at the Mapuche student federation and we have been mainly focused on certain new proposals from the government, in this case a right wing government (Piñera government), and of the CONFECH (Confederation of Chilean Students, it congregates the federations of students from different universities), which is supposedly the representative instance of students. These proposals were missing the rights of indigenous people established in the convention 169 from ILO in the matter not only of education but also on health issues, environment, sustainable development and all those things. So we realized we have all those instruments but we have not been considered. Education is something relevant for us because now we are immersed in those spaces... they are talking about a change in education and maybe this change is going to affect us in 20 or 30 more years, so we have to be there and be a valid interlocutor with the government, in this case with CONFECH and that is why we are organized and we joined this instance in order to generate alternatives of education; pointing that education is not something homogeneous, it has to be something heterogeneous, considering regional and indigenous contexts that coexist today with Chileans. That is why we started organizing ourselves and looking for spaces of action.” (Male President of the Mapuche student Association, 22 years old)

Education is used as a tool for resisting discrimination and to improve the possibilities of their own people as explored in Section 1, 4) a Reasons for the new appreciation. Many Mapuches consider Lautaro as a hero and an example because he was a Mapuche lonko (*Tribal chief*) that got infiltrated in the Spanish army and afterwards used the same strategies of the Spaniards against them.

“I study law because I say; well as a Mapuche I have seen so many injustices in my life; along history. Maybe I felt I had the vocation to study education but I said it is full of Mapuche teachers, there are also Mapuches in other professions but not so many in law and then I said, ok if my ancestors like Lautaro, for example, sacrificed themselves so much for their people... Lautaro inserted himself as a spy inside the Spanish army and he used that in favor of his own people, so I said I will follow his example

and I am going to study something that maybe I don't like that much but that someday can be useful for my people.” (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

Education as a tool of resistance gives information and empowerment to people. It is argued that before having education, people who live in communities could be deceived because they didn't understand very well how the rest of society worked. Therefore, having access to education allows them to build their own opinion about their people and the Chilean society.

“I have done a big jump from having only little information when I was in a rural area to when I got into the higher education system. Education is a tool to contest spaces and to generate opinion on equal opportunities with other people. I remember that when people used to go to the communities to do political campaigns for university or parliamentary elections, I observed how people were lying and were buying the votes, so to say. They were telling people how society works and how they could help them; they promised them lots of things... Now you see this and you know it is wrong and that a change is needed; for that it is important to acquire some knowledge in order to start questioning the reality in which we are immersed. The most reasonable today is to be able to get into higher education and be able to finish it.” (Male President of the Mapuche student Association, 22 years old)

As described in *Section 1: Contextualization and specific characteristics of Mapuches in Chile*, higher education (university or technical) is very expensive in Chile. Even public institutions have tuitions fees that are very high considering the average national income (Ann Matear, 2006). Therefore, not everyone can easily have access to higher education. Access for indigenous people is lower than for the non-indigenous population, but lately indigenous are getting more opportunities to enter university thanks to the creation of indigenous scholarships and other benefits.

“From my mom's side of the family, I am the first one to get into higher education, so given the vulnerable situation that many Mapuche communities live in, not only for my community but for the majority of communities in the Araucanía region, getting into higher education is very difficult. One of my main purposes is to increase the awareness of the reality in which Mapuche people live, so it has been very useful for me to be a critical person regarding what has been going on and I have been generating social networks and contacts here and there.” (Male President of the Mapuche student Association, 22 years old)

As a personal strategy, to resist discrimination means to be strong and to defend one's own position and identity; making people respect them.

“I started feeling discrimination when I was 14 years old, when I started to go out of home, to go to the city because I used to live in rural areas. So when I started to work in the city, there I started to feel discrimination, I was like a countryside girl, people used to look at me in a weird form. But afterwards not anymore because you have to make people respect you.” (Mapuche female, maid (domestic worker), 39 years old)

In some cases, even parents taught their children to defend themselves from abuses and misbehaviors from peers. Nevertheless, in cases where the parents were ashamed of being Mapuches, children felt ashamed of these discriminations and didn't even tell their parents about it.

“At the beginning, I was discriminated against very hard but my mother told me “If they call you India it doesn't matter, Indios are not from here they are from India; we are indigenous people. You don't have to feel bad about it”. Because people call you like that in a derogatory form and when you are a

child you don't understand why if you feel so proud about what you are... they discriminate you against because you are darker and indigenous. So my mom used to tell me: "My daughter, if they tease you, defend yourself! If someone attacks, you defend yourself! If they hit you defend yourself! Do not allow this behavior and if they need to talk to your parents I will go!"" (Female Mapuche student activist, 25 years old)

Conclusion

During the process of Nation-state building/independence in Chile, a cultural and linguistic homogenization took place, even though many different indigenous groups were part of the country. The particular culture of the Elite, which was a Creole¹⁵² assimilation and hybridization with the Spanish European culture, was enacted as the legitimate one. Other languages, cultures and religions were made invisible and considered illegitimate. The idea emerged of a homogenous Chilean culture that is nothing more than the hegemonization of the Elite Chilean culture.

The idea of having a hegemonic identity and culture was based in global ideas of that historical period: a State should be the expression of a sovereign nation. Following this idea, the nation on which the formation/independence of the Chilean State was based, was the Creole nation. This Creole nation not only denied the indigenous population but also the mixed mestizo and hybrid culture of Chile. Indigenous groups were constituted as minorities and ethnicized. Only one Nation and one official language were established as the official one. The Chilean nation was romantically described as the mix between brave indigenous people (especially referring to the Mapuches) and the Creoles. Both groups were born on Chilean soil, which was the basis for citizenship in Chile and most Latin-American countries¹⁵³. However, in this mix, the "white" element was considered more desirable, and the mestizo mix was only valued in an abstract but not practically form. Consequently, no element from the Mapuche Nation was taken into account in the definition of the Republic as a whole. Mapuches were constituted as the "Other" in relation to the Chilean "Self" and in this process less value was attached to them.

Mapuches are legally considered as Chilean citizens but their value as belonging to the Nation-state is inferior. Their perspective on history has been invisibilized. Their cultural customs are valued only as folklore but rejected when they are attached to the recognition of the Mapuche as a different nation inside of Chile or attached to the recovery of ancestral land. They can express their culture but only as something non-political or without any controversy with the Chilean Nation-state, which is hardly possible due to the conflictive historical relation between the two. As a result, their belonging to the Nation-state is conditioned on the acceptance of Chilean nationality and the way the Chilean Republic has interpreted and solved the historical conflicts. They have been historically constituted as illegitimate citizens and the opportunity to give them legitimacy lies on their recognition as a different nation within a plural country. This means that in order to bring legitimacy to the Mapuche and other

¹⁵² Spanish descendants born in Chile

¹⁵³ Most of American countries have citizenship based in the *Jus Solis* principle.

indigenous groups, Chile has to recognize its plurality of culture and stop considering itself as a homogeneous country.

Recognizing the plurality in Chile would mean in the first place to recognize all indigenous groups as different folks within Chile; a constitutional recognition that has still not taken place. Such recognition would also lead to give indigenous groups the right to have a different nationality and autonomy. This would help overcome the idea of Mapuche nationality and autonomy as a threat to Chilean hegemonic culture, which is one of the mechanisms of illegitimizing Mapuche citizenship.

Another mechanism of illegitimizing Mapuche citizenship is the criminalization of their struggles for recovering ancestral land and the consideration of their worldview only as a spiritual and folkloric component. Their worldview is not only spiritual but also at the same time a political position that represents an alternative to the neoliberal development model. In order to make Mapuche citizens more legitimate, their struggle should not be conceptualized as terrorism and Mapuches should not be tried under an anti-terrorist law. In addition, if we want to consider them as valid actors, their perspective would need to be considered as a valid voice in development projects that affect them and other Chileans. Their voice would also need to be taken into account in the narration of Chilean history if we want the new generations to understand the conflict from a more complex perspective. The points of controversy and conflict need to be presented and taught.

Mass media also plays an important role in overcoming all these mechanisms of illegitimization of the Mapuche citizenship. The criminalization and discrimination of Mapuches in mass media needs to end and more plural reports and more information needs to be given on the issue if a more plural society is to be built.

Similarly, to the case of Northeasterners in India, the most embedded and unconscious mechanism of delegitimation of Mapuches in Chile, together with the invisibilization of their history, is the racist classificatory devaluations they face. Different kinds of stereotypes are built, affecting their valuation in society. The phenomenon of racist classificatory devaluation is related with the classification and evaluation of an ethnic group regarding a hierarchy of power within the Nation-state but also internationally. When a group is ethnicized, it is attributed with less power and is considered as a minority, usually with less value and sometimes less rights. This has happened to ethnic groups within a Nation-state like Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India but the same mechanism is observed today with ethnitized migrants (Grossfoguel, 2004). Their valuation depends on how power hierarchies were configured during the Nation State building and what symbolic values (or devaluation) were attached to their features, customs and culture. Thus, international power hierarchies were reproduced in different nation-states. Hence, the value attached to the cultural specificities and features of Mapuches constitute their racist symbolic capital (Weiss, 2011), which influences and constitutes part of all the other capitals (economic, cultural and social) (Bourdieu, 1986).

Mapuches have a more negative racist symbolic capital than mestizos or white Chileans. Their surnames hold a negative symbolic value as well. However, this inferior value based on their features and their culture intersects and is influenced by other factors that constitute the economic, cultural and social capital of the person. It is important to note that by illegitimate citizen I do not mean that Mapuches are the most oppressed or devaluated persons in Chile. There are many other discriminations and oppressions suffered by other indigenous groups and poor non-indigenous

population. With illegitimate citizenship, I am describing a specific kind of inequality related with the dimension of belonging to Chile and with the ethnization of the concept of citizenship.

This inequality related to citizenship intersects and is influenced by many other classification concepts in Chile such as class, gender, religion, etc. In the case of Mapuches, even though they all experience discriminations because of their features or surnames, which become stronger when the person has a darker skin, the way this discrimination is managed and experienced on a personal level differs depending on the amount of resources of the person. People who are more educated and have a relatively higher socioeconomic position, understand better that racist devaluations have their roots mainly in lack of education and knowledge about Mapuche culture and history. Therefore, they can confront it better.

Another fact that proves that ethnicity/race operates as a symbolic capital is that the same source of discrimination can be sometimes transformed into a resource. The phenomenon of exotization is at the same time a form of discrimination and a resource. Exotization is discrimination because one difference is enacted, therefore, the person is not considered as equal because she is seen as an object with a particular characteristic. In the case of Chile, the phenomenon of exotization has taken the form of folklorization; Mapuches are seen as something exotic to show as particular from Chile but more as a decorative element than a substantial one¹⁵⁴. Mapuches are seen as an enclave to the past and in this sense they are also considered to show a supposedly Chilean cosmopolitanism. This exotization as a resource has some benefits within the current reassessment of Mapuche culture in Chile. As described in the analysis, today many Mapuches are proud of recognizing themselves as such and they can even count with some special benefits like scholarships and others. This is how discrimination can be capitalized upon as a resource that gives certain benefits (a social recognition and some material benefits), even though it remains a discrimination. However, opposed to the case of Northeasterners in India, the exotization of Mapuche women is not sexualized as they are not considered as a beauty reference. The indigenous have always been conceptualized from a racist perspective in Chile as ugly and without taste.

In this chapter, was demonstrated how Mapuches have been constituted as illegitimate citizens since the formation/independence of the Chilean Nation-state, how this delegitimation has been reproduced by the different Chilean governments and mass media, and the racist discriminations they suffer, especially when they migrate to cities.

Racist/ethnic classificatory devaluations are intimately related to citizenship; it is a reminder that certain groups do not legitimately belong to the Nation-state. This delegitimation of citizenship is an inequality problem that has been empirically analyzed in this study. However, this specific inequality cannot be understood independently from its relationship with other categories like social class and gender (and some other categories important for specific countries). As the objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the specific inequality provoked by the delegitimation of citizenship, its relationship with class and gender was broadly shown but not analyzed in depth.

¹⁵⁴ This can be noticed in the touristic exploitation of Mapuche creations like handicrafts and especially regarding food. See Aguilera, 2012.

Final Conclusions

The present dissertation contributes to the study of citizenship through the theoretical and empirical development of the concept of *illegitimate citizenship* and its observation in two different countries: Chile and India. Despite the different contexts, the main results show that very similar mechanisms produce and reproduce the illegitimacy of citizenship in the case of two ethnic groups; Mapuches in Chile and Northeastern Indians. This research, rather than being an abstract analysis on how citizenship should be, it explores how citizenship operates today.

At first sight, the concept *illegitimate citizenship* seems like a contradiction in itself since citizenship is supposed to be legitimate by definition. However, this work shows how a person's citizenship can become illegitimate when his or her belonging to the nation is questioned even though he or she belongs to the state. This illegitimation is carried out through devaluations against people that do not adapt to the supposedly homogenous culture of the nation, due to its ethnicity or race.

Citizenship entails a legal and symbolic belonging to the nation-state. It becomes illegitimate when the legal part is accepted while the symbolic belonging is questioned. The symbolic belonging to a nation-state is based in the concept of a homogeneous nation even if countries consider themselves multicultural. Therefore, ethnic groups are considered legally part of the state but remain symbolically *out of the nation*. Ethnic groups were constituted as minorities through *ethnification* during the nation-state formation. *Ethnification* is a process of disempowerment and dispossession that devalued many aspects of these people, including their individuality. These ethnic groups are included in the new nation-states as citizens, yet as illegitimate ones as they are part of the state but not of the nation.

Therefore, as explained during the whole thesis, Illegitimate citizenship is a ethnicized citizenship. It has been constituted like that as we still live in a colonial world-system, where nation-state was formed enacting one ideal citizen with clear racial and ethnic features. Or at least, the boundaries that define who is not a legitimate citizen are well defined. These illegitimate citizens are dispossessed of their autonomous individuality and their actions are always explained through the belonging to a racial or ethnic group: the migrants; the Muslims; the indigenous people or the Northeastern Indians. Individuality is a white western privilege in the world-system, as explained in chapter 1. However, if we observe national cases, as the particular case of India, this individuality and autonomous privilege is given to the group that led the nationalist independence in 1947 (formation of the current nation-state); the Hindu upper cast and upper class nationalist men. In the case of Chile, the groups that led Independence in 1810, were European descendant (white) upper class men.

Consequently, this research highlights two aspects of citizenship. Firstly, by developing the concept of *illegitimate citizenship* it shows how citizenship can be a factor that reproduce colonial, racist and masculine social inequality that affects ethnic minorities in the world-system. Secondly, this dissertation describes how the delegitimation of citizenship empirically operates, using for that the case of two ethnic groups in two very different countries: Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India.

Citizenship is a factor of social inequality that affects ethnic minorities in general. Not all citizens are considered equally belonging to the nation-state. Some groups, such as ethnic minorities, were

relegated as secondary during the nation-state building process. These citizens are considered illegitimate until today. This affects the opportunities these groups possess and how their activities and habitus traits are valued. *Illegitimate citizenship* is an inequality that operates next to other inequalities that are based on gender, social class, caste, religion etc.

The thesis at hand explores the historical constitution of *illegitimate citizenship* in two specific cases. As mentioned above, results show that in both cases very similar mechanisms produce and reproduce the illegitimacy of citizenship. This is an important finding considering the very different context of Chile and India. In both countries three major mechanisms can be distinguished. The first mechanism is the belief in a homogenous culture within the nation-state, which constitutes a legitimate and hegemonic identity in both countries. The second is the racist classificatory devaluations against ethnic groups perpetrated by the state and by the population in general. The third mechanism is the invisibilization of the history of both ethnic groups, resulting in a general lack of knowledge about Mapuches in Chile and Northeastern Indians.

Mapuches and Northeasterners have been constituted as the “other” backward and primitive within the national identity. This constitution of the “other” implies always an epistemic violence (Spivak, 1988). The “other” is constituted as inferior with the help of racist classifications and devaluations. In this process, the role of formal education has been fundamental in shaping mental structures and visions where Mapuches and Northeasterners have been portrayed as people with no merit. This is especially expressed in the teaching of history, where these ethnic groups have been shown only as exotic and backward, but their own vision regarding history has not been shown. They are not considered important in national history and their perspectives and way of conceiving conflicts are not presented. If anything, they are considered as folkloric parts of the past without agency.

Consequently, this research concludes that the habitus of *illegitimate citizens* as ethnicized and colonial ones has been devalued. Therefore, they have had historically less access to capital and resources, which affects the opportunities they have as a group to participate in different spheres of society (job market, education, health, politics, etc).

Conversely, this delegitimation of citizenship is a specific kind of inequality that questions the belonging of certain groups to the nation. During the formation of the nation-state, a division between people belonging to the nation and those only belonging to the state (ethnic groups) was perpetrated. This affects the recognition of ethnic groups and devaluates their dignity as citizens in a very specific way. There are other citizens who suffer a devaluation of dignity based on their class, gender or religion. However, they are still considered as part of the nation. They are still considered as symbolically belonging to the nation-state; their citizenship is not delegitimized as in the case of ethnic groups. Therefore, *illegitimate citizenship* is a particular inequality that devaluates the symbolical belonging to the nation-state while accepting the legal belonging.

Illegitimate citizenship is a phenomenon that operates in every nation-state. This research does not consider nation-states as isolated and closed spaces, but considers them to be situated in a world-system. It follows Grosfoguel’s (2004) and Wallerstein’s (1991) argument of a hierarchy of power between countries and regions in the world. Both authors posit that not all nation-states have the same amount of power in the political world-system structure. This fact has consequences for the symbolic

value that different citizenship bear. Due to eurocentrism and colonialism, North Atlantic countries are more valued than the ones from the so called Global South, constituting a center/periphery dynamic that operates until today. Therefore, citizenship from North Atlantic countries possesses higher symbolic value than citizenship from Southern countries in an international context. This hierarchy is also tied to racist classificatory images of the people who live in the less valued countries of the Global South. This racist-economical-social hierarchy of power between countries and regions in the world is based on the history of colonization, being it territorial, political or just economical colonization. Colonialism still exist, even though its forms have changed as it was profoundly analyzed in Chapter 1.

Following Anja Weiss (2010), racism presuppose a stable marker based in some biological or other kind of constant difference, which makes otherness visible and impact on social classification, practices and institutions, assigning lesser rights to collectives of that category. Racism is experienced by people from the Global South in an international context, due to the world-system hierarchies and by ethnic groups within nation states. Chile and India, as countries who experienced colonization, incorporated a racial hierarchy of the world as legitimate. For instance, in both countries to be “whiter” is considered more valuable and attached to supposedly more virtues than being “darker”. Therefore, this racist hierarchy constitutes part of the symbolic capital an individual possess, ascribing them with more or less value. Consequently, illegitimate citizenship as an ethnicized and racialized concept constitutes a type of symbolic capital.

One of the major implications of this thesis is the clear evidence that citizenship does not need nation as justification anymore. This dissertation shows a specific type of inequality that emerges when citizenship bases its legitimacy in nation and homogenizes ethnic groups. Thus, in a multi-centric and globalized world, where mobility of people, goods, ideas and communications are intensified, citizenship attached to nation becomes an asynchrony. The boundaries of citizenship have to be redefined. The plurality has always existed inside every country, but it has been denied and oppressed with the homogenizing tendency of the concept of nation. Conceiving nation-state as a homogenous entity links citizenship to an essence called nation. This makes citizenship a very inflexible concept that is not useful anymore if more plural societies want to be potentiated.

Therefore, this dissertation is a contribution to the critique of a concept that attaches citizenship to nation, critique that already some authors have proposed such as Bauboeck (2014, 2015), Arendt (1951) and Isin and Turner (2008). New research could help to develop new concepts or highlight already existing concepts that do not base citizenship in nation. For this purpose, both an international comparative perspective and a non- Eurocentric perspective on citizenship could enlighten this challenge for the field of citizenship studies.

This dissertation can encourage future research with some of its implications. For example, further research might focus on how citizenship in general - and not only *illegitimate citizenship* - operates as symbolic capital. In this research, the concept of symbolic capital was used to examine the racist classificatory devaluations that illegitimate citizens suffer. However, in order to empirically analyse the general concept of citizenship as symbolic capital, the phenomenon of citizenship related to migration and people mobility needs to be studied. It is evident that different valorizations of people’s citizenship exist when we situate nation-states in a world-system hierarchy. With the phenomena of migration, it becomes clear that citizenship is valued differently and that it brings different opportunities and rights to people. Being a migrant from the USA in Germany is not the same as one from Turkey, India or Chile.

Inside every nation state, a citizen, a migrant or a refugee attains different valuation and has different access to resources.

When analyzing migration, it becomes evident that citizenship is one of the categories that determine the position that people possess in society. This position is determined in general by habitus, the amount of valuable capitals a person has (economic, cultural, social and symbolic) and also by other relevant categories such as gender, religion and caste, depending on the historical context¹⁵⁵. Therefore, citizenship becomes another category of classification, acting as symbolic capital that provides more or less value to the person.

Hence, new studies on citizenship as symbolic capital in migration would help to further understand the phenomenon of citizenship, its relationship to inequalities and to racist classificatory devaluations. In addition, to study how illegitimate citizenship operates in the case of migrant groups, especially in the case of ethnicized migrant groups, would also help to better comprehend the phenomenon of illegitimate citizenship.

This dissertation was designed to include a third case of study: the case of people with Turkish migration background in Germany. It was considered the third case of the empirical study, aiming to compare the illegitimate citizenship of native ethnic groups with ethnicized migrants and also it would have allowed to include a North Atlantic country case. However, the particularities and differences between native ethnic groups and migrants are too enormous for this comparison. Further research with focus on this topic could perfectly connect to the thesis at hand.

The phenomenon of migration was taken into account when theoretically and empirically defining the concept, considering that citizenship in the contemporary world cannot be understood without referring to migration. Migration challenges citizenship and obliges to redefine the boundaries of the concept. Hence, parallel to the other two cases of study, I conducted interviews with people with Turkish migration background in Germany and the analysis of these interviews contributed to the development of the concept of *illegitimate citizenship*. Despite the fact that the analysis of these interviews could not be completed nor included in this analysis, they gave some lights about the concept. Furthermore, those interviews can be used for further research on the topic. New research could focus on the differences or particularities of *illegitimate citizenship* when comparing ethnic groups with migrants and even with the case of refugees.

The relationship between citizenship and inequalities remains unclear and constitutes a challenge that this research undertook. It has been widely discussed that citizenship is a concept supposed to ensure equality for all citizens. However, many citizenship studies have realized that on the contrary it reproduces the existent inequalities in society, as it was shown in chapter 2 in this dissertation.

In an international context, there is an inequality provoked by citizenship, which is related to the racist classification of the world. As mentioned before, not all citizenships have the same value on a global scale due to the (racist) hierarchy of power in the world-system. This hierarchy of power is also reproduced inside every nation-state through the reproduction of racist classificatory devaluations.

¹⁵⁵ In some contexts, or countries, religion and caste are relevant in determining social position, while in others not.

One of the main findings of this thesis is that *Illegitimate citizenship* is a specific kind of social inequality that affects the belonging dimension of citizenship. Citizenship is delegitimized when the belonging dimension of a person to a certain nation is defied, even though this person has legal rights and duties and belongs to the state. This questioning of the belonging to a nation-state is possible because the legitimacy of citizenship is ultimately based on the identity concept of nation. This is what happens to ethnic groups such as the ones studied here, but it could also apply to ethnicized migrants. When they are delegitimized, their different cultural practices and habitus are devalued and considered to go against the supposed cultural unity of the nation-state. Therefore, they are seen as threatening the fundamentals of the nation-state, following the idea that a nation-state is a closed and homogeneous cultural unity.

Marshall (1992 [1950]) proposes that citizenship is not a mechanism that confronts capitalism or social inequality, but one that brings a change in the status of every human being from total inequality to basic equality expressed in some minimum rights. Marshall posits that these rights have evolved in history being first civil rights in front of the law; afterwards political rights, including the right to vote and finally social rights were obtained, which allow obtaining some minimum welfare. However, he presupposes citizenship as the base on which inequality can be built. From a meritocratic perspective, people all do have equal basic opportunities granted by citizenship. If they fail in achieving a better socioeconomic position, it is considered their own fault by the general neoliberal discourse; they are considered less intelligent or less hardworking.

Hence, conceptualizing citizenship as a principle of equality is the major pitfall of most theories on citizenship. They transform citizenship into an ideal concept, analyzing how it should be instead of analyzing how citizenship actually operates in contemporary societies. Therefore, when the concept of citizenship is considered to bring a minimum of equality, it is implied that any inequality after that is legitimate and this argument helps justifying inequalities and a discourse of meritocracy.

Marshall (1992 [1950]) and most other poverty and inequalities approaches have taken for granted that a minimum of economic welfare, health and education directly confers dignity to people (Sen, 2006; Rawls, 1971). There is no doubt that state welfare helps to improve the material conditions of people, but it does not alter the value that society attributes to them. People are not automatically considered valuable when they access this minimum of economic welfare. It improves their material conditions and allows them to have enough to live. However, their status, and their level of dignity and equality remain untouched (Rehbein and Souza, 2014 a). Receiving benefits is perceived as a failure of the individual in the capitalist system, following the logic of meritocracy.

In the case of Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India it could be observed that the increase of state benefits does not necessarily bring dignity, even if it improves their economic conditions. The Chilean State has been progressively increasing some benefits focused on Indigenous people since the 1990s. This has bettered the material conditions and opportunities of Mapuche people especially in the educational field (scholarships for high school and university). However, racism - as a stable marker that makes otherness visible and has an impact in classifications, institutions and practices- remains. This racism comes from centuries of classificatory devaluations towards indigenous people as it was extensively explained in Chapter 1 and more empirically in Chapter 4.

Intercultural social policies in Chile have brought some progress in reversing the negative valuation of Mapuche people; there has been a process of new appreciation of Mapuche Culture during the last 15 years. Nonetheless, Mapuches still suffer from mistrust towards them. In the case of Northeasterners Indians, they have obtained the so called reservation (Affirmative action) as well as other people from Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes. Reservation comprises quotas for entering university (including scholarships), for working positions in the public sector and for political representation. Nonetheless, reservations do not consider income as criteria of selection. Therefore, many people with a good social and economic situation obtain these benefits. As a result, many Northeasterners are considered to attain the benefits without deserving them since some of them are in a good economic situation¹⁵⁶. Despite these welfare benefits, the classificatory valuation of Northeasterners has not improved. The policy of reservation has created even more resentment from the rest of the population towards them. Thus, the creation of these benefits has improved material conditions and opportunities for Northeasterners, but they have not improved their level of dignity.

Citizenship is a concept that expresses belonging to a certain nation-state, which legally gives equal access to rights and duties. However, this legal equality constitutes the base on which the structure of inequality can be built. The only citizens who can fully exercise their rights are the most privileged groups in every society. All other groups have at least one category that leads to the devaluation in some sphere of their lives. Women, even upper-class ones, will be oppressed because of their gender condition. Even though they are privileged in other dimensions, the discrimination on basis of their gender limits their chances to exercise all their rights. Therefore, only a small privileged group can fully exercise their rights. In India, the most privileged groups are the Hindu upper-caste and upper-class men while in Chile they are the white European descendant upper class males. They face less devaluations and have possibilities to accumulate more resources living the kind of life they have reason to value.

The case-studies: How illegitimate citizenship operates

Illegitimate citizens are the ethnicized devalued groups, who do not adapt to the hegemonic national culture. This is what happens to Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India, who suffered a process of ethnification during the formation of the nation-state. However, many of their devaluation started even before the formation of the nation-state as it was analyzed for both cases in the subchapter “Historical Perspective”. Their devaluation is intrinsically related to the current and past coloniality of the world-system. Mapuches in Chile were dispossessed of their land and culture (their worldview, language and customs were suppressed) while Northeastern Indians could conserve their culture but were constituted as a peripherality. These historical devaluations have resulted in less development and less access to opportunities by these groups. These devaluations are based on the ethnicity of these groups, affecting their classification, relation to institutions and practices.

In Northeast India and in the Araucanía region (where Mapuche come from), there exist fewer opportunities than in other parts of the country as both are the least developed regions in their

¹⁵⁶ In India there is a big debate on the reservation policy, especially because it does not take income in to consideration. In chapter 4 this topic is mentioned though not analyzed as this will also require a new research.

countries. Furthermore, they are both regions with many conflicts and tensions. In the Northeast India, a main issue is the tension between insurgency, local population and the army (AFSPA), adding up other religious, ethnic and communal clashes. In the Araucanía region, Mapuches fight a long struggle over their territory. They are confronted with landlords, logging companies and the police.

In order to maintain these devaluations, certain mechanisms that produce and reproduce the illegitimacy of citizenship for both ethnic groups operate in Chile and India. As mentioned before, one of the main findings in the dissertation is that these mechanisms are mainly the same for Mapuches and Northeasterners, even though they are very different countries with different history and processes. However, both experience coloniality¹⁵⁷.

1. The homogenizing power of nation

The first mechanism that produces and reproduces the illegitimacy of citizenship is the belief in a homogeneous culture within the nation-state, which constitutes the defined national legitimate and hegemonic identity. A dominant culture constitutes the legitimate national identity when uses its own authority (legitimate power) to impose. The same phenomenon has been conceptualized as *hegemonic culture* by Laclau (2000). Hegemony presupposes the existence of unequal power relations for it to exist, the dichotomy universality / particularity needs to be overcome by universalizing one particularity. Therefore, hegemony entails always an imposition that is contingent and historically determined. The legitimate national culture is the hegemonization of one particular culture universalized as “true” for the whole nation-state. The culture of one specific group is enacted as the legitimate, because they have the power to do so. Thus, this hegemonic culture constitutes the nation.

The belief that there should be a homogenous nation in the nation-state has provoked tensions between Northeasterners and the Indian Hindu hegemonic identity as well as between Mapuches and the Chilean hegemonic identity. From the perspective of the mainstream identity both ethnic groups and their different cultural practices are perceived as a threat.

In India the cultural practices of Northeasterners that are less valued and considered a threat to Hindu hegemonic identity are: Different gender relations; different religious culture; different food habits and their different relation to Caste. All these singular cultural practices are conflictive to the hegemonic Indian Hindu culture. In addition, the Northeast is a region with many conflicts and tensions. The main tension lies between insurgency (separatist movements), local population and the army with the presence of AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act). This act declares some areas as “disturbed areas” and grants military special rights to the military, as explained in Chapter 4.

The case of Mapuches in Chile is similar. However, only some aspects of their culture are considered a threat to the legitimate Chilean culture. The practice of their spirituality and world view challenges the “white occidental” development model that has been successfully established in Chile as hegemonic. Mapuches are seen as a danger when they demand a different nationality and the recovery of ancestral lands. Even though the conflicts have not the same magnitude as AFSPA in India, police execute violent raids and repression against Mapuches, who are judged under an anti-terror law promulgated during Pinochet’s dictatorship.

¹⁵⁷ Concept defined in Chapter 1.

It is important to acknowledge that all nation-state building processes produced imaginations of unity. They had to define or redefine borders and nations legitimated in supposedly old traditions and ethnic or cultural homogeneities. Therefore, citizenship was constituted as mechanism that produces an imagination and ideology of unity and homogeneity within a nation-state. Nevertheless, only some collectivities were made visible (the ones considered part of the nation) relegating others as secondary ones or simply denying them, such as the case of Northeasterners in India and Mapuches in Chile.

In both countries, the unity of the nation was crucial during independence and the acceptance of diversity has been seen as a threat, even in India; a supposedly multicultural country. The unity of the Indian nation is essential. Although different cultural groups are tolerated, they are not recognized as different nations within the nation-state but as citizens with different religions, races and places of birth needing to adapt to the hegemonic Hindu national culture. In the case of Chile, even until today, there is a fear of recognizing indigenous groups as a different people and nation within the Chilean Constitution. This happens despite the fact that the indigenous population was promised constitutional recognition during the Chilean transition to democracy. Both hegemonic national cultures in India and Chile fear losing the unity of the country.

2. Racism and devaluations

The second mechanism that produces and reproduces the illegitimacy of citizenship is the racist classificatory devaluations that Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India face. These racist classificatory devaluations are perpetrated by both the State and the population in general.

Racist classificatory devaluations consist in classifying groups based on a hierarchy of power within the nation-state and/or globally. This happens to ethnic groups inside a nation-state, yet it could also apply to ethnicized migrants. Consequently, racist devaluations and stereotypes are related with the value that the ethnic groups have in a particular country. In the case of Mapuches in Chile and Northeastern Indians, their valuation depends on how the power hierarchies were configured during the nation-state building and which symbolic values (or devaluation) were attached to their features, customs and culture. It is important to notice that the international power hierarchies and what was considered valuable is reproduced within the different nation-states. The colonial power structures continue even after the end of territorial colonization. Thus, the value attached to the specificities in culture and features of ethnic groups constitute part of their symbolic capital, which influence and it is part of all the other capitals (economic, cultural and social).

The value attached to the cultural particularities and features of a group constitute their racist symbolic capital. A positive racist symbolic capital might lift a person's social status, while the opposite brings severe disadvantages (Weiss, 2010; 2001). Mapuches and Northeasterners possess a negative or lower racist symbolic capital than the racist symbolic capital non-indigenous population in Chile and the so called mainstream Indians enjoy. As a result, both ethnic groups are frequently compelled to demonstrate why they should be accepted as belonging to the nation, while for the mainstream population the fact that they belong to the country is taken for granted, thus never questioned.

Northeasterners possess less racist symbolical capital than mainstream Indians. People from the Northeast belong to India formally, while constantly being reminded of their outsider status. Northeasterners who migrate to Delhi experience high levels of racism. They face a specific kind of

racism related with the similarity of their features with people from Southeast Asia. This puts at stake constantly their belonging to the nation-state. Not in legal terms but as a social recognition. In India there are many groups considered as “others” based on religion, caste, and even ethnicity such as Muslims, Dalits and Adivasis. Muslims and Adivasis are also questioned in their belonging to the nation but they do not experience the same kind of racist devaluation as Northeasterners. On the other hand, Dalits are devalued because of caste but included in the Hindu nation, even if it is in a very humiliating way.

As defined before, there is racism when some stable marker, based in some biological or other kind of stable difference, is enacted as a visible otherness (Weiss, 2010). Therefore, Muslims and Adivasis also possess less or negative racist symbolic capital. In the case of Adivasis and Northeasterners, this racist symbolic capital is based in the features, while in the case of Muslims is based in religion. Religion can also be visible for example through clothes or just by mentioning it, hence, it can also be considered as a racist symbolic capital. Therefore, to study illegitimate citizenship in India in the case of Muslim population and Adivasis could also be a topic for further research. Another interesting issue for future research is the inclusion of Dalits within the Hindu national culture and whether we can really speak of an inclusion, or of an inclusion through exclusion.

The specific kind of devaluation based on features that Northeasterners experienced in India, is experienced to a lesser extent by Northeasterners coming from Assam, as their looks are mixed and some of them do not have “mongoloid” features. They are usually considered racially as “mainstream Indians”. Nonetheless, discrimination starts once people know where they come from. As a result, people from Assam usually do not experience much discrimination on the streets or at first sight. Discrimination only starts when people know they are from the Northeast. Therefore, racism is not only a devaluation and classification based on features, but it is related to cultural practices and to specific groups of people. Features are important as they act as an immediate visible marker of otherness but there are other markers of racist devaluations based on linguistic, religious or cultural differences. Therefore, the main reason for the racist classificatory devaluations of Northeasterners is the idea of the Northeast as a region lagging behind; a backward, problematic, and exotic region.

In the case of Chile, Mapuches also possess less symbolical capital than non-indigenous population. Mapuches face devaluations as well as other indigenous populations in Latin America and in other parts of the world. Mapuche activists and intellectuals recognize that classificatory devaluations that affect many people stem from the dominant Eurocentric world order. They have been conceptualized as subaltern following a postcolonial point of view (Spivak, 1988) and in this framework; Europe has been put at the center. Mapuches criticize Europeans for claiming the unique knowledge about the world. Many Mapuche condemn the Eurocentric view of conquerors in America, expressed religiously through Christianity and secularly through the philosophical *positivist* perspective and the belief in science and progress. The positivism of August Comte and the social Darwinism were the philosophical base in the formation of the new republics in Latin America (Larraín, 2000; Jiménez, 2008). Their thought progress would be obtained by imitating Europe and if possible by bringing more Europeans to the new countries (Bengoa, 1999). Therefore, the very definition of citizens in Latin America is racist from its foundations. The Latin American nation-states based the legitimacy of citizenship in a new nation composed by a mix between European and indigenous (*mestizos*). However, in this mix, the indigenous components were silenced. In the case of Chile, this nation is based in a predominately white or white mix (white *mestizos*) culture, while all the others groups are relegated as secondary.

Devaluations against Mapuches are racist; they are discriminated against because of their skin color or surname. Skin color plays a role in Chile, because it operates as symbolic capital within the social space. Having white skin is considered to be more valuable. This hierarchy stems from the time of colonialism. Mapuches with white skin do not experience discrimination because of their looks. Discrimination starts when people know they are Mapuches, either because of their surnames or because they state this membership.

Regarding everyday devaluations in public places, one difference could be observed between the two cases. In the case of Northeastern Indians, almost all the interviewees declare to have faced many times small episodes of overt devaluations such as comments on the street or bad words and other manifestations of rejection in public places. People use the pejorative word “Chinky” or “Nepali” to refer to them and also show rejection by rudely asking to give the seats or by urinating them from a moving car. In the case of Mapuches, these episodes seem to be less or subtler. This does not necessarily mean that racist devaluations against Mapuches are fewer than in the case of Northeastern Indians. But overt devaluations as comments on the street, bad words or other manifestations of rejection as the use of the pejorative word “Indio”, is not so frequent and has diminished in the last 20 years. But there are still other subtler forms of everyday discriminations in their everyday lives.

As stated before, the racist classificatory devaluations are not only perpetrated by the society in general but also by the state. The main state generated violence and devaluation in the case of Northeasterners is the presence of AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act). As described above, this act declares some areas as “disturbed areas” due to insurgency and/or violence. It was declared in 1958 for Nagaland and extended to the other regions of the Northeast afterwards. AFSPA has been the subject of wide debate and discussion between the government and NGOs as there have been reports on human rights violations. In 2001, there were some agreements of ceasefire with some states of Northeast and in 2005 the Jeevan Reddy committee submitted its recommendations. Anyways, AFSPA continues operating now with some changes (especially with ceasefire) and differently in every state and areas of Northeast and it is still criticized by many.¹⁵⁸ Many Northeasterners also argued that protests against AFSPA are mostly ignored by the Indian government. Moreover, Northeasterners do not feel represented by the Indian State. They argue that there is a different attitude from the government towards Northeast than towards the rest of the population; they are either left aside, treated as exotic or portrayed as terrorists. This constitutes a racist devaluation and violence perpetrated by the state.

In the case of Mapuches in Chile, the major state violence they suffer is the criminalization of their struggle. They are also treated as terrorists. Regarding the conflicts in southern Chile, the state considers the no-Mapuche landlords or companies as the victims and Mapuches as the criminals. These negative stereotypes are reproduced by mass media. Mapuches are portrayed as lazy, alcoholics and terrorists. However, most of the media do not mention the dispossession of ancestral land, the poverty and the lack of opportunities they face.

Mapuches mostly do not find themselves represented by the state. Their struggles and demands for autonomy have not been fulfilled, even now that the state has been promoting focused social policies and cultural recognition. However, indigenous groups have not yet achieved constitutional recognition

¹⁵⁸ AFSPA was applied to the state of Jammu and Kashmir since 1990.

as a different people (folk or nation) inside the country, despite the fact that Chile ratified the ILO convention 169, where this possibility is mentioned as a right.

3. Invisible history

The third mechanism that produces and reproduces the illegitimacy of citizenship is the invisibilization of the history of these ethnic groups. Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India argue that one of the causes of discrimination is the lack of knowledge about their people, history and culture and the lack of a history constructed also from their perspective on the conflicts. This generates prejudices and stereotypes.

The history of both groups has been relegated as secondary; they have been constituted as a different kind of people inside the nation state. One hegemonic national identity has been legitimized as the valid one in Chile and India. In this legitimization process, the use of knowledge in the form of “an objective national history” has been fundamental. In the consolidation of nation-states, education in the form of history played a main role. History teaching focused on creating national pride and unity, thus, conflicts with some regions as the Northeast in India and conflicts with ancestral Mapuche land in Chile were ignored. To think on a more diverse country would also imply to know the subaltern perspectives on “national” history even if these perspectives are conflictive or contradictory.

In India, the lack of knowledge about the Northeast is much extended. At school, children from parts of India other than the Northeast do not learn about this region. Not until 2001 was the history of Northeast India included in the national syllabus and from that time onwards only their very old history has been taught. In a similar way, Mapuche culture is taught in Chilean schools as something very static; their characteristics are presented in a descriptive way and disconnected from the historical context. In both cases, formal education sees Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India as people belonging to the past; static objects without historicity. Therefore, the invisibilization of their history perpetuates the ethnification of these groups, who continue being as secondary to the main nation in the country. Their citizenship is devalued; they are included in the nation-state as citizens but as illegitimate ones.

The knowledge about Mapuches and Northeasterners is mainly obtained through mass media (TV, internet, social media and newspapers) or through personal relations. Both experiences are influenced by racist classificatory devaluations. In mass media, Mapuches and Northeasterners are mainly portrayed either as terrorist and separatist or as folklore. Therefore, they are not treated as a valid actor and their struggles are criminalized. This enforces racist classificatory devaluations, reproducing their less valuable citizenship.

Main differences between both cases of study

Next to all the similarities in the constitution of Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India as illegitimate citizens, there are also many differences as both countries do have their own culture and history. These differences are mostly historical, but also related to the operation of racist classificatory devaluations.

The main historical difference is that while Mapuches in Chile were dispossessed of their land and culture, Northeastern Indians could conserve their culture and lands but were constituted as peripherality.

Another difference is the sexualization of Northeastern women, which has been defined as one of the expressions of racist classificatory devaluations in India but not for Chile. Many studies on race have shown how racialized bodies are also frequently sexualized (Nagel, 2001,). In the case of Northeasterners, women are specially portrayed as sexual and racialized objects at the same time. This is the difference with the sexualization that mainstream population Indian women suffer. On the contrary, Mapuche women have not been sexualized as they are not socially considered “beautiful”. Indigenous features in Chile and in most Latin American countries have always been conceptualized- from a racist perspective- as “ugly” and “not desirable”. This does not mean that indigenous women have not been raped or misused by colonizers and later by landlords. Neither does it mean that they do not face sexual assaults when they migrated to the cities as housekeepers (maids) during the Fifties. It seems - and this is more a hypothetical affirmation on the topic - that Indigenous in Latin America were not constituted as sexual objects (despite the sexual assaults) as it occurs in other cases where racialization goes together with sexualization (black women, Asian women, Latin-American *mestizo* women, etc)¹⁵⁹. However, a further analysis of the historical causes would be necessary.

In the historical hierarchical racist and global conceptualization of beauty, to be white is considered more beautiful than being dark skinned and this hierarchy also operates in the case of Chile and India. Indigenous features are not considered desirable in Latin America. Yet, South East Asian features are considered generally exotic and beautiful. Northeastern women are sexualized and erotized. In India, sexual assaults are in general very high¹⁶⁰. Delhi is known for being a city where sexual violence and rape is frequent¹⁶¹. Sexual attacks occur to all kind of women in Delhi and not only to Northeastern women. However, for Northeastern women the danger of sexual attack together with the racist discriminations and sexualization they suffer, being in Delhi becomes a really hard experience. They feel it is harder for them to complain, make justice or simply to be considered a victim. Northeastern women are perceived to be more provocative and promiscuous because of the clothes they wear and the closer relationship they culturally have with males. Hence, their devaluation as not legitimately belonging to the nation state because of their different culture plus being a woman, has also consequences in the way a sexual assault and harassments are signified.

In the case of Mapuche women, their exotization is expressed through folklorization and not through sexualization. They are seen as something exotic to show as particular from Chile but more as a decorative element than a substantial one¹⁶². Mapuches are seen as a symbolic enclave to the past only worth to consider in order to highlight some national characteristic. Exotization as sexualization or as folklore constitutes a devaluation, because it only emphasizes one single characteristic of a person, ignoring its individuality and agency.

¹⁵⁹ See Nagel, 2001.

¹⁶⁰ The latest statistics of National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), every day 93 women are being raped in the country. According to NCRB data, there is a gradual increase in the number of rapes reported in India - from 24,923 in 2012 to 33,707 in 2013. See: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/93-women-are-being-raped-in-india-every-day-NCRB-data-show/articleshow/37566815.cms> . However, there is an extended belief that many rape cases are not reported in India <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-newdelhi/majority-of-rape-cases-go-unreported-mps/article5063089.ece> .

¹⁶¹ The number of rapes in Delhi has almost doubled from 585 in 2012 to 1,441 in 2013. Delhi is followed by Mumbai (391), Jaipur (192) and Pune (171) among the top unsafe cities in the country <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/93-women-are-being-raped-in-india-every-day-NCRB-data-show/articleshow/37566815.cms>

¹⁶² This can be noticed in the touristic exploitation of Mapuche creations like handicrafts and especially regarding food. See Aguilera, 2012.

Regarding stereotypes of men, Mapuches and Northeasterners are considered heavy drinkers and to the Mapuches it is added the label of lazy. When Northeasterners men face bad comments or public aggressions and they respond, they might get drawn into fights and sometimes they are even beaten up to death¹⁶³. This is another difference between both ethnic groups. Northeasterners face more visible violence from the rest of the population than Mapuches. Usually, Mapuches are not attacked outside the context of land conflicts in the south of Chile, while Northeasterners are beaten up or face other overt devaluations in public places as it was described before. This fact communicates to Northeasterners more openly than in the case of Mapuches that they are not desired as part of the nation state, because the main cause of violence and stereotyping is their ethnic condition.

A further difference is regarding the use of the language of both ethnic groups. The language of Mapuches, the Mapudungún, was suppressed for centuries. Consequently, in the census 2012, only 8.2% of the population that consider themselves Mapuche declared they can sustain a conversation in Mapudungún. This is very different in the case of Northeasterners. In India, every federal state has the liberty and power to specify their own official language(s) through legislation and therefore there are more than 20 officially recognized languages. Although, the two main hegemonic languages are Hindi and English, which are used for important official purposes such as parliamentary proceedings, judiciary and communications between the Central and State Governments. Northeast is a region composed by eight federal states and every state has their own official language and relative autonomy.

Mapudungún was heavily repressed and the consequences of this repression are still felt. The Chilean State boosted a homogenizing education, where only Spanish language was to be taught at school, while other indigenous languages were forbidden. In some cases, teachers used to hit the students to prevent them from speaking in their mother tongue. This also led to institutional devaluation of Mapuche people as some of them –even if they are only a few – for long time could not make proper use of some services as hospitals or civil registration services, because nobody spoke their indigenous language. This is an example of the ethnification process that constitutes the Mapudungún not as legitimate language inside the Chilean nation-state. Thus, it expresses that people who speak this language and not Spanish do not legitimately belong to the nation-state. Devaluations based on language occurred in Chile for long time and even though it has been regressing since 1990, it is still perceived to be high. Today, there are intercultural facilitators in many social services in the Araucanía region and in some communes in the metropolitan region where the presence of indigenous population is high. Therefore, there have been some public policy progresses in the topic.

This institutional devaluation based on language does not occur to Northeasterners. Moreover, when they are in Delhi they can communicate in English, a language that the majority of Northeasterners speaks very well. However, they are still devaluated for not speaking fluent Hindi on the streets or markets places. For Northeasterners this language devaluation goes together with the everyday devaluation experience in public places and it is not a specific institutional devaluation due to language as in the case of Mapuches. If Northeasterners go to a hospital or public institutions, they will be able to speak in English or they would be able to use their not fluent Hindi and be understood; something that does not occur in Chile with the use of Mapudungún.

¹⁶³ This happens very frequently in Delhi. See <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/india-murder-northeastern-man-delhi-renews-racism-debate-1457489>

Those are the main differences between the case of Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India as illegitimate citizens.

Ways of resistance

Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India have found ways of resistance against the devaluations they face. Northeasterners organize themselves in student unions, many with the help from the church. They have created a support centre and helpline; Northeast East Support Center and Helpline (NESCH). NESCH is a joint initiative of various human rights activists, social workers, students, journalists and lawyers seeking to prevent harassment and abuses against North East Indian people and tribal communities that live outside their own states.

Mapuches found different ways of resisting discrimination. On one hand, there is a Mapuche movement with diverse organizations and political postures. On the other hand, personal strategies to face discrimination, such as affirmation and positive valuation of their own culture help to face discrimination. Furthermore, education is seen as a tool for resisting devaluations either from a Mapuche movement perspective or as a personal strategy.

An interesting point regarding the Mapuche movement is its link with other non-indigenous Chilean social movements. This does not happen in the case of Northeasterners. Chilean social movements include the Mapuche struggle in their purposes, considering it a very important effort in order to build a plural society. In return, the Mapuche movement joins certain causes and brings in the indigenous perspective. This reciprocal relationship gives the Mapuche movement strength and recognition among important social actors, helping in resisting devaluations and fighting old stereotypes. At the same time, the Mapuche movement maintains distance with other non-indigenous social movements in order to protect an identity approach but sharing common values and perspectives of a more egalitarian society. One of the biggest synergies between Mapuche and non-Mapuche movements took place during the Chilean student movement with a series of protests during 2006 and 2011. Some leaders of the student social movement were Mapuches, some of them were interviewed for this research.

Final remarks and limitations of the research

This dissertation shows how citizenship can be a factor of social inequality that affects ethnic groups, by studying the Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India. Secondly, it describes how the delegitimation and ethnification of certain groups is an inherent part of the constitution of a homogenous nation; the base for the formation of many nation-states in the world-system.

The mechanisms that produce and reproduce the illegitimacy of citizenship for ethnic groups are mainly the same for Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India - despite some contextual differences. In the two countries there is a belief in a homogenous culture within the nation-state, which constitutes the defined *national legitimate identity*. Secondly, in both countries, these groups experience classificatory devaluations, being some of them racist classificatory devaluations perpetrated by the state or by the population in general. Thirdly, there has been an invisibilization of the history of these ethnic groups; thus, there is a general lack of knowledge about them in both countries. Their perspective about the historical conflicts has also been ignored. Besides, these ethnic groups stem from areas where there are fewer opportunities than in the rest of the country, which has led to migration to the "center": Santiago and New Delhi respectively. However, in both cases they have created ways of resisting these devaluations.

Mapuches and Northeasterners have suffered a process of ethnification; they have been constituted as a minority during the building of the nation-state in a colonial world-system. However, their devaluation started even before independence, as shown in detail in Chapter 4 and 5. Therefore, they both face a double colonial subordination in two different scales; one regarding the subaltern position of Chile and India in the world-system and a second one within the nation-state.

The process of ethnification and racist classificatory devaluations affected the citizenship of these ethnic groups. They were considered legally part of the new nation-state, but their cultural practices and features were devalued and until today are not considered to bear the legitimate culture and features that compose the nation. They were and are included in the country, but in a subordinated and violent way, as the “others” that have to adapt. Therefore, their inclusion as illegitimate citizens mean that they have to constantly prove they are valuable to belong to the nation and have to constantly fight against stereotypes and racist classificatory devaluations.

The value attached to cultural specificities and features of a group constitute the racist symbolic capital of an individual. While there are also other groups in Chile and India that suffer subordination or racism, the particularity in the case of ethnic groups, is the direct relation between the racist classificatory devaluations and the belonging dimension of citizenship. This belonging is questioned in a subtle way, because ethnic groups have been constituted as minorities during the formation of the nation-state. Nation-states are supposed to be based in homogenous nations and in order to construct that, the existence of minorities helps as opponents to national identity. Hence, one group (created or already existing) is enacted as the cultural referent and the rest are subdued as secondary. That is what happened with Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India and it is a specific citizenship inequality related to the racism and ethnicization inherent to the hierarchical and colonial world-system.

Consequently, the inequality problem in citizenship started with the attachment of citizenship to the concept of nation during the creation of nation-states (building and independence), persisting until today. In a multi-centric and globalized world, a concept of citizenship that is attached to nation is an asynchrony. To disconnect the concept of nation from citizenship, would allow a more flexible concept of citizenship. If this were the case, other forms of belonging could be promoted within the concept of citizenship as having some kind of tie to the country (based on birth, working or studying experience, family connections, etc.). This would potentiate more diverse countries, opening possibilities for newcomers as migrants and refugees as well as native ethnic groups to legitimately belong to the nation-state. All of them could be legitimate citizens of the country, even if they do not share the same past and perspective of history.

This dissertation deals with a historical perspective that contextualizes the process of dispossession of Mapuches and the construction of Northeast peripherality in India, before and after the formation (independence) of the nation-states. However, it should not be understood as a complete historical analysis. Further research could concentrate in the historical emergence of nationalist discourses and the role given there to these ethnic groups. Additionally, to study the role of these ethnic groups during the process of independence could contribute to understand their process of ethnification in a more detailed manner. In the case of Chile, the role of Mapuches during independence was mentioned, however, not in detail¹⁶⁴. For the case of India, the role of Northeasterners during the independence process could become a research on its own.

¹⁶⁴ It was mentioned that Mapuches did not trust Chilean nationalist and supported the Spanish crown

Moreover, the relationship of this citizenship inequality problem with class is very complex. They are related to each other but are completely different phenomenon: *“the constructed “peoples” – the races, the nations, the ethnic groups- correlate so heavily, albeit imperfectly, with “objective class”* (Wallerstein, 1991; 84). Therefore, the analysis of constructed groups as ethnic groups, nations and races has to be conducted together with an analysis of social class but not considered the same reality. Furthermore, all these concepts have to be put into perspective within the hierarchy of value of the world system, its current coloniality and its relationship with other nation-states, in order to improve the understanding of social inequalities, its hierarchies and valorizations in a contemporary world.

Therefore, one of the limitations of this study is the unsolved relationship between *illegitimate citizenship* and social class. I concentrated on studying one kind of inequality related with belonging: the illegitimacy of citizenship.

Another limitation of this dissertation is that the third case of study on people with Turkish migration background in Germany could not be included. The original idea was to include this analysis in order to compare the phenomenon of illegitimate citizenship not only between two ethnic groups in Chile (Latin America) and India (South Asia) but also with the case of an ethnicized migrant group in Europe. Nonetheless, this topic would have opened new questions. The specificities of a migrant group, even though ethnicized, are different than the ones of ethnic native groups. Therefore, the study of illegitimate citizenship in migrants group in a “Northern” country could constitute the following research.

Appendix

Methodology

This dissertation is mainly based on a sociological perspective, with *configurational* qualitative analysis as the main methodological approach. This means that empirical data was analyzed as a configuration, where every new insight and concept alters the whole picture: “The configuration is multidimensional and open, dialectical and relational. No element can be defined ultimately and independently, but only in relation to the other elements of the configuration” (Rehbein, 2007; 26). Nevertheless, explanations on the whole configuration are impossible as it constantly changes and depends on multiple factors. Thus, concepts and propositions have to be revised constantly, which means that the analysis is not closed and definitive (Rehbein, 2007).

This perspective suggests that social configurations or relations should be studied in a precise place and time because entire theoretical explanations of the phenomena are impossible. Every attempt to understand social reality brings a point of view –even contradictory sometimes – that will help to understand the phenomenon. For that reason, the construction of the object of study, and not only the fieldwork, needs to be done empirically in order to situate it in its own social configuration. This approach to studying social phenomena has been also named *kaleidoscope* perspective (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001). It suggests that reality can be perceived only partially. As a result, the only way to interpret it is having different approaches and different versions of the same fact, as in the view through a kaleidoscope (See also Rehbein, 2015).

This research not only conducted an empirical data collection, but also an empirical definition of the object of study - in this case citizenship. The purpose was to situate the concept of citizenship in its own social configuration in a determined place and time. In this logic, two fieldworks were conducted respectively in Chile and in India. During the first fieldwork, the object of study (Citizenship) was contextually defined, and in the second fieldwork, more accurate data was collected regarding the relationship between citizenship and inequality in ethnic groups. The main forms of data collection were interviews, focus groups and historical materials as will be shown in the description of the fieldwork.

1. Why it is important to compare?

Comparative historical analysis has a long and well-known history in social science. Many famous authors that we know as the founders of modern social science from Adam Smith to Tocqueville, Karl Marx and Weber, resorted to comparative historical analysis as a central mode of investigation. Recently, books and studies published in various topics were all committed to offering historically grounded explanation for large-scale and important phenomena (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003).

However, not only is it important to provide a comparative historical analysis but also a comparative international perspective which allows us to better understand the specificities and generalities of certain phenomena. As Piketty argues (Piketty, 2015) the history of inequalities is always country specific but in order to see these specificities, we need a general analysis of the commonalities.

6) 1.1 Nation-states as unities of analysis

This comparative international perspective is based on nation-states as unities of analysis, as they still operate as unities in a symbolical and practical way. However, this does not mean that they are isolated entities. To observe nation-states or countries as unities of analysis does not necessarily entail methodological nationalism (Smith 1979). In this research, the notion of society is not bound to the idea of a self-sufficient social unit. Ulrich Beck called this way of looking at social phenomena the “container model of society” (Beck 1997). The container model perceives society as a closed entity with a clear stratified social structure—in which every individual has *one* fixed social position—and an inherent law of development (or evolution or modernization) (Rehbein, 2007). Nonetheless, in this dissertation, the nation-states of India and Chile are considered as social spaces and fields of power. Nation-states have been constituted as unities in their very creation as it was theoretically explained in Chapter 3 and empirically analyzed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

Nation-states interact with each other in a world-system, where there is also a hierarchy of nation-states. As Wallerstein (1991) argues, this unequal interstate system maintains the world division of labor in the world economy, dividing the countries in core-periphery relationships. All these processes occurred during the expansion of Europe and the racial division of people mainly between white and non-white, which is also related to the position that countries have in this world hierarchy. Race, and therefore racism, is the consequence of geographical concentrations associated with the world division of labor. Racism is not a minor topic when analyzing a country and its relationship with other countries in a world hierarchy.

7) 1.2 Why India and Chile?

In order to make a comparison, similarities and differences are important. This research focuses on similarities, but differences are considered as important specificities that allow a better framing and understanding of the phenomenon of citizenship.

The criteria for choosing these two countries as case studies were based both on similarities and differences.

In terms of similarities, Chile and India are both peripheral countries; they belong to the so called Global South and experienced a colonialism that determined their structures until today. Both are still affected by the still operating coloniality of power. In both countries, there are ethnic groups that have been constituted as illegitimate citizens, whose dynamic can be traced to the formation of the respective nation-states. Moreover, we can find many inequalities in both countries: Chile is a very unequal country with a Gini coefficient of 0.52 (World Bank, 2015), while India has extreme social exclusions, the caste system being only one of them (Heller, 2009).

The differences between Chile and India are very big and that is why it is so impressive that the analysis of illegitimate citizenship showed many similarities between both ethnic groups. Their history, geographical location and culture (religion, customs, and values) are very different. Chile is a small Latin-American country with approximately 16 million inhabitants, with its own particularities but also sharing common traits with the rest of Latin-America (commonalities that are mentioned when pertinent). India is one of the biggest and most diverse countries in the world, with 1.2 billion inhabitants, and very different culture and traditions.

2. The fieldwork

8) 2.1 The first fieldwork

Following the *configurational* analysis, the empirical data was studied in a precise place and time, because complete theoretical explanations of the phenomena are impossible. For this reason, not only the fieldwork, but also the construction of the object of study - citizenship in this case – was done empirically in order to situate citizenship in its own social configuration.

The first step in my research was to empirically situate citizenship in its own social configuration in Chile and India. For this purpose, I conducted interviews with experts in politics, social sciences in both Chile and India. The aim was to explore the historical discourses in which citizenship is involved, observing what the main concerns are and how citizenship is conceptualized in every country. I found out that in this conceptualization of citizenship, the role of national history is really important in configuring the “national discourse” of every country. This “national discourse” can be expressed in a homogeneous (Chile) or multicultural way (India), but in both cases it appeals to the unity of the nation-state based in the concept of nation.

2.1.1 The first fieldwork in Chile

The first fieldwork aiming to build the concept of citizenship was conducted in Chile during October – November 2010. I conducted a total of 17 interviews, 10 of which were with scholars, whose subject of study is related to citizenship; 3 with members of the government from a department dealing with the promotion of democratic participation (DOS Division de Organizaciones Sociales, *Social organizations department*); 3 with social activists and 1 with an NGO member. I included interviews with social activists, members of NGO's and members of the government following the recommendations of experts, who argue in those years, that one of the main concerns about citizenship in Chile has been the lack of civil participation in democracy¹⁶⁵.

2.1.2 The first fieldwork in India

The first fieldwork aiming to build the concept of citizenship was conducted in India during March – April 2011. I conducted a total of 9 interviews with scholars and I attended 3 seminars related to the caste system and democracy: “Caste, Democratic Politics and National Building: historical and contemporary India”, “Who is a citizen?” and “Making of Casteless Society in India: Discourses and Mobilizations”. In the case of India, activists were not directly concerned with the definition of citizenship I wanted to address with the questionnaire. When talking about citizenship, the focus was putted on the social justice dimension of citizenship more than in participation as it was in the case of Chile. Therefore, social activists and members from NGOs were not interviewed during this first fieldwork. This initial difference in the way of observing citizenship in Chile and in India was one of the first findings that led to a change in the focus of the research.

2.1.3 Preliminary results following the first fieldwork

¹⁶⁵ After the important student movement in Chile in 2011, the perspectives on civil participation in democracy have changed. Before that movement, researchers were mostly worried about the lack of engagement of civil population in democracy.

After the first fieldwork, there were some preliminary findings that helped to define which specific aspects of citizenship will be studied. One of the preliminary findings was that in Chile in 2010 the concern about citizenship was expressed through the concept of civil and democratic participation, while in India the main concern about citizenship was expressed through the concept of social justice. This allowed me to realize that citizenship is expressed in “different languages” in every country and these “languages” - or cultures of democracy for Charles Taylor (Taylor, 2007) - are determined by the history of the nation-state building. This means that the historical events that every country has faced determine a certain type of democracy and a different way to conceive citizenship. This concept of citizenship defines who is a citizen and what rights and duties are related to it. Therefore, it appeared from both fieldworks that the abstract concept I had operationalized for citizenship was not enough to explain the way citizenship operates in every country configuration.

Another finding from the first fieldwork was the importance of the historical process of nation-state formation in the development of citizenship. In both countries, the discourse of nation-state building is directly related to citizenship and determines the meaning of this concept. This fact made me focus on the historical process of nation-state building and the formation of nationalist discourses. The creation of nation-states is not something “natural” or necessary, and the way in which these nation-states are formed has consequences on the social processes and institutions, especially for citizenship. The nationalist and homogenizing discourses in every country not only define who is and who is not a citizen, but also who is and who is not a legitimate citizen. This creates new discriminations and inequalities regarding citizenship. The process of defining who is a citizen and who is a legitimate and “true” citizen is still mixed with the idea of nation, which is the basic idea of a nation-state. However, there is a conflation between the concept of citizenship and the concept of nation, which are not the same. This conflation potentiates the monolithic image of a country as a homogenous nation-state. Many theories argue that pluralism is a new phenomenon, although differences have always existed but have been suppressed by this kind of homogenizing discourse. Therefore, the emphasis of the research changed and focused on observing the homogenizing discourses in the process of nation-state building and how these discourses create or reproduce some inequalities, like illegitimate citizens in some groups such as ethnic groups.

The hypothesis was that, in the process of nation-state building, the discourse of unity embodied in nationalism was enacted, and with this, many groups were left behind as illegitimate citizens (such as the non-Hindu population in India or the indigenous population in Chile, to name only some general examples). These nationalistic discourses (with different degrees of nationalism) are still influencing the idea of legitimacy of citizenship and this has many social consequences. As a result, at this point of the research the main question was redefined. The new research question by the end of 2011 was: *What does it mean to be a legitimate citizen in Chile and India and which new inequalities are related to this?*

9) 2.2 The second fieldwork

2.2.1 The decision of focusing on ethnic groups

Following the findings of the first fieldworks in Chile and India, my object of study was the formation of a legitimate and illegitimate citizenship within the Chilean and Indian nation-state. During the nation-state building process, many groups were relegated as secondary ones, as in the case of ethnic

groups. Ethnic groups and racial discrimination are associated with the formation of illegitimate citizens and inequalities. Therefore, in the second fieldwork, the idea was to find the mechanisms through which citizenship is delegitimized in the two different countries, using a case study of a specific ethnic group in each country. Before moving to the second fieldwork, I conducted a literature review on the topic of group formation, racist discrimination and inequalities, and on the topic of nation-state building. Afterwards I decided to focus my research on one ethnic group in Chile and another one in India and to compare them as “illegitimate citizens”.

In Chile, I decided to research the Mapuches, the biggest indigenous group and the one with the most conflicts with the Chilean State and the hegemonic identity and the one with lower income compared to the rest of the population. In India, I decided to research people from Northeast India as their belonging to India is always put at stake in a manner that does not happen with other populations. India is a diverse country with different languages, religions and customs and even the features of Indian people are very diverse. However, people from Northeast are most of the time mistaken for people from China or South East Asia and are discriminated against because of this reason. Hence, both ethnic groups are interesting examples of illegitimate citizenship.

2.2.2 Important time gap in the research

After I took the decision of focusing my research on studying the formation and current manifestations of the illegitimate citizenship of Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India, I traveled to Chile at the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012 in order to conduct interviews with Mapuche people. However, due to health reasons, I could not continue with the second fieldwork and the research was stopped for one year until I completely recovered.

I started working on my research again in January 2013. During February-March 2013, I conducted interviews with people from Northeast India in Delhi, and in December 2013 and January 2014, I conducted interviews with Mapuches in Chile.

2.2.3 The interviews and focus groups in Chile and India

In both cases, I conducted semi-structured interviews with Mapuches in Chile and Northeast Indians. I focused the interview on knowing their experiences of discrimination and belonging, complemented by some questions about their family background, childhood and education. The technique used for sample selection was the snowball.

In India, I contacted some people from the Northeast and some organizations like the North East Support Center and Helpline (NESCH) and from there I contacted new people. The tendency was that I was contacting many people from the same region, religion or tribe, since Northeastern migrants tend to live with people from the same state and community. Thus, after the first few interviews, I had to start asking for people from other states and professions, in order not to have only students as interviewees.

In Chile, I also contacted some organizations at the local level and then I start asking the same interviewees for further contacts.

ii.2.2.3.1 Second fieldwork in India

I conducted 11 interviews and 1 focus group with people coming from Northeast India and living in Delhi and 1 Interview with a Northeast Indian doing a PhD in Germany. Six of them are women and 5 are men. The focus group participants were 10 students; 5 men and 5 women, most of them from the state of Meghalaya. All my interviewees and focus group participants lived in Delhi and migrated either to study or work, and only 2 of them grew up in Delhi. This means that most of them have migration experience, and as mentioned in Chapter 4, migration from the North East is different from the usual patterns of migration of the rural poor to urban centers. Compared to migrants from other parts of India, migrants from the North East are from more privileged economic and educational backgrounds and many of them are students. However, they face this ethnic discrimination.

iii. Indian income groups

The following part shows the main income distribution categorization used in India, in order to situate the social background of the interviewees. All my Northeastern Indians interviewees and focus groups participants have good economic and educational backgrounds, as most of the migrants from the Northeast have compared to rest of the population. They belong to the three groups with better incomes in India, which are only 20% of the Indian population. The following information it is very important in order to understand the distribution of income in India and what it really means that my interviewees have a good economic situation, especially in order to compare it with other countries.

The construction of incomes groups are models that try to illustrate how income is distributed in the population. They have many weaknesses but bring a broad idea. One of the main weaknesses is that they do not measure wealth in the case of rich population and therefore do not distinguish them from top incomes.

In India, the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) conducts income surveys and created the database Market Information Survey of Households (MISH) that classifies people into five income groups (McKinsey Global Institute, 2007)¹⁶⁶. This classification can be broadly compared with the one performed in Chile by the socio-economic characterization survey (CASEN). The Chilean income groups are segmented in quintiles and deciles of incomes, while in India the segmentation is done by income brackets. In Chile the groups will be divided in equal percentages: 5 groups of 20% of the population in the quintiles of income or 10 groups of 10% of the population in the deciles of income classification. While in the case of India, the criteria are the constitution of four income brackets, which segment population in 5 groups of income of different sizes: For instance, one is 35% of the population; another other 43%, another 19%, the next 2% and the last one 1% of the population in the highest bracket of income.

The five income groups categorization in India are: Deprived, Aspirers, Seekers, Strivers and Globals (McKinsey Global Institute, 2007). **The Deprived** income groups are the households living with less than 90,000 Indian rupees a year, which means 7,500 rupees per month. Assuming an average household of 4 people¹⁶⁷, this means that every person lives with 1,875 or 1,500 rupees per month,

¹⁶⁶ This was the most complete and clear data that could be found available online regarding Indian income groups. Is not the newest data, however, the estimations for 2015 built by Mckinsey 2007 coincide with estimations done in 2012 with survey data from 2009/2010 by Meyer and Birdsall, 2012.

¹⁶⁷ NCAER reports 5.0 as the average household size in their 2004/2005 survey. More recent numbers from India's 2011 Census suggest a smaller household size with a median of around 4 members. This would effectively increase the thresholds in per capita terms (Meyer and Birdsall, 2012)

which is less than one US Dollar per day per person. However, if we convert it into constant 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar¹⁶⁸, these numbers would be around 3 to 4 dollars per day per person¹⁶⁹. **Aspirers** are the households with a real annual household income between 90,000 and 200,000 rupees (between 1,875 and 4,166 rupees per month per person). Assuming again an average household size of 4 to 5 people and converting into constant 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar, these numbers would be around 4 to 8 dollars per day per person.

The middle class has been defined as comprising of two economic segments: **Seekers** with real annual household disposable incomes of 200,000 to 500,000 Indian rupees (between 4,166 and 10,416 rupees per month per person) and **Strivers** at 500,000 to 1,000,000 Indian rupees (between 10,416 and 20,833 rupees per month per person). Assuming again an average household size of 4 to 5 people and converting into constant 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar, these numbers would be around 8 to 20 dollars per capita per day for **Seekers**, and 20 to 40 dollars per capita per day for **Strivers**. **Globals** are the households with a real annual household above 1,000,000 Indian rupees, more than 20,833 rupees per month per person, which assuming again an average household size of 4 to 5 people, is approximately 10 dollars per day per person. However, if we converted into constant 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar is above 40 dollars per day per capita. In 2005 Global amounted to 0.01% of the population (around 1 Million households) and were estimated to grow to 0.3% of the population by 2015 (around 3.3 Million households) (McKinsey Global Institute, 2007).


In 2005, the Indian middle class was still relatively small, comprising approximately 5% of the population, which represents around 13 Million households (50 Million people). Using the database of the 2009/2010 NSS (National Sample Survey), Meyer and Birdsall (2012) argue that the amount of people forming the middle class (**Seekers** and **Strivers**) actually increased to 91 Million in 2011. McKinsey Global Institute (2007) estimated that in 2015 the middle class will reach 20% of the population, which means around 200 Million people and it will grow to a 42% of the population by 2025, which will mean 583 Million people. Following the estimation from McKinsey Global Institute (2007) for 2015, the **Deprived** will decrease from 54% to 35%, **Aspirers** will remain around 40%, while **Seekers** will grow from 4% to 19% of the population, and **Strivers** will grow from 0.2% to 1%. **Globals**, on the other hand, will grow as mentioned before from 0.01% of the population in 2005 to 0.3% in 2015 (McKinsey, 2007). This can be observed in the following graphs together with the estimations for 2025.

¹⁶⁸ The constant 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar is a hypothetical currency that is used as a means of translating and comparing costs from one country to the other using a common reference point, the US dollar. It shows how many goods and services could be bought in the US domestic market. 1 US dollar in India can buy much more goods than in the US. That is why this way of comparison is necessary.

¹⁶⁹ There are many critiques to the purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar, as it is an index based in the national GDP. Thus it does not consider the different costs of living in different cities. Living in a village in India does not allow the same purchasing power than in Delhi or Mumbai. These big cities are much more expensive. However, the purchasing power parity dollar has been used here as a very general reference of the purchasing power of dollars in India, which of course is bigger than in the US.

FIGURE 9: INDIAN INCOME GROUPS

INDIA WILL SEE FURTHER REDUCTION IN POVERTY AND GROWTH OF ITS MIDDLE CLASS




Following the estimation from McKinsey Global Institute (2007) for 2025, the **Deprived** will decrease from 35% to 22%, and **Aspirers** from 43% to 36%. **Seekers** will grow from 19% to 32%, and **Strivers** will grow from 1% in 2015 to 9% in 2025. **Globals**, on the other hand, will grow from 0.3% in 2015 to 1.03% (McKinsey, 2007).

The following graph shows how the shape of India's income pyramid will change from 2005, to 2015 and 2025. Observing data from 2009/2010 in Meyer and Birdsall (2012) it could be noticed that the tendency proposed by the Mckinsey Global Institute (2007) is accurate.

FIGURE 10: INDIAN INCOME GROUPS ESTIMATED FOR 2015 AND 2025

THE SHAPE OF INDIA'S INCOME PYRAMID WILL CHANGE
DRAMATICALLY AS INCOMES GROW



iv. Description of the Northeastern Interviewees

Of my 11 interviewees, 5 could be defined as **Global**, 2 as **Strivers** and 4 as **Seekers**. In the focus group, the participants were also a mix of **Globals**, **Strivers** and **Seekers**. These three groups are the 20% of the population with better incomes in India. Even though my interviewees belong to the three higher income groups, they neither belong to the elite nor are millionaires and they should be better classified as upper middle class. In the upper group of Globals - that constitutes 0.3% of the Indian population - there is a strong difference inside the group between the income of people like my interviewees and Indian millionaires and billionaires¹⁷⁰. This becomes clearer when knowing their occupations, which can be observed in figure n°12. The occupations of the interviewees classified as **Globals** are assistant professor and human resources director from a prestigious Indian university; small businessman; administrative at the Australian embassy and a PhD student from a well-off family. The occupations of the interviewees classified as **Strivers** are a PhD and an M Phil student, who receive a scholarship and additional allowance from her parents back home. **Seekers** (the lowest group of the middle class with an income between 4,166 and 10,416 rupees per month per person) are mainly students who receive this amount of money either from their parents or from a scholarship.

I interviewed students and people from the Northeast working in Delhi coming from good economic and educational backgrounds, like the majority of people who migrate from Northeast India to the big cities (Remesh, 2012, Appendix Tables 3 & 4; 6). Therefore, when I started looking for people coming from the Northeast, it led naturally to people with a good socio-economic situation and a high level of education¹⁷¹.

I chose people from different states of the Northeast; however, it was not possible to find people from all 8 states composing Northeast India. I interviewed people from Arunachal Pradesh (1), Assam (2), Manipur (4), Meghalaya (2 and the focus group), Nagaland (2) and Tripura (1) and could not find people from Mizoram and Sikkim. This is because there are only few people coming from Sikkim and Mizoram to Delhi compared with the amount of people coming from Manipur (most of the migration from Northeast India), Assam, Nagaland and Meghalaya (Remesh, 2012). There are also not so many people coming from Tripura but I was able to find someone to interview. Therefore, the fact that I didn't interview people coming from Sikkim and Mizoram can be considered as a limitation to this research. However, the case of Sikkim is exceptional.

Sikkim was included as a part of Northeast India mainly due to public policy reasons. Many authors and analysis do not consider it as a part of Northeast India because of geographical and cultural differences (Dikshit and Dikshit, 2014). This research also does not include any person from the district of Darjeeling. Even though Darjeeling belongs to the state of West Bengal, many people - especially the Nepali-speaking population - consider themselves geographically, ethnically and historically closer to the Northeast than to West Bengal¹⁷².

¹⁷⁰ In many data income, wealth or inheritance is not included.

¹⁷¹ It would have required more effort to find people from the Northeast who do not have a good economic situation. They are rather a minority. People working in services such as call centers, malls or BPOs are also from a relatively good economic and educational background. Most of the migration from Northeast India to Delhi is for studies and afterwards people choose to remain there.

¹⁷² As mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 1. *Contextualization and specific characteristics of Northeast India*. In an interview with a woman coming from Darjeeling, she argues that she considers herself part of Northeast India as they are confronted with the same discriminations and problems. She also indicates that the exclusion of Darjeeling from the Northeast (especially from Sikkim), seems to her "an exclusion within the exclusion". When looking into the map, Darjeeling seems to be part of the Northeast even geographically since it is in the northern part of West Bengal and limits with Sikkim. Nonetheless, it would be an impossible enterprise to grant every ethnic group with its own state

I also interviewed people from different religions. People from the Northeasterners that migrate to Delhi are: 49.7% Christians, 45% Hindus, 5% Buddhist and 0,2% Muslim (Remesh, 2012). Therefore, Christians constitutes half of the migration to Delhi but are also the group of Northeasterners that tend to face more tensions because of the different culture. Most of the Hindu population from the Northeast comes from Assam, which is a very unique case inside the Northeast, as it was described in Chapter 3.

From Assam, I interviewed 1 Hindu and one Muslim female student. In Assam 64.8% of the population is Hindu and 30.7% is Muslim. From Manipur, I interviewed only Christians, even though in this region 41% are Christians, 43% Hindus, 10.3% from tribal religions and 8% Muslims. This is mainly because I used the snowball technique for sample selection, which led me only to Christian Manipurians, who are also the ones that faced more tensions regarding their different cultural practices. The interviewees from Meghalaya and the focus group participants coming from this state are Christians like the 65% percent of the population in that state. Both interviewees from Nagaland are Christian like the 88% of the population in that state. My interviewee from Tripura is also a Christian, even though in that state Christians are a minority of less than 2% and 85% of the population are Hindu, 7% are Muslims and 4,6% are Buddhists.

The technique of sample selection led me to a Christian community, which is a good sample as Christians and Muslims are the most affected Northeasterners by tensions with the Hindu hegemonic culture.

Most of my interviewees do not belong to any caste but to different tribes. Only the interviewee from Assam declared she belongs to a Hindu Upper Caste, even though it is not an important matter for her and she argues that caste does not matter in Assam as much as in “mainland India”.

The majority of my interviewees are young people between 21 and 30 years’ old who are still studying at the university, either in a bachelor, master, M Phil or PhD program. The majority of Northeasterners who migrate to Delhi are young people that come to pursue higher studies or work. In the study conducted by Remesh (2012) on migration from Northeast India to Delhi, from the 400 Northeastern migrants interviewed, around 74.8% of respondents were from the 25-30 age group and 15.2 % were younger (18-25 Age group). In addition, I interviewed people who are already working, in order to compare the two kinds of lives and experiences. Their age group was between 30 and 55. This was very interesting as they brought new perspectives to understand the phenomena of delegitimation of citizenship in India.

in India since there are many different ethnic groups in different areas. Furthermore, from my point of view, the idea of every ethnicity having its own territory is not the best solution for this problem. But rather making India more plural in accepting cultural differences without considering one identity as the “true, valuable and hegemonic”.

TABLE 2: CHARACTERIZATION OF NORTHEASTERN INDIANS INTERVIEWEES

Interview	State	Occupation	Religion	Gender	Caste/Tribe	Age	Educational level	Income in ruppees per month per	Categorization of income	Occupation of the father	Occupation of the mother
I1	Arunachal Pradesh	PhD Student	Tribal religion	female	Tagin tribe	28	Studying a PhD in Sociology	10.000	Seeker	Bussines man	Housewife
I2	Assam	PhD Student	Hindu	female	Khsatriyas	27	Studying a PhD in Sociology	16.000	Striver	Politician and social worker	School teacher
I3	Assam	Masters Student	Muslim	female	No caste	23	Studying masters in sociology	8.000	Seeker	Bank manager	Housewife
I4	Manipur	Student Activist	Christian protestant Baptist	male	Naga tribe	26	Studying a master in Financial management	8.500	Seeker	Politician	Housewife
I5	Manipur	Assistant Professor	Christian Baptist	female	Tribe	28	M Phil in languages	50.000	Global	Bussiness man/politician	Nurse
I6	Manipur	Small businessman/social	Christian Baptist former	male	Tribe	38	Master in Economics and Human Rights	25.000	Global	Peasant	Housewife
I7	Manipur	Human ressources University service	Christian Catholic	male	Tribe	43	Master degree in Bussiness administration (HR)	50.000	Global	Small landowner	Hosewife
I8	Meghalaya	Administrative position at Australian embassy	Christian Presbiterian	female	Tribe	33	Bachelor in Political Sciences and diploma in Tourism	36.000	Global	Civil Servant	Civil Servants
I9	Nagaland	MPhil. Student	Christian Baptist	female	Tribe	28	Doing an M Phil. In political sciences	15.000	Striver	Civil Servant	Civil Servants
I10	Nagaland	PhD Student	Christian Baptist	male	Tribe	30	Studying a PhD in Germany	73.145 (1.000 euros)	Global	Member of the army, afterwards in the Civil Service	Politician, member of the woman comission
I11	Tripura	Student	Christian Baptist	male	Tribe	21	Studying Bachelor in geography	7.000	Seeker	School teacher	Housewife
F1	Meghalaya	Students, assistant professors, people working	Christian	5 men and 5 women	Tribe	most of them 25, one 55 and other 46	Studying at University or with University degree	Different but between this range 8.500 until 70.000 ruppes	Seekers, Strivers and Global		

v.2.2.3.2 Second fieldwork in Chile

I conducted 7 interviews and 1 focus group with Mapuche people who live most of the time in Santiago de Chile. As mentioned in Chapter 4, regarding the migration of Mapuches, 37% of those who declare themselves Mapuches live in Santiago. They are mostly the offspring of Mapuches who migrated during the fifties in search for better opportunities. Their migration experience or that of their parents is an important factor that I considered when choosing the interviewees in order to be able to compare it with the case of Northeast Indians. Some of my interviewees were born in Santiago, but others migrated from the Araucanía region, either to study or with their parents.

The **focus group** participants were **6 students: 4 men and 2 women**. Four of them were born in Santiago and two of them were born in the Araucanía region and then migrated to Santiago de Chile. All my interviewees and focus groups participants belong to the so called lower middle class.

vi. Chilean income groups

The following part shows the main income distribution categorization used in Chile, in order to situate the social background of the interviewees. All the Mapuches interviewees and focus groups participants belong to the so called lower middle class, who have a relatively good economic and educational background considering the disadvantaged conditions of Mapuches in Chile. I selected this group in order to compare it with the Northeastern in India, who have a similar life conditions. An Upper middle class person in India have very similar economic and cultural conditions as a lower middle class person in Chile. As mentioned before, the construction of incomes groups are models that try to illustrate how income is distributed in the population. They have many weaknesses but bring a broad idea about income groups. In the case of Mapuche, there is no single interviewee that belongs to the top income group.

Most of my interviewees and focus group participants are educated middle class Mapuches. Most of them belong to the Third Quintile of income in Chile and only one person belongs to the second quintile

of income with an income of 100,000 Chilean pesos¹⁷³ per person in the household, which is more than 4 dollars per person per day but 2 dollars converted into constant 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar. The following table shows the income quintiles and deciles in Chile.

TABLE 3: INCOME QUINTILES IN CHILEAN PESOS BASED ON THE CASEN 2011 SURVEY AND UPDATED ON THE 2014 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX¹⁷⁴

Quintile	Deciles	From (chilean pesos per person per month in a household)	Until (Chilean pesos per person per month in a household)	Percentage
I	I	\$ 0	\$ 48.750,00	10% lower incomes
	II	\$ 48.751	\$ 74.969,00	10%
II	III	\$ 74.970	\$ 100.709,00	10%
	IV	\$ 100.710	\$ 125.558,00	10%
III	V	\$ 125.559	\$ 154.166,00	10%
	VI	\$ 154.167	\$ 193.104,00	10%
IV	VII	\$ 193.105	\$ 250.663,00	10%
	VIII	\$ 250.664	\$ 352.743,00	10%
V	IX	\$ 352.744	\$ 611.728,00	10%
	X	\$ 611.729,00		10% highest income

Note: the table was created by the author and the income groups to which the interviewees belong were highlighted.

This classification is very similar to the one used in Chile for marketing purposes called GSE (Socio-economic group characterization in Spanish). This classification is based in the socio-economic characterization survey (CASEN), but adds education, occupation, goods and some sociocultural dimensions.

The GSE classification (socioeconomic group classification in Spanish) has been mainly used by marketing studies and it is a useful tool that indicates the position of a person in society. It divides population in five groups. Both classifications - socioeconomic and deciles/quintiles - are not the same but can be complementary and approximately match with each other (Desk Research and GFK Adimark, 2013). As shown in the table below, the group with the 10% highest income in the country can also be described as the ABC1 socioeconomic group (GSE), which corresponds to the highest decile of income (Decile X). To the socioeconomic group C2, which concentrates 20% of the population, belong the deciles of income IX and VIII approximately. To the socioeconomic group C3, which concentrates 25% of the population, belong the deciles of income VI and VII and the highest income of decile V approximately. To the socioeconomic group D, which concentrates 35% of the population, belong the highest income from deciles II, decile III and IV, and the lowest income from deciles V. The socioeconomic group E is formed by Decile (I) and by the lowest part of Decile II, and corresponds mainly to people facing extreme poverty.

¹⁷³ One US Dollar is approximately equivalent to 700 Chilean pesos and 1 Euro is approximately equivalent to 800 Chilean pesos. 100.000 Chilean pesos are equivalent to 146 US Dollars (130 Euros) per person per Month, which is considered under the line of poverty in 2015 (130.000 Chilean pesos per Month per Person). It is important to consider that in Chile the prices of goods and services are very similar to those in Europe, but housing (rents and real estate prices) is cheaper. Anyhow the purchasing power parity dollar in Chile is less than the currency exchange rate. In 2005, one US Dollar was approximately equivalent to 500 Chilean pesos, while 1 international dollar was equivalent to only 332,47 Chilean pesos in purchasing power.

¹⁷⁴ One US Dollar is approximately equivalent to 700 Chilean pesos and 1 Euro is approximately equivalent to 800 Chilean pesos.

TABLE 4: SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP CLASSIFICATION (GSE) IN CHILE COMPARED WITH DECILES OF INCOME IN CHILEAN PESOS

GSE (socioeconomic group)	From (chilean pesos per person per month in a household)	Until (chilean pesos per person per month in a household)	Percentage	Deciles (Approx)
ABC1	\$ 720.374,00		10% highest income	Decile X
C2	\$ 291.167,00	\$ 720.171,00	20%	Deciles VIII and IX
C3	\$ 153.239,00	\$ 291.151	25%	(Highest income from decile V), VI and VII
D	\$ 64.233,00	\$ 153.228,00	35%	(Highest from decile II), III, IV, (lowest from decile V)
E	\$ -	\$ 64.225,00	10% lowest income	Deciles I, (lowest income of decile II)

Note: The table was created by the author and the incomes groups to which my interviewees belong to were highlighted

The line of poverty in 2015 corresponds to incomes below 130,000 Chilean pesos approximately per person per month (6 US Dollars per day and approximately 3 converted into constant 2005 purchasing power parity Dollars per day) and the line of extreme poverty is below 90,000 Chilean pesos approximately per person per month (4 US Dollars per day and approximately 1,96 converted into constant 2005 purchasing power parity Dollars per day) (Observatorio Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2015). Deciles III, IV and part of Decile V are considered to be below the line of poverty and coincide more or less with the socio-economic group D (Group E includes the people facing extreme poverty). The highest half of Quintile III (or Decile V) with more than 130.000 Chilean pesos of income per person per month, is considered to be lower middle class and coincides more or less with socioeconomic group C3 and the upper half of group D.

vii. Description of the Mapuche interviewees

The Mapuches I interviewed are in the middle of the social strata scale in Chile, most of them being from Quintile III (with one person in the highest part of Quintile II). This means that most of them belong to the socioeconomic group C3 and to the upper half of group D, which can be labeled as **lower middle class**.

My interviewees are a relatively privileged group among the indigenous, since they are very well educated lower middle class people (Desk Research and GFK Adimark, 2013). The percentage of indigenous population living under the line of poverty is higher (19%) than for the non-indigenous population (13%).

The following table shows the characteristics of the Mapuche people I interviewed in Chile, including the occupation of their mother and father. Their improved social and economic positions are a relatively new phenomenon. Young Mapuches have access to more social benefits and recognition than their parents, as it was explained in Chapter 4.

TABLE 5: DESCRIPTION OF MAPUCHES INTERVIEWEES IN CHILE

Interview	Occupation	Gender	Age	Religion/spirituality	Income	Educational level	Work of the father	Work of the mother
CL1	Student and social activist	Female	25	Mapuche worldview	Quintil III	Studying law in 5th year	Construction worker	Maid
CL2	Student and social activist	Male	22	Mapuche worldview	Quintil III	Finishing a masters in social work	Peasant	Maid
CL3	Housekeeper (maid)	Female	39	Christian Catholic	Quintil II	8th grade	Peasant	Peasant
CL4	Hoswife and former Housekeeper (maid)	Female	74	Christian Pentecostal	Quintil III	High school complete	School teacher	Peasant
CL5	Student	Female	24	Agnostic	Quintil III	Studying technical medical career	Baker	Maid
CL6	School teacher	Male	32	Agnostic	Quintil III	University complete	Construction worker	Hoswife
CL7	Student	Female	23	Mapuche worldview	Quintil III	Studying social work at the university	Construction worker	Maid
FCL8 Focus group	6 Students	4 Men and 2 women	26 aprox	All of them Mapuche worldview, some were christians before	Quintil III	Studying at the university	Construction worker, baker	Maid, hoswife and peasant

I interviewed mainly educated Mapuches because of two core reasons. Firstly, to be able to compare them with Northeast Indians who are mainly young educated Northeasterners. Secondly, because the new appreciation of the Mapuche culture, has been especially strong among young educated Mapuches, who are also more politically involved and want to engage in the recognition of Mapuches as a valid but different actor. This recognition of the Mapuche culture also includes the validation of their worldview or spirituality, as spirituality for them is not separated from other ideas about the world.

Therefore, I chose 4 students; 2 of them are also social activists. I interviewed 1 school teacher, which is one of the most popular professions chosen by Mapuches since the fifties. In addition, I interviewed a woman with a low level of education, who works as a housekeeper (maid) - the most frequent job for female Mapuches and the one with the lowest income. This allowed me to compare with the more educated Mapuche interviewees. Another of my interviewees is a former housekeeper and a housewife of 74 years old, who brought an important point of view from an older generation. As it was shown in Chapter 4, the experience of older and younger generations of Mapuches is completely different and this point of view was crucial to understand some other processes and experiences. The focus group was conducted mainly with young Mapuche students in order to get a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of new appreciation of Mapuche culture¹⁷⁵.

Of my 7 interviewees, 3 declare to believe in the Mapuche worldview, even though in Chile only 0.9% of Mapuche people above 15 years old declare indigenous spirituality as their religion (National Statistics Institute, 2012). In the focus group, all of the participants declared to believe in the Mapuche spirituality or worldview. Of my interviewees, only 2 declare to be Christian and they also happen to be the older ones; the housewife and former housekeeper and the current housekeeper. Besides, two younger educated Mapuches consider themselves as agnostics. This coincides with current research who argue that new Mapuches generations are changing their life styles and world view, recovering old traditions and beliefs.

¹⁷⁵ 2 interviews were lost due to health reasons but the notes made during the interviews were kept and used as a valid analysis material.

3. Techniques of analysis

The analysis of the interviews and focus groups consisted mainly in a content analysis. For this process, I used the software for qualitative analysis in social science **Atlas ti**.

First, I defined some categories of analysis that emerged from the interviews and from the theoretical approach I was constructing. Afterwards, based on these categories of analysis, I went through each interview and focus group a second time and created more subcategories of analysis within each category. The categories of analysis were very similar for the case of Mapuches in Chile and Northeasterners in India, but due to the particularities of each, some different dimensions were also defined. All these categories constructed and analyzed later gave form to the section Mechanism that Produce and Reproduce the Illegitimacy of Citizenship for Northeasterners and Mapuches, where some similarities but also some differences were described in detail.

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